another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. perhaps we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes. for it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and when these have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. but one might complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. for, as we said at the outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are. so when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.

but if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him? surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. what is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one’s duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? or is this not so in all cases, but only when one’s friends are incurable in their wickedness? if they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. but a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.

but if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend? surely he cannot. when the interval is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? for not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. but we have discussed these matters.

should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never been his friend? surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.