ratification of the treaty—observations on the effects likely to be produced thereby—conclusion.

the restrictions regarding officers visiting the city of lahore being removed, we hastened to take advantage of this liberty. the streets and bazaars were so thronged with inhabitants, and the recently disbanded soldiery, that it was exceedingly difficult to force a path on horseback, and an elephant was found to be the most advantageous mode of travelling. a brigade of our native infantry were cantoned in the badshahee mosque, a large, half-dis[pg 270]mantled building, which had stood the test of a good many pieces of artillery during the late effervescences in lahore. the walls which enclose it were speckled with the prints of grape-shot and bullets, and the angry passions of men had left their marks on every portion of the once sacred edifice. the mosque afforded a strong military position, and allah's mansion promised a commodious quarter for christian, mahommedan, and hindoo.

the gardens, amidst this general revolution, had not shared the same fate, or had been more easily restored, for the flowers and shrubs were flourishing and exhaling fragrance around, nourished, perhaps, by the gory manure which had been lavishly spread on the parterres.

adjoining these gardens, was the tomb of the old lion of lahore—runjeet singh—as yet unfinished, but a humble monument to the memory of such a chief. the sikh nation, since runjeet's death, had been too busily employed in slaughtering each other to afford leisure for national testimonies to the founder of their dynasty; but that chieftain[pg 271] can dispense with monumental records to hand his name to posterity. history will not neglect him.

our engineers were actively employed in repairing the badshahee mosque, and in improving its defences, that it might become an eligible situation for the garrison, which was destined to remain at lahore for the present, according to the articles of the treaty.

in other parts of the city, we found lahore little altered from the condition in which we left it on our return from afghanistan in the winter of 1839-40.

very few european adventurers had withstood the late turbulency of the population.

a german, who had superintended the manufacture of gunpowder, a spaniard, who had planned the engineer's work at sobraon, and a frenchman, (mons. mouton,) who had held a subordinate command in the cavalry and artillery, formed the wreck of the european officers in the sikh service.

the inhabitants, having now so far regained[pg 272] their confidence as to feel assured that the british had no intention of plundering the city, reopened their shops, and our camp was daily crowded with itinerant tradesmen, offering their wares for sale. the prices put on their goods led to a supposition that the vendors entertained a high opinion of our wealth and a low one of our knowledge of the value of their merchandize.

the shalimar gardens, about four miles from the city, formerly the chosen scene of the ranee's entertainments, were a favourite resort for our leisure hours. the luxuriant shrubberies and flower-beds, with marble aqueducts and fountains, rendered these gardens a delightful retreat from the noonday sun, which was now becoming oppressive under our canvas abodes on the plain.

during several interviews held with the sikh durbar, the terms of arrangement with the lahore chiefs were finally settled, which provided for the fulfilment of all the clauses specified in the before-mentioned treaty with ghoo[pg 273]lab singh. that chief[63] was selected as prime vizier, whilst the ranee continued as regent during the minority of dhuleep singh. a force of 10,000 british troops, under command of sir john littler, were named to occupy lahore,[64] and assist the sikh durbar in the fulfilment of the measures which were deemed necessary for the future government of the country.

the native army of lahore were to be re-enlisted under a reduced system of pay—viz., under the same footing as they enjoyed during the lifetime of runjeet singh; and their establishment was never to exceed twenty-five battalions, of eight hundred men to each battalion, with 12,000 cavalry.

[pg 274]

the sikh durbar, being unable to raise at once the sum of one and a half crore of rupees demanded as an indemnification for the war undertaken by the british government, ceded in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, (one million sterling,) all interest in the territories lying in the hill districts, between the beeas and indus, including the provinces of cashmere and hazarah.[65]

fifty lacs (500,000l.) were paid down before the ratification of the treaty.

if the british government should at any time wish to send troops through the punjaub, on notice being given, they are to be allowed to pass through the lahore territories. the maharajah is never to retain in his service any british subject, nor the subject of any european or american state, without the consent of the british government being previously obtained.

the maharajah agreed to recognise the independent sovereignty of ghoolab singh to[pg 275] such hill territories as were guaranteed to him by the british government, and that sirdar was to be admitted to the privilege of a separate treaty with the british, in consideration of the good services rendered by him in procuring peace.

the limits of the lahore territories are not to be changed without the british concurrence.

this treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, was signed by the maharajah and his ministers, and by the governor-general of india and his secretaries, on the 9th of march, 1846.

the day following the signature of this treaty, on the governor-general paying a visit to the lahore court, a paper was read, conveying the thanks of the sikh sirdars to his excellency for his generosity, kindness, and mercy shown towards the sikh nation, and for having consented to leave a force for the maintenance of the sikh government, until a satisfactory settlement of affairs could be arranged, provided that could be effected within twelve months.

