the peninsular campaigns had, by the process of constantly “pegging away,” to use abraham lincoln’s expression during the american civil war, resulted in sapping the strength of france, and led to the emperor’s deposition. perhaps it was not the main cause of his fall after all; but it was the one open wound that bled the french to death, when all other districts of europe were in awe-full peace. the kingdoms and empires of europe had either successively fallen, or been cowed by the mighty genius of napoleon. spain and portugal, almost the least of these european peoples, had been the only nations who continuously and persistently stood out against his usurpation. it is more than probable that, without england’s aid, even their patriotic stubbornness might have broken down. they wanted active help, practical sympathy, and money. all these england provided, taking the fact that she was not then very rich and populous, without stint. how her efforts to aid in the great aim of crushing the dominance of france, doubtless through motives that were based on natural and national selfishness, were responded to, the whole of the history of the peninsular war clearly shows. there were only barren honours to the chiefs, utter and cruel ingratitude throughout to the men who, ill fed and scornfully treated, fought the battles of spanish generals and soldiers, who were hardly worth fighting with or for. omit england’s part in the great peninsular struggle, and there is scarcely a single case in which the spanish or the portuguese either fought a good fight or played a straight game. in both207 countries france had friends, and in both countries, therefore, were traitors to their own cause, and still more to that of their british allies.
whatever was the result of the hard work and fighting in the peninsula from 1808 to 1814, the british certainly owe no debt of gratitude to either spain or portugal. the utter ingratitude of both nations towards the insular power who alone of all the nations of europe gave them practical help, is more than apparent. the iberian peninsula was, and is, full of the graves of brave men who fought to save a country that had not the intelligence to save itself. its coffers were filled with hard-earned british gold, which they had not the grace to acknowledge.
but the long war did one thing. it trained british officers and british soldiers to fight the last great fight in europe for many a year.
though the army at waterloo contained but a proportion of the peninsular veterans, the glory of the work they had done, the conviction of their own military masterfulness, the memory of what the army had been there, was a great factor in the final struggle against the greatest military power in europe, when that final struggle came.
the teaching and the glory of the peninsula made raw soldiers fight at quatre bras and waterloo as brave men should. peninsular victories had wiped out the remembrance of many years of either only partial success or actual defeat, and had carried the enthusiastic morale all armies should have back to the best days of blenheim and ramilies.
thus things were when the return from elba was devised, and, “with the violets in the spring,” napoleon returned to france. at the moment of his return the french army numbered in round numbers about 150,000 men, and this he speedily increased to 200,000, a small body to meet the huge masses that were putting themselves in motion for his destruction. there were the russians about poland, numbering 280,000; the austrians were 250,000 strong; prussia alone could furnish 200,000 men; and, in addition, there208 were the minor german states, as well as portugal and spain. holland and belgium were not to be firmly reckoned on in case of disaster, but, stiffened by the british and prussians, they might find it difficult to avoid casting in their lot with the other nations, and even assume an enthusiasm that possibly was only superficial. to stand, centrally situated, on the defensive, was but to invite disaster; and the time required for the close concentration of the enormous allied mass could be calculated with tolerable certainty, though railways were not. for a time at least, therefore, the nations east of the rhine could be disregarded, but those north of the sambre came under a different category. they were closer, and therefore within striking distance. they could not only be got at quickly, and possibly be defeated, before the eastern armies could arrive to their assistance, but in case the emperor felt compelled to move towards the rhine, they might assail him in flank, attack his communications, and even capture his capital. finally, the brussels road marked the line of junction of two allies who spoke different languages, and who had not fought side by side before. this joint, then, was the element of weakness. if it could be broken through, the french might, like a wedge, split asunder this flank of the coalition, and, if fortune favoured napoleon, might destroy in detail two of his nearest enemies. besides, something must be done, and this course would soonest of all carry the war out of france. across the frontier the british army covered the front from the charleroi-brussels road to ostend, and the prussians extended the arc eastward to liège. the former numbered about 106,000 men (of whom about 34,000 were british, and the remainder germans, hanoverians, brunswickers, nassauers, dutch, and belgians), with its base of supply between ostend and antwerp; the latter 117,000, with its base on the lower rhine. thus the area covered by the troops had a frontage of about 100 miles and a depth of nearly 40. opposed to them was a compact french army of 125,000 men.
campaigns of waterloo (1815) & marlborough.
on the other hand, the allies did not care at first to take the initiative, though they were enormously superior in number.209 each had his own views as to what their great antagonist would do. wellington had, throughout, made up his mind that the emperor would attack his right and sever his communications with the sea, although such a course would force the concentration of the two possibly undefeated armies. so determined was he that this view was correct, that even on the supreme day of waterloo he had detached at halle some 10,000 men to guard the flank that was not even threatened. in his first and last meeting with napoleon he did not grasp his adversary’s skill. he was planning an invasion of france at the moment the french tricolors were crossing the frontier. on the other hand, blucher, with the difficult country of the ardennes between his line of communication and the enemy, was necessarily not so anxious for his outer flank, and was quite prepared to fight opposite charleroi.
the duke of wellington
with napoleon, decision and execution followed rapidly one on the other. the army was quickly and secretly concentrated, and after issuing an address appealing to past glories, in which direct reference is made to the english “prison ships,”44 it crossed the sambre on the 15th june, and the outposts became engaged; but when night fell, only a portion of the french army were on the north bank of the stream. the staff work had been bad, and an important order was not received in time, because it was sent by one orderly instead of in duplicate by two, and he had a bad tumble. then began the series of delays which were among the many causes that led later to the emperor’s defeat at waterloo.
