the kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. for not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? these sometimes clash. so too with regard to the pleasant. now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. this however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is ‘that which seems lovable’. now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word ‘friendship’; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. but to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. or must we add ‘when it is recognized’? for many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. these people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? to be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.