with the year 1808 began the great struggle in the peninsula, which, directly and indirectly, led to the long peace. its immediate cause was the seizure by napoleon of the iberian peninsula, the establishment on the spanish throne of his brother joseph, and then the determined rising of the people against this uncalled-for foreign usurpation.

this practically gave us a cause for interference, and for again joining issue with our ancient enemy. we were rarely so well prepared. we had under arms about 300,000 men, with 80,000 in india, 108,380 militia, and 200,000 volunteers. an army, not large, for it numbered but 30,000 men in all, but of excellent material, was equipped and placed under the command of sir hew dalrymple, with burrard as second in command, and the two divisional leaders were sir arthur wellesley and sir john moore. the force comprised the 3rd, 18th, and 20th, with, later on, the 10th and 15th light dragoons. the line regiments were the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, the 1-9th, 2-20th, 1-28th, 1-29th, 32nd, 36th, 38th, 40th, 43rd, 45th, 52nd, 60th, 71st, 79th, 82nd, 91st, 92nd, 97th, with some light battalions, the king’s german legion, and a full proportion of guns.

it is somewhat difficult to group the operations that continued from this date to 1814; but it may be convenient to deal with them generally in two groups. 1. from roli?a and vimiera to torres vedras. 2. from portugal to france, or from busaco to toulouse.

a glance at the map will show that there are only two174 good roads by which spain can be approached from france. the western pass is the bidassoa, by which the bayonne road reaches madrid; the eastern, that of de pertus, carrying the perpignan road by saragossa to madrid. furthermore, the great central plateau is traversed by a series of more or less parallel mountain ridges running east and west; so that while movement laterally is comparatively easy, that from north to south is difficult. such was the terrain which was to see so much hard fighting; a land held by a keenly patriotic and high-spirited people, possessed of great tenacity of purpose, and especially qualified for that guerilla warfare for which such a land was peculiarly suitable. throughout, the contest, as far as the french and their immediate opponents, the spanish and portuguese, are concerned, was accompanied by circumstances of the greatest barbarity. french orders to shoot patriots and destroy villages in which risings against the foreign rule had occurred, tended largely to the formation of those bands of guerillas and partisans, in the minds of every member of which was but one thought—revenge. not unfrequently these bands degenerated from patriotic francs-tireurs into mere hordes of banditti, a terror indiscriminately to the armies of both the combatants and the civil population.

this, then, broadly speaking, was the state of affairs when great britain determined on siding actively with the enemies of france, and up to this time, at least, matters had not improved, as the hostilities became more and more prolonged. one decisive success only, that of the defeat and capitulation of dupont at baylen, had hitherto attended the spanish arm, and at this battle england was represented by one english officer, captain whittingham, as military attaché.

the first of the groups into which the whole campaign may, for convenience, be divided, practically resulted in the deliverance of portugal. the first division under wellesley landed at the mouth of the mondego, and the first skirmish at obidos resulted in the retirement of the french advanced troops, and then laborde was defeated at roli?a, a victory which was all the more important as175 being the first success that had been gained by the british army in europe since the campaign in egypt and the affair of copenhagen. in it the 5th, 6th, 9th, 29th, 32nd, 36th, 38th, 40th, 45th, 60th, 71st, 82nd, 91st, and the newly-formed rifle brigade took a distinguished part. but instead of rapidly following up the success gained, burrard, much to wellesley’s disgust, decided on waiting till the second division under moore, which had reached mondego bay, should have joined the headquarters of the army. but junot, who commanded in chief the armies in portugal, anticipated this by advancing against the first division, which was in position on the vimiera heights near the maceira river, and somewhat inferior in strength to the assailant.