the left wing under ney was so long in closing up to quatre bras, that the british troops at the end of the day outnumbered their opponents, and d’erlon’s corps had been swinging pendulum-like between the two battlefields of ligny and quatre bras, to be useful at neither. turning to the allied side, blucher had readily gauged the french plan, if wellington had not. the night sky, reddened with the glare of many fires on the night of the 14th june, had210 warned the advanced corps of ziethen that a large force lay in front of him, the details of which were told him by the deserter bourmont, who was received with scant courtesy by the honest old prussian. “it is all one,” he said in german, when he noticed the white cockade of the bourbons in the general’s hat, “what a man sticks in his hat, a scoundrel remains a scoundrel”; and so, dismissing him, he carried out the concentration of his army towards ligny. here, on the morning of the 16th, the french right wing, under napoleon’s personal leadership, forced back the prussians, and after a severe conflict, which lasted till night, drove them back, he thought in the direction of liège, practically in the direction of wavre. but when defeated, blucher’s “noble daring” in deciding on falling back on wavre rather than liège, “at once snatched from napoleon the hoped-for fruits of his victory, and the danger ligny had for a few hours averted was left impending over him.”
on the other flank, there is much to be said. there seems little doubt that false reports from france had lulled wellington into a feeling of security for which, as results proved, there was little basis; and to this may be added the somewhat futile demonstrations against his right front.
even when the passage of the sambre by the french army was actually known, on the afternoon of the 15th, still he delayed his decision, and merely orders for the concentration of his widely-spread units were issued. when at night the news was confirmed, the general tenor of the orders pointed rather to a concentration at nivelle than on the charleroi road; yet he knew by then that imposing masses of hostile troops were north of that place. had ney been vigorous and rapid, nothing could have prevented the separation of the allied armies.
that this was not so, was due to the independent initiative of a dutch-belgian general, perponcher, who assembled his command at quatre bras, without orders, only a mile or two from the french bivouac, on the night of the 15th june. then came the celebrated ball when—
211
“there was a sound of revelry by night, and belgium’s capital had gathered then her beauty and her chivalry, and bright the lamps shone o’er fair women and brave men; a thousand hearts beat happily; and when music arose with its voluptuous swell, soft eyes look’d love to eyes which spake again, and all went merry as a marriage bell; but hush! hark! a deep sound strikes like a rising knell!
did ye not hear it! no; ’twas but the wind, or the car rattling o’er the stony street; on with the dance! let joy be unconfined: no sleep till morn, when youth and pleasure meet to chase the glowing hours with flying feet— but hark! that heavy sound breaks in once more, as if the clouds its echo would repeat; and nearer, clearer, deadlier than before! arm! arm! it is—it is the cannon’s opening roar.”
after the ball, the prince of orange, anxious for orders, was told by the duke, it is said, to “go to bed”; but he started instead for quatre bras, which his chief did not reach until eleven o’clock.
then the duke rode to ligny and conferred with blucher. at this conference he agreed, against apparently his own and müffling’s opinion, to move to the right rear of the prussians and act as a reserve, provided he were not attacked himself. to do so he must have moved by the namur chaussée, which passes through quatre bras. to do so at all, therefore, that point must first be securely held. to have made a flank march in the very presence of the enemy, and to have left his own line of advance, towards which his troops were converging, exposed to danger, would but have been to court disaster. to lend any aid whatever to blucher, quatre bras was his first case. but herr delbruck, in his life of gneisenau, makes the assertion that the battle of ligny was only fought on the assumption that 60,000 men would form on their right to strengthen, and if necessary prolong, their line on this side, while müffling, on the other hand, clearly points out that the promise to come to ligny was quite conditional—“provided,” to use the duke’s own words, “i am not attacked myself.”
212 moreover, for the prussians to fight at ligny can scarcely be considered optional. like the action at quatre bras, it was unavoidable, unless they retreated at once on waterloo; for if wellington were obliged to engage the enemy in order to check his advance and complete his concentration, it was equally blucher’s only choice to give battle at ligny so as to enable bülow to join him. but now comes in a very remarkable statement made by gneisenau, who was the chief of staff to the prussian army which blucher commanded in chief. he was the thoughtful brain thereof, as his chief, old marshal “vorwarts,” was the fighting leader. excellent as the latter was at carrying out with abundant energy a plan entrusted to him, the devising of that plan was given to more able and accomplished students of the art of war. gneisenau was esteemed one of these, and the prussian plan of co-operation with wellington is probably due mainly, if not entirely, to him. this fact must be borne clearly in mind in criticising his comments on the campaign in which he took so prominent a part. moreover, he was next in command to blucher, and was thus placed with the object of assuming supreme authority over the prussian army, should such an eventuality as the temporary or permanent disablement of blucher render his services necessary. such an eventuality occurred at ligny, and the retreat to wavre was therefore directed by gneisenau, although the final operations of the prussian army, which led to so brilliant a result as the battle of the 18th june, were superintended by blucher himself. gneisenau’s position, therefore, was difficult and delicate. in supreme command all the honours of victory would be his; acting as second in command, only a reflection of that glory would fall upon him. some allowance must be made, therefore, for his views with regard to the campaign, if only for the sake of the possible reason that his judgment was embittered by the fact that, in the opinion of the world, to wellington and to blucher, not to gneisenau, the successful issue of the most momentous battle that the world has seen was mainly due.
it is difficult to understand without some such charitable213 assumption the bitterness of his remarks regarding the english commander-in-chief, which are so prominently brought forward in the fourth volume of his life. not only does he comment in an almost contemptuous spirit on the early dispositions of wellington before the hostile armies came into contact, but he accuses him of a want of camaraderie which is foreign to the english character, and with which wellington cannot fairly be charged.
none the less, the prussian leader plainly and brusquely considers that he was guilty of culpable slowness in concentrating after the french had attacked ziethen’s outposts on the sambre on the 15th june, and charges him with dilatoriness in issuing the necessary orders on the receipt of the intelligence that the prussian outposts were so engaged, and with want of loyalty to his prussian allies in not rendering them active assistance at ligny.
the two first of these may be dismissed without comment. they were matters of opinion, and, rightly or wrongly, wellington took his own view regarding them, and must abide, like other men, by his acts, and submit to honest criticism. but the last is more serious, for it is not only stated that ligny would not have been fought, had it not been for wellington’s asserted promise to help, but that he promised in case of disaster to fall back, with a portion of the army at least, with blucher to the rhine. gneisenau’s charge is both venomous and explicit. he compares his own impression with the want of cordial feeling that undoubtedly frequently existed between the duke and the spanish generals in the peninsula; but this is such an ex parte statement as to merit little rejoinder.
