the previous campaign had practically terminated with the french evacuation of portugal. only almeida and badajoz on and about the frontier line were held, and blocked an advance eastward into spain; but beyond the former in that direction lay the stronger fortress of ciudad rodrigo. the two first were besieged or blockaded, by spencer at the former, and beresford at the latter, wellington lending aid to either wing as required; and both sieges brought on a battle, that in the north, fuentes d’onoro, where wellington commanded, and albuhera in the south, where beresford had charge.

massena, with 40,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 36 guns, moved towards almeida, and was met by wellington, with a force of 32,000 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and 42 guns, at fuentes d’onoro, but the portuguese were of little value. supplies had as usual been deficient, and ammunition was wanting.

the battle presents few features of professional interest. as the light division fell back before the advancing french, there was a skirmish at gallegos on the 2nd may, and at fuentes d’onoro on the 3rd may; but the real battle there was not fought until the 5th, and was of a very desperate character. to say the least, it was indecisive, though the french claim the victory, as, though they did not themselves advance, wellington retired to re-form. but massena neither raised the siege of almeida, nor advanced farther into portugal. it is rather in personal incidents that this “soldiers’ battle” is noteworthy. here it was that the tactical192 conditions of artillery were reversed, and the guns charged through a french column. “a great commotion was observed in their main body; men and horses were seen to close, with confusion and tumult, towards one point, where a thick dust and loud cries, and the sparkling of blades and the flashing of pistols, indicated some extraordinary occurrence. suddenly the multitude became violently agitated, an english shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent asunder, and norman ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his battery; his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low and pointed weapons in desperate career.”40

here, too, the connaught rangers, stigmatised by picton, because of their habit of plundering, as “the greatest blackguards in the army,” drove the french out of fuentes d’onoro with terrible loss, in a gallant charge which even picton admired. “well done, brave 88th,” he exclaimed, as they returned; and in reply to the remark made by some of the men, “are we the greatest blackguards in the army now?” responded with a smile, “no, no! you are brave and gallant soldiers; this day has redeemed your character.” besides the 88th, the 14th hussars and 16th lancers, the 24th, 42nd, 43rd, 45th, 51st, 52nd, 60th, 71st, 74th, 79th, 83rd, 85th, 92nd, and rifle brigade shared in the glories of the day. shortly afterwards, bremner evacuated almeida without being opposed by the 2nd queen’s, whose regimental badge is the paschal lamb, or the 4th king’s own, whose badge is the lion, and hence arose the following doggerel, the authorship of which is unknown:—

“the ‘lambs’ were asleep, the ‘lions’ were at play, the eagle spread his wings and ’tween them flew away.”

the battle led to the fall of massena, who was recalled to france, and marmont took his place in command of the193 northern army. ten days after fuentes d’onoro, the news reached wellington of soult’s advance against beresford; but though he started to reinforce him with the 3rd and 7th divisions, he was not in time to share in the bloodiest battle of the whole of the peninsula, that of albuhera, in which beresford, with the spanish troops under blake and castanos, fought to cover his siege of badajoz, with the grave anxiety lest defeat should lead to a fresh invasion of portugal. out of the 30,000 men which composed the allied force, but 7000 were british, and these were the 3rd dragoon guards, the 3rd, 7th, 23rd, 28th, 29th, 31st, 34th, 39th, 48th, 57th, 60th, and 66th regiments; and of them only 1800 men were unwounded when the fire ceased.

the spaniards on the right were first attacked, and soon gave way, and for the rest of this short four hours’ fight, the brunt of battle lay with the british contingent. the men behaved with valour extraordinary even in those days of hard, continuous fighting; and there was heavy need for it. the allied right was practically en l’air, with sufficient cover close to a dominating hill, which was not held, to make a flank attack easy. against this girard, with the 5th corps and latour-maubourg’s cavalry, were early moved.

here, when the spanish broke, was moved colborne’s division, one brigade of which had three of its regiments, the 3rd, 66th, and 48th, almost destroyed, and only the 31st had time to form square. there was bitter fighting, round the colours of the buffs especially, and confusion reigned supreme for a moment in the right wing. but soon the 29th pressed into the fight, and on them the spaniards somewhat rallied. as their colonel, duckworth, fell, he cried, “die hard, my men, die hard!” whence comes their honoured nickname of the “die-hards.” richly they deserved it, for out of 25 officers 22 fell, of 570 rank and file 425 were killed or wounded, and the king’s colour bore thirty bullet wounds.41

the battle was almost lost when colonel hardinge on his own responsibility called up cole’s brigades, one of which194 was composed of the 7th and 23rd fusilier regiments, and thrust him into the confused fight on the right, while allen turned round to regain albuhera, which had been abandoned. the fresh reinforcements were irresistible, though the fire was terrible. “the fusilier battalion, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships; but, suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the british soldier fights. in vain did soult with voice and gesture animate his frenchmen, in vain did the hardiest veterans break from the crowded columns and sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and, fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen, hovering on the flank, threatened to charge the advancing line. nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. no sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns on their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as, slowly, and with a horrid carnage, it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. in vain did the french reserves mix with the struggling multitude to sustain the fight, their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion; and the mighty mass, breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep.”