the attack was delivered with the greatest boldness, but checked by fire, and especially by the shrapnell shells, which were first used here, and then by the determined charges of the 50th (the “blind half hundred,” owing to the prevalence of ophthalmia in the regiment in 1801, or the “dirty half hundred,” from the men smearing their faces with their black cuffs), the 43rd and the 71st (then known from the number of lowland scotsmen in their ranks as the “glasgow light infantry”) the french fell back beaten. one instance of bravery, worth recording here, is that of a piper of the 71st, who, though his thigh was shattered by a musket shot, played on bravely, sitting on his knapsack, exclaiming, “deil hae me, lads, if ye shall want music!”

again, owing to burrard’s want of dash, the final counter attack was checked, and the french withdrew in fair order; but though crawford’s brigade had hardly been engaged, and a vigorous pursuit was rightly urged by wellesley, dalrymple again determined to await the arrival of moore, and so the chance was lost. for this battle the regiments already mentioned as being engaged at roli?a, as well as the 2nd, 20th, 43rd, 50th, and 52nd, bear the name of vimiera on their colours.

but though the english army thus delayed, junot thought the game was up. he entered into negotiations176 for the abandonment of portugal, and by the “convention of cintra” the fortresses were to be given up, and the french troops transported to france in the vessels of the russian fleet for a time blockaded in the tagus by a british fleet.

meanwhile moore, landing at maceira bay, had joined the army, the whole of which finally marched to lisbon.

the convention was bitterly condemned in england, though napoleon thought she had concluded a good bargain. by it portugal had been temporarily freed, and a good base of operations, with good harbours, was obtained for further efforts. none the less both dalrymple and burrard were practically retired, and the supreme command was now open for the future duke of wellington when the time came. but scapegoats were wanted, if only to please the irresponsible and irrepressible home critics.

“but when convention sent his handywork, pens, tongues, feet, hands, combined in wild uproar; mayor, aldermen, laid down the uplifted fork; the bench of bishops half forgot to snore; stern cobbett, who for one whole week forbore to question aught, once more with transport leapt, and bit his devilish quill again and swore with foe such treaty never should be kept. then burst the blatant beast, and raged, and roared, and slept.”34

for a brief space, matters were quiescent. but napoleon fully recognised the gravity of the situation, and saw that a spanish rising might become a grave menace to france. he even induced his ally, the czar, to address king george a letter, asking him to make peace “in the name of humanity”! it was like “satan reproving sin,” and produced no result; so he himself therefore took the matter in hand. he re-invaded spain to re-instate joseph on the spanish throne. he defeated the spanish armies, to be met by the advance of the army under moore, who had succeeded to the command after the convention of cintra, had landed at lisbon, and was to be reinforced by sir david baird, who had reached corunna with a force of some ten thousand men.

177 it was arranged that the two divisions should concentrate at salamanca, but there were many difficulties in the way. the point of union, or concentration, was too close to the enemy to be safe. there was spanish and portuguese opposition, want of money on the one hand; on the other, a country to traverse which was ill provided with roads, and those of the worst character. hence moore still further subdivided his command. the cavalry and artillery and heavy baggage were to move by elvas on salamanca, whither baird was also directed; the remainder in two columns, one by almeida, the other by alcantara, and thence by ciudad rodrigo to salamanca; while, in addition to this separation, the columns themselves were further subdivided into sub-units, separated by intervals in the columns of march, thus greatly increasing their depth and lessening their power of concentration for battle. moore’s difficulties increased rather than lessened as the advance continued. the spanish, profuse of promises of assistance, were slow in fulfilling them. the transport was notoriously insufficient and inefficient. the inhabitants themselves, strangely enough, were by no means enthusiastic to their allies and would-be deliverers. the spanish armies had been successively beaten, and were much disorganised. there was nothing for it but retreat really, though moore made a last desperate effort to retrieve matters, trusting to the glowing but untrue reports as to the enthusiastic resistance the madrile?os were prepared to make, and continued his advance to madrid. the idea was more than risky. the capital was already in french hands; lefevre had already, by a movement towards talavera, seriously endangered his retreat to portugal. the weather was most severe, the local supplies of the smallest.