the evidence of every officer who shared in the glories and troubles of the peninsular campaigns bears full testimony to the jealousy, and want even of courtesy, sometimes shown by the spaniards, both towards the army that was fighting for the deliverance of the country and the chief who commanded it. it was not wellington only who experienced this difficulty of operating with the spanish allies of the214 british. lord lynedoch45 very fully supports the accusation of incompetency, jealousy, and uncordiality against the spanish generals. after the battle of barrosa, his letters and despatches refer frequently to his own difficulties with them; and as a general officer acting somewhat independently of the principal british army, his corroboration of the generally received opinion is valuable and trustworthy.
it is unjust in the extreme to draw any comparison between the want of unanimity that frequently existed in spain, and the enforced inability of wellington to come to the assistance of blucher on the field of ligny. but wellington wrote a letter, which is quoted in detail in herr delbruck’s life of gneisenau, in which this controversy arises. it runs as follows:—
“sur les hauteurs derriere frasnes,
le 16 june 1815, á 10 heures et demi.
“mon cher prince,—mon armée est situé comme il suit. le corps d’armée du prince d’orange a une division ici et à quatre bras et le reste à nivelles. la reserve est en marche de waterloo sur genappe, où elle arrivera à midi. la cavalerie anglaise sera à la même heure à nivelles. le corps de lord hill est à braine le comte.
“je ne vois pas beaucoup de l’ennemi en avant de nous, et j’attends les nouvelles de votre altesse; et l’arrivée des troupes pour decider mes operations pour la journée.
“rien n’a paru du c?té de binche ni sur notre droit.—votre très obeissant serviteur,
“wellington.”
much capital is made out of this document. it is assumed that wellington made a promise which he must have known could not be fulfilled. and the still graver charge is implied that the letter was intentionally misleading. it seems scarcely credible that such a view could be maintained, knowing the good feeling that obtained between him and all the prussian leaders except gneisenau. moreover,215 wellington’s own army was not so good, so homogeneous, or even so numerically superior to that of the french as to render his chance of fighting the emperor single-handed, when his troops were flushed with victory, a successful one. the political feeling of the belgians, the sympathy undoubtedly felt by many with the french, a sympathy only half concealed in many cases, would be an additional reason for his being very far from desirous of in any way opposing the concentration of the allied armies.
at the time specified there was, judging from his own statement as to the reconnaissance, little doubt in his mind but that no serious attack would be made on quatre bras; and he evidently intended to move to ligny unless prevented. as to the actual position of his corps, he seemed to have indicated where they might possibly be by the time when the letter was written, rather than where they actually were; the errors in position of the different corps averaging ten miles. he seems to have forgotten, however, that by the after order of 10 p.m. on the 15th june, picton had been directed to march along the namur road, only “to the point where the road to nivelles separates,” i.e. near mont st. jean. clausewitz’s view that the halt there was designedly made until after the interview with blucher is, as colonel chesney remarked, “obviously inconsistent” with the known time of picton’s appearance with the leading division at quatre bras. as a matter of fact, he apparently overrated his power of concentration and the movement of his brigades, though there seems no reason to doubt but what they might have been, on the whole, very nearly in the positions assigned had they moved with ordinary speed.
be all this as it may, the battle of quatre bras began. at the cross roads there, at 2 p.m. on the 15th june, were 7000 dutch belgians and 16 guns, against 17,500 french infantry and cavalry and 38 guns, who speedily drove back the outposts at frasnes, and were pressing them still farther back through the wood of bossu on the allied right when the first reinforcements came. these were pack’s brigade, composed of the 42nd, 44th, 92nd, and 95th; kempt’s brigade,216 of 28th, 32nd, 79th, and 1st, and a hanoverian brigade of four battalions, with two more batteries; and thus from 3.30 to 4.30 the allies numbered 20,000 men with 28 guns, against 18,000 with 44 guns. now, therefore, picton, with whom the duke “was barely on speaking terms,” made a counter attack on the left, with the usual result that the fire of the line drove back the enemy’s skirmishers which covered the advance of their columns, and these, broken by fire against their mass and then charged with the bayonet, fell back too. but on the other wing, the right, there was some confusion. the brunswickers there had fled, both horse and foot, and their duke was wounded. the 42nd in the tall rye grass were somewhat rolled up, as they were not in square, while the 44th, assailed in front as well as rear, faced both ranks outwards, and reserved their fire to twenty paces. so the enemy’s charge swept on across the field from right to left until the 92nd checked it and compelled it to retire. meanwhile, the bossu wood on the right was lost, and the french heavy cavalry in vain charged the british squares, but broke up the 69th, whose order to form square had been countermanded by the prince of orange. so the fight fluctuated until between 5 and 6 p.m., when the allied troops now numbered 32,000 men and 68 guns (against 20,700 and 50 guns) by the arrival of the guards and some brunswickers. then the whole force advanced, and victory rested with them. thus the battle ended at about 6.30 p.m., and at that time, even if d’erlon had joined ney, the french left would still have been outnumbered. but wellington, writes the ablest critic of this momentous campaign, “at dusk, thirty hours after his first warning, had only present at quatre bras three-eighths of his infantry, one-third of his guns, and one-seventh of his cavalry. truly, in holding his own, the great englishman owed something that day to fortune.”46
this is really the gravamen of gneisenau’s charge. during the night the allied right wing was reinforced to 45,000 men, but, short as the distance between the wings was, showing217 how less intimate the connection between the allied armies was than it should have been, blucher’s left wing was beaten and in full retreat, and the english general did not know the fact till late.
so retreat was unavoidable, and was begun at 10 a.m. on the 17th. wellington was to fall back on the known position of waterloo. blucher had promised to come with his whole army if he could. napoleon had despatched grouchy with 33,000 men to prevent this, and keep the prussians on the move; but the emperor’s own ill health and failing strength had again caused delay; so grouchy started late, and napoleon wasted his time in rest and a review.
