i have mentioned in an earlier chapter how general st?ssel was recalled from port arthur in june, and i will now explain the circumstances under which this happened.

when the japanese began landing, and in particular after the débacle at kinchou, st?ssel began showering telegrams on kuropatkin, in which he made out affairs to be very critical, and implored for help. later he sent lieutenant-colonel gurko, of the general staff, who was on the fortress staff, to him with despatches. (before this prince gantimuroff had succeeded in breaking through and returning with despatches.) when gurko left he reported his departure to the commandant, and—knowing well what st?ssel was like—asked if smirnoff wished him to give any particular reports to the commander-in-chief.

'tell him,' said smirnoff, 'everything that you have seen. and if you hear that they want to make a separate command of the district, tell him the best man for it is general subotin, who knows the peninsula thoroughly.'

in june captain odintsoff was also sent to the north by st?ssel with very alarming despatches, and he also, in reporting his departure to smirnoff, was given the same instructions. after reading these despatches, and[pg 174] hearing from odintsoff a corroboration of what he had heard from gurko, kuropatkin came to the conclusion that st?ssel must be ill. but before deciding to recall him he consulted others, and after their reply he had no option left him as to how to act. he decided with great regret that he must sever his friendly relations with st?ssel, which dated from the time when they had been boys together in the 1st cadet corps, and when he used to spend his holidays at the latter's home. realizing that it was inevitable, he made up his mind to recall his old comrade, but before doing so he unfortunately made for him the appointment of officer commanding the district.

on june 18 he sent two cypher messages to arthur, one addressed to st?ssel, ordering him to hand over everything to smirnoff and leave the place, and the other to smirnoff. the former, having received both of them, concealed their existence. shortly afterwards two more telegrams from kuropatkin to him and smirnoff were received, brought by a subaltern officer of the reserve on the lieutenant burakoff. this time general st?ssel came to the conclusion that silence could not longer be kept and that he must act, so he destroyed the messages to smirnoff, and sent the following letter to kuropatkin:

'your despatch of july 2 was handed to me on the positions as i was repelling an attack in force by the enemy. i was anxious to leave arthur, but as things are at present i consider my presence here essential for the good of the fatherland and our troops. every one here knows me, chinese as well as russians, and they trust me, knowing that the japanese will never get into the place save over my dead body. neither fock nor nickitin believes in general smirnoff, who is unknown to the officers and men, and who calls the latter cowards. he may be all right in his way, but he is a professor and not a fighting general. if you are determined that i should come to liao-yang, i will do so on receipt of fresh instructions to that effect from you.'

pic

on the attacked front: after an attack.

[pg 175]

meanwhile, as might have been expected, the enemy were not going to wait for the reply to this to come, and, having cut our communications at kinchou, they occupied dalny, and before the letter reached liao-yang general nogi had begun to operate on green hills. st?ssel, of course, was not very sure as to its reception and whether good or evil would result to him. taking advantage, however, of it being a time of war, he now began reporting direct to the tsar, to whom he sent telegrams describing an absolutely untrue condition of affairs. he turned the defeats and retirements in the district into victories, and telegrams of congratulation began to come in from their imperial majesties.

on the night of the 23rd, the japanese made the most desperate of all their attacks so far. they made three separate and most determined assaults on zaredoubt battery, on the line between it and big eagle's nest, and on ruchevsky battery. though temporarily successful at one or two points, they were finally driven back out of all with shocking slaughter. they then again concentrated a gun-fire on these points, and our men took whatever cover they could find, anxiously awaiting a fourth assault which did not take place. when the sun rose the heaps of corpses in front of the works were revealed. in the heat the smell from them was appalling: even the cotton wool with which our men had plugged their nostrils was not of much avail.

with regard to the firing from the battery on golden hill[21] a rather amusing incident occurred. as prematurely bursting iron shells from this battery had somewhat endangered general st?ssel he gave orders that it was not to fire. major-general biely, commanding the fortress artillery, thereupon reported to smirnoff that the 11-inch howitzers were not to be used, notwithstanding the damage they were doing to the enemy.

[pg 176]

'well, let us go to st?ssel,' said smirnoff; 'you tell him that in future you will use steel shells.'

they accordingly went to the officer commanding the district and found him very indignant about the premature bursts of the iron shells.

'may i use steel shells, sir, instead?' asked biely.

'will they be all right?'

'oh, yes.'

'very well, but are you sure?'

smirnoff energetically supported biely and they went out.

