i

we have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government. we have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions, how and from what causes they arise.

of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them. moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democracies.

when i speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, i mean such as these: when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.

i have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider how these and other forms of government are to be established.

first of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. for the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. there are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. one (1) has been already mentioned — differences of population; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. a second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. for one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. there is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing one. founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as i have already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. we will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.

ii

the basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. one principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. this, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. another is that a man should live as he likes. this, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. this is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.

such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important — such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the magistrates over none or only over a very few. of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as i said in the previous discussion. the next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. and whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these — low birth, poverty, mean employment. another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. these are the points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all should count equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers. and in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state.

iii

next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts? — which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution — this or one based on numbers only? democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. in both principles there is some inequality and injustice. for if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power — but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the majority, as i was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. to find a principle of equality which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.

now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. granted: but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed — the poor and the rich — that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. for example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. if they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. but, although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger care for none of these things.

iv

of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the in the previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of them all. i am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. for the best material of democracy is an agricultural population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honor. a proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. moreover, they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at mantinea; yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at mantinea. hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good). the good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account. every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed, there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. but the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. it is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, and why? because the people are drawn from a certain class. some of the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a view to making the people husbandmen. they provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. formerly in many states there was a law forbidding any one to sell his original allotment of land. there is a similar law attributed to oxylus, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man’s land on which he could not borrow money. a useful corrective to the evil of which i am speaking would be the law of the aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are all of them husbandmen. for their properties are reckoned in the census; not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than the amount required.

next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. the people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers. besides, people of this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of assembling together. where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or constitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. we have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind.

the last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. the more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have been pretty fully considered. in order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. this is the way in which demagogues proceed. whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class — beyond this not to go. when in excess of this point, the constitution becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. measures like those which cleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy at athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of families should be restricted and converted into public ones; in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connections. again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the license permitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the aflowing everybody to live as he likes. such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner.

v

the mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. the legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. he must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. the demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to please the people. but those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred. thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, i say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. this system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry. and if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public services. by administering the state in this spirit the carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. it is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. the example of the people of tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will. moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. a like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.

enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.

vi

from these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. we have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy.

the first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. in this there ought to be two standards of qualification; the one high, the other low — the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the higher for the superior ones. he who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. the number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the people. the principle, narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. for as healthy bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care. the populousness of democracies generally preserves them (for e state need not be much increased,since there is no necessity tha number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz., good order.

vii

as there are four chief divisions of the common people — husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also there are four kinds of military forces — the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy. when the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established. for the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses. the second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor. but the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, where they are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. a remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. and this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. an oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a power against itself. and therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops; and these, when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed warriors in reality. the oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as i said before, to those who have a property qualification, or, as in the case of thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments, or, as at massalia, to men of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. the magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offense at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. it is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public edifice, and then the people who participate in the entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables will have memorials of their munificence. this, however, is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor; oligarchies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized.

viii

next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. no state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. in small states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in larger there must be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated.

first among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. for in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another’s wants; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. a second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. this is commonly called the office of city warden, and has various departments, which, in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbors. there is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country — the magistrates who hold this office are called wardens of the country, or inspectors of the woods. besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called receivers or treasurers. another officer registers all private contracts, and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. this office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. these officers are called recorders or sacred recorders, presidents, and the like.

next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also the custody of prisoners. the difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law. still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. it is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. in like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court has given judgement, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. for penalties are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.

in many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, ‘the eleven’ at athens. it is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. for it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. there ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of it.

these are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first; next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. in some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one; these officers are called generals or commanders. again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of light-armed troops. and there are subordinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops and of horse; having others under them: all these are included in the department of war. thus much of military command.

but since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, and has no other functions. such officers are called by various names — scrutineers, auditors, accountants, controllers. besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, in a democracy, over the assembly. for there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. in some places they are called ‘probuli,’ because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly ‘councillors.’ these are the chief political offices.

another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. one office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood; for example, superintendents of public worship, guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city. they are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes prytanes.

these, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country; also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. there are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. some of these are clearly not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of women and children — the poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants.

once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain states — guardians of the law, probuli, councillors — of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. enough of the different kinds of offices.