i

the design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed. next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions remain to be considered.

in the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail attaining them, as i have already explained. democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. the democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form of inequality. all these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. there is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors. here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands. further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. or the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, e.g., the establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at sparta it is said that lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king pausanias, the ephoralty. at epidamnus, too, the change was partial. for instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the heliaea when an election takes place, and the office of the single archon was another oligarchical feature. everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion — for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.

now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the first i mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. for example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of two, namely, the half. as i was saying before, men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. hence there are two principal forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. in what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. that a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. they are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fall to end badly. the inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others.

still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. for in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. no dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. and we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

ii

in considering how dissensions and poltical revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. they may be said to be three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. we want to know (1) what is the feeling? (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? the universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz., the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may and may not be just. inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. the motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor, or the fear of dishonor and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends. the causes and reasons of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which i have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven. two of them have been already noticed; but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honor — not, as in the case which i have just supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.

iii

what share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. when the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. it is evident, again, what an influence honor exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. men who are themselves dishonored and who see others obtaining honors rise in rebellion; the honor or dishonor when undeserved is unjust; and just when awarded according to merit.

again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. and therefore, in some places, as at athens and argos, they have recourse to ostracism. but how much better to provide from the first that there should be no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding a remedy.

another cause of revolution is fear. either men have committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. thus at rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits that were brought against them. contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution; for example, in oligarchies — when those who have no share in the state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at thebes, for example, where, after the battle of oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. at megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. and at syracuse the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of gelo arose; at rhodes, before the insurrection.

political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. for as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. and this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the iapygians just after the persian war, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy; or as was the case at argos, where the argives, after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day of the month by cleomenes the lacedaemonian, were compelled to admit to citizen some of their perioeci; and at athens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry at the time of the peloponnesian war, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens. revolutions arise from this cause as well, in democracies as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. when the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. forms of government also change — sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, as at heraea (where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans); or owing to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices, as at oreum, where, upon the accession of heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government.

again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change; i mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter; at ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. for the ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all.

another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident. hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the achaeans who joined the troezenians in the foundation of sybaris, becoming later the more numerous, expelled them; hence the curse fell upon sybaris. at thurii the sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. at byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of antissa, who had received the chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the zancleans, after having received the samians, were driven by them out of their own city. the citizens of apollonia on the euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution; the syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows; the people of amphipolis, having received chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.

now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as i said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.

again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. for example, the chytians at clazomenae did not agree with the people of the island; and the people of colophon quarrelled with the notians; at athens too, the inhabitants of the piraeus are more democratic than those who live in the city. for just as in war the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. the greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difference of place.

iv

in revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at stake. even trifles are most important when they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at syracuse; for the syracusan constitution was once changed by a love-quarrel of two young men, who were in the government. the story is that while one of them was away from home his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he to revenge himself seduced the other’s wife. they then drew the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and so split all the people into portions. we learn from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. the mistake lies in the beginning — as the proverb says —‘well begun is half done’; so an error at the beginning, though quite small, bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts. in general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city is involved, as happened in hesdaea after the persian war. the occasion was the division of an inheritance; one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father’s property and the treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes.

at delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of all the troubles which followed. in this case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her. whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the temple. at mytilene, too, a dispute about heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the athenians in which paches took their city. a wealthy citizen, named timophanes, left two daughters; dexander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his sons; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the athenians (of whom he was proxenus) to interfere. a similar quarrel about an heiress arose at phocis between mnaseas the father of mnason, and euthycrates the father of onomarchus; this was the beginning of the sacred war. a marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of epidamnus. a certain man betrothed his daughter to a person whose father, having been made a magistrate, fined the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state.

governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. thus at athens the reputation gained by the court of the areopagus, in the persian war, seemed to tighten the reins of government. on the other hand, the victory of salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the athenians the empire due to command of the sea, strengthened the democracy. at argos, the notables, having distinguished themselves against the lacedaemonians in the battle of mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy. at syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. at chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables, killed phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. at ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant periander, transferred the government to themselves. and generally it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. for either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.

revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g., the rich and the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no middle class; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. and, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, always being a minority. such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.

revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards. fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. this was what happened in the case of the four hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavored to retain the government. (2) in other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. the revolutions which effect constitutions generally spring from the above-mentioned causes.

v

and now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.

revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public stir up the people against them. the truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. at cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. at rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. the democracy at heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. much in the same manner the democracy at megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. at length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the people, established the oligarchy. the same thing happened with the democracy of cyme, which was overthrown by thrasymachus. and we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. for sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine; either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate.

of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. they are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight. tyrannies were more common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at miletus out of the office of the prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. thus at athens peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and theagenes at megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they had put them to graze in land not their own. dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above the laws. a more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.

these are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.

vi

there are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies: (1) first, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as lygdamis at naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. but revolutions which commence outside the governing class may be further subdivided. sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at massalia and istros and heraclea, and other cities. those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. at massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at istros ended in a democracy, and at heraclea was enlarged to 600. at cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change. for the notables fell out among themselves, because only a few shared in the government; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son not hold office together, and, if there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. the people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. the city of erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the basilidae, but the people took offense at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the constitution.

(2) of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either (a) he practices upon the oligarchs themselves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at athens charicles’ party won power by courting the thirty, that of phrynichus by courting the four hundred); or (b) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people. this was the case at larissa, where the guardians of the citizens endeavored to gain over the people because they were elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club; or, again, where the law-courts are composed of persons outside the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favor, and so they change the constitution; this happened at heraclea in pontus. again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them; for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people. changes in the oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant living; for then they want to innovate, and either try to make themselves tyrants, or install some one else in the tyranny, as hipparinus did dionysius at syracuse, and as at amphipolis a man named cleotimus introduced chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up against the rich. for a like reason in aegina the person who carried on the negotiation with chares endeavored to revolutionize the state. sometimes a party among the oligarchs try directly to create a political change; sometimes they rob the treasury, and then either the thieves or, as happened at apollonia in pontus, those who resist them in their thieving quarrel with the rulers. but an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within; of this we may see an example at pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves.

oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one, that is to say, when the whole governing body is small and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. thus at elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because the senators were only ninety in number, and were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the lacedaemonian elders. oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as timophanes did at corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants. sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. and in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. this happened at larissa when simos the aleuad had the government, and at abydos in the days of iphiades and the political clubs. revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. of quarrels about marriages i have already mentioned some instances; another occurred at eretria, where diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage. a revolution at heraclea, and another at thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party, at heraclea upon eurytion, and at thebes upon archias; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the agora. many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class taking offense at their excessive despotism; for example, the oligarchy at cnidus and at chios.

changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counselor, judge, or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, often occur by accident. the qualification may have been originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. but after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody participates in every office; this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. these are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.

we must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class; i mean to say, from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.

vii

in aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share in the honors of the state; a cause which has been already shown to affect oligarchies; for an aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government of a few, although few not for the same reason; hence the two are often confounded. and revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the mass of the people are of the high-spirited kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers. thus at lacedaemon the so-called partheniae, who were the [illegitimate] sons of the spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize tarentum. again, revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonored by those higher in office, as lysander was by the kings of sparta; or, when a brave man is excluded from the honors of the state, like cinadon, who conspired against the spartans in the reign of agesilaus; or, again, when some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at lacedaemon in the days of the messenian war; this is proved from the poem of tyrtaeus, entitled ‘good order’; for he speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land. again, revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as, at lacedaemon, pausanias, who was general in the persian war, or like hanno at carthage.

constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements, democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy and oligarchy. for to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments; and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim, but differ from polities in the mode of combination; hence some of them are more and some less permanent. those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional governments. and therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are contented. but the rich, if the constitution gives them power, are apt to be insolent and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy an oligarchy. but the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change into democracy. this happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form. in like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. the only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own.

what i have just mentioned actually happened at thurii, where the qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. the notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. . . . but the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land.

again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at lacedaemon, where property tends to pass into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. the city of locri was ruined by a marriage connection with dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or in a wellbalanced aristocracy.

i have already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned by trifles. in aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. the citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so with greater ease the government change something else which is a little more important, until they have undermined the whole fabric of the state. at thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some young men who were popular with the soldiers of the guard for their military prowess, despising the magistrates and thinking that they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them. whereupon the magistrates who had charge of these matters, and who are called councillors, at first determined to resist, but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the constitution. but other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose; and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists, who established a dynastic oligarchy.

all constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. this was exemplified in the old times of the athenians and the lacedaemonians; the athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the lacedaemonians the democracies.

i have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions in states.

viii

we have next to consider what means there are of preserving constitutions in general, and in particular cases. in the first place it is evident that if we know the causes which destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which preserve them; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation.

in all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more especially in small matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. the expense does not take place at once, and therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that ‘if each part is little, then the whole is little.’ this is true in one way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles.

in the first place, then, men should guard against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the political devices of which i have already spoken invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. further, we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. they should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honor, or the common people in a matter of money; and they should treat one another and their fellow citizen in a spirit of equality. the equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as i have already remarked. the short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. for the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them.

constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the constitution. wherefore the ruler who has a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night watch, never relax their attention. he should endeavor too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. no ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman.

as to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the qualification but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually and in larger cities every third or fifth year. if the whole is many times greater or many times less than when the ratings recognized by the constitution were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. where this is not done a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; or in the opposite case constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy.

it is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen but to give moderate honor for a long time rather than great honor for a short time. for men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. but if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he should be sent clean out of the country. and since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. and for a like reason an increase of prosperity in any part of the state should be carefully watched. the proper remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality.

but above all every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. in oligarchies special precautions should be used against this evil. for the people do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government — indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private business — but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose both honor and profit. if office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined; for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. all would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. and this result may be accomplished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices; for the poor will not want to have them when there is nothing to be gained from them — they would rather be attending to their own concerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. in order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the revenue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. and honors should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incorruptible. in democracies the rich should be spared; not only should their property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. it is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. in an oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to them; if any of the wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had wronged one of his own class. provision should be made that estates pass by inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheritance; for in this way properties will be equalized, and more of the poor rise to competency. it is also expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have less share in the government (i.e., to the rich in a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality or preference in all but the principal offices of state. the latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class.

ix

there are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices —(1) first of all, loyalty to the established constitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government; for, if what is just is not the same in all governments, the quality of justice must also differ. there may be a doubt, however, when all these qualities do not meet in the same person, how the selection is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and just, which should we choose? in making the election ought we not to consider two points? what qualities are common, and what are rare. thus in the choice of a general, we should regard his skill rather than his virtue; for few have military skill, but many have virtue. in any office of trust or stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess.

it may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. but may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? if, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public?

speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are held to be for the interest of various constitutions, all these preserve them. and the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned — to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms of government; for many practices which appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. a nose which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye; but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other; and this is true of every other part of the human body. the same law of proportion equally holds in states. oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by having none at all. wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. for neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. if equality of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form; for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined.

there is an error common both to oligarchies and to democracies: in the latter the demagogues, when the multitude are above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just as in oligarchies the oligarchs should profess to maintaining the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. for there are cities in which they swear —‘i will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them which i can’; but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling; in the form of their oath there should be an express declaration —‘i will do no wrong to the people.’

but of all the things which i have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. the best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. for there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. now, to have been educated in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution. and in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. for two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and freedom. men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. in such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of euripides, ‘according to his fancy.’ but this is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation.

i have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance.

x

i have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its destruction and preservation. what i have said already respecting forms of constitutional government applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. for royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms; it is therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. these two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. the appointment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people, and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. history shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables. at any rate this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. in any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state. thus pheidon at argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; phalaris, on the other hand, and the ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. whereas panaetius at leontini, cypselus at corinth, peisistratus at athens, dionysius at syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues.

and so, as i was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. for all who have obtained this honor have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war; others, like cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the lacedaemonian, macedonian, and molossian kings. the idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression. whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, honor. wherefore also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings honor. and the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries.

that tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. as of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end is wealth; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. both agree too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. from democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this dass, who either want to rule or to escape subjection. hence periander advised thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. and so, as i have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government; subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. and of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property.

the ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire to all mankind. the attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. any sort of insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. for example, the attempt made upon the peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonor offered to the sister of harmodius and the insult to himself. he attacked the tyrant for his sister’s sake, and aristogeiton joined in the attack for the sake of harmodius. a conspiracy was also formed against periander, the tyrant of ambracia, because, when drinking with a favorite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. philip, too, was attacked by pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by attalus and his friends, and amyntas the little, by derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. evagoras of cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for his wife had been carried off by evagoras’s son. many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. such was the attack of crataeas upon archelaus; he had always hated the connection with him, and so, when archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of elymeia, when he was hard pressed in a war against sirrhas and arrhabaeus, and the younger to his own son amyntas, under the idea that amyntas would then be less likely to quarrel with his son by cleopatra — crataeas made this slight a pretext for attacking archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connection with the king. and from a like motive hellonocrates of larissa conspired with him; for when archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfill his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought that the connection between them had originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of power. pytho, too, and heracleides of aenos, slew cotys in order to avenge their father, and adamas revolted from cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child.

many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. thus, at mytilene, megacles and his friends attacked and slew the penthilidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. at a later date smerdis, who had been beaten and torn away from his wife by penthilus, slew him. in the conspiracy against archelaus, decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged because archelaus had delivered him to euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes.

fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. thus artapanes conspired against xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging darius against his orders-he having been under the impression that xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offense would be forgiven.

another motive is contempt, as in the case of sardanapalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the storytellers say truly; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else. dion attacked the younger dionysius because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt; for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. the expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt; the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, cyrus attacked astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. thus again, seuthes the thracian conspired against amadocus, whose general he was.

and sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like mithridates, who conspired against ariobarzanes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.

bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.

attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as well as in those already mentioned. there are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honorable in the world; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. it is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. he must have the resolution of dion, who, when he made war upon dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying ‘that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to him.’ this is a temper to which few can attain.

once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. that such a government will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do what they will. democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of hesiod, ‘potter hates potter,’ because they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. and therefore the lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the syracusans during the time when they were well governed.

again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of gelo was, and more recently that of dionysius; in the case of gelo because thrasybulus, the brother of hiero, flattered the son of gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name. whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of thrasybulus and save the tyranny; but those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. in the case of dionysius, dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished himself.

there are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies — hatred and contempt. hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. it is often times even more ready to strike — the angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle. and men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. to this cause is to be attributed the fall of the peisistratidae and of many others. hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless.

in a word, all the causes which i have mentioned as destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting; it is generally destroyed from within. and there are two ways in which the destruction may come about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. royalties do not now come into existence; where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or tyrannies. for the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters; but in our own day men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and any one who obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. in hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, although possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. their overthrow is then readily effected; for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like him or not.

the destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes.

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and they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. the more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired; for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways; and they are less envied by their subjects. this is the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the molossians. and for a similar reason it has continued among the lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by theopompus in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the ephoralty. he diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less, but greater. there is a story that when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, ‘no indeed,’ he replied, ‘for the power which i leave to them will be more lasting.’

as to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. one of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. of such arts periander of corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the persians in the administration of their government. there are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back, for the preservation of a tyranny, in so far as this is possible; viz., that the tyrant should lop off those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual confidence). further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are doing: if they are always kept under, they will learn to be humble. in short, he should practice these and the like persian and barbaric arts, which all have the same object. a tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the ‘female detectives’ at syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom hiero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. the pyramids of egypt afford an example of this policy; also the offerings of the family of cypselus, and the building of the temple of olympian zeus by the peisistratidae, and the great polycratean monuments at samos; all these works were alike intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of dionysius at syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury their whole property. the tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. and whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.

again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. such are the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. for the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of flattery.

hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; ‘nail knocks out nail,’ as the proverb says. it is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him.

such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. all that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. these are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody; (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled despotically but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men; (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles them.

this then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. the nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. but of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. but though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. in the first place he should pretend a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. he should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. such a policy is at all events much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind. in the second place, he should be seen to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. he should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not with fear. yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offense against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe a like self-control towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. in the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. in these things a tyrant should if possible be moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked; not so he who is temperate and wide awake. his conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. he ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very gods fighting on his side. at the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. and he should honor men of merit, and make them think that they would not be held in more honor by the citizens if they had a free government. the honor he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. it is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. if after all some one has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. and if any one is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at once. the tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. he should be especially careful of his behavior to men who are lovers of honor; for as the lovers of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of honor and the virtuous when their honor is affected. therefore a tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all; or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon others — and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of dishonor by the increase of honor.