in the separate treaty concluded with ghoolab[pg 276] singh, the british government transferred, as an independent possession to that chief, all the hill countries east of the indus[66] and west of the ravee.

in consideration of this transfer, ghoolab singh bound himself to pay to the british government a sum of seventy-five lacs of rupees, (750,000l. sterling.)

ghoolab singh bound himself to refer any disputes between himself and any other state to the arbitration of the british government. also to join, with his whole force, the british troops, when employed within the hills adjoining his possessions; and the british engaged to aid in protecting the sirdar from external enemies.

ghoolab singh engaged to take no british subject, nor european, nor american, into his service without the consent of the british; and, in acknowledgment of the supremacy of the british government, promised to present, an[pg 277]nually, a horse, twelve shawl goats, and three pairs of cashmere shawls.

this treaty was concluded at umritsir, on the 16th of march, 1846.

whilst these treaties were in progress, continual meetings between the chiefs occurred, and it was a matter of much interest to view the changed deportment which the vis fortioris had inflicted on the sikh sirdars. runjoor singh, who had directed the operations at buddewal and aliwal, requested a special introduction to his friend, sir harry smith; and tej and lal singh, the commandants at moodkee and ferozeshuhur, now converted into ministers of state, were most diffuse in their expressions of friendship and gratitude towards the british chiefs.

the coin which was brought for the payment of the fine inflicted, proved pretty correctly that the vast treasures stored by runjeet singh in the treasury of govindghur, had been melted down into soldiers' pay, and that the sirdars had been too lavish in their expenditure to retain much ready money for the benefit of the commonwealth.

[pg 278]

russian, persian, chinese, and afghan currencies, intermingled with gold and silver jewellery, were scraped together to meet the exigencies of the case, and the far-boasted wealth of the punjaub appeared to have evaporated during a two months' campaign.

silver being the current coin throughout india, the counting out of large sums occupied a very considerable time, and thus afforded leisure to the lahore durbar to make exertions to raise the sums of money demanded, which they had with much alacrity promised to pay, but which they counted out with much difficulty and evident reluctance.

news having ere this reached the furthermost parts of the country of the termination of the war, it became necessary to hasten the reduction of the sikh forces to the stipulated amount; and orders were forwarded to the killedars of forts, and commandants of districts, to take measures for effecting this purpose. less difficulty than was apprehended was experienced with the portions of the army which were cantoned in distant parts of the country,[pg 279] and, with the exception of a fortress of great strength, named kote kangra, in the hill districts, none of the sikh officers held out for any time against the british mandates.

the army of the punjaub had been so heavily disabled at sobraon, and during each of the previous actions the loss in artillery had been so considerable, that these circumstances could not be concealed from their fellow-soldiers and countrymen, which tended to dishearten the rest of the army for any further resistance.

the fanatic akalees, so notorious in the military annals of runjeet singh, and who had been exceedingly abusive formerly to such british officers as had attended at reviews of the sikh army, were scarcely ever beheld during our late engagements, nor did i see a man wounded by a quoit[67] during any of the battles. i was told by a sikh officer in lahore, that this race of priest soldiery had been so active and forward during the lahore massacres of the few[pg 280] preceding years, that the greater portion of them had met with the fate they so amply deserved, and were nearly destroyed. if this be true, it is certainly one of the chief benefits conferred on the punjaub by their sanguinary revolutions.

the fate of the sikh sirdars, since runjeet's death, has presented also a tragical catalogue: thirty-five have been murdered, seven died a natural death, eleven were killed in the late actions, twelve remain living at lahore.

under the present reduced state of the sikh army, it is not the least probable that the nation can ever become again the formidable enemy which they have lately been found.

in the first place, their military establishment being numerically reduced to one-third of their late numbers, and the extent of the country requiring these to be quartered far apart, a british force of superior numbers could, in a few days, in case of an insurrection, take post under the walls of lahore. the reduction of an army must, doubtless, impair the martial propensities of a nation,[pg 281] and when these weakened battalions are under the surveillance of the keen-eyes of the british agents, who must, henceforward, dwell in lahore, we may reckon almost as safely on information reaching us of any irregularities, as we might in the native forces of india.

but, as i have before stated, the principal confidence of all indian armies is placed in their guns. as the greater part of these are in our possession, and the lahore arsenal cannot be as busily employed now, without our knowledge and consent, as formerly, the scarcity of cannon will be an obstacle, to which it ought not to be difficult to add a scarcity of artillerymen, for the profession is a noisy one, and therefore their practice is easily overheard, and without unremitting attention and practice, artillery are not usually very formidable.

