of all the great men of action who since the conquest have guided the course of english policy, it is probable that none is less known to the reader of history than richard neville earl of warwick and salisbury. the only man of anything approaching his eminence who has been treated with an equal neglect is thomas cromwell, and of late years the great minister of henry the eighth is beginning to receive some of the attention that is his due. but for the kingmaker, the man who for ten years was the first subject of the english crown, and whose figure looms out with a vague grandeur even through the misty annals of the wars of the roses, no writer has spared a monograph. every one, it is true, knows his name, but his personal identity is quite ungrasped. nine persons out of ten if asked to sketch his character would find, to their own surprise, that they were falling back for their information to lord lytton's last of the barons or shakespeare's henry the sixth.

an attempt, therefore, even an inadequate attempt, to trace out with accuracy his career and his habits of[pg 2] mind from the original authorities cannot fail to be of some use to the general reader as well as to the student of history. the result will perhaps appear meagre to those who are accustomed to the biographies of the men of later centuries. we are curiously ignorant of many of the facts that should aid us to build up a picture of the man. no trustworthy representation of his bodily form exists. the day of portraits was not yet come; his monument in bisham abbey has long been swept away; no writer has even deigned to describe his personal appearance—we know not if he was dark or fair, stout or slim. at most we may gather from the vague phrases of the chroniclers, and from his quaint armed figure in the rous roll, that he was of great stature and breadth of limb. but perhaps the good rous was thinking of his fame rather than his body, when he sketched the earl in that quaint pictorial pedigree over-topping all his race save his cousin and king and enemy, edward the fourth.

but warwick has only shared the fate of all his contemporaries. the men of the fifteenth century are far less well known to us than are their grandfathers or their grandsons. in the fourteenth century the chroniclers were still working on their old scale; in the sixteenth the literary spirit had descended on the whole nation, and great men and small were writing hard at history as at every other branch of knowledge. but in the days of lancaster and york the old fountains had run dry, and the new flood of the renaissance had not risen. the materials for reconstructing history are both scanty and hard to handle. we dare not swallow hall and hollingshead whole, as was the custom for two[pg 3] hundred years, or take their annals, coloured from end to end with tudor sympathies, as good authority for the doings of the previous century. yet when we have put aside their fascinating, if somewhat untrustworthy, volumes, we find ourselves wandering in a very dreary waste of fragments and scraps of history, strung together on the meagre thread of two or three dry and jejune compilations of annals. to have to take william of worcester or good abbot whethamsted as the groundwork of a continuous account of the times is absolutely maddening. hence it comes to pass that warwick has failed to receive his dues.

of all the men of warwick's century there are only two whose characters we seem thoroughly to grasp—the best and the worst products of the age—henry the fifth and richard the third. the achievements of the one stirred even the feeble writers of that day into a fulness of detail in which they indulge for no other hero; the other served as the text for so many invectives under the tudors that we imagine that we see a real man in the gloomy portrait that is set up before us. yet we may fairly ask whether our impression is not drawn, either at first or at second hand, almost entirely from sir thomas more's famous biography of the usurper, a work whose literary merits have caused it to be received as the only serious source for richard's history. if we had not that work, richard of gloucester would seem a vaguely-defined monster of iniquity, as great a puzzle to the student of history as are the other shadowy forms which move on through those evil times to fall, one after the other, into the bloody grave which was the common lot of all.

in spite, however, of the dearth of good chronicles,[pg 4] and of the absolute non-existence of any contemporary writers of literary merit, there are authorities enough of one sort and another to make it both possible and profitable to build up a detailed picture of warwick and his times. first and foremost, of course, come the invaluable paston letters, covering the whole period, and often supplying the vivid touches of detail in which the more formal documents are so lamentably deficient. if but half a dozen families, as constant in letter-writing as john and margery paston, had transmitted their correspondence to posterity, there would be little need to grumble at our lack of information. other letters too exist, scattered in collections, such as the interesting scrawl from warwick himself, in his dire extremity before barnet fight, to henry vernon, which was turned up a year ago among the lumber at belvoir castle. much can be gathered from rolls and inquests—for example, the all-important information as to centres and sources of local power can be traced out with perfect accuracy from the columns of the escheats roll, where each peer or knight's lands are carefully set forth at the moment of his decease. joining one authority to another, we may fairly build up the england of the fifteenth century before our eyes with some approach to completeness.

