assemblage of the british forces on the sutlej—sikhs threaten to recross—sir harry smith detached towards loodiana—skirmish near buddewal.

during the first week in january, the reserve force, under sir john grey, joined the main column of the army, and took post near the river, along which pickets were thrown out by the divisions nearest the enemy's position, to watch their proceedings on the opposite bank.

nearly every soldier in the north-western provinces was at, or approaching, the head-quarter camp, which extended over no incon[pg 134]siderable portion of ground. large supplies had been laid in for the army at ferozepore and from the country bordering on bussean. the british generals now became masters of their own time for the planning and prosecution of further operations.

on the opposite bank of the sutlej, the sikh camp, with its hives of parti-coloured canvas, speckled the country as far as the eye could reach, and appeared to shelter a mighty host, notwithstanding their recent losses. nearly opposite the village of sobraon the tents appeared more closely packed together, about a mile distant from the river, and thence the banks sloped gradually towards the water; but, about three miles higher up, and immediately above the fords of hureeka, the banks rise precipitously, on the right shore, to a height of about forty or fifty feet, and overlook the british side of the river where the slope is very gradual and nearly uniform.

the country on the left bank is mostly bare, except near the river and close above hureeka, where some thick reeds and underwood served[pg 135] as a cover for the enemy's spies and stragglers to watch or fire upon our videttes, but this jungle was shortly afterwards burnt.

opposite sobraon the sikhs appeared to be remarkably busy, and it was shortly discovered that they were employed in constructing a bridge of boats across the sutlej. this, at the time, was considered a mere piece of bravado. few conjectured that the enemy would have the hardihood to attempt a passage in the face of the british army, and they were left, unmolested, to complete their purpose. in a few days the bridge was complete save four boats, and we began to suspect that the deficiency, which was of some days' continuance, was intentional, when one morning the gap was filled up, and their workmen were seen busily constructing a tête-de-pont on the british shore.

a battery of sikh guns was posted on the right bank which would sweep the bridge, and it was conjectured that the enemy had mined some of the boats, so that in case of the british attempting to use them they might[pg 136] at any time be blown up; but no inclination was manifested on our part to accept this invitation.

the hum in the enemy's camp towards nightfall, and the glare of their camp fires, caused the scene to resemble the vicinity of a large city, whilst the occasional arrival of a chief from lahore was greeted with acclamations and the roar of cannon. from the ramparts of a small fortified village on the right flank of our position, we could observe the sikh battalions turning out every evening for parade and exercise, and their artillery practice was almost unremitting. the fire of cannon and musketry, which was constantly heard even after nightfall, made us frequently conjecture that some point of our position had been attacked, but it proved that the enemy were only amusing themselves.

our spies brought word that an attack on the british army was meditated on the part of the enemy, who only awaited a report, from their astrologers, of the stars being favourable to the success of the undertaking.

[pg 137]

on the 13th of january, a battery of guns was brought up by sir hugh gough's orders, and placed in position; and, as soon as the daylight enabled him to ascertain the distance, a cannonade was opened on their advanced lines, which was promptly replied to by the enemy. little or no damage ensued except the bursting of our largest gun (an iron eighteen pounder), which wounded an artilleryman severely, and put an end to the game. that evening the sikhs struck their tents, which had been impudently pitched so near our position, not wishing to risk the effects of a chance shot on a repetition of that day's proceeding; but they might have spared themselves the trouble, for the first experiment was sufficient.

occasional skirmishes took place at the outposts along the river, which served to interrupt in a measure the tedium of camp routine. the sikhs, who now crossed in great numbers during the day to work at their entrenchments, and usually retired towards nightfall, amused themselves with ball practice at any moving object they could discern within musket range.

[pg 138]

a small look-out tower, which we had thrown up to watch their proceedings, served the sikhs for constant practice, and the compliment was returned upon such of their marksmen as ventured to offer themselves for targets.

as our officers were strictly interdicted from the pursuit of small game in the jungles which bordered on the river, some were obliged to content themselves with this inferior sport, but the practice, being at a long range, was nearly innocent.

one night a party of sikhs made a successful foray upon a picket of irregular cavalry, and killed three or four of them. as the enemy occupied the high ridge above hureeka ford, which precluded any view into the interior, it was impossible to ascertain the post or strength of their pickets, although the videttes on the bank were always visible. the sikhs had therefore the advantage of commanding the fords whenever they pleased to make use of them for predatory excursions.

our inaction at this time, when in face of[pg 139] the whole sikh army, may appear strange to many, but the british generals had wisely resolved that offensive operations should not be resumed, if avoidable, until the means were at hand for striking an effective blow and pursuing the advantage when gained. the siege train had only quitted delhi early in january, and the pontoon train at ferozepore was, in the meantime, being secretly but effectively prepared for service. any operations which might be undertaken before the whole machinery could be brought into action would therefore have been of little avail.

the time dragged slowly and monotonously on with us. the outpost duties of outlying and inlying pickets and camp guards were severe and tiresome; but even when free from such restraints, few quitted the lines of their regiments, as we knew not the hour we might be called on for action.

this state was not destined to be of long duration. reports had already been forwarded to head-quarters that loodiana was threatened[pg 140] by the enemy, and about the middle of january the communication with that place was interrupted.

the sikh army, swollen daily by the influx from lahore, began to experience a scarcity of provisions, which induced them to send foraging parties across, on the line of the upper sutlej, to procure supplies. as our line of frontier was too considerable to be properly watched without an extension of front, which was deemed imprudent, the fords of the sutlej being very numerous, the enemy were enabled hitherto to communicate freely with the opposite shore.

it now became necessary, however, to sweep the country of the obstacles to a free communication with loodiana. to effect this object, sir harry smith was detached, on the 17th of january, with the first brigade[34] of his division, two corps of native cavalry, and a light field battery, to clear the country of the enemy.