the british retreat was well conducted in wretched weather, and despite the heavy ground, there was some rearguard fighting, chiefly by the cavalry on both sides. at length, on the sodden ground about mont st. jean, both armies settled down for what rest was possible, and waited for the dawn. thus the british prepared for battle, with the hope that blucher, or the certainty that night, would come on the 18th june 1815.
but still, with a firmness that seems degenerating into obstinacy, wellington persisted in his nervous anxiety for his right flank, as he had done throughout, and stationed some 10,000 men out of his small army at hal. his excuse that the troops were inferior is futile, for he had battalions of a precisely similar character on the battlefield of waterloo. he must have known, from the extent of front occupied, that the bulk of the french army were in front of him. he must have guessed that some considerable force had been despatched to keep the defeated prussians on the move. he knew that the distance of hal was such as to preclude the possibility of any further considerable detachment from the main french army being made, as it would be entirely isolated from the main battle.
his force was none too strong to hold the position till blucher came. his centre was weak and reserves were insufficient. by ten o’clock, thinks shaw kennedy, “it is difficult to understand how any fear for the hal road218 could have existed.” none the less he left ten thousand men, under the prince of orange, not only unemployed, but likely to remain unemployed.
there, unfortunately for them, were left a brigade of dutch belgians and one of colvile’s division, that of johnston, comprising the 35th, 54th, 59th, and 91st regiments.
whether wellington ever rode to wavre to personally arrange with blucher as to his co-operation or not, is one of those things which cannot be proved. that it was quite possible, that the distance apart of the two allied armies was such that it could be easily done, that wellington, not unnaturally anxious, might have thought of it, all might have been. but it is not proved, any more than the myth that later on he hoped that “night or blucher might come.” to accept the first part of the wish as true would mean that the retreat of a beaten or at least shaken army through a forest at night was a matter of no difficulty, which is absurd; to assume the latter part is reasonable, inasmuch as the blow so struck must have assailed the french rear. it is probable he did see then the necessity of the prussian help, and, so seeing, might have tried to ensure it by a personal talk with his stout-hearted ally.
the position selected for the battle lies almost at right angles to the road between brussels and charleroi, is about two miles long, and only about three-quarters of a mile from that held by the french. its folds, of equal height with those held by the french, fairly concealed all the troops but those immediately in front line; its gentle slopes merged easily into those southward of it. on its left were the roads that led to wavre and blucher, whose general line of march must inevitably lead to an attack on the village of planchenoit in rear of the french right wing, and only about half a mile from their line of retreat by the charleroi road.
the position, finally, had three strong advanced posts: on the right, the chateau of hougomont; in the centre, the small farm of la haye sainte; and on the left those of219 papelotte, la haye, and smohain; while the right wing, extending towards braine la leud, was somewhat strengthened by merbe braine in rear of it.
as this is the last and most momentous battle of the long war, it will be well to examine briefly the dispositions made on both sides, for what practically, then as now, were the three lines of battle.
commencing on the extreme left, where the ground was somewhat flat, and to cover the right hand of the two roads by which the prussians intended coming if they could, were the brigades of vivian and vandeleur, made up of the 10th and 18th hussars, the 1st hussars of the king’s german legion, and 11th, 12th, and 16th light dragoons; perponcher’s dutch belgians, holding in advance the farms in front, and with one brigade (bylandt’s) extended to their right, on the exposed and open slopes of the ridge; vincke’s and best’s brigades; pack’s, formed of the 1st, 3rd, 1-42nd, 2-44th, and 92nd; kempt’s, whose right rested on the charleroi road, having the 28th, 32nd, and 79th, the latter of which detached three companies in advance to hold the knoll of la haye sainte, on the east side of the road.
this formed the left wing of the first line. west of the charleroi road came ompteda’s, kielmansegge’s, and halkett’s (30th, 33rd, 69th, 73rd), the right of which rested where the mound of the lion now stands, and ompteda detached the 2nd light battalion of the king’s german legion to hold la haye sainte in advance; the two guards brigades under byng and maitland (2nd coldstream and 2nd and 3rd foot guards) extending to the nivelles road, with hougomont held in front by the light companies of the division of guards and some nassau and hanoverian troops; and then echeloned back came du plat’s brigade and adam’s brigade (the 52nd, 71st, 2-95th, and 3-95th), in advance of which was extended from hougomont to well the other side of the nivelles road (which was abattised) the 4th brigade, composed of the 14th, 23rd, and 51st regiments. its right flank was covered by a220 squadron of the 15th hussars, which linked it to the dutch belgians at braine la leud.
thus the first line, often further subdivided into two parts, held the ridge, with a series of advanced posts and advanced troops in front, covered throughout by skirmishers.
the second line, from right to left, was mainly cavalry. grant’s 3rd brigade (7th, 13th, 23rd light dragoons) to the nivelles road; dornberg’s (23rd, 1st, 2nd light dragoons and one of the king’s german legion) to the charleroi road; the 3rd hussars of the king’s german legion; and across the charleroi road somerset’s heavy brigade (the 1st and 2nd life guards, the royal horse guards, and the 1st dragoon guards), with on its left ponsonby’s union brigade, composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th dragoons.
in the third line behind the right was a hanoverian brigade in merbe braine, and extended as far as the charleroi road were the hanoverian hussars, the brunswick corps, collaert’s division, and lambert’s division (4th, 27th, 46th) when they came up.
the artillery were distributed freely by batteries along the front of the line, and some held in reserve; but there was no concentration of artillery. the proportion of each line seems to have been, out of 50,000 infantry, for the advanced posts, 6000 men; in main or first and second line, 31,000 men; in reserve, 13,000 men. these were formed when in line two, three, or even four deep, and shaw kennedy formed von alten’s division, each battalion (or pair of battalions) in column on a front of two companies, whence they at first formed line to re-form column and square when attacked by cavalry. the whole of the front was covered by skirmishers. but it will be noticed again how much stronger the right wing is than the left, owing to the rooted and unfounded conviction that wellington held that his right would be chiefly assailed. and yet it is evident that if the weak left wing were once broken through, the battle might be lost. thus the proposed point of junction of the allied armies, the221 junction that could alone inflict a telling disaster on the french, this which was all-important to allied as distinctive from local success, was more or less en l’air.