the whole picture of the times is very depressing on the moral if not on the material side. there are few more pitiful episodes in history than the whole tale of the reign of henry the sixth, the most unselfish and well-intentioned king that ever sat upon the english throne—a man of whom not even his enemies and oppressors could find an evil word to say; the troubles came, as they confessed, "all because of his false lords, and never[pg 5] of him." we feel that there must have been something wrong with the heart of a nation that could see unmoved the meek and holy king torn from wife and child, sent to wander in disguise up and down the kingdom for which he had done his poor best, and finally doomed to pine for five years a prisoner in the fortress where he had so long held his royal court. nor is our first impression concerning the demoralisation of england wrong. every line that we read bears home to us more and more the fact that the nation had fallen on evil times. first and foremost among the causes of its moral deterioration was the wretched french war, a war begun in the pure spirit of greed and ambition,—there was not even the poor excuse that had existed in the time of edward the third—carried on by the aid of hordes of debauched foreign mercenaries (after henry the fifth's death the native english seldom formed more than a third of any host that took the field in france), and persisted in long after it had become hopeless, partly from misplaced national pride, partly because of the personal interests of the ruling classes. thirty-five years of a war that was as unjust as it was unfortunate had both soured and demoralised the nation. england was full of disbanded soldiers of fortune; of knights who had lost the ill-gotten lands across the channel, where they had maintained a precarious lordship in the days of better fortune; of castellans and governors whose occupation was gone; of hangers-on of all sorts who had once maintained themselves on the spoils of normandy and guienne. year after year men and money had been lavished on the war to no effect; and when the final catastrophe came, and the fights of formigny and chatillon ended the[pg 6] chapter of our disasters, the nation began to cast about for a scapegoat on whom to lay the burden of its failures. the real blame lay on the nation itself, not on any individual; and the real fault that had been committed was not the mismanagement of an enterprise which presented any hopes of success, but a wrong-headed persistence in an attempt to conquer a country which was too strong to be held down. however, the majority of the english people chose to assume firstly that the war with france might have been conducted to a prosperous issue, and secondly that certain particular persons were responsible for its having come to the opposite conclusion. at first the unfortunate suffolk and somerset had the responsibility laid upon them. a little later the outcry became more bold and fixed upon the lancastrian dynasty itself as being to blame not only for disaster abroad, but for the "want of governance" at home. if king henry had understood the charge, and possessed the wit to answer it, he might fairly have replied that his subjects must fit the burden upon their own backs, not upon his. the war had been weakly conducted, it was true; but weakly because the men and money for it were grudged. the england that could put one hundred thousand men into the field in a civil broil at towton sent four thousand to fight the decisive battle at formigny that settled our fate in normandy. at home the bulwarks of social order seemed crumbling away. private wars, riot, open highway robbery, murder, abduction, armed resistance to the law, prevailed on a scale that had been unknown since the troublous times of edward the second—we might almost say since the evil days of stephen. but it was not the crown alone that should[pg 7] have been blamed for the state of the realm. the nation had chosen to impose over-stringent constitutional checks on the kingly power before it was ripe for self-government, and the lancastrian house sat on the throne because it had agreed to submit to those checks. if the result of the experiment was disastrous, both parties to the contract had to bear their share of the responsibility. but a nation seldom allows that it has been wrong; and henry of windsor had to serve as scapegoat for all the misfortunes of the realm, because henry of bolingbroke had committed his descendants to the unhappy compact.

want of a strong central government was undoubtedly the complaint under which england was labouring in the middle of the fifteenth century, and all the grievances against which outcry was made were but symptoms of one latent disease.

ever since the death of henry the fifth the internal government of the country had been steadily going from bad to worse. the mischief had begun in the young king's earliest years. the council of regency that ruled in his name had from the first proved unable to make its authority felt as a single individual ruler might have done. with the burden of the interminable french war weighing upon their backs, and the divisions caused by the quarrels of beaufort and gloucester dividing them into factions, the councillors had not enough attention to spare for home government. as early as 1428 we find them, when confronted by the outbreak of a private war in the north, endeavouring to patch up the quarrel by arbitration, instead of punishing the offenders on each side. accounts of riotous assemblages in all parts of the country, of armed violence at parliamentary elections, of[pg 8] party fights in london at parliament time—like that which won for the meeting of 1426 the name of the parliament of bats (bludgeons)—grow more and more common. we even find treasonable insurrection appearing in the strange obscure rising of the political lollards under jack sharp in 1431, an incident which shows how england was on the verge of bloodshed twenty years before the final outbreak of civil war was to take place.

