a despatch from mr. edgar hamilton to the "daily news," as follows, was published on saturday, 15th september:

"at little waltham i found myself close to the scene of action. about a mile ahead of me the hamlet of howe street was in flames and burning furiously. i could see the shells bursting in and all over it in perfect coveys. i could not make out where they were coming from, but an officer i met said he thought the enemy must have several batteries in action on the high ground about littley green, a mile and a half to the north on the opposite side of the river. i crossed over myself, and got up on the knoll where the leicestershires and dorsets had been stationed, together with a number of the 4·7-inch guns brought from colchester.

"this piece of elevated ground is about two miles long, running almost north and south, and at the top of it i got an extensive view to the eastward right away to beyond witham, as the ground fell all the way. the country was well wooded, and a perfect maze of trees and hedgerows. if there were any germans down there in this plain they were lying very low indeed, for my glasses did not discover the least indication of their presence. due east my view was bounded by the high wooded ground about wickham bishops and tiptree heath, which lay a long blue hummock on the horizon, while to the south-east danbury hill, with our big war-balloon floating overhead, was plainly discernible.

"while i gazed on the apparently peaceful landscape i was startled by a nasty, sharp hissing sound, which came momentarily nearer. it seemed to pass over my head, and was followed by a loud bang in the air, where now hung a ring of white smoke. it was a shell[119] from the enemy. just ahead of me was a somewhat extensive wood; and, urged by some insane impulse of seeking shelter, i left the car, which i ordered my chauffeur to take back for a mile and wait, and made for the close-standing trees. if i had stopped to think i should have realised that the wood gave me actually no protection whatever, and i had not gone far when the crashing of timber and noise of the bursting projectiles overhead and in the undergrowth around made me understand clearly that the germans were making a special target of the wood, which, i imagine, they thought might conceal some of our troops. i wished heartily that i was seated beside my chauffeur in his fast-receding car.

"however, my first object was to get clear of the wood again, and after some little time i emerged on the west side, right in the middle of a dressing station for the wounded, which had been established in a little hollow. two surgeons, with their assistants, were already busily engaged with a number of wounded men, most of whom were badly hit by shrapnel bullets about the upper part of the body. i gathered from one or two of the few most slightly wounded men that our people had been, and were, very hardly put to it to hold their own. 'i reckon,' said one of them, a bombardier of artillery, 'that the enemy must have got more than a hundred guns firing at us, and at howe street village. if we could only make out where the foreign devils were,' continued my informant, 'our chaps could have knocked a good many of them out with our four-point-sevens, especially if we could have got a go at them before they got within range themselves. but they must have somehow contrived to get them into position during the night, for we saw nothing of them coming up. they are somewhere about chatley, fairstead lodge, and little leighs, but as we can't locate them exactly, and only have ten guns up here, it don't give us much chance, does it?' later i saw an officer of the dorsets, who confirmed the gunner's story, but added that our people were well entrenched and the guns well concealed, so that none of the latter had been put out of action, and he thought we should be able to hold on to the hill all right. i regained my car without further adventure, bar several narrow escapes from stray shell, and made my way back as quickly as possible to chelmsford.[120]

"the firing went on all day, not only to the northward, but also away to the southward, where the saxons, while not making any determined attack, kept the vth corps continually on the alert, and there was an almost continuous duel between the heavy pieces. as it appeared certain that the knoll i had visited in the forenoon was the main objective of the enemy's attack, reinforcements had been more than once sent up there, but the german shell fire was so heavy that they found it almost impossible to construct the additional cover required. several batteries of artillery were despatched to pleshy and rolphy green to keep down, if possible, the fire of the germans, but it seemed to increase rather than diminish. they must have had more guns in action than they had at first. just at dusk their infantry had made the first openly offensive movement.

