what pleasure is, or what kind of thing it is, will become plainer if we take up the question again from the beginning. seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. for it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. for this reason, too, it is not a movement. for every movement (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at. it is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. in their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. for the fitting together of the stones is different from the fluting of the column, and these are both different from the making of the temple; and the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks nothing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of only a part. they differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time. so, too, in the case of walking and all other movements. for if locomotion is a movement from to there, it, too, has differences in kind-flying, walking, leaping, and so on. and not only so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another, nor is it the same thing to traverse this line and that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a different place from that. we have discussed movement with precision in another work, but it seems that it is not complete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. but of pleasure the form is complete at any and every time. plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. this would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.

from these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers are not right in saying there is a movement or a coming into being of pleasure. for these cannot be ascribed to all things, but only to those that are divisible and not wholes; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a movement or coming into being; therefore there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either; for it is a whole.

since every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense which is in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects (for perfect activity seems to be ideally of this nature; whether we say that it is active, or the organ in which it resides, may be assumed to be immaterial), it follows that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. and this activity will be the most complete and pleasant. for, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense, and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete is pleasantest, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity. but the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combination of object and sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of a man’s being healthy. (that pleasure is produced in respect to each sense is plain; for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. it is also plain that it arises most of all when both the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to an object which corresponds; when both object and perceiver are of the best there will always be pleasure, since the requisite agent and patient are both present.) pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age. so long, then, as both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity; for when both the passive and the active factor are unchanged and are related to each other in the same way, the same result naturally follows.

how, then, is it that no one is continuously pleased? is it that we grow weary? certainly all human beings are incapable of continuous activity. therefore pleasure also is not continuous; for it accompanies activity. some things delight us when they are new, but later do so less, for the same reason; for at first the mind is in a state of stimulation and intensely active about them, as people are with respect to their vision when they look hard at a thing, but afterwards our activity is not of this kind, but has grown relaxed; for which reason the pleasure also is dulled.

one might think that all men desire pleasure because they all aim at life; life is an activity, and each man is active about those things and with those faculties that he loves most; e.g. the musician is active with his hearing in reference to tunes, the student with his mind in reference to theoretical questions, and so on in each case; now pleasure completes the activities, and therefore life, which they desire. it is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since for every one it completes life, which is desirable. but whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present. for they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.