in ghoolab singh, the british government ought to possess a tower of strength, for they have made him a greater man than he ever was before; and it must palpably be his interest to maintain amicable relations with the british, having paid beforehand for his alliance in solid[pg 282] rupees. the tribute of a few goats and shawls cannot be very irksome to the governor of cashmere, as the price of the guarantee for his dominions; and not being himself a sikh by parentage, and most of his army being also aliens to the punjaubees, there cannot be much danger of a collusion between that chief and any sikh sirdars who might desire a change of administration.

the establishment of so powerful a chief as ghoolab singh as our ally, on a line of hill territories bordering the whole punjaub on the north, has afforded a security sufficient to deter the sikhs from any thoughts of hostility, so long as the chief of cashmere remains contented with his principality, or unable to discover more powerful friends than the british.

i cannot for one moment do ghoolab singh the injustice of supposing, that he would prefer the precarious sovereignty of the punjaub to his present secure and extensive government. the lesson which that sirdar must have learned, when within a hair's breadth of being sacrificed to a popular turmoil in lahore, ope[pg 283]rated so favourably, that he manifested the utmost desire to return to his mountains as soon as practicable after the departure of the british authorities from the sikh capital. but should ambition whisper such a wild project in his ear as to aim at the throne of lahore, prudence would surely suggest that the sikh nation had recently experienced how much could be done against the british with a chance of success.

the tract of country between the beeas and the sutlej, known as the jullundur dooab[68] which was ceded to us in the first treaty arranged by ghoolab singh at kussoor, though extending over territory, will, on reference to the map, be seen to contract the actual frontier line.

that frontier, uniting at the northern angle with the territories of our ally, ghoolab singh, and overlooking, from a strongly defensible country, the city of umritsir and fort of govindghur, has materially altered our position relative to the punjaub.

the new forts built as our outposts on that[pg 284] frontier will not, it is to be devoutly hoped, be encumbered by large towns and cantonments; or, if that be deemed indispensable, the area of the new fortresses should be sufficiently extensive to admit all european inhabitants to take refuge within their defences.

the part enacted during the late war by our old enemies, the afghans, has been a matter of surprise to many. the natural and religious antipathy between the afghans and sikhs is a sufficient cause for a want of co-operation at the outset, but the overthrow of the feringhee would have been a temptation which, if gilded with a fair chance of success, must have overcome all minor prejudices. situated at a distance of five hundred miles from the scene of action, and the news travelling at anything but a railroad pace over this long interval, the afghan chiefs learned of the sikh invasion and the result of the actions under so many shapes, that they were at a loss which to believe.

akbar khan, having assembled his forces, was hurrying in a state of commotion towards the lower gorge of the khyber pass, when the[pg 285] news of the sikh defeat at sobraon reached him, which induced that chief to refrain from any further proceedings. if any entertain a doubt as to whether his real intentions were to co-operate with the british or with the sikhs, this last measure must amply explain them, for what better opportunity could have presented itself to the mountain chief for striking a blow at peshawur than the period of paralyzation ensuing after so many rapid and severe defeats of the sikh forces?

had matters befallen otherwise, there is little doubt that success on the part of the sikhs would have ensured the performance of the promises of assistance sent by akbar khan to lahore, and such a swarm of eastern warriors would have spread over our north-western provinces, as had never been seen since the days of the victorious nadir shah.

affairs being now in a train for settlement, it was no longer deemed necessary to keep the whole army concentrated at lahore. two regiments (the 16th lancers and 31st foot) were permitted to volunteer previously to[pg 286] proceeding to calcutta and embarking for england, and as, during such occasions, liquor is freely administered, and discipline necessarily relaxed, the camp afforded daily evidence of the prevailing tastes of the english soldier.

it is a general opinion in the service, and i believe a correct one, that soldiers who have served long in india are not the best material for home employment. it does not at all surprise me, that men who have been employed in storming batteries and overcoming armies, whose days have been passed in marching under the fiery beams of an eastern sun, and whose nights have been spent in watchfulness through the chilling damps of a january night in india, should not feel much relish for resuming their recruit's skin. when a man has done the utmost which the service requires of him, nay more, when his conduct has become the theme of encomium, and he has enjoyed a private's full share of the thanks of parliament, he is not generally over well pleased when set assiduously to work at battalion drill with a herd of recruits, to help and make a new regi[pg 287]ment. it is on this account, i think, that soldiers who have served in india are not the best qualified for english duties, and not because the habits they have contracted in the east have become so inveterate that they are unable to shake them off. yet, with this conviction on my mind, it certainly was a painful sight to witness the breaking up of a regiment, which must ensue under the volunteering system. a man awakes on the morrow after his intoxication, and finds that he had bound himself with hopeless fetters to exile. another presents himself as a willing offering for service in the east, which he could hardly hope to see to an end, abandoning all ties of home and kindred, and embracing with satisfaction, as his adopted country, in lieu of old england, the land of the stranger and of the heathen. how many an anxious mother, or orphan sister, has looked forward, with eager expectation, for the return of a regiment to their native country, and found that after all the perils of war had been overcome, the blandishments of an eastern bazaar had induced the expected son or brother[pg 288] to abandon and forget the natural ties of kindred, and to separate himself for ever from those who ought to have some hold on his affections!