on the french side also there were three lines, and these formed and marched in eleven columns, of which four were to form the first, four the second, and three the third line. they executed the movement in the most perfect order.
the first line was composed of reille’s corps, 15,000 strong, in two lines of columns, ranks three deep, and having on its left the light cavalry of the corps (fifteen squadrons in three lines); and d’erlon’s corps (16,000 strong and similarly formed), the eleven squadrons of its own light cavalry in three lines being on its right.
the second line was composed of, from the left, kellerman’s cuirassiers; in two lines fifty feet apart, lobau’s corps, in mass of battalion columns; and the light cavalry of daumont and subervie and milhaud’s cuirassiers.
in the third line was guyot’s heavy cavalry of the guard, then the guard itself, drawn up in a column six lines deep, and on its right the lancers and chasseurs of the guard under lefebvre.
when any attack was made, the attacking force formed into a smaller number of larger columns (d’erlon’s corps, for example, forming five), and all were thickly covered by light infantry skirmishers.
the artillery was more or less massed, especially on the right, and came into action, on several occasions, as at la haye sainte, within two hundred and fifty yards of the infantry. there is no doubt that until the battle was well advanced, napoleon believed he was going to win. reaching the field on the evening of the 17th, and finding the enemy in position, he is reported to have said, “i wish i had the power of joshua to arrest the sun, that i might attack the enemy to-day.” even the next morning he, though imagining the allied force in front of him was superior in numbers, considered, “we have at least ninety chances to a hundred in our favour.”
222 nor was wellington less sanguine. blucher had promised that “i shall not come with two corps only, but with my whole army,” and blucher was likely to prove a man of his word; but the weather and the roads rendered it improbable that he should join hands with him, seriously, till the afternoon was well advanced. as he rode along the line between 9 and 10 a.m. on the 18th, he was cheered. he was wearing a blue frock-coat and white buckskin pantaloons, with hessian boots and tassels, a white cravat, a low cocked hat without a plume, but ornamented with a black cockade for britain, and three smaller for spain, portugal, and the netherlands. in his right hand he carried a long field telescope drawn out and ready for use. general alava, who joined him from brussels, found him under a tree observing the movements of the advancing french. “how are you, alava?” said he, laughing. “bonaparte shall see to-day how a general of sepoys can defend a position!”
the general conduct of the battle can best be briefly described by a series of attacks or phases, though, naturally, the fire both of guns and skirmishers along the entire front of battle throughout the day never ceased. the first attack was made at 11.30 by reille, against the right at hougomont, the artillery of that corps being reinforced by kellermann. this resulted in the british being driven from the wood and garden of the house, but not from the buildings themselves. still, it had been a very close affair. the guards, in falling back to the house, had not time to close the door of the yard before the french were on them, and severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued; but finally colonel macdonnell and a few men managed to close it, killing all the french who had penetrated. it was the narrowest escape of capture hougomont had. as it was, some of the outbuildings were in flames, and the fire, curiously enough, only ceased at the feet of a wooden image of our saviour.
the second attack was delivered at 1.30 by d’erlon, against the left and centre, with the whole of his corps, first in four great columns, and finally, as the right-hand column split in223 two against the farms, into five. but though they temporarily gained papelotte and the gardens of la haye sainte, the only tangible success on the french side was the retreat in some haste of bylandt’s brigade. one of the main causes of the failure of the attack was the vigorous offensive taken by ponsonby’s and somerset’s brigades. it was during this period that picton, who had been wounded at quatre bras and concealed it, fell dead while cheering on kempt’s brigade; and sergeant ewart of the greys, and captain clarke of the royal dragoons, each by the capture of an eagle in the charge, gained for those regiments the distinction of the eagle badge on their appointments. the charge of the heavy brigade, too, must have recalled medi?val days, for, meeting the french cuirassiers, the clash of weapons upon armour was, as lord somerset said, “like so many tinkers at work.” when the french fell back to re-form, la haye sainte, the real key of the position, was reinforced, but only by two companies, and the 92nd regiment had by then been reduced to less than 300 strong. the french cavalry attack began at 4 p.m. on the right centre. the fierceness of the attack had lulled for a while; there had been no effort of a serious nature against the right during the second phase. the cannonade continued there, as it did equally on the left after d’erlon fell back.
but now there was to be a change in the method of attack, and milhaud’s cuirassiers, forty squadrons strong, crossing from the right, advanced into the gap between la haye sainte and hougomont,—a frontage of about 1000 yards only,—to attack in lines of columns the british and other regiments opposed to them, which threw themselves into squares. thrice milhaud attempted to break them, and, failing, was driven back by the british cavalry to re-form. then, at 5 p.m., those who were left, together with kellermann and guyot, seventy-seven fresh squadrons in all, made the same desperate effort. but by six o’clock this too had failed. the ground was strewn with the bodies of horses, lancers, cuirassiers, carbiniers, chasseurs, horse grenadiers, hussars, light and heavy dragoons, and the mighty mass of224 horsemen was practically destroyed, and that mainly by infantry and artillery fire.
