i continued daily to send my 'news' to the novy kry, but the strictness of the censors deprived it of all interest and sometimes of its accuracy. for instance, on august 17, my article stated that work was being rapidly hurried on all along the defences. this was by no means the case everywhere, for the engineers, spoilt by six years of doing nothing or of only constructing private buildings, neglected the important mobilization works. there were exceptions, for some of the engineer officers did really good work, but the majority did nothing. then again, as regards the quality of the food which i had praised in my article—it was eatable, but far from nutritious, and the siege had only just begun. again, i mentioned general gorbatovsky; but i did not venture to say that this officer, who was always to be found in the section of the defences under his command, never rested, or that he spent day after day on the fortified positions, where by his presence and cheerfulness he inspired the men with confidence. though the men were cheerful, i had not dared to say that they were physically incapable, and weedy, which was the truth. i did not mention that when officers begged for timber, planks, iron, or material for building bomb-proofs the engineers replied that they had no transport, or else refused the requests of the 'small fry.' neither could i hint that the only way in which general smirnoff could make these[pg 164] lazy engineers work was by personally going round and seeing how his orders were being executed.

many and many a life lies at the door of the engineer officers in arthur. if st. petersburg be held responsible for the mistake of cutting down the perimeter of the defences of port arthur, the engineers, of whom some left for russia at the first shot and others were criminally idle, will also have to answer for much. if they had worked hard and conscientiously while the place was in our possession the mistakes committed at st. petersburg would not have had such dire consequences.

on the 18th there was a lull—an absolute cessation of firing—all day. this was so unusual that it seemed ominous of something worse to follow, and we were filled with forebodings. indeed, the hospitals, in which the first hints of an approaching assault were usually to be found, were preparing to meet the expected demands of the next few hours. i accompanied general smirnoff on his afternoon inspection. having gone round many works and said a cheery word to all he met, he went up on to danger hill and we climbed into the look-out station.[17] the sun had already sunk below liao-tieh-shan, but from the top of the hill we could see everything quite distinctly. after last instructions with regard to the concentration, etc., of the troops on the north-east front we silently made our way back to arthur, all of us feeling impressed with the uncertainty of what might come.

at 5 a.m. on august 19 the enemy opened fire from all their batteries on our works, particularly on those of the west and eastern fronts. gradually increasing their fire, they made a determined attack on the foot-hills of angle hill. at 7 a.m. this was repulsed, and then they concen[pg 165]trated their artillery fire chiefly on angle hill on the western front, and on b battery, little eagle's nest, and others on the eastern. general st?ssel watched the progress of the fight from fort no. 1, and general smirnoff took up his position on danger hill, whence he commanded. at noon the fire slackened, only to be shortly renewed with increased ferocity. having prepared the way with artillery, the japanese again advanced, but were repulsed everywhere, though they gained possession of a ravine opposite water supply redoubt, and, taking advantage of the darkness, lay concealed in an outer ditch, and fired at some of our outposts. from twilight till morning the town was bombarded, and at 6 p.m. one of the arsenal buildings was set alight. i was again with smirnoff that day, and, amidst all the turmoil and stress, the thing that disturbed me most was that several shells had fallen into the hospitals. it was right and proper that our forts should be shelled, but that the enemy should be able so early in the siege to fire right into the centre of the fortress augured ill for the future. smirnoff was kept tied to the telephone, and we stayed for some time at his quarters. as we were sitting on the balcony we heard a shot fired from golden hill. in a few seconds, high up above us, we heard a noise. it grew louder and louder, then something flashed and struck the ground in front, scattering mud and gravel over us.

'that's luck; let us go and look at it,' said smirnoff.

it was half of a prematurely bursting shell from golden hill, weighing some 320 to 360 lb. the iron shells of the 11-inch howitzers on golden hill were so cunningly contrived that most of them burst, not in the enemy's lines as intended, but over the town and over our own positions.

at 2 p.m. kondratenko telephoned to say that the[pg 166] trenches below angle hill had been abandoned, and in the evening he came in to report personally. this was the enemy's only gain that day. night came, and the fire was continued all along the line. while we in the town were kept awake by anxiety and on account of the hideous uproar, how about the men at the front? those narrow, deep, advanced trenches, which wound about like black ribbons on all sides of the fortress, were full of men. if we, in the inside, could not sleep, how could these men, whom a shell might at any instant turn into blood and dust? there they lay peering ahead and whispering to each other in their unaccustomed surroundings—tired, strained, and watchful.