on the evening of the 3rd of march, previously to the breaking up of the army, the three british cavalry regiments which had been engaged in the late actions, assembled to dine together, when the extensive tables spread under long rows of tents exhibited a motley array of uniforms, and an equally varied collection of dinner-equipage, such as will rarely be met with again. the number of black bottles would have been startling to the advocates of plate and decanters; but on this occasion they were all applied to their legitimate purposes. formerly, the case had been widely different; for many regiments, after the sorrows of buddewal, had devoted those unseemly flagons, not only to the service of wine, but to the more urgent calls of illuminating the tables; and guinness's portly bottles had often stood in homely familiarity beside their more slender and elegant claret brethren; both alas! de[pg 289]graded to the vile purpose of supporting wax candles.

the next morning, the two regiments above-named quitted their fellow-comrades to commence their roasting expedition towards calcutta; and a few days afterwards, the greater part of the army returned towards their allotted cantonments in india, leaving sir john littler, with ten thousand men, to form the garrison of lahore.

the governor-general, who had now been raised to the honour of a peerage, proceeded by the sacred city of umritsir towards his summer abode in the himalayah mountains; and the forces under brigadier wheler, with some additional native corps, occupied the newly-ceded territories in the jullundur dooab.

amidst this general departure and dispersion of our forces, there remained but one troublesome and refractory party, in the killedar, or native governor of a fort, near the foot of the hills, called kote kangra. deaf to the orders from the lahore durbar, he resolutely objected to surrender his command;[pg 290] and the fort was known to be so strong, that it was found necessary to despatch additional troops, with some guns of heavier metal, to reduce the place.

for upwards of three months, this obstinate killedar continued to refuse possession of his fortress. after numerous parleys and conferences, which were accorded with the humane intention of preventing any further bloodshed on either side, a suitable train of battering-guns reached the british camp, when, seeing that any further resistance would be hopeless, the commandant of the fort surrendered to the detested feringees, marching out his garrison with the honours of war.

thus ended the sanguinary struggles with an enemy who had caused the british supremacy in india to quake to its foundations, and who had so far profited by the often-repeated lessons taught them in european tactics, that it is not surprising that clauses should be inserted in the treaties to restrict such inconvenient knowledge for the future. but, although the instruction may be discontinued, yet the[pg 291] information gained, and the practical purposes to which it has been applied, cannot be annihilated by treaties and proclamations. few will now venture to question the soundness of the maxim, that our indian empire must be maintained by the sword.

the practical comment on the late war has been a large reduction of our native army, recently promulgated. if this be followed by an augmentation of the european troops employed in the north-western provinces, we may understand the economy, and applaud the policy, which dictated such a measure; but if, with the extension of territory, a reduction of the forces—which already had just sufficed to turn the scale in our favour—should ensue, a second campaign on the sutlej will be likely to render the abolition of the queen's and company's forces in india a probable result.

my tale of eastern wanderings, and of the campaigns in which it has been my lot to bear a humble share, is told.

the subject of these pages has beguiled many a leisure hour in camp and quarters. i[pg 292] hope i may not have retaliated unfavourably on such of my readers as have been liberal enough to accompany me throughout my long journey.

i have spoken freely on all subjects connected with military matters, because i take the deepest interest in my profession, and feel convinced that the trade of war cannot be better served than by a minute and free investigation of all its details.

if, in the description of active operations, any errors of details may be detected, let me be judged leniently; for the confusion of the field of battle not only prevails at the moment, but its din will often bewilder the mind of the eye-witness long after the cannon have ceased.

that it is not an easy matter to be accurate in such details, may be inferred from the fact, that in the despatches of sobraon, especial thanks were given to a brigadier for his exertions in the field during that day, when the innocent hero of the despatch was fast asleep on a sick bed at ferozepore. such is the fortune of war, that the feather-bed is often more[pg 293] prolific of honour than the path of thorns, and "the bubble reputation sought in the cannon's mouth."

now that the scene of active operations has closed, i cannot flatter myself that the author of these volumes can have excited sufficient interest in his movements to be followed any further in his pilgrimage. therefore, on the sun-burnt plains of lahore we will part; and we cannot do so under more favourable terms than those emphatically recommended by the eccentric terence—

"vos valete et plaudite."