of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive, if they effect their purpose. therefore special precaution should be taken about any who think that either they or those for whom they care have been insulted; for when men are led away by passion to assault others they are regardless of themselves. as heracleitus says, ‘it is difficult to fight against anger; for a man will buy revenge with his soul.’

and whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule, and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach to his government; for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens; either party added to the force which he already has, will make him stronger than his assailants.

but enough of these details; what should be the general policy of the tyrant is obvious. he ought to show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a king. he should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life; he should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery. for then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. his power too will be more lasting. his disposition will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and he will not be wicked, but half wicked only.

xii

yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. the tyranny which lasted longest was that of orthagoras and his sons at sicyon; this continued for a hundred years. the reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws; and in various ways gained the favor of the people by the care which they took of them. cleisthenes, in particular, was respected for his military ability. if report may be believed, he crowned the judge who decided against him in the games; and, as some say, the sitting statue in the agora of sicyon is the likeness of this person. (a similar story is told of peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the areopagus.)

next in duration to the tyranny of orthagoras was that of the cypselidae at corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six months: cypselus reigned thirty years, periander forty and a half, and psammetichus the son of gorgus three. their continuance was due to similar causes: cypselus was a popular man, who during the whole time of his rule never had a bodyguard; and periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. third in duration was the rule of the peisistratidae at athens, but it was interrupted; for peisistratus was twice driven out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only seventeen; and his sons reigned eighteen-altogether thirty-five years. of other tyrannies, that of hiero and gelo at syracuse was the most lasting. even this, however, was short, not more than eighteen years in all; for gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth; hiero reigned for ten years, and thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. in fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration.

i have now gone through almost all the causes by which constitutional governments and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved.

in the republic of plato, socrates treats of revolutions, but not well, for he mentions no cause of change which peculiarly affects the first, or perfect state. he only says that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the change consists in those numbers ‘of which 4 and 3, married with 5, furnish two harmonies’ (he means when the number of this figure becomes solid); he conceives that nature at certain times produces bad men who will not submit to education; in which latter particular he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be educated and made virtuous. but why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather common to all states, nay, to everything which comes into being at all? and is it by the agency of time, which, as he declares, makes all things change, that things which did not begin together, change together? for example, if something has come into being the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change with things that came into being before? further, why should the perfect state change into the spartan? for governments more often take an opposite form than one akin to them. the same remark is applicable to the other changes; he says that the spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny. and yet the contrary happens quite as often; for a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy than into a monarchy. further, he never says whether tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it changes. and the reason is, that he could not very well have told: for there is no rule; according to him it should revert to the first and best, and then there would be a complete cycle. but in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at sicyon changed from the tyranny of myron into that of cleisthenes; into oligarchy, as the tyranny of antileon did at chalcis; into democracy, as that of gelo’s family did at syracuse; into aristocracy, as at carthage, and the tyranny of charilaus at lacedaemon. often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, like most of the ancient oligarchies in sicily; for example, the oligarchy at leontini changed into the tyranny of panaetius; that at gela into the tyranny of cleander; that at rhegium into the tyranny of anaxilaus; the same thing has happened in many other states. and it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into oligarchy merely because the ruling class are lovers and makers of money, and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should have an equal share in the government with themselves. moreover, in many oligarchies there are laws against making money in trade. but at carthage, which is a democracy. there is no such prohibition; and yet to this day the carthaginians have never had a revolution. it is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the other of the poor. is not this just as much the case in the spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or all are not equally good men? nobody need be any poorer than he was before, and yet the oligarchy may change an the same into a democracy, if the poor form the majority; and a democracy may change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the other indifferent. once more, although the causes of the change are very numerous, he mentions only one, which is, that the citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all, or the majority of them, were originally rich. this is not true: though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution; but, when anybody else, it is no great matter, and an oligarchy does not even then more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of government. again, if men are deprived of the honors of state, and are wronged, and insulted, they make revolutions, and change forms of government, even although they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked — of which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be the cause.

finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies and democracies, socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one form of either of them.