the losses of individual regiments were enormous. in the 23rd so many officers had fallen that corporal robinson brought his captain’s company out of action; and the 57th left on the field 23 officers and 400 men out of a total of 570. for this it bears the laurel wreath, only carried by the six minden regiments.

so victory remained with the allies, though little aid had been given by the spaniards. the french retreated on seville in fair order, having captured several colours, one195 gun, and some prisoners. albuhera was essentially a soldiers’ battle. it was won by sheer hard fighting.

the army now turned to renew the siege of badajoz, the capture of which, as well as ciudad, was essential for further offensive operations. but though several daring efforts were made to storm the breaches made, the siege had to be raised on the approach of the combined forces of marmont and soult.

after much man?uvring, marching, and counter-marching on both sides, during which, at the brilliant little affair of el bodon, the 5th charged the french cavalry with fire and bayonet; and at arroyo des molinos, where girard was surprised by hill, who, after a forced march, made a night attack, and the 92nd stormed the village to the somewhat appropriate tune of “hey, johnny cope, are ye waukin’ yet.” the brilliant action resulted in the dispersal of the corps, with the loss of all its artillery, baggage, and military chest, at a cost of but a few killed and wounded; but though the 9th and 13th light dragoons, as well as the 92nd, 50th, 71st, and 34th took part in the action, only the standards of the last-named regiment bear the name of arroyo des molinos, the sole case of a battle not a general action being inscribed on the colours. for capturing the 34th battalion of french infantry there, the 34th long wore a red and white pompon; and it is said, when the french battalion surrendered, the french officers embraced their english confrères with the words, “ah, messieurs, nous sommes des frères, nous sommes du trente-quatrième régiment tous deux. vous êtes des braves. les anglais se battent toujours avec loyauté et traitent bien leurs prisonniers.”

there were skirmishes elsewhere, as at tarifa, where the 47th, 87th, and 95th regiments successively defended the breach, and where the 13th light dragoons, the 28th, 34th, 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments were engaged; but this was only preparatory to the siege of ciudad rodrigo and badajoz, both of which were stormed, and fell. their capture, with the seizure of the bridge of alcantara (which improved the communications) and the destruction of that of196 almanza (which severed the direct communication between marmont and soult), finally opened the doorway into spain. in the attack on ciudad the 5th, 43rd, 45th, 52nd, 60th, 74th, 77th, 83rd, 88th, 94th, and rifle brigade shared, and the men plunged into wild excesses in the sack which followed, and which the officers seemed powerless to check. it cost the allies a total loss of 1702, including crawford of the light division, who was killed, while colborne, gurwood (who afterwards edited the wellington despatches), and major george napier, all of the 52nd, were wounded. but marmont’s siege train was captured.

at badajoz, whither wellington had proceeded after fuentes, curiously enough the garrison was never summoned to surrender—an omission for which many french writers unreservedly blame him, as being an act contrary to the usages of war, and savouring of a feeling of revenge. be that as it may, the place was invested on the 17th march, while hill covered the siege against soult, and on the 7th april was stormed, with the terrible loss of nearly 5000 men. the defence was most gallant and desperate. for two hours the storming column tried in vain to mount the principal breach, defended by mines, chevaux de frise of sword-blades, and a close fire of musketry, grape, and hand-grenades, and then fell back sullenly to re-form. but, as in other cases, though this the “real attack” had failed, the “false attack” had succeeded, and the 4th, followed by other regiments, penetrated into the town by escalade. so the place surrendered, and its fall was succeeded by a butchery more dreadful than that of ciudad. men were “literally drowned in brandy.” soldiers and camp—followers behaved equally disgracefully. for two days and nights there seems to have been no check to the horrors. there was nothing but “shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder. shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded through the town.”

