the german successes were continued in the north and midlands, and notwithstanding the gallant defence of sir george woolmer before manchester and sir henry hibbard before birmingham, both cities were captured and occupied by the enemy after terrible losses. london, however, was the chief objective of von kronhelm, and towards the metropolis he now turned his attention.

after the defeat of the british at chelmsford on that fateful wednesday, lord byfield decided to evacuate his position at royston and fall back on the northern section of the london defence line, which had been under construction for the last ten days. these hasty entrenchments, which would have been impossible to construct but for the ready assistance of thousands of all classes of the citizens of london and the suburbs, extended from tilbury on the east to bushey on the west, passing by the laindon hills, brentwood, kelvedon, north weald, epping, waltham abbey, cheshunt, enfield chase, chipping barnet, and elstree. they were more or less continuous, consisting for the most part of trenches for infantry, generally following the lines of existing hedgerows or banks, which often required but little improvement to transform them into well-protected and formidable cover for the defending troops. where it was necessary to cross open ground they were dug deep and winding, after the fashion adopted by the boers in the south african war, so that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enfilade them.

special bomb-proof covers for the local reserves were also constructed at various points, and the ground in front ruthlessly cleared of houses, barns, trees, hedges,[129] and everything that might afford shelter to an advancing enemy. every possible military obstacle was placed in front of the lines that time permitted, abattis, military pits, wire entanglements, and small ground mines. at the more important points along the fifty miles of entrenchments, field works and redoubts for infantry were built, most of them being armed with 4·7 or even 6 and 7·5 in. guns, which had been brought from woolwich, chatham, portsmouth, and devonport, and mounted on whatever carriages could be adapted or improvised for the occasion.

the preparation of the london lines was a stupendous undertaking, but the growing scarceness and dearness of provisions assisted in a degree, as no free rations were issued to any able-bodied man unless he went out to work at the fortifications. all workers were placed under military law. there were any number of willing workers who proffered their services in this time of peril. thousands of men came forward asking to be enlisted and armed. the difficulty was to find enough weapons and ammunition for them, to say nothing of the question of uniform and equipment, which loomed very large indeed. the attitude of the germans, as set forth in von kronhelm's proclamations, precluded the employment of fighting men dressed in civilian garb, and their attitude was a perfectly natural and justifiable one by all the laws and customs of war.

it became necessary, therefore, that all men sent to the front should be dressed as soldiers in some way or another. in addition to that splendid corps, the legion of frontiersmen, many new armed organisations had sprung into being, some bearing the most fantastic names, such as the "whitechapel war-to-the-knives," the "kensington cowboys," the "bayswater braves," and the "southwark scalphunters." all the available khaki and blue serge was used up in no time; even though those who were already in possession of ordinary lounge suits of the latter material were encouraged to have them altered into uniforms by the addition of stand-up collars and facings of various colours, according to their regiments and corps.

only the time during which these men were waiting for their uniforms was spent in drill in the open spaces of the metropolis. as soon as they were clothed, they were despatched to that portion of the entrenchments to[130] which their corps had been allocated, and there, in the intervals of their clearing and digging operations, they were hustled through a brief musketry course, which consisted for the most part in firing. the question of the provision of officers and n.c.o.'s was an almost insuperable one. retired men came forward on every side, but the supply was by no means equal to the demand, and they themselves in many instances were absolutely out of date as far as knowledge of modern arms and conditions were concerned. however, every one, with but very few exceptions, did his utmost, and by the 11th or 12th of the month the entrenchments were practically completed, and manned by upwards of 150,000 "men with muskets" of stout heart and full of patriotism, but in reality nothing but an army pour rire so far as efficiency was concerned.