"several lines of skirmishers suddenly appeared in the valley between little leighs and chatley, and advanced towards lyonshall wood, at the north end of the knoll east of little waltham. they were at first invisible from the british gun positions on the other side of the chelmer, and when they cleared the spur on which hyde hall stands they were hardly discernible in the gathering darkness. the dorsetshire and the other battalions garrisoning the knoll manned their breastworks as they got within rifle range, and opened fire, but they were still subjected to the infernal rafale from the hanoverian guns on the hills to the northward, and to make matters worse at this critical moment the xth corps brought a long line of guns into action between flacks green and great leighs wood, in which position none of the british guns except a few on the knoll itself could reach them. under this cross hurricane of projectiles the british fire was quite beaten down, and the germans followed up their skirmishers by almost solid masses, which advanced with all but impunity save for the fire of the few british long-range guns at pleshy mount. there they were firing almost at random, as the gunners could not be certain of the exact whereabouts of their objectives. there was a searchlight on the knoll, but at the first sweep of its ray it was absolutely demolished by a blizzard of shrapnel. every german gun was turned upon it. the hanoverian battalions now swarmed to the assault, disregarding the gaps made in their ranks by the magazine fire of the defenders as[121] soon as their close advance masked the fire of their own cannon.

battle of chelmsford. position on the evening of september 11. battle of chelmsford.

position on the evening of september 11.

"the british fought desperately. three several times they hurled back at the attackers, but, alas! we were overborne by sheer weight of numbers. reinforcements summoned by telephone, as soon as the determined nature of the attack was apparent, were hurried up from every available source, but they only arrived in time to be carried down the hill again in the rush of its defeated defenders, and to share with them the storm of projectiles from the quick-firers of general von kronhelm's artillery, which had been pushed forward during the assault. it was with the greatest difficulty that the[122] shattered and disorganised troops were got over the river at little waltham. as it was, hundreds were drowned in the little stream, and hundreds of others killed and wounded by the fire of the germans. they had won the first trick. this was indisputable, and as ill news travels apace, a feeling of gloom fell upon our whole force, for it was realised that the possession of the captured knoll would enable the enemy to mass troops almost within effective rifle range of our river line of defence. i believe that it was proposed by some officers on the staff that we should wheel back our left and take up a fresh position during the night. this was overruled, as it was recognised that to do so would enable the enemy to push in between the dunmow force and our own, and so cut our general line in half. all that could be done was to get up every available gun and bombard the hill during the night in order to hamper the enemy in his preparations for further forward movement and in his entrenching operations.

"had we more men at our disposal i suppose there is little doubt that a strong counter-attack would have been made on the knoll almost immediately; but in the face of the enormous numbers opposed to us, i imagine that general blennerhasset did not feel justified in denuding any portion of our position of its defenders. so all through the dark hours the thunder of the great guns went on. in spite of the cannonade the germans turned on no less than three searchlights from the southern end of the knoll about midnight. two were at once put out by our fire, but the third managed to exist for over half an hour, and enabled the germans to see how hard we were working to improve our defences along the river bank. i am afraid that they were by this means able to make themselves acquainted with the positions of a great number of our trenches. during the night our patrols reported being unable to penetrate beyond pratt's farm, mount maskell, and porter's farm on the colchester road. everywhere they were forced back by superior numbers. the enemy were fast closing in upon us. it was a terrible night in chelmsford.

"there was panic on every hand. a man mounted the tindal statue and harangued the crowd, urging the people to rise and compel the government to stop the war. a few young men endeavoured to load the old crimean cannon in front of the shire hall, but found it clogged with rust and useless. people fled from the villa residences in brentwood road into the town for safety, now that the enemy were upon them. the banks in high street were being barricaded, and the stores still remaining in the various grocers' shops, luckin smith's, martin's, cramphorn's, and pearke's, were rapidly being concealed from the invaders. all the ambulance waggons entering the town were filled with wounded, although as many as possible were sent south by train. by one o'clock in the morning, however, most of the civilian inhabitants had fled. the streets were empty, but for the bivouacking troops and the never-ending procession of wounded men. the general and his staff were deliberating to a late hour in the shire hall, at which he had established his headquarters. the booming of the guns waxed and waned till dawn, when a furious outburst announced that the second act of the tragedy was about to open.

