the virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation, reason, desire.

of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.

what affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.

the origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. this is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this. hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (it is to be noted that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have sacked troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence agathon is right in saying

for this alone is lacking even to god,

to make undone things thathave once been done.)

the work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.