the enemy made great efforts during the whole of the night of the 19th to seize water supply redoubt, and held the parapet till daybreak. on the 20th there was desperate fighting round angle hill and water supply and pan-lun-shan redoubts, in which we lost 500 men. at midday we heard that we had lost angle hill. when kondratenko reported this personally, smirnoff was very angry. it appeared that the men had retired without orders, and had left eight guns of sorts on the hills, which kondratenko engaged to try and recapture. at 9 p.m. a series of unsuccessful attacks were made on temple redoubt, and at midnight on water supply and pan-lun-shan redoubts, and the enemy got possession of the north-east corner of the former. at daybreak on the 21st two companies of frontier guards went to the assistance of water supply redoubt and surprised the enemy, who retired suddenly on their own reserves. they came under fire from erh-lung-shan fort, and left more than 1,000 dead on the ground.

pic

inside a trench on the eastern front.

it was about this time that the enemy wore us down and captured pan-lun-shan redoubt. this redoubt was so important to us that smirnoff resolved to retake it[pg 167] at all costs, and its recapture was one of the bloodiest fights that had yet occurred. colonel prince machabelly commanded the battalion entrusted with this work, and the redoubt was taken on the night of the 21st. in the midst of the hand to hand fighting, when grenades were bursting on all sides, and machine guns were firing point-blank, the bomb-proofs were set on fire. the place blazed up like a torch, and our men had to retire to trenches in rear. the japanese could not get into it either, and so it became neutral, pan-lun-shan hill remaining in our hands till the fall of 203 metre hill in december.

prince machabelly, who was killed in this assault, was the beau-ideal of a soldier, and the circumstances under which he met his death were sad. he was under a cloud, having been made a scape-goat for the failure on wolf's hills, and having been deprived of the command of his regiment, the 13th east siberian rifles, which he had led with such gallantry at kuen-san. in spite of this he led his companies at the attack of pan-lun-shan as he had led his battalions on green hills; he won the redoubt for us, and was killed in the attempt.

at daybreak on the 21st i had gone with the commandant up on to danger hill. the japanese were pouring in a heavy fire especially on the north-east front, and general gorbatovsky, commanding the eastern portion, asked for reinforcements. the enemy was attacking the redoubts, kuropatkin lunette, the chinese wall, and big eagle's nest in force; the regimental reserves were melting away, and the position was serious. general smirnoff telephoned to fock, commanding the main reserve, to send up the last unit—the 14th regiment—at the double, fock, however, argued with him. time was flying, and gorbatovsky, losing patience, again begged for support, for each moment was precious. smirnoff, appreciating[pg 168] the seriousness of the situation, repeated his order to fock, who, to the anger and amazement of the officers standing round, again raised objections. the commandant, usually calm and self-controlled, then lost his temper.

'lieutenant hammer,[18] give me the note-book.' he quickly wrote a message. 'take this to general fock and give it to him personally.'

hammer disappeared. meanwhile, reports from gorbatovsky were coming in, each more alarming than the last. the artillery front had suffered heavily, and could only reply weakly to the enemy's guns, and the struggle was being maintained chiefly by the heavy guns of our coast batteries. considerable bodies of infantry were seen moving out of the villages,[19] and it appeared from what we could see that the japanese intended to attack, but not till evening. general gorbatovsky arrived, and greatly excited, reported that the decisive moment was at hand, the troops had suffered terribly from the enemy's guns, the infantry were utterly worn out, and without reinforcements the attack could not be repulsed! he hadn't slept for several days, and had been continually under a very heavy gun-fire, so that he was overtired and painted things somewhat blacker than they really were. general smirnoff, with his usual sang-froid, replied:

'it is not so bad as that. we must, above all, keep calm. you have been sitting in that hell, and from your immediate surroundings things have seemed to you worse than they really are. you are not quite yourself. take it easy, we'll soon put matters right.'

'quite so, sir, but things are very alarming. the japs are getting possession of the redoubts, which are in a critical state, and will in all probability deliver an assault[pg 169] on the centre, which has suffered so heavily. big eagle's nest and zaliterny battery are out of action; kuropatkin lunette is in a critical condition; b battery has only one serviceable gun and the naval battery is also disabled....'

