we had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the forms have been introduced by friends of our own. yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.

the men who introduced this doctrine did not posit ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an idea embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common idea set over all these goods. further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of god and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. further, since of the things answering to one idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. and one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, is (as is the case) in ‘man himself’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. for in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will ‘good itself’ and particular goods, in so far as they are good. but again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day. the pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that speusippus seems to have followed.

but let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single idea. what sort of goods would one call good in themselves? is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. or is nothing other than the idea of good good in itself? in that case the form will be empty. but if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. but of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. the good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one idea.

but what then do we mean by the good? it is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name. are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. but perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. and similarly with regard to the idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable. perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. this argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. it is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good itself’, or how the man who has viewed the idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby. for a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. but enough of these topics.