197 the plan of the siege itself was by no means a brilliant effort of genius, and the cost in human life serious. but for the fortunate action of the 4th, the storming column must have retired with a loss of 3500 men, having effected nothing. the only excuse for the storm of so strong a place after so brief and imperfect a siege was the necessity for breaking open this doorway into spain. the end was believed at the time to have justified the means, no matter how horrible. the best excuse is, that the british army was too weak to mask it, dared not delay for a prolonged siege, which might have led to a french concentration in overwhelming numbers, and could not pass it by. it was the old argument of necessity. the regiments who shared in the honours and dishonours of badajoz were the 4th, 5th, 7th, 23rd, 27th, 30th, 38th, 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 48th, 52nd, 60th, 74th, 77th, 83rd, 88th, 94th, and rifle brigade.

the affairs of almanza and alcantara have been already referred to, and other means were now taken to distract the attention of the french. the guerillas, more and more exasperated, renewed their efforts at annoyance, and never were they more successful. it is even said it took some thousands of men to escort a simple despatch! under cover of all this, wellington moved on salamanca, and after a brief delay captured the forts the french had erected to guard the town, and pushed forward to the douro, behind which marmont had retired, holding all the passages. then came a series of brilliant man?uvres, in which the french general once marched fifty miles without a check, and finally sought to turn the allied right, so as to seize the road to ciudad rodrigo. both armies for many hours marched parallel to, and within sight of, one another, and so marked was the early success of the french in this man?uvring, that on the 21st, wellington had more than half decided to retreat. but the next day fortune favoured him. marmont, in his anxiety to close the ciudad road, overreached himself, the left wing got separated from the right, and wellington, seizing the opportunity, poured in at the gap, and in forty minutes the french198 left wing was badly beaten; and but that the spanish had abandoned the guard of the alba ford, the whole army must have been to all intents and purposes destroyed. many regiments, both of horse and foot, shared in the glories of the battle of salamanca. it was the most skilful of any of wellington’s victories, as showing a tactical appreciation of the situation, which is often not so apparent elsewhere. he understood the selection of a good position, and how to encourage the fighting power of his men, to which, in most cases, the success of his battle may be chiefly attributed. at salamanca, though he behaved with skill, the adversaries’ mistake was so glaring as to be apparent to a general of far meaner capacity.

the troops engaged had been the 5th dragoon guards, the 3rd, 11th, 14th, and 16th light cavalry regiments, and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 36th, 38th, 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 48th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 58th, 60th, 61st, 68th, 74th, 79th, 83rd, 88th, 94th, and rifle brigade. the result of the operations so far was, that marmont, with 42,000 men and 74 guns, had, in twelve days, marched 200 miles, fought three combats and one general action, and had lost 1 marshal, 7 generals, and 12,500 men, with 2 eagles, several colours, and 12 guns.

battle of salamanca 22nd july 1812

pursuing clauset’s rearguard through valladolid, which fell back on burgos, to be watched by clinton, the victorious general entered madrid in triumph, and there his temporary success suffered a check. there was the usual complaint; want of supplies and want of cash. the “troops are now five months in arrears,” he writes, “and we are in debt in all parts of the country.” clauset, reorganised, had reoccupied valladolid, and wellington decided on turning against him, and, if possible, capturing burgos. but the preparations were notoriously meagre, the defence bold; so that after five assaults the attempt was abandoned, and wellington was compelled to once more retreat to portugal. the army had become greatly demoralised by the failure of the burgos siege. while the assaults had failed, all the199 sorties had been more or less successful. there were skirmishes in the retreat, but the conduct of the troops was, with the general exception of the guards and the light division, bad. as in moore’s retreat, drunkenness prevailed. at torquemada 12,000 men were for a time useless. doubtless the hardships were severe. “sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing on wet ground, in the rain, for two hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. their clothes were seldom dry for six hours together, and during the latter part of the retreat continually wet; sometimes they were bivouacked in a swamp when better ground was near, they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat, and had then no means of dressing it. the camp kettles had been sent on, or by some error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had foundered on the way, and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with wet materials, and under a heavy rain.”42

meanwhile, the french were concentrating in superior numbers; and, with more and more indiscipline and suffering, the army, with a loss of 9000 men and much baggage, finally encamped exhausted under the walls of ciudad rodrigo.

the first serious attempt to reconquer spain had failed, save for the moral effect of the occupation of madrid, the defeat of the french at salamanca, and the restriction of the french armies now to the northern part of spain. it was, none the less, the beginning of the end.

that end, the “deliverance of spain,” dawned in the early days of 1813, when all the allied armies were reorganised, and had recovered their tone.