still he attempted to engage soult, whose corps was somewhat weak and the bulk of whose cavalry were about sahagun. baird was directed on mayorga; moore himself moved on salda?a, and the 10th and 15th light cavalry, by a night march, engaged the enemy at sahagun, the latter regiment won the right to carry the name on its178 battle-roll. it is the only cavalry regiment so distinguished. this fully roused the energies of napoleon. he determined to attempt the complete destruction of the british force. soult from the north, through astorga, lefevre from the south by talavera, and the main army under his own command by the escurial pass, were to close in and surround moore.

the celebrated “retreat to corunna” commenced. moore was to change his base from lisbon to corunna, and began by falling back on castro gonzalo (at benevente) and baird was retiring on valencia (towns on the river esla) to unite with him at astorga; and at both mayorga and castro gonzalo skirmishes occurred with the french cavalry which were highly creditable to the british. napoleon pursued as rapidly as the state of the weather, with deep snow, would permit; but, recalled to france on the 1st january 1809, he left to soult the task of “driving the leopard into the sea.” while in supreme command, the emperor had infused his own boundless energy into the army, and had marched a force of fifty thousand men over snowclad passes and in bitter weather some two hundred miles in ten days! many brilliant skirmishes were carried out by the english cavalry at mayorga, benevente (where general lefebvre desnouettes was taken prisoner), and at constantine, and notoriously that by the 10th hussars at calcabellos; and an attempt was made to induce the enemy to attack at lugo, but it only resulted in a skirmish and not a battle, and the dismal retreat was continued by betanzos on corunna. by this time the army was completely demoralised. repeated orders had been issued, but seem to have been of little effect. at bembribee, for example, the men broke into the wine vaults, and drunkenness reigned; shops were broken into and plundered there and elsewhere. the sufferings were extreme. soldiers, women, and children lay down in the snow by the line of march to die. it being winter, fords were deep, and men had to cross them, and march in their wet clothes under storms of rain, wind, and sleet.

179 guns had to be abandoned, and, like the military chest on one occasion, thrown over precipices to avoid capture; and horses were shot, as there was no food for them. the “stars in their courses” fought against moore. even the precautions taken at lugo to carry out a night march failed, for the wind blew down the bundles of straw that had been placed to mark the roads, and bridges that should have been destroyed were left standing.

little wonder then that the troops hailed the sight of the sea at corunna with cheers, though it was three days after their arrival under the walls of the little fortress before the transports dropped anchor in the harbour. but the retreat was over, and the army stood at bay. with all their unquestionable indiscipline and insubordination on the march, those who were left had not lost the fighting spirit. it was either victory, or capitulation, or a most disastrous embarkation; and the army played for the first and won. soult had twenty thousand men flushed with the feeling of success to engage the remnants of moore’s army, barely fifteen thousand strong.

the stores and magazines having been destroyed, and the horses killed, the non-combatants and all the guns except nine six-pounders embarked. the regiments, too, would have followed, but soult prepared for attack, and the army faced him, with backs to the sea.

soult’s attack was purely frontal, and designed to drive back the supposed demoralised british army on the town. a strong force of cavalry was on the extreme left, next to which was a heavy battery, and on the right three heavy columns descended the ridge, covered by clouds of skirmishers to force the division of baird and hope. the 50th again distinguished itself by a vigorous use of the bayonet, and the ensigns bearing the colours fell, to be carried then by the colour-sergeants; while major charles napier, of whom we hear more, later, in scinde, was wounded and taken prisoner. baird, too, was severely wounded by a grapeshot, and the 42nd, being short of ammunition, were falling back, when moore himself led them forward with the stirring appeal,180 “my brave highlanders, you have still your bayonets. remember egypt;” and so doing fell from his horse with his shoulder shattered by a cannon ball. none the less, he watched the victorious advance of the 42nd into the shambles of elvina village, which was the key of the fight, until it was necessary to carry him to the rear on a blanket supported by sashes, and soon he breathed his last, with the hope, amply fulfilled, that his country would do him justice.

