let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. for the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another — and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. to examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. for plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’ there is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. for, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two sensessome to us, some without qualification. presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. for the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get startingpoints. and as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of hesiod:

far best is he who knows all things himself;

good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;

but he who neither knows, nor lays to heart

another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.