napoleon, too, was no longer in a position to help the armies whose opponents were bleeding his empire to death. russia first, and then united europe, were keeping his hands far too full to attend to a danger almost nearer home. the last french campaign in the peninsula was like that in central europe in the same year, 1813, a campaign of200 despair. the numbers on both sides were more equal than they had ever been. the allies had learned in the bitter school of dreadful experience, and were better organised and somewhat more homogeneous and concentrated than their opponents.

the general plan of wellington’s last campaign here was to directly threaten the french communications with france. it will be remembered that there were but two real lines of invasion from that country, one at the east, the other at the west of the pyrenees. so, threatening the french right, the strong line of the douro, behind which the french army lay, was turned at toro. they fell back behind burgos, therefore, and then behind the line of the ebro. this, again, was turned at its upper reaches by a most difficult march. “neither,” says napier, “the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the rocks retarded even the march of the artillery—where horses could not draw, men hauled; when the wheels would not roll, the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes—six days they toiled unceasingly, and on the seventh (that is, 20th june), they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of vittoria.”

* * * * *

so the battle area of vittoria was reached, and joseph stood to fight on a front parallel to his line of retreat on bayonne. as wellington had been strategically turning the right of the general line of defence so far, so in the battle he tactically continued the same idea, and the result was complete. “never,” says napier, “was an army more hardly used by its commander, and never was a victory more complete”; while general gazan writes that the french “lost all their equipage, all their guns, all their treasure, all their papers, so that no man could prove even how much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were barefooted.”

private 20th regt 1812.

the following regiments were engaged in the battle:—3rd and 5th dragoon guards, 3rd, 14th, 15th, 16th, 1st,201 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 28th, 31st, 38th, 39th, 40th, 43rd, 45th, 47th, 48th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 66th, 68th, 74th, 79th, 83rd, and 84th.

the deliverance of spain was nearly complete. only the extreme north-west of spain and that close to the frontier was left to joseph, erstwhile king of all spain. even this was soon abandoned. joseph fell back by pampeluna, and this, with san sebastian, was blockaded. the former eventually capitulated, and the latter, which was to furnish a new base of operations for wellington, now too far from portugal to use his former base, was stormed by the 1st, 4th, 9th, 38th, 47th, and 59th, and fell. desperate as was the gallantry of the troops, especially of the 52nd, the other side of the picture showed horrors and utter indiscipline, far worse even than those which disgraced the storm of previous sieges. the soldiery perpetrated villainies which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. at ciudad rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at badajoz lust and murder were added to rapine and drunkenness; but at san sebastian the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes.43

after sundry operations, including the series of extraordinary combats classed as the “battles of the pyrenees,” in which the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 11th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 28th, 31st, 34th, 36th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 45th, 48th, 50th, 51st, 53rd, 57th, 58th, 60th, 61st, 66th, 68th, 71st, 74th, and 79th took part, the lines of the bidassoa, nivelle, and nive were successively forced. in these actions the above regiments took part, as well as the 5th, 9th, 20th, 32nd, 38th, 43rd, 46th, 52nd, 62nd, 82nd, 83rd, 87th, 88th, 91st, 94th, 84th, 85th, and rifle brigade and 16th lancers.

finally, after further actions at bayonne and the passage of the adour, the last important battles took place at orthez and toulouse, and the long war in the south was practically at an end.

202 at orthez were the 14th hussars, and the 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 28th, 31st, 32nd, 34th, 36th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 45th, 48th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 58th, 60th, 61st, 66th, 68th, 71st, 74th, 82nd, 83rd, 87th, 88th, 91st, 92nd, 94th, and rifle brigade. there had been, in addition, minor actions at bordeaux and bayonne, and at the latter place war rockets were used for the first time in the british army; but these actions effected little, and were the last expiring struggles of the peninsular war. for a time, at least, there was peace in europe.

the british marched across france, and embarked for england and america. the spanish and portuguese armies retired to their respective territories, and the french armies dispersed over france. the now fully established standing army of great britain had, notwithstanding the indiscipline and violence that at times unfortunately characterised its fighting, earned a reputation which it has never lost. its undaunted courage had broken down altogether the civilian fear of an army. it was for the future only to be regarded economically or financially, not as a possible danger to the public peace. there was scarcely a family, hardly a village throughout the land which had not to mourn, but mourn with pride, the loss of some of its sons. it had earned the respect of foe as well as friend. it had dauntlessly shown that englishmen were not afraid to die. this spirit is touchingly referred to by thorburn in some poetry relating to a drummer boy of the 43rd, a regiment that, now linked with the 52nd, and, like it, in peninsular days a component part of the famous light division, distinguished itself from the coa to the pyrenees. as the story is told, it is that of an old grenadier who, in the rush of the charge which then formed the most important element in battle, as fire and the bullet do now, was wounded, but struggled on to find in his way