from the outset, he was despatched with almost certain failure in view. the wide dispersal of the spanish armies, their notorious want of cohesion and experience, were alone serious dangers; but if there be added to this, a force too small for the purpose, a most indifferent commissariat, and an ill-supplied military chest, the task imposed on moore was hopelessly impossible. still, whatever the errors made in the plan of campaign and in the disastrous retreat, corunna more than compensated for them, and moore, the guiding spirit of it all, was laid to rest in one of the bastions of the citadel, “with his martial cloak around him,” after the embarkation which followed. on the night of, and morning after, the battle, and when the 23rd royal welsh fusiliers were the last to quit the shore, the french, with chivalric courtesy, kept the tricolour half-mast high, and fired the parting salute of cannon over the grave of sir john moore. but the well-known poetry, descriptive of the hero’s funeral, written by wolfe, is not strictly accurate. there was no need for the “lanterns dimly burning,” as it was already daylight.

the troops engaged were the grenadier guards, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 20th, 23rd, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 36th, 38th, 42nd, 43rd, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 59th, 71st, 81st, 91st, 92nd, and rifle brigade; but as if to give the crowning touch to the sufferings of the campaign, the fleet was scattered by a storm on the way home, and many ships were wrecked.

military operations on a large scale ceased in portugal after the return home of moore’s army. soult had stormed and occupied oporto, and a strong army was nominally181 under the command of joseph in madrid and to the west, while lapisse was at salamanca and victor near talavera.

on the resumption of hostilities, sir arthur wellesley landed with an army at lisbon. the somewhat disorganised portuguese troops were to be “wheeled into line” by beresford, an officer already of some experience, who had recently commanded the rearguard at corunna, and who soon proved the value, militarily, of his selection as chief in command, though the rank and file were mutinous (and suffered for it) at braga; and portugal did not like, to say the least of it, the filling of most of the leading commands by british officers.

soult had already been somewhat isolated. in front of him were portuguese levies, with wellesley at their back; behind him the country swarmed with guerillas; his line of communication with madrid and the main army by amaranthe on his left was closed by the portuguese under silviera; on his right lay the sea and british ships of war. he had no resource but to abide events, and these came under the personal conduct of wellesley, though meanwhile soult had himself freed his line of retreat by defeating silviera.

guarding the approaches from spain by detachments at abrantes, santarem, and alcantara, the english general marched against oporto; directing beresford to cross the douro higher up and threaten the french line of retreat by amaranthe. after some skirmishes he reached the south bank of the river, where the pontoon bridge had been destroyed, and all the boats removed to the north bank. he decided on effecting the passage of the douro, en plein face of the enemy, and the tactics adopted are typical of such an operation. he menaced the mouth of the river, where gunboats were collected, as if with the intention of transferring his army by these means to the north bank of the estuary; he despatched murray to turn the oporto position at the ford of avintas, a short distance up stream; he selected a re-entrant bend which was covered by182 a commanding artillery position at the convent of serra; he recognised the tactical value of a seminary on the north bank, opposite the re-entrant, and, utilising some boats discovered by colonel waters, one of the staff, the troops embarked, and the seminary was occupied. but it must be noticed that “it was not until sir arthur had become aware of murray’s passage higher up the douro at avintas,” that he gave the order, “well! let the men begin to cross.” then the french awoke, but it was too late. desperate fighting occurred at the seminary gate, but the artillery on the serra hill was too powerful, and the enemy began to withdraw from the town, whereupon the portuguese passed boats across to villa nova, immediately opposite the city, where the pontoon bridge had been. there the guards, under sherbrooke, crossed, and the french retired in haste by the amaranthe road, to find that place occupied by beresford; so that soult had to continue his retreat in disorder, and that by a more circuitous route, pursued by sherbrooke and harassed by guerillas.