[123]

decree

concerning the power of councils of war.

we, governor-general of east anglia, in virtue of the powers conferred upon us by his imperial majesty the german emperor, commander-in-chief of the german armies, order, for the maintenance of the internal and external security of the counties of the government-general:—

article i.—any individual guilty of incendiarism or of wilful inundation, of attack, or of resistance with violence against the government-general or the agents of the civil or military authorities, of sedition, of pillage, of theft with violence, of assisting prisoners to escape, or of exciting soldiers to treasonable acts, shall be punished by death.

in the case of any extenuating circumstances, the culprit may be sent to penal servitude with hard labour for twenty years.

article ii.—any person provoking or inciting an individual to commit the crimes mentioned in article i. will be sent to penal servitude with hard labour for ten years.

article iii.—any person propagating false reports relative to the operations of war or political events will be imprisoned for one year, and fined up to ￡100.

in any case where the affirmation or propagation may cause prejudice against the german army, or against any authorities or functionaries established by it, the culprit will be sent to hard labour for ten years.

article iv.—any person usurping a public office, or who commits any act or issues any order in the name of a public functionary, will be imprisoned for five years, and fined ￡150.

article v.—any person who voluntarily destroys or abstracts any documents, registers, archives, or public documents deposited in public offices, or passing through their hands in virtue of their functions as government or civic officials, will be imprisoned for two years, and fined ￡150.

article vi.—any person obliterating, damaging, or tearing down official notices, orders, or proclamations of any sort issued by the german authorities will be imprisoned for six months, and fined ￡80.

article vii.—any resistance or disobedience of any order given in the interests of public security by military commanders and other authorities, or any provocation or incitement to commit such disobedience, will be punished by one year's imprisonment, or a fine of not less than ￡150.

article viii.—all offences enumerated in articles i.—vii. are within the jurisdiction of the councils of war.

article ix.—it is within the competence of councils of war to adjudicate upon all other crimes and offences against the internal and external security of the english provinces occupied by the german army, and also upon all crimes against the military or civil authorities, or their agents, as well as murder, the fabrication of false money, of blackmail, and all other serious offences.

article x.—independent of the above, the military jurisdiction already proclaimed will remain in force regarding all actions tending to imperil the security of the german troops, to damage their interests, or to render assistance to the army of the british government.

consequently, there will be punished by death, and we expressly repeat this, all persons who are not british soldiers and—

(a) who serve the british army or the government as spies, or receive british spies, or give them assistance or asylum.

(b) who serve as guides to british troops, or mislead the german troops when charged to act as guides.

(c) who shoot, injure, or assault any german soldier or officer.

(d) who destroy bridges or canals, interrupt railways or telegraph lines, render roads impassable, burn munitions of war, provisions, or quarters of the troops.

(e) who take arms against the german troops.

article xi.—the organisation of councils of war mentioned in articles viii. and ix. of the law of may 2, 1870, and their procedure are regulated by special laws which are the same as the summary jurisdiction of military tribunals. in the case of article x. there remains in force the law of july 21, 1867, concerning the military jurisdiction applicable to foreigners.

article xii.—the present order is proclaimed and put into execution on the morrow of the day upon which it is affixed in the public places of each town and village, the governor-general of east anglia,

count von schonburg-waldenberg,

lieutenant-general.

norwich, september 7th, 1910.

decree concerning the power of councils of war.

"i[124] had betaken myself at once to the round tower of the church, next the stone bridge, from which i had an excellent view both east and north. the first thing that attracted my eye was the myriad flashings of rifle fire in the dimness of the breaking day. they reached in a continuous line of coruscations from boreham hall, opposite my right hand, to the knoll by little waltham, a distance of three or four miles, i should say. the enemy were driving in all our outlying and advanced troops by sheer weight of numbers. presently the heavy batteries at danbury began pitching shell over in the direction of the firing, but as the german line still advanced, it had not apparently any very great effect. the next thing that happened was a determined attack on the village of howe street made from the direction of hyde hall. this is about two miles north of little waltham. in spite of our incessant fire, the germans had contrived to mass a tremendous number of guns and howitzers on and behind the knoll they captured last night, and there was any quantity more on the ridge above hyde hall. all these terrible weapons concentrated their fire for a few moments on the blackened ruins of howe street. not a mouse could have lived there. the little place was simply pulverised.

"our guns at pleshy mount and rolphy green, aided by a number of field batteries, in vain endeavoured to make head against them. they were outnumbered by[125] six to one. under cover of this tornado of iron and fire, the enemy pushed several battalions over the river, making use of the ruins of the many bridges about there which had been hastily destroyed, and which they repaired with planks and other materials they brought along with them. they lost a large number of men in the process, but they persevered, and by ten o'clock were in complete possession of howe street, langley's park, and great waltham, and moving in fighting formation against pleshy mount and rolphy green, their guns covering their advance with a perfectly awful discharge of shrapnel. our cannon on the ridge at partridge green took the attackers in flank, and for a time checked their advance, but, drawing upon themselves the attention of the german artillery, on the south end of the knoll, were all but silenced.