'that's splendid,' said smirnoff, rubbing his hands; 'now you use the iron ones as before because you have not got enough steel shells for the battery, and remember—if there are any premature bursts they are the enemy's!'

biely did this with the result that golden hill continued to be of great service to us, while the occasional premature bursts, which still continued, were put down to the japanese. st?ssel was quite pacified, but, unfortunately, soon found out that he had been deceived, and roundly abused smirnoff to his suite. he did not interfere, however, as the hill was undoubtedly a great check to the enemy.

the night assault on august 23 on the centre of the north-east front was the finale of the assaults in august, and what general nogi had said to the correspondent of the daily mail when he first saw him: 'you have arrived most luckily, just at the right time, neither too late nor too soon, you will see the end of our victorious campaign,' was not justified by the event.

the results of the eight days' desperate fighting were inconsiderable. on the western front we had lost angle hill and its foot-hills, and pan-lun-shan redoubt remained neutral. on the eastern front we had lost redoubts nos. 1 and 2, but only after an incessant and awful[pg 177] bombardment and most bloody assaults, which cost the japanese 22,000 killed and wounded. however, they at last learnt that the capture of arthur was not all plain sailing. they realized that russians were not chinese, and it was a complete surprise to them that the fortress which in january might have been captured by a coup de main had grown into a stronghold against which tens of thousands of men had perished. proud in the knowledge of their superiority, they had on august 16 suggested that we should capitulate, but upon counting up their losses at a council of war on the 26th, they came to the sorrowful conclusion that it would be yet some time before they took the place.

expecting to hear at any moment of the fall of arthur, japan had been preparing lanterns and flags to celebrate a great national holiday; but at last she had to confess that, although russians are by nature negligent and careless, they can in moments of emergency do wonders. in the country of the rising sun complaints were raised that the besieging army was not making such progress as it should, and the dissatisfaction almost turned into something worse. the government of the mikado acted wisely and promptly, proposing that those who were discontented should go and join the besieging army in order to replace casualties and show how things ought to be done. the amour-propre of the proud japanese, especially the samurai, was touched, and whole transports filled with volunteers came to the kwantun peninsula.

later, when the chinese reported that these newly arrived recruits, which included many old men and mere boys, were being drilled and trained in the lunwantun valley, our battleships and electric cliff shelled them at long range, just to remind them that arthur was not yet dead; when the october assault was repulsed, we found amongst the killed and wounded numbers[pg 178] of old and very young men. strong, indeed, must have been the spirit of the nation, which in the moment of trial could back up its discontent by example and action. during my residence in japan before the war, i had ventured to write that the japanese were a nation with a great future; but i was laughed at.

on the 25th, big hill, little eagle's nest and b battery were bombarded, and the enemy were seen to be concentrating behind sugar hill. during the night a sortie was made from 203 metre hill to recover the guns left on angle hill, but we could not bring them in, so they were blown up. the japanese were now entrenched along the foot-hills of angle hill, and on the ridge joining angle hill with 203 metre hill, and had mounted some thirty guns near two villages.[22] a force of infantry and cavalry also was concentrated north of pigeon bay. i rode round with the commandant on the 25th on his tour round the north-east. the military road was a track of death and destruction. everywhere were half-dried puddles of blood, broken rifles, haversacks, boots, carts, blood-stained clothes, wheels, horses, broken down gun-carriages, and unrecognizable corpses, and it was ploughed up with shells. the rest-house on little eagle's nest, where not long ago we had spent many careless hours, was burnt to a heap of ruins. at eagle's nest the greater part of the bomb-proofs and parapets had been destroyed, and the infantry were sitting about, some above ground and some below; the reserve was behind the steep slope, in various shelters made of corrugated iron or anything which they could get hold of. this improvised cover might protect from the sun, but certainly from nothing else. the officers and men were reduced to shadows, unwashed, and wearing torn uniforms. they asked the commandant for planks—any sort of timber—to help them with the aid of earth to get[pg 179] some protection. smirnoff smiled as he heard them; but it was a cynical smile, for, two days previously, he had given the strictest orders that they should be supplied with the very planks for which they were now asking. his order had not been obeyed, and for this the engineers were entirely to blame.