the greater part of the guns were also placed in position, especially on the north and eastern portions of the lines, and the remainder were being mounted as fast as it was practicable. they were well manned by volunteer and militia artillerymen, drawn from every district which the invaders had left accessible. by the 13th the eastern section of the fortifications was strengthened by the arrival of the remnants of the ist and vth army corps, which had been so badly defeated at chelmsford, and no time was lost in reorganising them and distributing them along the lines, thereby, to a certain extent, leavening the unbaked mass of their improvised defenders. it was generally expected that the enemy would follow up the success by an immediate attack on brentwood, the main barrier between von kronhelm and his objective—our great metropolis. but, as it turned out, he had a totally different scheme in hand. the orders to lord byfield to evacuate the position he had maintained with such credit against the german garde and ivth corps have already been referred to. their reason was obvious. now that there was no organised resistance on his right, he stood in danger of being cut off from london, the defences of which were now in pressing need of his men. a large amount of rolling stock was at once despatched to saffron walden and buntingford by the g.e.r. and to baldock by the g.n.r., to facilitate the withdrawal of his troops and stores, and he was given an absolutely free hand as to how these were to be used, all lines being kept clear[131] and additional trains kept at his disposal at their london termini.

the lines of london rough sketch showing approximately the lines of entrenchments constructed for the defence of the metropolis. the lines of london

rough sketch showing approximately the lines of entrenchments constructed for the defence of the metropolis.

september 13 proved a memorable date in the history of england.

the evacuation of the baldock-saffron walden position could not possibly have been carried out in good order on such short notice, had not lord byfield previously worked the whole thing out in readiness. he could not help feeling that, despite his glorious victory on the ninth, a turn of fortune's wheel might necessitate a retirement on london sooner or later, and, like the good general that he was, he made every preparation both for this, and other eventualities. among other details, he had arranged that the mounted infantry should be provided with plenty of strong light wire. this was intended for the express benefit of fr?lich's formidable cavalry brigade, which he foresaw would be most dangerous to his command in the event of a retreat. as soon, therefore, as the retrograde movement commenced, the mounted infantry began to stretch their wires across every road, lane and byway leading to the north and north-east. some wires were laid low, within a foot of the ground, others high up, where they could catch a rider about the neck or breast. this operation they carried out again and again, after the troops had passed, at various points on the route of the retreat. thanks to the darkness, this device well fulfilled its purpose. fr?lich's brigade was on the heels of the retreating british soon after midnight, but as it was impossible for[132] them to move over the enclosed country at night, his riders were confined to the roads, and the accidents and delays occasioned by the wires were so numerous and disconcerting that their advance had to be conducted with such caution that as a pursuit it was of no use at all. even the infantry and heavy guns of the retiring british got over the ground nearly twice as fast. after two or three hours of this, only varied by occasional volleys from detachments of our mounted infantry, who sometimes waited in rear of their snares to let fly at the german cavalry before galloping back to lay others, the enemy recognised the fact, and, withdrawing their cavalry till daylight, replaced them by infantry, but so much time had been lost, that the british had got several miles' start.

as has been elsewhere chronicled, the brigade of four regular battalions with their guns, and a company of engineers which were to secure the passage of the stort and protect the left flank of the retirement, left saffron walden somewhere about 10.30 p.m. the line was clear, and they arrived at sawbridgeworth in four long trains in a little under an hour. their advent did not arouse the sleeping village, as the station lies nearly three-quarters of a mile distant on the further side of the river. it may be noted in passing that while the stort is but a small stream, easily fordable in most places, yet it was important, if possible, to secure the bridges to prevent delay in getting over the heavy guns and waggons of the retiring british. a delay and congestion at the points selected for passage might, with a close pursuit, easily lead to disaster. moreover, the great eastern railway crossed the river by a wooden bridge just north of the village of sawbridgeworth, and it was necessary to ensure the safe passage of the last trains over it before destroying it to preclude the use of the railway by the enemy.