now the prussian army was fully en évidence. as early as 4.30, bülow’s corps from wavre had reached the field, and had so hotly engaged the french that lobau’s corps and the cavalry division of subervie and daumont had been detached to oppose him; and by six o’clock they had to be reinforced, from napoleon’s last reserve, by eight battalions of the guard, or one-third its total strength, when blucher had developed on, and in rear of, the french right flank, 29,000 infantry and 64 guns. the second attack on the centre by ney occurred between five and six. it was mainly directed on la haye sainte, which was carried after desperate fighting, and the poor remnants of the king’s german legion, who had fought magnificently until they were short of ammunition, were almost annihilated. hougomont and the whole of the right centre had meanwhile been again assaulted, though without result; but when la haye sainte fell, the english centre was, for a brief space, broken. the french, pressing in, inflicted heavy losses on the brigades on either side of the charleroi road, especially those of ompteda and kielmansegge. between halkett’s brigade on the west of the charleroi road, and kempt’s on the right, there was a great gap. so dire had been the slaughter, that at one time the duke, pointing to a mass of killed and wounded men of the 28th and 73rd, asked what square that was so far in advance. it was a critical moment in the battle.
but here wellington’s coolness in the ordering of a battle stood him in good stead. says kennedy: “this very startling information he received with a degree of coolness, and replied to in an instant with such precision and energy as to prove the most complete self-possession, and left on my mind the impression that his grace’s mind remained perfectly calm during every phase, however serious, of the action; that he felt confident of his own powers of being able to guide the storm which raged around him; and from the determined manner in which he then spoke, it was evident that he had resolved to defend, to the last extremity, every inch of the225 position which he then held. his grace’s answer to my representation was in the following words, or very nearly so:—‘i shall order the brunswick troops to the spot, and other troops besides. go you and get all the german troops of the division to the spot that you can, and all the guns that you can find.’”
so the gap was filled and the danger ceased; but, “most fortunately, napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve, proving that he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have done.”
it was all too late now. ney had pressed for reinforcements, to receive the reply, “où voulez-vous que j’en prenne? voulez-vous que j’en fasse?” how could he indeed? blucher was close at hand now with three corps, and was forcing the french right and rear from smohain to planchenoit, with 52,000 infantry and 104 guns.
the fifth and last french attack was made at 7.30, with the guard on the right centre, and these, with all other available divisions and the cavalry, made for the first time a general assault along the entire line.
ten battalions of the guard formed into two columns and pushed up the slopes between la haye sainte and hougomont, covered by skirmishers; but the storm of fire in front, and especially in flank, by colborne’s judicious management of the 52nd, was too severe. a gallant effort was made by the picked soldiery of france to crest the blood-stained, well-defended heights; but the game was played out, and “the guard turned and fled.” “tout est perdu,” said the half-broken host. “la garde est répousée”; and even napoleon at the failure of this final effort repeated the saying, and finished with, “sauvons nous.” as the french fell back, the whole allied line advanced, and though the defence of planchenoit still continued up to this moment, that village too was carried, and the french army of waterloo ceased to be, and fled in utter rout to france. it was eight o’clock, and by that time the loss226 since the passage of the sambre amounted to at least 40,000 french, and 30,000 of the allied troops.
no account of this great and most decisive battle is complete without a further reference to the prussian co-operation, and the action grouchy may have taken to interfere and prevent what, if it were successful, must have been decisive as to result. at the end, one french corps, some battalions of the guard, and two cavalry divisions were face to face with some 50,000 men. it will be remembered that grouchy had been despatched from ligny late on the 17th, to prevent this very union of the allied wings.
he was 33,000 strong, with 96 guns, and by 8 a.m. on the 18th, the morning of waterloo, was nearing wavre. it was at sart-le-walhain that he heard the cannon-roar of battle to his left. what was he to do? nowadays he would have moved to the sound of the guns, and, however it might be matter of opinion, such a course would have, to say the least, not have lessened the helpfulness of the task his chief had given him. his object was to keep the allies apart. what he did, did not. he attacked the prussians in front of wavre. to have crossed the dyle above wavre, difficult though it was, might have had two results. first, he would have turned the prussian position there where the stream was less difficult. he must have isolated the corps at wavre, and might have, by appearing on the flank of the prussian column of march on smohain and planchenoit, forced one other corps at least, to form front towards him, and thus checked or “contained” two of the enemy’s corps. he might have done more with this half-beaten army. but most of all, he would have, and must have, as the day went on, by prolonging the french right at planchenoit, prevented the direct advance of blucher on the french right rear and line of retreat. his very appearance between the dyle and planchenoit would have had an effect, possibly considerable, on the prussian army. it is immaterial whether, as the hours flew by, grouchy could have joined hands with lobau at planchenoit.227 blucher might have and would have got one corps by sart-le-walhain on the british left; but it is possible that all his other corps would have been checked, facing the unknown danger of grouchy, between the field of waterloo and the passages at wavre. doubtless napoleon made a mistake in not giving grouchy a more free hand. he, grouchy, feared his great chief, and thought literal obedience to orders was more important than translating those orders. not that grouchy’s appearance near the great field would have prevented disaster; but it might have prevented rout. there might have been more men to call on, say the eight battalions of the guard, when ney most wanted them in his further effort against the english centre, and la haye sainte had fallen. grouchy attacked in front the strongest part of the prussian line of defence. had he turned it, he would have carried out both his literal and his factual orders to keep the prussians back from joining wellington.
hence, as napoleon himself said, “this morning we had ninety chances for us; this arrival of bülow loses us thirty.”
but blucher, unmolested, had only difficult ground to traverse, wearied troops to encourage, and his promise to help wellington to keep his energy at its highest. he was not threatened in his march. thielemann could hold wavre, and so, desperately playing the bold game, he won success. it was “toujours l’audace” over again. he had promised to come with all he could bring, and he nobly fulfilled his promise. never was there a better leader of men in a time of sore anxiety. he knew he could call upon the personal hatred of prussians, who remembered, themselves or through their people, the french occupation of their country not many years before. his cheering cry in that heavy march, of “kinder, ihr wollt doch nicht dass ich wortbrüchig werden soll” touched the heart of every weary, tired man, and “englishmen ought never to forget it,” because it made waterloo not merely a victory, but a rout. the hard defensive battle is due to the men, both germans and english, wellington commanded. the utter collapse of the french is due to blucher’s steadfastness of purpose,228 and to grouchy’s too literal obedience to napoleon, and his fear of disobeying his direct command. none the less grouchy, useless as a subordinate who had to translate literal orders into practical action, a good divisional leader when under distinct orders rather than a semi-independent commander, acting according to his dim “regulation” lights, saved the remnants of his force with great skill, and might have done more. to the british army is due much of that marvellous victory, but not all. until colonel chesney wrote the waterloo lectures, all foreign students of the campaign looked askance at the claim of the british army to have been, as for long years it was asserted to be, the only great factor in the great fight. no proud nation should fear to recognise such external help, and yet, less than fifty years ago, all british soldiers were led to believe that they alone had won the hard-fought battle, and that prussian help at waterloo was a mere incident, not a great element in the victory that is due to both.