but all these public troubles would have been of comparatively small importance if the heart of the nation had been sound. the phenomenon which makes the time so depressing is the terrible decay in private morals since the previous century. a steady deterioration is going on through the whole period, till at its end we find hardly a single individual in whom it is possible to interest ourselves, save an occasional colet or caxton, who belongs in spirit, if not date, to the oncoming renascence of the next century. there is no class or caste in england which comes well out of the scrutiny. the church, which had served as the conscience of the nation in better times, had become dead to spiritual things; it no longer produced either men of saintly life or learned theologians or patriotic statesmen. in its corporate capacity it had grown inertly orthodox. destitute of any pretence of spiritual energy, yet showing a spirit of persecution such as it had never displayed in earlier centuries, its sole activity consisted in hunting to the stake the few men who displayed any symptoms of thinking for themselves in matters of religion. so great was the deadness of the church that it was possible to fall into trouble, like bishop pecock, not for defending[pg 9] lollardry, but for showing too much originality in attacking it. individually the leading churchmen of the day were politicians and nothing more, nor were they as a rule politicians of the better sort; for one like beaufort, who was at any rate consistent and steadfast, there are many bourchiers and george nevilles and beauchamps, who merely sailed with the wind and intrigued for their own fortunes or those of their families.

of the english baronage of the fifteenth century we shall have so much to say in future chapters that we need not here enlarge on its characteristics. grown too few and too powerful, divided into a few rival groups, whose political attitude was settled by a consideration of family grudges and interests rather than by any grounds of principle, or patriotism, or loyalty, they were as unlike their ancestors of the days of john or edward the first as their ecclesiastical contemporaries were unlike langton or even winchelsey. the baronage of england had often been unruly, but it had never before developed the two vices which distinguished it in the times of the two roses—a taste for indiscriminate bloodshed and a turn for rapid political apostasy. to put prisoners to death by torture as did tiptoft earl of worcester, to desert to the enemy in the midst of battle like lord grey de ruthyn at northampton, or stanley at bosworth, had never before been the custom of england. it is impossible not to recognise in such traits the results of the french war. twenty years spent in contact with french factions, and in command of the godless mercenaries who formed the bulk of the english armies, had taught our nobles lessons of cruelty and faithlessness such as they had not before imbibed. their demoralisation had been displayed in[pg 10] france long ere the outbreak of civil war caused it to manifest itself at home.

but if the church was effete and the baronage demoralised, it might have been thought that england should have found salvation in the soundheartedness of her gentry and her burgesses. unfortunately such was not to be the case. both of these classes were growing in strength and importance during the century, but when the times of trouble came they gave no signs of aspiring to direct the destinies of the nation. the house of commons which should, as representing those classes, have gone on developing its privileges, was, on the contrary, thrice as important in the reign of henry the fourth as in that of edward the fourth. the knights and squires showed on a smaller scale all of the vices of the nobility. instead of holding together and maintaining a united loyalty to the crown, they bound themselves by solemn sealed bonds and the reception of "liveries" each to the baron whom he preferred. this fatal system, by which the smaller landholder agreed on behalf of himself and his tenants to follow his greater neighbour in peace and war, had ruined the military system of england, and was quite as dangerous as the ancient feudalism. the salutary old usage, by which all freemen who were not tenants of a lord served under the sheriff in war, and not under the banner of any of the baronage, had long been forgotten. now, if all the gentry of a county were bound by these voluntary indentures to serve some great lord, there was no national force in that county on which the crown could count, for the yeoman followed the knight as the knight followed the baron. if the gentry constituted themselves the voluntary followers of the baronage, and aided their employers to keep england unhappy, the class of citizens and burgesses took a very different line of conduct. if not actively mischievous, they were sordidly inert. they refused to entangle themselves in politics at all. they submitted impassively to each ruler in turn, when they had ascertained that their own persons and property were not endangered by so doing. a town, it has been remarked, seldom or never stood a siege during the wars of the roses, for no town ever refused to open its gates to any commander with an adequate force who asked for entrance. if we find a few exceptions to the rule, we almost always learn that entrance was denied not by the citizens, but by some garrison of the opposite side which was already within the walls. loyalty seems to have been as wanting among the citizens as among the barons of england. if they generally showed some slight preference for york rather than for lancaster, it was not on any moral or sentimental ground, but because the house of lancaster was known by experience to be weak in enforcing "good governance," and the house of york was pledged to restore the strength of the crown and to secure better times for trade than its rival.

warwick was a strong man, born at the commencement of henry the sixth's unhappy minority, whose coming of age coincided with the outburst of national rage caused by the end of the disastrous french war, whose birth placed him at the head of one of the great factions in the nobility, whose strength of body and mind enabled him to turn that headship to full account. how he dealt with the problems which inevitable necessity laid before him we shall endeavour to relate.