203

“’twas a little drummer boy, with his side torn terribly with shot; but still he feebly beat his drum, as though the wound were not.

but when the mameluke’s wild horse burst with a scream and cry, he said, ‘o men of the forty-third, teach me the way to die.’”

and so the story goes on to tell how the wounded grenadier, with a bullet in his hip, pressed on into the fight, to fall himself later. the story is, of course, probably mythical, but there is a certain ring in it that shows the spirit of those old fighting days.

equally mythical is that of the drummer boy and sergeant matcham in the ingoldsby “legend of salisbury plain,” where “one mr. jones,” hearing certain groans, states—

“that he followed the moans, and, led by their tones, found a raven a-picking a drummer boy’s bones! then the colonel wrote word, from the king’s forty-third, that the story was certainly true that they heard.”

it must not be imagined that the final result of the war on the french side was other than creditable in the highest degree to soult. no one recognises this more than napier, and his eulogy is worth quoting.

“vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can justly deny him. in this celebrated campaign of nine months, although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places, and entrenched five great camps with such works as marius himself would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations, and, either attacking or defending, delivered twenty-four battles and combats. defeated in all, he fought the last as fiercely as the first; remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing the struggle, when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. these efforts were fruitless, because suchet renounced him; because the people of the south were apathetic, and fortune was adverse;204 because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable troops.”

wellington, patient under difficulties, had fully succeeded in his task of freeing the peninsula from french domination. and if at salamanca he showed a tactical skill which stands out in contrast to some of his other victories, the final campaign of vittoria shows a strategical grasp which is not, in the opinion of foreign experts in the art of war, so brilliantly apparent in the years before 1813–14. but one thing may be mentioned, of which many are now ignorant. a common cry among the french throughout the prolonged war was the cruelty with which their prisoners in england were treated. the charge embittered the already bitter contest, and though foreign nations were little better than ourselves, if at all, there was more than a sub-stratum of truth in what was openly proclaimed in france.

however much abuse may have been lavished on france in the time past, and which lives to our shame and sorrow below the surface even now, this is one of the evil heritages of that war-stricken time. this is the recorded story of how the prisoners were treated: “they were consigned in huge batches, like so many convicts, to the hulks at chatham and portsmouth, and to inland prisons at dartmoor and in some rural districts of scotland. the history of the hulks is one simple tissue of horrors. the government had no active wish to maltreat its prisoners, but the officials placed in authority over them were often rude, and oftener drunken, and did not understand the character of their guests. worse than that, they did not care about such understanding; and at the time it was rather patriotic than otherwise to detest a frenchman. the prisoners were not systematically starved, but they were fed as men-of-war’s men were then victualled—on weevilly biscuit, salt junk, and jury rum. they had no means of cooking their food in their own fashion; they were pent-up between the decks of old vessels, all but deprived of exercise, and denied the commonest appliances of cleanliness. so they had the scurvy, dysentery, typhus, and a host of other ailments; now and then an epidemic would break out205 among them, and they would die like sheep afflicted by the rot. the most horrible profligacy was rampant on board those floating pandemoniums. the prisoners had nothing whatever to do, and vast numbers of them belonged to the lowest and most ignorant classes. so they swore and gambled, they quarrelled and fought; scarcely a week passed in which some fatal duel did not take place among them. such were the hulks,—the dreaded pontons,—descriptions of which, not much overcharged, were drawn up by the order of napoleon, and distributed among the french peasantry, in order to inflame their minds against the english.”

can one wonder at the revengeful feeling that lived afterwards? so thackeray thought, in telling with marvellous brilliancy the fictional story of that 17th of june in brussels, when “the cannon of waterloo began to roar,” when “from morning until past sunset” the sound never ceased, and “it was dark when the cannonading stopped all of a sudden.

“all of us have read of what occurred during that interval. the tale is in every englishman’s mouth; and you and i who were children when the great battle was won and lost, are never tired of hearing and recounting the history of that famous action. its remembrance rankles still in the bosoms of millions of the countrymen of those brave men who lost the day. they pant for an opportunity of revenging that humiliation; and if a contest, ending in a victory on their part, should ensue, elating them in their turn, and leaving the cursed legacy of hatred and rage behind to us, there is no end to the so-called glory and shame, and to the alternation of successful and unsuccessful murder, in which two high-spirited nations might engage. centuries hence we frenchmen and englishmen might be boasting and killing each other still, carrying out bravely the devil’s code of honour.” no one who lives now but must most fervently hope that the remembrance of that evil heritage may be buried so deep as never to rise again!