"as soon as this was effected another strong column of germans followed in the footsteps of the first, and deploying to the left, secured the bridge at little waltham, and advanced against the gun positions on partridge green. this move turned all our river bank entrenchments right down to chelmsford. their defenders were now treated to the enfilade fire of a number of hanoverian batteries that galloped down to little waltham. they stuck to their trenches gallantly, but presently when the enemy obtained a footing on partridge green they were taken in reverse, and compelled to fall back, suffering terrible losses as they did so. the whole of the infantry of the xth corps, supported—as we understand—by a division which had joined them from maldon, now moved down on chelmsford. in fact, there was a general advance of the three combined armies stretching from partridge green on the west to the railway line on the east. the defenders of the trenches facing east were hastily withdrawn, and thrown back on writtle. the germans followed closely with both infantry and guns, though they were for a time checked near scot's green by a dashing charge of our cavalry brigade, consisting of the 16th lancers and the 7th, 14th, and 20th hussars, and the essex and middlesex yeomanry. we saw nothing of their cavalry, for a reason that will be apparent later. by one o'clock fierce fighting was going on all round the town, the german hordes enveloping it on all sides but one. we had lost a great number of our guns, or at[126] any rate had been cut off from them by the german successes around pleshy mount, and in all their assaults on the town they had been careful to keep out of effective range of the heavy batteries on danbury hill. these, by the way, had their own work cut out for them, as the saxon artillery were heavily bombarding the hill with their howitzers. the british forces were in a critical situation. reinforcements—such as could be spared—were hurried up from the vth army corps, but they were not very many in numbers, as it was necessary to provide against an attack by the saxon corps. by three o'clock the greater part of the town was in the hands of the germans, despite the gallant way in which our men fought them from street to street, and house to house. a dozen fires were spreading in every direction, and fierce fighting was going on at writtle. the overpowering numbers of the germans, combined with their better organisation, and the number of properly trained officers at their disposal, bore the british mixed regular and irregular forces back, and back again.

"fearful of being cut off from his line of retreat, general blennerhasset, on hearing from writtle soon after three that the hanoverians were pressing his left very hard, and endeavouring to work round it, reluctantly gave orders for the troops in chelmsford to fall back on widford and moulsham. there was a lull in the fighting for about half an hour, though firing was going on both at writtle and danbury. soon after four a terrible rumour spread consternation on every side. according to this, an enormous force of cavalry and motor infantry was about to attack us in the rear. what had actually happened was not quite so bad as this, but quite bad enough. it seems, according to our latest information, that almost the whole of the cavalry belonging to the three german army corps with whom we were engaged—something like a dozen regiments, with a proportion of horse artillery and all available motorists, having with them several of the new armoured motors carrying light, quick-firing and machine guns—had been massed during the last thirty-six hours behind the saxon lines extending from maldon to the river crouch. during the day they had worked round to the southward, and at the time the rumour reached us were actually attacking billericay, which was held by a portion of the reserves of our vth corps. by the time[127] this news was confirmed the germans were assaulting great baddow, and moving on danbury from east, north, and west, at the same time resuming the offensive all along the line. the troops at danbury must be withdrawn or they would be isolated. this difficult man?uvre was executed by way of west hanningfield. the rest of the vth corps conformed to the movement, the guards brigade at east hanningfield forming the rearguard, and fighting fiercely all night through with the saxon troops, who moved out on the left flank of our retreat. the wreck of the first corps and the colchester garrison was now also in full retirement. ten miles lay between it and the lines at brentwood, and had the germans been able to employ cavalry in pursuit, this retreat would have been even more like a rout than it was. luckily for us the billericay troops mauled the german cavalry pretty severely, and they were beset in the close country in that neighbourhood by volunteers, motorists, and every one that the officer commanding at brentwood could get together in this emergency.

"some of them actually got upon our line of retreat, but were driven off by our advance guard; others came across the head of the retiring vth corps, but the terrain was all against cavalry, and after nightfall most of them had lost their way in the maze of lanes and hedgerows that covered the countryside. had it not been for this we should probably have been absolutely smashed. as it was, rather more than half our original numbers of men and guns crawled into brentwood in the early morning, worn out and dead-beat."

reports from sheffield also showed the position to be critical.