there were two road bridges on the great eastern railway near the village of sawbridgeworth, which might be required by the dunmow force, which was detailed to protect the same flank rather more to the northward. the most important bridge, that over which the main body of the saffron walden force was to retire, with all the impedimenta it had had time to bring away with it, was between sawbridgeworth and harlow, about a mile north of the latter village, but much nearer its[133] station. thither, then, proceeded the leading train with the grenadiers, four 4·7 guns, and half a company of royal engineers with bridging materials. their task was to construct a second bridge to relieve the traffic over the permanent one. the grenadiers left one company at the railway station, two in harlow village, which they at once commenced to place in a state of defence, much to the consternation of the villagers, who had not realised how close to them were trending the red footsteps of war. the remaining five companies with the other four guns turned northward, and after marching another mile or so occupied the enclosures round durrington house and the higher ground to its north. here the guns were halted on the road. it was too dark to select the best position for them, for it was now only about half an hour after midnight. the three other regiments which detrained at sawbridgeworth were disposed as follows, continuing the line of the grenadiers to the northward. the rifles occupied hyde hall, formerly the seat of the earls of roden, covering the operations of the engineers, who were preparing the railway bridge for destruction, and the copses about little hyde hall on the higher ground to the eastward.

the scots guards with four guns were between them and the grenadiers, and distributed between sheering village and gladwyns house, from the neighbourhood of which it was expected that the guns would be able to command the chelmsford road for a considerable distance. the seaforth highlanders for the time being were stationed on a road running parallel to the railway, from which branch roads led to both the right, left, and centre of the position. an advanced party of the rifle brigade was pushed forward to hatfield heath with instructions to patrol towards the front and flanks, and, if possible, establish communication with the troops expected from dunmow. by the time all this was completed it was getting on for 3 a.m. on the 13th. at this hour the advanced guard of the germans coming from chelmsford was midway between leaden roding and white roding, while the main body was crossing the small river roding by the shallow ford near the latter village. their few cavalry scouts were, however, exploring the roads and lanes some little way ahead. a collision was imminent. the dunmow force had[134] not been able to move before midnight, and, with the exception of one regular battalion, the 1st leinsters, which was left behind to the last and crowded into the only train available, had only just arrived at the northern edge of hatfield forest, some four miles directly north of hatfield heath. the leinsters, who left dunmow by train half an hour later, had detrained at this point at one o'clock, and just about three had met the patrols of the rifles. a yeomanry corps from dunmow was also not far off, as it turned to its left at the cross-roads east of takely, and was by this time in the neighbourhood of hatfield broad oak. in short, all three forces were converging, but the bulk of the dunmow force was four miles away from the point of convergence.

it was still profoundly dark when the rifles at hatfield heath heard a dozen shots cracking through the darkness to their left front. almost immediately other reports resounded from due east. nothing could be seen beyond a very few yards, and the men of the advanced company drawn up at the cross-roads in front of the village inn fancied they now and again saw figures dodging about in obscurity, but were cautioned not to fire till their patrols had come in, for it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe. shots still rattled out here and there to the front. about ten minutes later the captain in command, having got in his patrols, gave the order to fire at a black blur that seemed to be moving towards them on the chelmsford road. there was no mistake this time. the momentary glare of the discharge flashed on the shiny "pickel-haubes" of a detachment of german infantry, who charged forward with a loud "hoch!" the riflemen, who already had their bayonets fixed, rushed to meet them, and for a few moments there was a fierce stabbing affray in the blackness of the night. the germans, who were but few in number, were overpowered, and beat a retreat, having lost several of their men. the rifles, according to their orders, having made sure of the immediate proximity of the enemy, now fell back to the rest of their battalion at little hyde hall, and all along the banks and hedges which covered the british front, our men, rifle in hand, peered eagerly into the darkness ahead of them.