formation of the lines of battle at waterloo 17th june 1815.
thus was waterloo fought, and lost, and won. “all might have failed, but for the astonishing staunchness of the english and german infantry in wellington’s army. nothing, in war or in peace, is so trying to the nerves as passively to await deadly peril, making no effort to avert it. and never probably in war was greater strain of this nature put upon troops, than fell on alten’s and picton’s divisions at waterloo. the guards and hanoverians who held hougomont had more prolonged and exciting conflict, the heavy cavalry did magnificent service: to maitland’s brigade, and still more to the 52nd, belongs the conspicuous glory of having given the last crushing blow. but, after all, the chief honour belongs to the english brigades of halkett, kempt, and pack, and to the germans who stood by their side.”47
* * * * *
the conclusion of the campaign offers but few points of interest. the prussians mainly carried on the pursuit, and it must have been embittered by all the dreadful history of the past. one can understand the troopers sabreing229 till arms were weary, with “that for jena, and that for austerlitz.” there were skirmishes at namur, laon, and cambrai; peronne “la pucelle,” was stormed; and within eighteen days since the french crossed the frontier, the allied armies were before paris, which soon capitulated, and the great war was over. the last shot was fired on the 3rd july 1815, when the advanced guard of the 16th light dragoons were entering paris. then ney, “le brave des braves,” was shot, and napoleon, surrendering himself to his ancient enemy, the english, finished his days at st. helena.
* * * * *
during the prolonged war, which was almost continuous from 1793 to 1815, the actual and permanent increase to the army list had been considerable, though there had been many fluctuations. second battalions to many regiments had been formed, disbanded, restored, and in some cases given a separate existence. up to 1805, moreover, the period of service had been usually for life, but in that year it was fixed at seventeen years, with the power of re-engagement for twelve years more.
in 1793, the twelve regiments of infantry, numbering from the 78th to the 89th inclusive, had been formed. the 90th in perthshire, and the 91st in argyllshire, had been raised by private enthusiasm, the former by “sir thomas graham,” and hence called his “perthshire greybreeks,” from the colour of their breeches; and the latter by the duke of argyll, though it then was numbered the 98th. but the 5th royal irish dragoons was disbanded for disloyalty during the irish rebellion, though there is but little evidence that the disaffection was general. it is curious to notice how the frequent and serious cases of mutiny in the navy found no parallel in the army. even the above was undoubtedly much exaggerated, and so strong was the loyal feeling in the army that, in 1798, the 2nd queen’s subscribed ￡100 for the discovery of the author of sundry seditious pamphlets that were being circulated.
dress had often changed, though merely in minor details, the three-cornered hat was replaced, about 1796, by a230 cylindrical hat, somewhat like the modern “stovepipe” headdress, but with the side turned up with a cockade and feather. black cloth leggings replaced the white spatterdashes. powder disappeared in 1796, but pigtails, though shortened to 7 inches in 1804, were not abolished altogether until 1808. how so ridiculous a fashion had been retained so long it is hard to imagine. men were helpless to finish off their headdress for parade by themselves. “tie for tie,” and “plait for plait,” was the general cry in every barrack-room, and woe to the man who had no friend to help him! the only trace of the absurd custom is the black silk “flash” worn on the collars of the officers of the royal welsh fusiliers.
the old hussar dress, with its swinging pelisse, was introduced from hungary, where it was the national attire, about 1806, when the 7th, 10th, and 15th light dragoons adopted the new name of “hussars,” and wore a scarlet shako, instead of the former headdress, the busby; while by 1820, the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 17th light dragoons were armed with the lance, and appeared in the army list as lancers. for their services at ciudad, badajoz, and san sebastian, the engineers became the “corps of sappers and miners.”
one noticeable thing relating to the highland forces had occurred in the early part of the period under consideration. between 1793 and 1809, scotland had willingly furnished some 70,000 men to fill the ranks of her national section of the army. but north britain was not populous, and the supply of men, more than such a country could afford, began to fail. there were then one cavalry and nineteen infantry regiments serving with the colours and wearing the tartan; but already, as too often occurs at the present time, there were many regiments which perforce were recruited in england, and were only scottish by name and dress. hence it was that six of these regiments, the 90th, 91st, 72nd, 74th, 75th, and 94th, were ordered to abandon the kilt, and adopt the ordinary line uniform.
there had been many changes in the form of the sword. at first a broad two-edged blade, a heavy, hacking weapon231 with a cross hilt, it was designed to wound men in armour. not that, apparently, they ran much danger, for in many a battle few were killed. the wounds received in action appear to have been chiefly contusions.48 the mace or axe was in armoured days probably more effective than the sword. as armour was abandoned, and the mail gauntlet discarded, so the hilt became more complex (as in the so-called modern “claymore” hilt), to guard the naked, or merely gloved hand. the weapon itself was now made to thrust as well as cut, and the lighter and thinner blade was stiffened and strengthened (as in bayonets) with grooves. finally, about the end of the last century, and for long after, the merely thrusting rapier was almost universal, save the hanger or cutlass used by bluejackets. but fashions change, and the rapier blade widened out into the modern cut-and-thrust sword, and the simple shell-like rapier guard again spread out to cover hand and wrist. swords were worn by the rank and file of the british infantry battalions up to 1745, the grenadiers carrying them seventeen years longer.
spears & swords.
pike
blkbill
partisan
lochaber axe
halberd geo: ii.
