after much hesitation, opposition, many quarrels, alterations, and frequent fresh orders, a column consisting of two regiments and three batteries was formed on may 15, on which evening it moved out of nangalin station to take the field. the advance-guard, under the general command of lieutenant-colonel laperoff, was composed of the battalions of the 13th regiment and the 3rd battery of the 4th east siberian rifle artillery brigade. at daybreak on the 16th the column got near the shanshihlipu heights, where, as soon as it was light, the advance-guard heard firing in front. this altogether puzzled laperoff, for he knew that none of our guns were ahead of him. it turned out that, owing to ignorance of the country, the main body had lost its way, got in front of its advance-guard, and had attempted to occupy these heights, without having reconnoitred them or even despatched scouts in advance. fock, commanding the 4th division, had trusted to luck, and we paid the price, especially the 3rd battery, under romanovsky, for the enemy had occupied the position before us, and opened a heavy fire on this battery as it came up, almost destroying it.

this battery was admirably supported by, and only got away out of action with the assistance of, the 'bullock[pg 55] battery,' under lieutenant sadikoff. on the initiative of this young officer, whom our gunners afterwards dubbed the 'guardian angel,' some old chinese guns had been collected and formed into a battery drawn by bullocks. laperoff did not know what to do with his advance-guard under the peculiar circumstances, for it was no longer in advance, he received no orders, and the fire was getting hotter. briefly, the result was that our force had, after heavy casualties, to retire to nangalin without effecting anything. as soon as the withdrawal began general fock who had hitherto been with the rear guard, suddenly turned up. when laperoff reported the mistake and its disastrous result, he began to excuse himself, saying that he had never given the orders, and complained of the inactivity and idleness of his chief of the staff. 'traitors! they are all traitors! they never obey my verbal orders; they only obey written ones.'

this fight showed the superiority of the enemy in artillery preparation, in fire control, and in knowledge of how to use the ground. after taking shanshihlipu they were able to mask their guns perfectly, but we, not understanding the value of ground, exposed ourselves needlessly, and suffered much. while they, after a tedious sea-voyage, victoriously advanced, we, on our own ground, with every chance of selecting and fortifying the best positions beforehand, only tried to occupy them after the enemy had already done it. so, after the first brush, we withdrew rapidly and with much loss to the celebrated but worthless position at kinchou.

after carefully watching everything that happened throughout the whole campaign, and thus getting to know and appreciate the russian soldier under service conditions, i have come to the conclusion that he was not only a hero, but a titan, and i must say i had never dreamed that he would exhibit the moral and physical[pg 56] strength that he always did. possessing such qualities, had he only received proper training, and been well led by the more senior of his officers, we would never have witnessed that pitiable slaughter—for which general fock, with the approval of the officer commanding the district—at kinchou was responsible. the first fight at shanshihlipu, its failure, and the rapid retreat had a disastrous effect on the moral of the men. they lost that confidence which counts for so much in war.

from the moment of the withdrawal from shanshihlipu up till may 26 the ground lying in front of kinchou was never properly reconnoitred. i would lay particular stress on this absence of any regular and well-organized intelligence work, because, operating as we did with our eyes shut, we always allowed the enemy, who was energetic, insistent, and cunning, to take us unawares.

and now to the kinchou position. the fortification of it was still being carried on solely by the labour of the 5th regiment, which gallant corps did not belong to general fock's division, and so was not spared. as has been already mentioned, colonel tretiakoff, commanding the regiment and nominally in command of the position, knew well that it was anything but ready even for a temporary defence. as before, so now, especially after shanshihlipu, he recognized the absolute necessity of masking the guns, which were standing exposed on the highest points, without any attempt at concealment. he fully realized that durable splinter-proofs, and not mere 'hen-coops,' were necessary, that the infantry trenches should be made deeper, and that all the communications should be greatly improved; but his representations still met with little success. though fock continued to talk much, he no longer said that he would destroy the whole japanese army here. on the contrary, he turned round and declared,[pg 57] in self-contradiction, that to attempt to hold the place long would be a crime.