'all right, you shall have the planks to-day. hammer, make a note of it,' answered smirnoff.

on the 26th and 27th the enemy continued to mount guns and push forward their works, but there was no general action. smirnoff and kondratenko were much exercised about our lack of heavy guns, and, through the agency of prince mackalinsky (naval officer attached to the fortress staff), arranged for the fleet to supply some. this officer was of the utmost use to us as an intermediary between the fortress staff and the navy; for the navy as a rule wanted many reasons before they would assist us.

on the night of the 26th we discovered that the enemy had abandoned nos. 1 and 2 redoubts, which were full of corpses; but on the night of the 27th these were again occupied by them. at 2 a.m. in the morning of the 28th there was an alarm of a general attack, but it turned out to be an attack on 203 metre hill, long hill, and fort no. 4 only.

the 28th passed fairly quietly, with unimportant gun-fire, as did the 29th. on the night of the 29th our communications behind the main line were heavily shelled. during the preceding three days the gendarmes buried 700 japanese dead in front of our north-east positions. this was done under fire. in the evening of the 29th the enemy entrenched near water supply redoubt, and we temporarily recaptured part of no. 2 redoubt by a sortie.

that evening, prince mickeladsey informed me that he was sending a post to st. petersburg, and that i could[pg 180] send a telegram. he added: 'but don't talk of it, for if it is known, —— will at once hear of it.'

i wrote out two identical telegrams—one to a relative in st. petersburg, and one to a friend:

'arthur is enabled to hold out only by the efforts of smirnoff and his excellent assistant kondratenko.... when i can give you details your hair will stand on end. tell the tsar this, for it is absolutely necessary that —— should be removed.'

the prince sent off these telegrams in a special letter with the official stamp, and in a separate packet, addressed to our consul in chifu. the latter duly received them, but in spite of prince mickeladsey's request to despatch my wires to their destination, he never sent them, and gave as his excuse that they would have discredited a great name. he did this notwithstanding the fact that they were enclosed in a letter from the chief of the gendarmes in port arthur. nor did he even consider it his duty to report the circumstances to his superiors, although he might have known that there is never smoke without fire. at the end of the siege, when i reached chifu on the rastoropny, on board of which i had been sent from port arthur, with the knowledge and by the direction of the commandant and all the admirals 'as an officer of the fortress' (st?ssel wished, as he expressed it, to 'abolish' me), the consul received a telegram from port arthur to the effect that i was a japanese spy. he accordingly went to all the officers in authority and did everything he could to procure my arrest, and i was only saved by the intervention of the chinese governor, who declared that he would send an armed guard to protect me.

on august 30 a shell from one of the batteries blew up a japanese magazine on the eastern front. general biely at once gave orders for the battery to pour in a still hotter fire on to the magazine. as far as we could see the shells[pg 181] fell splendidly, preventing the enemy from saving the material, for groups of men could be seen running about in every direction, but at a considerable distance. to the left of orphan hill a big-gun battery was brought up by them, but it was very effectively fired on by one of our coast batteries. on the same day general st?ssel published the following district order:

'i have to-day had the honour to receive a telegram from the tsar to the following effect: "to-day being the christening day of the heir to the throne, i appoint you and colonel semenoff, commanding the 26th east siberian rifle regiment, to be my aides-de-camp."'[23]

the following is what the late colonel raschevsky thought of this: 'we are all delighted with the latter appointment which is most just (the appointment of semenoff as a.d.c.), but that st?ssel should have received this honour is a proof of how often those in authority are rewarded for the deeds of others.'

by twelve noon all the official world in arthur was on their way to congratulate the newly appointed a.d.c. i did not wish to go, but was persuaded that it was necessary.

'go? you must go; if you don't you will make him an enemy for ever. he will put you face downwards and deprive you of the possibility of seeing and collecting the valuable historical material which you are getting,' said the experienced and canny ones. i bowed to the wisdom of this, and went and did as i was advised. in the evening i called on the commandant. for some time he had been very ill with dysentery, and for the last two days[pg 182] had been told by the doctor that he was on no account to ride. he certainly seemed to be very much thinner than before.

the following order was issued by general st?ssel on the 31st:

'on the night of the 29th and 30th a sortie and an attack on no. 2 redoubt was again made by the scouts and sailors. the former dashed into the trenches, but the sailors did not do all that was expected of them, and so the attack was unsuccessful and the loss of life wasted. no more such attacks are to be made without my personal sanction on each occasion. similar sorties would be better carried out under the command of a man like the chief of the fortress staff, who is thoroughly acquainted with the locality.'

