on the 5th the viceroy left for mukden, having handed over the command of the fleet to rear-admiral witgeft. a worse choice could not have been made. that witgeft expiated his shortcomings as a fleet commander by his gallant death in the execution of his duty does not alter the fact that it was wrong to appoint a shore admiral to the command of a fleet before which lay such a tremendous task. the main duty of the fleet in port arthur was to co-operate with the army and to prevent a landing on the peninsula. this was entirely appreciated by smirnoff and makharoff, who worked together and settled many questions in regard to future combined operations. fate, however, decided against their execution, for smirnoff became subordinate to st?ssel, and makharoff was struck off the roll of the living.

the enemy, who had landed at petsiwo without opposition, attacked on the 6th our weak advanced posts of frontier guards and compelled them to retire, after cutting the railway near the station of pulienten. telegram after telegram came in urging energetic measures. even the station-master at kinchou made a report as to the landing, but was reprimanded, and ordered not to talk nonsense, for st?ssel saw no urgency. the only opposition to the enemy's disembarkation was made by about fifty[pg 45] scouts of the frontier guard, under the command of lieutenant sirotko, who, after making an obstinate resistance, were obliged to withdraw before the enemy's advanced troops, which were nearly twenty times as strong. although everything was ready at the station of nangalin for the despatch of a train full of reserves, it was not sent, and the frontier guards were not reinforced.

on may 8 the last train, loaded with ammunition, came in from the north. she brought the news that north of pulienten the telegraph had been destroyed and the railway damaged by the frontier guards retiring to wafangtien. what some had known must happen, but of which others had doubted the possibility, did happen—port arthur was actually cut off, and henceforth upon its garrison lay the serious task of attracting and retaining a whole army, and so decreasing the enemy's concentration against our forces in the north.

the evacuation of dalny is a good example of the ill-informed and over-centralized control of our general officer commanding the district. the peaceful inhabitants of this town were first disturbed on the 3rd and 5th of may by the news of the enemy's landing at petsiwo. they began to flee, but only a few got away. on the 6th the railway was cut, and steps were taken to repair it; but st?ssel's order, no. 168, of may 8—

'the inhabitants of dalny and talienwan are to remain quietly in their houses, as they are not in the least in danger from the enemy'—

somehow did not produce the expected feeling of security. afterwards, on the 11th, when the rail had been again cut, a train full of civilians was, by st?ssel's permission, sent off. it was met by the enemy, fired on, and sent back to dalny.

now that we were isolated, the blockade by sea became[pg 46] stricter, while to the north the disembarkation of the besieging army was permitted to take place without opposition. the second phase of the military operations in the kwantun peninsula had commenced, for we were now absolutely dependent on our own resources. this is my excuse for again referring to the vital question of supply. what had been done on the whole? from february 8 till may 8 port arthur had been connected by rail with siberia, and only blockaded by sea in a half-hearted manner, and during that time all necessaries could have been poured into the town. nevertheless, now that we were cut off, we found ourselves very badly off for provisions. it had evidently been forgotten that, for a successful defence of a fortress one of the chief essentials, in addition to troops, guns, and ammunition, is an ample supply of food and a rational organization of the sanitary department. it is necessary to emphasize these points in order to show up all the factors which led to port arthur's fall. by the orders published, which i do not quote, it is clear that even in may some anxiety was felt by the authorities, especially the commandant, as to the food-supply. from the beginning of that month the troops were put on short rations. when one considers the exceptional conditions of service and the continued arduous work carried on at high pressure in the fortress and district, it appears that, to last out, the men should rather have had increased rations. but it could not be done, and they had to carry on for eight months on insufficient food. yet, though the rail had not been used as it might have been to bring in food, that mountain of packing-cases near the station showed that it had not been idle. this mound, which served as a landmark—a sort of a triumphal arch by the entrance to the old town—was composed entirely of—vodka! we might lack food in arthur, but never drink. can a more hopeless state of[pg 47] things be imagined? for of all places in the world where drink can do harm, a fortress full of half-nourished men is the worst. st?ssel's efforts to repress drunkenness were beyond praise, but what could he do? the sale of spirituous liquor was forbidden in all shops, stores, or public-houses; but it could always be got for money, and all drank what they wanted to. it was there.