halberd geo: iii.
spontoon 1820
1350
1580
scheavona 1600
claymore 1700
rapier 1800
modern 1896
no infantry weapon has exercised so powerful an influence on the destinies of mankind as the sword. the gladius conquered the world not merely because it was a true steel weapon and an excellent fighting tool, as compared with those of the nations the romans had to meet, but because it was carried by men who knew its value. morale—moral courage—is induced by a knowledge that one’s weapons are superior to those of the antagonist. the good sword implies a personal courage, the intention of closing with the adversary, and an individuality that no other weapon possesses. at times it had its special religious aspect. the cross of the crusader’s sword was the emblem to him of his faith and of his cause. his prayers said before it, a consecrated weapon, had all the reverence that would have been attached to prayers before the crucifix; his oath upon it was as an oath on the cross of christ. at all periods a ceremonial weapon, now it is mainly so. the two-handed sword of state has been carried before kings and princes and232 potentates from early days even until now. the dress sword of the lord mayor means but guardian power. the state sword worn by a court official but implies the defence of the sovereign’s person, and the right of those surrounding the throne to carry arms. at all times it has been the emblem of personal authority and governance.
highly prized as heirlooms in those days when swords were rare, they often appear in the chronicles of ancient wills. ?thelstan mentions in his will “the sword of king offa, the sword which ulfeytel owned, and that with the silver hilt which wulfric made.” similarly, in old japan the father’s sword was a precious heirloom, a sacred charge, and this feeling has been common among all nations where the profession of arms was held to be noble, and the arms themselves consequently revered. mrs. norton has touched this chord very tenderly in one of her poems—
“tell my mother that her other sons will comfort her old age, for i was but a truant bird, who thought his home a cage; for my father was a soldier, and even as a child, my heart leaped forth to hear him tell of struggles fierce and wild. and when he died and left us to divide his scanty hoard, i let them take whate’er they would, but kept my father’s sword; and with boyish love i hung it where the bright light used to shine, on the cottage walls of bingen, fair bingen by the rhine.”
this very feeling caused a certain amount of personality to be attached to the sword itself. thus, swords have had fanciful names, as c?sar’s “crocea mors” (yellow death), charlemagne’s “joyeuse,” mahomet’s “al battar” (the beater), ali’s “zulfagar,” and king arthur’s “excalibur.” in other cases they bore mottoes, such as on the scotch sword which has—
“at bannockburn i served the bruce of which the inglis had no ruse;”
and an italian blade has on it—
“draw me not without cause, sheath me not without honour.”
in other cases the mottoes are of a religious cast as “in te domine,” “there is no conqueror but god,” “do not233 abandon me, o faithful god,” and so on. lastly, some swords bear the names or monograms of the places where they were made, or persons who forged them. thus solingen in germany and sahagun in spain were noted for sword blades, and the former is so still. many of the early makers take their names from the town in which they worked or were born, as alonzo de sahagun and andrea di ferrara did.
after the close of the peninsular war, the usual rapid reduction of the national armed strength followed. hardly had wellington returned to england than the volunteer and yeomanry corps, as well as the militia, were disembodied; but, for the first time, there was a delay in the reduction of the regular forces. the prolonged war had still further, for a time at least, caused the nation to forget its former prejudice against a standing army. it had got accustomed, at least, to its existence, and on the civil life of the country was reflected the military glory won by its sons in foreign war. there had been much almost personal antagonism to the pretensions and aggressions of france, and this had led, more than anything else perhaps, to the feeling that the army was after all but an integral portion of the commonwealth, and need not be, and had no intention of being, hostile to the national peace at home. to this gradual increase in political freedom was added less fear of the sovereign. the time had passed since any king of england either could, or would, use the army (in the way the stuarts wanted to do) as a means of repressing the people or their freedom. englishmen had got over this childish dread lest the soldiery should be used actively against them. the national police that had protected abroad the commerce of the land and kept its shores practically inviolate was no longer feared. it was expensive now. that was all.
the reductions in the time to come, therefore, were but economic questions, and when the national pocket was pinched, the army was reduced as the readiest and easiest means of meeting the deficit. it was no longer feared, had even become respected and respectable; but its keeping up was a matter234 of taxation. all reformers seek to reduce this burden, and what so easy as to lessen the cost of a machine, the value of which in the past may have been great, and only possibly might be of equal value in the future? but in the immediate present (at any period in this century) the reformer merely looked at things as they then were, and carefully put off till the to-morrow what it would have been less costly to do quietly to-day. such politicians do not see that the ominous war-cloud means war risks, greater haste, higher prices, and more expenditure. but it matters little to them so long as retrenchment, whether wise or not is immaterial, comes to them. “what has posterity done for them,” that they should trouble about a future that only concerns their children? and yet, if these same economists were to put off life insurance until age and waning health came, they would consider such a course more than unbusiness-like. the nation had by sheer force of circumstances been led to see the value of the national insurance—the army; but it was reluctant to effect as sound an insurance in this respect as the case needed. the story of all voluntary armies has practically been the same.
with the cessation of hostilities came the shower of rewards, but with a considerable reservation. ensigns of the guards were to rank as lieutenants, and the 1st foot guards were made “grenadiers.” generals were made peers, and the knighthood of the bath expanded to decorate others. but tommy atkins, who did the fighting? he got nothing, save discharge on a full or a limited pension, ranging between sixpence and a shilling a day, or chelsea hospital! his sole reward was the increase of pay of his sergeant-major, the addition of a colour-sergeant at two-and-fourpence a day to each company, and, some thirty years later, for those who survived—a medal! never were the rank and file of an army that had done so much rewarded at so exceedingly cheap a rate.
the necessity for keeping the regular army on a war footing after 1815, still remained so long as there was an army of occupation, 25,000 strong, to be kept in france. in 1816,235 therefore, the numerical strength of the army was 175,615 men, exclusive of those employed in india. but when that occupation ceased, a reduction of 26,000 men followed as a matter of course, and most of the cadres of regiments were reduced to a very low peace strength.