it is interesting here to record that a little later, when colonel waters was taken prisoner, he effected his escape when guarded by four gens d’armes, owing to the mere speed of his horse, and this notwithstanding that “he was on a wide plain, and before him and for miles behind him the road was covered with french columns. his hat fell off, and, thus marked, he rode along the flank of the troops; some encouraged and others fired at him, and the gens d’armes, sword in hand, were always close at his heels. suddenly he broke at full speed between two of the columns, gained a wooded hollow, and, having thus baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army, and the third day reached headquarters, where lord wellington, knowing his resolute, subtle character, had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent.”35

but danger from the main french army, under victor and lapisse, threatened the southern part of portugal. hearing of soult’s disaster, the french fell back again on183 talavera, where, facing them, was the ill-disciplined spanish army under cuesta. with the latter wellesley proposed to co-operate and advance against madrid. so he marched, after making arrangements for the defence of oporto, by abrantes and placencia, where the concentration with the other portuguese forces available was effected, to oropesa. there he was joined by cuesta, an old man of crabbed temper and of great self-conceit, and the combined army advanced on talavera.

here wellesley first had practical experience of the weakness of his spanish allies. the talk of their generals and officers “was like the maddest boastings of don quixote, their conduct in action was that of his squire.”36 supplies promised were not forthcoming. plundering was therefore far from uncommon, and the british army was by no means well disciplined at that time. even their own general recognised this. “the army,” he writes, “behaves terribly ill. they are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than sir john moore’s army could bear failure.... they plunder in all directions.” but they were only very raw soldiers after all, and hungry men are not easily kept in order when food exists, and they can have none of it unless they take it by force. at talavera, for example, the men had only “a few ounces of wheat in the grain throughout that day” of battle. cuesta obstinately took his own line, and suffered for it. he would not attack the french, when wellesley proposed to do so, but went to bed! taking the initiative himself afterwards, he was roughly handled, and fell back in disorder, but was finally persuaded to make a stand at talavera. the allies numbered some 53,000 men, with 100 guns, of which the british counted 19,000. the french, under the nominal supreme command of joseph, numbered 50,000 seasoned troops and 80 guns. these took the offensive. early in the day, some 10,000 of the spanish broke and fled, taking cuesta with them. whittingham, formerly the military attaché at baylen and now brigadier, helped to stop the gap thus made by bringing up some184 spanish battalions of stiffer metal. so the army held its own, the french fell sullenly back, and thus ended the first day’s battle.

at daybreak, the combat was renewed, and, owing to the intense heat of the day, somewhat intermittently. during one of these lulls, both combatants ran to assuage their thirst at a stream that ran between the armies, and conversed amicably until the bugler on both sides sounded the “fall in,” and the recent friends met again as foes. so the battle was renewed with varying fortune, until, as evening drew on, the french retired to their original position.

during the latter part of the day a vigorous cavalry charge was made by the 23rd light dragoons and arentschild’s hussars of the german legion on the head of a french column, but, meeting with a deep ravine, the former plunged confusedly into it; but they still managed to reach the enemy’s square, where they were practically annihilated, though they undoubtedly paralysed the enemy for a time. but arentschild, wiser in his generation, wheeled aside, exclaiming, “i will not kill my young mens.”

* * * * *

on the 29th july, crawford’s light division, the 42nd, 52nd, and 95th, joined the army after a march of forty-two miles in twenty-six hours, during which each carried sixty pounds’ weight, in a time of extreme heat, and went on outpost duty at once!37 verily they were men in those days, when khaki suits and sun-helmets were not.

the victory of talavera made sir arthur my lord viscount wellington, with a pension of ￡2000 a year, and placed its name on the colours of the 3rd dragoon guards, 14th hussars, 16th lancers, coldstream and scots guards, the 3rd, 7th, 24th, 29th, 31st, 40th, 45th, 48th, 53rd, 60th, 61st, 66th, 83rd, 87th, and 88th regiments of the line. a gold medal was also granted to all officers above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, who had served at corunna and talavera.