all we knew of the enemy was that they continued to advance undisturbed along the mandarin road towards kinchou. on the kinchou position everything was quiet. work was being carried on by colonel tretiakoff alone with the regiment under his command. general fock occasionally paid the place a visit, went round the works, joked with the soldiers, gossiped with the officers, and went off to dalny. the one point he insisted on was the arming of the right flank and the construction of a battery on lime hill. general st?ssel sat in port arthur, and kept all in a continual state of astonishment by his orders. in the fortress we had, up to now, placed a good deal of confidence in the kinchou position, for general st?ssel had told every one that the japanese would never be allowed to come beyond it, and few except the japanese knew what was going to happen. on may 10 we read the following order:

'on account of the possible arrival (from kinchou) of the whole of the 4th east siberian rifle division, the commandant will make arrangements for the building of field-ovens.'

our commander, without even having seen the enemy, was already looking behind him! to many it was now evident that the stronghold at kinchou was not particularly to be relied on, and alarming rumours began to be circulated about it. every one at once declared that as a position it was beneath contempt, but the officer commanding the[pg 48] district paid no regard to such things, and continued to publish weighty orders, such as that of may 12:

'i am always meeting private soldiers, particularly those of the 7th reserve battalion, wearing felt boots. this is irregular, and it would be better that skins should be bought at the butchers' and cured.'

as a detail, the men wore felt boots because during the whole siege they had nothing else, because for six years the fortress had never been supplied with a sufficient quantity of leather boots.

up to the present no serious steps had been taken at kinchou; only a few weak battalions had been thrown forward in advance of the position. that was the real state of affairs, though other information was invented for the inhabitants. at this time men who knew the ground and could scout well, like some of the frontier guards, were invaluable, and yet they were scarcely ever employed. for some reason they did not find favour in the eyes of the generals. every one knew the splendid qualities of these frontier guards, but they were ignored till they came under the command of kondratenko. even when the enemy advanced and seized the position near shanshihlipu we did nothing. in dalny fock did the 'dictator'; in arthur we continued to write orders. for instance, no. 187:

'to-day, near the church, i met two officers with a lady; she was wearing an officer's rifle forage-cap. it appears that one of the officers was lieutenant erben, and the lady his wife. i do not think that i need dwell upon how out of place it seems for one of the female sex to wear a military cap with a cockade, when even retired officers and reserves are not allowed by regulation to wear them.'

in dalny there were numerous buildings, docks, and the most splendid breakwaters running out into the sea for a distance of one and a half miles, but nothing had so far[pg 49] been done to destroy them in the event of the town being abandoned. it was only by an order of may 14 that a committee was appointed to settle which of the larger buildings should be destroyed. the result was that the japanese eventually found the docks and quays untouched, and of the greatest service to them when they used that place as a base. on the 14th also the fact that the enemy had landed in force at petsiwo was first mentioned in orders. this news was twice repeated in the paper—once as an official communiqué upon the doings of fock's troops, and again as a true account of the reconnaissance. as a matter of fact, they had by this time occupied the village of shanshihlipu, but of this the staffs of both generals st?ssel and fock were in complete ignorance till the fight of may 16. that they did not know of it is proved by the fact that the 3rd battery of the 4th east siberian rifle artillery brigade, on occupying the southern heights at shanshihlipu, was almost blown out of existence by the enemy's artillery, which had already, somewhat earlier, taken up a position on the northern hills opposite. on my asking the colonel how this had happened, he said:

'everything was in such a muddle that it is a wonder any of us are alive to tell the tale. st?ssel gave one order and fock another—every hour brought fresh instructions.'

fock, who had always declared that kinchou was quite unassailable, seeing that the enemy had landed and were advancing in earnest to the attack, stated publicly that to give battle at kinchou would be a crime, that a division there would be merely destroyed. the 15th and 16th east siberian rifle regiments were hurriedly entrained, and moved backwards and forwards, first to dalny and then back to port arthur. the confusion boded ill.