when describing the repulse of the blockers on the night of may 2, i essayed to bring forward the importance of the work done by the guard-ships, and now a word as to the destruction of the japanese battleship hatsuse. from the beginning of the blockade admiral loschinsky and the captain of the amur had studied the usual course of the enemy's ships, with a view to laying mines along it. this was impossible for some time, owing to the fog and the number of ships, especially destroyers, cruising about. at last, on may 14, during a council held at admiral witgeft's, at which loschinsky was present, the captain of the amur asked permission to set to work. loschinsky turned to witgeft, as his senior, and asked permission to start this important but risky work. 'as you like; it is entirely your business and you are responsible,' was the reply. loschinsky then turned to the captain of the amur. 'the enemy is not visible; there is scarcely any fog, and what there is will only help us. go, and god be with you! lay not less than fifty mines, and none nearer than ten miles.' the admiral himself did not go on this trip, as the meeting had only just begun and was a very important one. the amur left at three and returned after five, no one at all suspecting what an invaluable service to the besieged place she[pg 51] had done that day. at eleven o'clock next morning, in sight of the whole fortress, the japanese battleship hatsuse struck a mine and perished even more quickly than the petropalovsk; the fuji also was badly damaged. thus did the amur avenge the petropalovsk.

loschinsky and several others were at the moment with the naval commander-in-chief. as the tide was at the flood, those who were present advised witgeft to take advantage of the favourable conditions, and at once to send out three battleships, all five cruisers, and the destroyers to capture the damaged battleship and its escort of three. 'everything will be done in its own good time,' was the answer. even when balashoff, the master of the hunt,[11] hurried up to point out with great earnestness the necessity for the fleet putting out in order to make an end of the japanese on the sea, witgeft repeated: 'wait; everything will be done in its own good time.' only at 12.30 were orders given to the cruiser division and the destroyers to get up steam. the former could not put out at all, for, being a holiday, their crews were ashore, and it was two o'clock before the destroyers got under way. the novik, which happened by chance to be under steam, joined them. out they went at full speed, and, regardless of danger, tried to approach the wounded battleship in broad daylight—but the psychological moment had passed: the enemy had carried out repairs, and opened such a fire that it was impossible to get near, for every destroyer was valuable, and there was no object in throwing them away. they returned.

the garrison and inhabitants were disgusted. the navy had again made a mess of it. had witgeft been a man of decision, had he kept his fleet ready for battle, the picture would have been different. for had the fleet[pg 52] gone out at once, the fuji and the battleship and two cruisers with her would undoubtedly have been destroyed. this would have so weakened the enemy's fleet that the fight on july 11 would have had another result. all the same, the destruction of the hatsuse greatly influenced the defence afterwards, in particular during the strict blockade. from the moment she was destroyed not a single big ship except the nisshin and kasuga, which stood at long range, and threw some 10-inch shells on to cross hill, ventured near port arthur. the fortress was thus ensured from the dreadful prospect of being bombarded from the sea, and therefore all the big guns on the sea-front, from the 6-inch up to the 11-inch howitzers, were turned towards the land, and gave invaluable help in the land defence to the end.

after the blowing up of the hatsuse, the sweeping, blocking, and defence of the roads was made over to the officer in command of the cruiser division, and the hunt for mines went on day and night. the cruisers went out by turns at night into the outer roads. this almost invariably called forth an attack by the enemy's destroyers, which, covered by the confusion of the fight, laid mines. our destroyers were ordered by witgeft to lie in pairs in takhe and white wolf's bays. despite loschinsky's energetic protests that it was the duty of the fortress artillery and guard-ships to wage war against mine-layers, and not the work of the destroyers, which ran great risk of being blown up, witgeft was immovable. but the wisdom of loschinsky's advice was proved later, for on one dark, foggy night the lieutenant burakoff and the boevoy were rendered hors de combat by japanese torpedo-boats, which crept up to them unawares in takhe bay. in the middle of may witgeft gave orders that mines should be laid by junks near inchenzy and melankhe, which was done. when the amur was laying mines west[pg 53] of liao-tieh-shan she ran on to the mast of a sunken blocker, and damaged herself badly. it was impossible to dock her, as the only dock was occupied, and we had to make use of the bogatir and afterwards the reshitelny for this work.