nothing happened for quite half an hour, and the[135] anxious watchers were losing some of their alertness, when a heavy outburst of firing re-echoed from hatfield heath. to explain this we must return to the germans. von der rudesheim, on obtaining touch with the british, at once reinforced his advanced troops, and they, a whole battalion strong, advanced into the hamlet meeting with no resistance. almost simultaneously two companies of the leinsters entered it from the northward. there was a sudden and unexpected collision on the open green, and a terrible fire was exchanged at close quarters, both sides losing very heavily. the british, however, were borne back by sheer weight of numbers, and, through one of those unfortunate mistakes that insist on occurring in warfare, were charged as they fell back by the leading squadrons of the yeomanry who were coming up from hatfield broad oak. the officer commanding the leinsters decided to wait till it was a little lighter before again attacking the village. he considered that, as he had no idea of the strength of the enemy, he had best wait till the arrival of the troops now marching through hatfield forest. von der rudesheim, on his part, mindful of his instructions, determined to try to hold the few scattered houses on the north side of the heath which constituted the village, with the battalion already in it, and push forward with the remainder of his force towards harlow. his first essay along the direct road via sheering was repulsed by the fire of the scots guards lining the copses about gladwyns. he now began to have some idea of the british position, and made his preparations to assault it at daybreak.

to this end he sent forward two of his batteries into hatfield heath, cautiously moved the rest of his force away to the left, arranged his battalions in the valley of the pincey brook ready for attacking sheering and gladwyns, placed one battalion in reserve at down hall, and stationed his remaining battery near newman's end. by this time there was beginning to be a faint glimmer of daylight in the east, and, as the growing dawn began to render vague outlines of the nearer objects dimly discernible, hell broke loose along the peaceful countryside. a star shell fired from the battery at newman's end burst and hung out a brilliant white blaze that fell slowly over sheering village, lighting up its walls and roofs and the hedges along which lay its[136] defenders, was the signal for the devil's dance to begin. twelve guns opened with a crash from hatfield heath, raking the gladwyns enclosures and the end of sheering village with a deluge of shrapnel, whilst an almost solid firing line advanced rapidly against it, firing heavily.

battle of harlow 1st phase about 5 a m sept 13th battle of harlow

1st phase

about 5 a m sept 13th

the[137] british replied lustily with gun, rifle, and maxim, the big high-explosive shells bursting amid the advancing germans and among the houses of hatfield heath with telling effect. but the german assaulting lines had but six or seven hundred yards to go. they had been trained above all things to ignore losses and to push on at all hazards. the necessity for this had not been confused in their minds by maxims about the importance of cover, so the south side of the village street was taken at a rush. von der rudesheim continued to pile on his men, and, fighting desperately, the guardsmen were driven from house to house and from fence to fence. all this time the german battery at newman's end continued to fire star shells with rhythmical regularity, lighting up the inflamed countenances of the living combatants, and the pale up-turned faces of the dead turned to heaven as if calling for vengeance on their slayers. in the midst of this desperate fighting the leinsters, supported by a volunteer and a militia regiment, which had just come up, assaulted hatfield heath. the germans were driven out of it with the loss of a couple of their guns, but hung on to the little church, around which such a desperate conflict was waged that the dead above ground in that diminutive god's acre outnumbered the "rude forefathers of the hamlet" who slept below.

it was now past five o'clock in the morning, and by this time strong reinforcements might have been expected from dunmow, but, with the exception of the militia and volunteer battalions just referred to, who had pushed on at the sound of the firing, none were seen coming up. the fact was that they had been told off to certain positions in the line of defence they had been ordered to take up, and had been slowly and carefully installing themselves therein. their commanding officer, sir jacob stellenbosch, thought that he must carry out the exact letter of the orders he had received from lord byfield, and paid little attention to the firing except to hustle his battalion commanders, to try to get them into their places as soon as possible. he was a pig-headed man into the bargain, and would listen to no remonstrance. the two battalions which had arrived so opportunely had been at the head of the column, and had pushed forward "on their own" before he could prevent them. at this time the position was as follows:[138] one german battalion was hanging obstinately on to the outskirts of hatfield heath; two were in possession of the copses about gladwyns; two were in sheering village, or close up to it, and the sixth was still in reserve at down hall. on the british side the rifles were in their original position at little hyde hall where also were three guns, which had been got away from gladwyns. the seaforths had come up, and were now firing from about quickbury, while the scots guards, after suffering fearful losses, were scattered, some with the highlanders, others with the five companies of the grenadiers, who with their four guns still fought gallantly on between sheering and durrington house.