'i agree,' continued smirnoff, 'matters are very bad, but i have already taken the necessary steps. the 14th regiment, which is in the main reserve, i have ordered up to the north-east front, to be échelonned by battalions near big eagle's nest and the ice-house. in addition to this i am getting six naval companies (1200 strong), which i will concentrate at the front in the bomb-proofs of the 9th regiment. when night comes on the guns must be repaired; where there are none, i'll send field-guns from the general reserve, and we will hurl back the assault. you return now, and at 4 p.m. i will come and give you detailed orders as to what to do.'

gorbatovsky departed, and at that moment up came lieutenant hammer with a note for the commandant. instead of at once carrying out smirnoffs urgent order to move the 14th regiment up to the north-east front, fock had written a whole page in reply, in which he expressed his conviction of the danger of the move, especially of a concentration near the ice-house, which the enemy would doubtless shell! the building was at the foot of the very hill from which the commandant had issued this order; it was in a well-concealed spot, and was not even being fired at.

the commandant was furious. 'here, hammer, write at once to fock, and say that if he doesn't immediately carry out my order, i'll remove him from his command.'

at 1 o'clock the artillery attack began to slacken. the enemy, having seized two villages[20] began moving towards the redoubts, and the assault seemed to be near. it should be observed that from the very first, appreciating the[pg 170] weakness of the north-east front, smirnoff had armed it at the cost of the western, having transferred to it the 9-inch howitzers from wolf's battery, and mounted a number of the guns received from the fleet. he was convinced that the chief blow would fall here, and more particularly because directly behind this front lay, so to speak, the heart of the fortress (harbour, dock, commissariat dép?ts, chief magazine, mills). st?ssel, on the contrary, had always considered that the west side was the more important.

having sent off hammer and given his final orders, smirnoff turned to the officers present.

'gentlemen, the gun-fire is slackening, and the enemy will rest. the attack won't take place before dark; we can now rest and refresh ourselves.'

on our way down, we met the 14th regiment, whom smirnoff greeted, telling them that he would see them again in the evening. later, when the north-east front was being continually stormed, smirnoff for a long time could not find one of the battalions of this regiment, and wondered how it could have got lost. after exhaustive inquiries, it turned out that it and the scout company had, with the general's knowledge, remained in barracks! the general himself had not come with the regiment (the last one in the reserve), but had remained in his quarters in the town.

though a great danger threatened the fortress that night smirnoff did not lose his head, his prophecy as to the course of events being fully justified. after giving some more orders he asked us all to breakfast. in the middle of it st?ssel turned up in a very agitated state. he refused refreshment, and said: 'redoubts nos. 1 and 2 are being captured. both eagle's nest and zaliterny battery are in ruins, the adjacent batteries are badly injured, the local reserves are used up, and the[pg 171] enemy are still pounding us. the losses are enormous. it is difficult to hold out. what is to be done?'

pic

general gorbatovsky.

just then, unannounced, in walked general fock, and interrupted:

'your excellency, gorbatovsky is a traitor. he is uselessly wasting the reserves—inviting a slaughter of them by putting them into the trenches. if he does this we'll have to surrender. he is a traitor, sir!'

smirnoff turned to st?ssel, and said quietly:

'i do not know that i fully understand. gorbatovsky's actions do not quite tally with those of a traitor. for three days and nights he has been constantly under fire, directing the defence, and by his gallantry encouraging the men. i will see to the repulse of the attack; the reserve must be used when necessary.' then, turning suddenly to fock: 'and you, sir, it appears, do not intend to obey my orders? to-day, instead of at once carrying them out, you employed your time writing replies.... i never give an order twice. bear that in mind.'

for his action on this day fock was removed from his command by smirnoff, and so, from august 21 right up to december 18, he took no part in the operations, and employed himself in writing long memoranda and giving advice to st?ssel.

in the early hours of august 22 the enemy attacked the redoubts which were held by the naval detachment, and all day long heavy fighting continued round long hill, between it and divisional hill, round jagged hill, and redoubts nos. 1 and 2. redoubt no. 1 changed hands four times during the course of the day, and remained in the enemy's hands, as did no. 2. the japanese cunningly managed to transfer their field-guns through the kiaoling to the east side, whilst they kept the garrison of jagged hill under cover by their heavy shell-fire.

[pg 172]

at daybreak on the 23rd all was silence. the enemy had abandoned no. 1 redoubt, and were retiring from no. 2, both of which, after five days' bombardment, had been reduced to a shapeless heap of ruins. at 11 p.m. that night by moonlight the enemy opened up with two searchlights, one from behind ta-ku-shan, the other opposite chi-kuan-shan fort, and, lighting up our parties who were searching for wounded, kept on firing on them—so much so that after a few hours our humane efforts had to be stopped.