185 meanwhile, soult was again advancing, and now in great force, on placencia, which place he reached without opposition, as cuesta had failed to guard the ba?os pass as he had promised. wellington, unaware of this, marched to it; while the advance of joseph again rendered a retreat, in presence of such numbers, unavoidable. cuesta fell back, abandoning both spanish and british wounded to french generosity, which was not misplaced.

finally, the spanish were defeated in a series of small affairs, while wellington had crossed the tagus at arzobespo. winter quarters were taken up in the valley of the mondego, when the spaniards were defending ciudad rodrigo on the one hand, and beresford was covering almeida on the other; but the cessation of hostilities, in other parts of europe about this time, enabled napoleon to pour considerable reinforcements into the peninsula, and to attempt once again the invasion of portugal. then, by the summer of 1810, the french had three corps (victor, mortier, and sebastiani) in andalusia; joseph, with 24,000 men, in madrid; and three corps (ney, regnier, and junot), to be united under the “spoiled child of victory,” massena, who was selected to invade portugal, and prove that on this occasion, at all events, fortune was going to “spoil the child.” there were three roads by which this invasion could be effected,—from oporto, from badajoz, and from salamanca by almeida and the coa. this latter route was watched by crawford with some of the light division.

here occurred the first skirmishes along the coa, which were brilliant rather than useful; and the army, falling back before massena, who captured ciudad rodrigo and almeida, took up a position on the busaco sierra, as much with the view of restoring the morale of troops already becoming disheartened by retreat, as for checking the enemy. “it was, in fine, a political battle, and wellington afterwards called it a mistake.”38 the delay in attacking186 enabled wellington to further strengthen his position on the ridge, eight miles long, the flanks of which rested on the mondego on the right, and on some precipitous ravines on the left; and the french attack on it was conducted with the greatest boldness and impetuosity.

though strategically unnecessary, the battle is interesting tactically, as showing clearly the method of fighting frequently adopted, that of the defensive; and it compares the french columnar formation—the ranks of the companies being three deep, covered in their advance by skirmishers—with the linear formations of frederick the great and wellington. napier’s description of busaco is singularly vivid:—

“crawford, in a happy mood for command, made masterly dispositions. the tableland between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the 43rd and 52nd regiments drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile behind them, on higher ground and close to the convent, the german infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. in front of the british regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures in which ross’s guns were placed; and beyond them, the riflemen and ca?adores were placed as skirmishers, covering the slope of the mountain. while it was still dark, a straggling musketry fire was heard in the deep valley; and when the light broke, three heavy masses, detached from the sixth corps, were seen to enter the wood below and throw forward a profusion of skirmishers. one of them, under general marchand, emerging from the dark chasm and following the main road, seemed intent to turn the right of the light division; a second, under loison, made straight up the face of the mountain against the front; the third remained in reserve. simon’s brigade, leading loison’s attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity; and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed nor its speed in the least abated. ross’s guns187 were worked with incredible quickness, yet the range was palpably contracted every round. the enemy’s shot came singing up in a sharper key; the english skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, the artillery drew back, and the victorious cries of the french were heard within a few yards of the summit.

“crawford, standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of the attack; and now, with a shrill tone, ordered the two regiments in reserve to charge. the next moment, a horrid shout startled the french column, and 1800 british bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. yet so brave, so hardy were the leading french, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten men fell before them. not a frenchman had missed his mark—they could do no more. the head of the column was violently thrown back on the rear, both flanks were overlapped at the same moment by the english wings, then terrible discharges at five yards’ distance shattered the waving mass, and a long track of broken arms and bleeding carcases marked the line of fight.”

at this battle were engaged the 1st, 5th, 9th, 38th, 43rd, 45th, 52nd, 74th, 83rd, 88th, and the rifle brigade. during the pursuit and retreat, both armies plundered somewhat, and three men were hanged at leira by wellington for this crime; while skirmishes with the rearguard occurred frequently, showing that the armies were still in close touch.