the navy had given us two long-range canet guns, which had been got into position on the left flank, under the idea that the attack would develop there, which, as a matter of fact, it did. a great deal of labour and time had been expended on doing this, and the guns were splendidly masked. but a few days before the battle general fock insisted on their being dismounted, taken down, and dragged off to a position on the right. he was told that this flank on lime hill was not important, and that the enemy would never attempt to advance that side (which was justified by the event); but he would not reconsider his order. the guns were taken down; there was no time to remount them again, and so they fell, unused and uninjured, with two waggon-loads of ammunition, into the enemy's hands.

the batteries on this most important position, called in the highest military circles the 'key to arthur,' were commanded by lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, and the command of the artillery was given to a very young officer, one captain visokikh. he continually reported that he had not enough ammunition, asked for projectors to light up the kinchou valley, and begged for sand-bags, sleepers, rails, beams, etc., for thickening the cover and making the buildings splinter-proof, but without result. i know for a fact that his brother, commanding the 7th sector in port arthur, so well appreciated his helpless position that he, quite illegally, upon his own authority, sent ammunition to him. tretiakoff, finding that even st?ssel would do nothing to assist him, at last went direct to smirnoff, and telling him everything, asked his help. the latter did everything that he was able so as to delay the fall of kinchou, if only for a few days; but what he could do was little, for his powers did not[pg 58] extend beyond the fortress glacis. when some of the necessary materials did arrive, the men worked like slaves to improve the defences, the fortress artillerymen assisting the men of the 5th regiment, under the supervision of colonel tretiakoff and captain schwartz. but it was too late.

now, shortly before the battle the state of affairs in the district was, to put it mildly, slightly mixed. if the staff issued an order, the general, instead of at once carrying it out, wrote long-winded memoranda and proceeded to do the opposite. trains stood in the stations ready to start day and night, and, as can be seen from the orders, the wretched 15th regiment spent its time entraining and detraining, being taken out one day and brought back the next. the authorities seemed to have lost their heads, and orders were only issued to be at once cancelled. the day before the battle was a nightmare of confusion: no one knew what was being done or why it was done. men were worn out by being 'messed about' uselessly from one place to another, and were never long enough in any place to get to know it. the work on the position which had for a short time been proceeding again had to cease for want of materials. for instance, the frontal battery on lime hill, under the command of lieutenant solomonoff, to a certain degree important as being able to fire on the approaches to the right flank, was armed with four old chinese guns. it had no traverses, and no bullet-proof shelter for the gunners or ammunition, and was not connected by telephone with the commandant.

this was the state of the kinchou position.

in port arthur, after the viceroy's departure and the assumption of command of the fleet by witgeft, there was a lull in naval operations; but rapid progress was being made with the repairing of the lame ducks. the[pg 59] battleships and cruisers—too precious to use—lay motionless in the inner roads, the destroyers, gunboats, and the novik were alone active. the latter were kept with steam up, and were always cruising about, protecting the mine-trawlers, laying mines, or doing short or long reconnaissances, which were called by the men 'adventures'—a very suitable name. complete ignorance of the coast generally, pointless tasks, lack of speed, bad engines, absence of well-thought-out plans, a numerous, keen, and powerful enemy, who always operated systematically and cleverly, rendered these expeditions abortive of any result except fatigue, waste of coal, and loss of vessels.

having served all his time ashore, witgeft naturally could not give an example of useful activity; moreover, the very weak line he took with junior officers undoubtedly greatly undermined his own authority and naval discipline generally. the attitude of the younger officers towards him and other seniors was deplorable, and noticeable even to outsiders; the juniors not only saw the defects, and the incompetence of their seniors, but they publicly criticized them. at the same time, a great gulf grew between army and navy, and scarcely a day passed without a conflict between the officers of the two services; they insulted each other in the streets. and the position of the sailors was a difficult one, because they themselves were not to blame: it was not their fault that they did little cruising and were generally in port in peace-time; that they had not been taught how to shoot and know their ships; that the only thing required of them was spittle and polish. like the infantry, the naval officers were not trained for war.

general st?ssel, instead of endeavouring to get the two services to pull together, made matters worse, and in his effort to gain personal popularity amongst the younger army officers did not even refrain from making fun of the[pg 60] officer commanding the fleet. however, later on, when soldiers and sailors fought together and were struck down side by side in the trenches, all differences vanished—men recognized men.

on may 20 we had another sea attack, carried out by seven ships and two destroyers. it lasted from shortly after midnight to 2 a.m. the result was immaterial.