with the final capture of nos. 1 and 2 redoubts by the japanese—their greatest success during the month—they gained an enormous advantage. they at once constructed trenches back from both of them, which was, of course, an easier operation than throwing them forward under the gun-fire of our batteries. the commandant considered it absolutely essential to organize sorties against them, but general st?ssel, by every means in his power, opposed this.

the series of assaults culminating on the 23rd of this month were so bloody and had such a great influence on the course of the defence, that they are worthy of further description. it had been evident on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd that the japanese were preparing to deliver the final blow by a general attack. our difficulty, in the absence of balloons, was to ascertain where that blow would fall along the extensive front. chinese reports were quite untrustworthy, and we could not see enough from any of the positions to judge where the enemy was concentrating. the standing kiaoling, the ravines and roughness of the ground greatly assisted the concealment of their move[pg 183]ments. on the evening of the 23rd the commandant, after long and careful inspection of the enemy's positions, ordered the last battalion of the 14th regiment to eagle's nest. this left a main reserve, only two companies strong, under quail hill, to cover the valley of the lun-ho. two companies! all the rest had been sucked up into the firing-line. he then sent orders to admiral wiren to be ready to land a detachment of 800 men from the ships at anchor to form a reserve. it was now 7 p.m., and the darker it got the more silent became the line of front, and the more tense our expectancy.

pic

the assault repulsed.

nogi himself, on the highest point of wolf's hills, was gazing fixedly towards port arthur hidden in darkness; for having concentrated more than two divisions, with a strength of over 35,000 men, on the portion from redoubt no. 2 to b battery (three and a half miles), and having determined with one blow to seize chi-kuan-shan fort, b battery, and eagle's nest, he was anxiously trying to pierce the bloody veil of the future. smirnoff seemed to divine the thought of his chief enemy as if by inspiration, and despatched his force opposite where nogi was concentrating. there was this difference, however—that while nogi was playing with tens of thousands of men—smirnoff had to count every section.

at 11 p.m. nogi gave the sign, and a living avalanche of men rolled irresistibly up towards us, and from valley, ditch and ravine the japanese appeared. rifles cracked, machine guns spluttered, guns boomed and boomed again, and the air was turned into an inferno of shrieking missiles. the rays of the searchlights flashed up and down, rockets shot up into the sky like enormous fiery snakes, and burst in hundreds of large brilliant balls, eclipsing the light of the eternal stars and blinding the heroic little infantry-men who were attacking us. they ran forward, fell, jumped up again and pressed on, in[pg 184] groups together. in the shimmering rays of the searchlights, the flashes of bursting shells seemed almost blood-red. the noise became a horrible blur of sound—shouts, moans, cheers—clash of arms and detonations. but at last it ended; the clamour gradually died away; the attack had been repulsed. in front of us not a living soul remained—only dead—piles of dead and wounded men. never shall i forget that night.

at 2 a.m. a second wave started and surged forward, despite the shower of lead and steel poured into it. with incredible efforts it got possession of the chinese wall opposite zaredoubt battery, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued. the searchlight was turned on to the spot, and lit up a revolting picture; our last two companies of the reserve were sent forward at the double from quail hill, and every japanese by the wall was bayonetted; then the rays glided further afield searching for the enemy, but only lit up a ground strewn with bodies.

at 3 a.m. a third attack commenced, and it seemed as if the passionless, cold-hearted nogi had sentenced the last of his troops to death. the signal was given, and a fresh wave of living flesh and blood rolled forward. this time it was the attack—the spring—of a maddened, wounded, blood-drunk herd of tigers—not men. our truly awful fire was of no avail; the mass roared forward with the strength of a tidal wave. on it came, though lit up by rockets and searchlights, on, on it rolled irresistibly; on, right through the breached chinese wall, and up on to zaredoubt and wolf's battery, half of which it seized. but the timely arrival of two companies again saved everything, for after a bloody hand-to-hand fight the japanese were thrown back; they gave way, and fell back on those in rear. it was a critical moment, but our light showed up their thick reserves taking cover[pg 185] in the ravine between chinese wall and zaredoubt hill, and they were almost destroyed.

pic

burial-parties at work.

a reddish vapour slowly rose up over this valley of death, and screened the bursting shells and the rays of light. it grew light; the attacks had been repulsed, and not a rood of ground had the enemy got, but the scene on all sides was awful. the rising sun showed up sheaves of corpses on the ground that was still ours. death had indeed triumphed, and had claimed 22,000 lives.

from this time forward the enemy remained content with the slower advance of regular siege operations.