this emphasises the prescience of wellington in preparing for this emergency. the temporary abandonment of spain was due entirely to one cause, and that he early and fully recognised. “i have no motive,” he writes, “for withdrawing the british army from spain, whether of a political or military nature, excepting that which i have stated to you in conversation—namely, a desire to relieve it from the privations of food which it has suffered since the 22nd of last month; privations which have reduced its strength, have188 destroyed the health of the soldiers, and have rendered the army comparatively inefficient.” writing after the battle of talavera, on the 31st july, he says: “it is positively a fact that during the last seven days the british army has not received one-third of its provisions, and that at this moment there are nearly four thousand wounded soldiers dying in hospital from want of common assistance and necessaries,” and this while the spanish army was well fed. in such a case, even an attempt at embarkation might have been disturbed even more seriously than at corunna, unless preparations to meet such an emergency were made, let alone the moral effect of such a withdrawal from the peninsula. hence, long before, the “lines of torres vedras” had been begun, and carried on with the greatest secrecy. massena was not aware, apparently, of their existence. those who did know, thought the works were merely for the protection of the capital, and to cover the embarkation if decided on. they were rather too extensive for either. they were in three lines, covering the five roads converging on lisbon; the outer line was twenty miles from lisbon, and twenty-nine miles long, extending from the tagus to the mouth of the zizambre; the second line, eight miles in rear, was twenty-four miles long, equally strongly fortified; the third line, which was to cover embarkation, enclosed an entrenched camp, with fort st. julian, a place of strength. in all there were one hundred and fifty redoubts, and six hundred guns; and british marines joined hands with the army and portuguese in defence, while british gunboats guarded the flanks of the torres vedras lines.

behind them, in all, were 130,000 combatants, of whom 70,000 were regulars.

massena made sundry partial efforts against the lines, and then fell back on a fortified position at santarem; while junot, after capturing badajoz and besieging cadiz, had left victor to continue the siege, and moved to join his chief; but he was turned back by the news that general graham had, by transferring a force from cadiz by sea, assailed the french lines at barrosa. the grenadiers, scots189 and coldstream guards, and the 28th, 67th, 87th, and rifle brigade distinguished themselves in the battle, and sergeant masterton, of the 87th, captured the first eagle taken in the peninsular war. thus to their former nickname of the “faugh-a-ballagh,” or “clear-the-way boys,” was possibly added that of the “aiglers.” the battle had lasted but one and a half hours when the french retired.

in the meantime, massena was steadily getting weaker, while his immediate adversary was getting reinforced; and he therefore determined on a retreat, which was “marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed.”39 wherever they bivouacked, “the scene was such as might have been looked for in a camp of predatory tartars, rather than in that of civilised people. food and forage, and skins of wine, and clothes, and church vestments, books and guitars, and all the bulkier articles of wasteful spoil were heaped together in their huts, with the planks and doors of the habitations which they had demolished. some of the men, retaining amidst this brutal service the characteristic activity and cleverness of their nation, fitted up their tents with hangings from their last scene of pillage, with a regard to comfort hardly to have been expected in their situation, and a love of gaiety only to be found in frenchmen.” it was not for four days that wellington was aware that the french were retreating; but as soon as he could concentrate, he commenced a pursuit, in which a series of brilliant skirmishes and rearguard actions were fought at pombal, redinha, condeixa, cazel nova, and foz d’aronce.

beresford was detached to besiege badajoz. at sabugal, which wellington describes as “one of the most glorious actions british troops were ever engaged in,” the 43rd, with four companies of riflemen, practically checked the whole of regnier’s corps, with artillery and cavalry added, and even captured one of the enemy’s howitzers.

these operations resulted in massena’s abandonment of portugal, and his retirement by ciudad rodrigo to salamanca,190 having lost thirty thousand men since he had crossed the frontier a year before.

throughout the whole of this campaign, the greatly, preponderating numbers of the french had been minimised by the usual jealousy and want of co-operation between the french marshals. only napoleon’s master-hand could keep them in hand, and make them work to a common end. the difference between the conduct of the war from the time he advanced by vittoria on madrid and dispersed the spanish armies, and that after his return to france, is too marked to require comment.