[pg 141]

the day after the major-general had quitted camp, intelligence arrived which proved that the enemy were in much greater force than had been at first supposed, and had committed some ravages at loodiana, which place was now threatened by a considerable body from the right bank.

on the 19th, brigadier cureton was despatched, with the 16th lancers and two troops of horse artillery, to reinforce sir harry smith.

brigadier cureton, after two forced marches, overtook the major-general at the town and fort of jugraon, where h.m.'s 53rd regiment, on its route from the lower provinces, also joined sir harry's column.

accounts were received at jugraon, of the enemy being in great force on the british side of the river; and it was stated that a portion of the cantonments of loodiana had been destroyed by the sikhs, who had afterwards encamped on the plain below the town, and between it and the river.

brigadier godby now held the cantonments with one corps of native cavalry and[pg 142] three of native infantry, (including a goorkha[35] battalion, recently arrived from their mountain quarters,) and a light field battery. the fort, which stands in the town of loodiana, on the side looking towards the river, but beyond cannon-range from the sutlej, was garrisoned by a few convalescents, and the dep?t of the 50th.

the enemy were reported to have thrown an advanced party into the fort of buddewal, which lay on the road between jugraon and loodiana, and belonged to the ladwa rajah, a sikh chief, who had instigated this expedition, and had conveyed his family and valuables from the protected sikh states into the punjaub.

a small party belonging to the puttealah rajah had for some time before the arrival of colonel godby's force occupied the town of loodiana, but had not stirred a hand in defence of the cantonment.

[pg 143]

sir harry smith had met with none of the enemies' parties on his march to jugraon, except in the fort of durrumkhote, where a few shrapnel induced the garrison to abandon the place, and a small party of sepoys were placed to occupy it.

at two o'clock on the morning of the 21st of january, the british forces moved from jugraon towards loodiana, instructions having been forwarded to brigadier godby to march out of cantonment, and effect a junction with the advancing column, on its line of march, about daybreak. the heavy baggage and wheel-carriages were ordered to be left in the citadel of jugraon, which was occupied by two companies of sepoys. the cavalry and horse artillery took the head of the column; and after a slow and weary march in the dark,[36] sir harry's forces arrived about sunrise within[pg 144] two miles of buddewal, all baggage being kept in rear of the column, to prevent any obstruction in the operations which might be requisite.

during the halt, a native spy arrived with information of the enemy having advanced, and occupied the fort of buddewal in strength; but the general discredited the report, and the advance was sounded without any alteration of route being determined on. brigadier godby's forces did not make their appearance, although the time for meeting as appointed had passed; it was therefore evident that they must have taken another route, and have probably missed us in the dark.

on issuing from the close country upon the plain, a cloud of dust was discerned rising over some trees on our left flank, and soon afterwards, some goorchera horsemen, galloping through the grove, announced the enemy to be on the alert. in a few minutes, the grove was swarming with the sikh irregular cavalry, who continued to move parallel with our brigade, which advanced steadily into the[pg 145] plain, having wheeled into open column of troops. several of the sikh chiefs rode boldly up within a hundred yards of us, and watched the cavalry brigade passing in review, and approaching the fort of buddewal. on our front, and to the right, nearly as far as the eye could reach, stretched a sandy plain, with scarcely a bush on its surface, beyond which lay loodiana, about six miles distant. our left was flanked by groves of trees, and on the left front was the town and fort of buddewal, frowning over the low range of mud houses in its neighbourhood, the whole of which swarmed with the enemy's infantry.

the fort was a brick building of some solidity, in which were placed the heaviest guns; but entrenchments and abattis were thrown up round the town, which were defended by lighter guns and musketeers.

the cavalry and horse artillery continued to advance into the plain, and deployed under cover of some sand hills, whilst sir harry smith rode along the position, to reconnoitre the enemy. several sikh chiefs continued[pg 146] busily employed in the same manner; but as yet, no hostilities had taken place, though each sought eagerly an opening to give the first advantageous blow. at length, the head of our infantry column came in sight, and the sikhs, who had been intently watching their movements, now ranged themselves in continuous line amongst the trees up to the walls of the town. a quick flash from the sikh position, succeeded by a cannon-ball, which plunged heavily into the sand, announced the enemy's hostile intentions; but the cavalry brigade were cleverly posted among the sand hills, which defiladed them from fire in a great measure, although they were too low to be quite effectual for that useful purpose.

the infantry, as they advanced into the plain, toiling through the deep sand, fared much worse; for the sikh light guns, being pushed forward, soon got the range, and the shot tore through the ranks with deadly precision.

the enemy's shells were comparatively harmless, being made of pewter or lead, and simply loaded with powder; but the round[pg 147] and chain-shot came hurtling through the air, or playfully ricochetting from the sand ere they plunged through or over our line, seldom missing their object by an interval which the next discharge was not likely to correct.

one direct shot from a battery, which must, i think, have been a chain-shot, i saw strike a subdivision of infantry on the flank, and turn over every man. at length, the toilsome and blood-stained advance was accomplished, and the infantry, nearly exhausted, formed a second line to the cavalry, and halted to recover breath.

the sikhs, emboldened at the paucity of our numbers, advanced from under cover into the open plain, whilst a body of cavalry, issuing from the grove of trees before-mentioned, pounced upon our baggage, which had not yet reached the open ground. two ressalahs of irregular horse, and details of a few men from each regiment, were marching with the baggage. the enemy, taking two light field-pieces with them, fired upon the confused heap of cattle, and soon caused such a scene of[pg 148] commotion, that they were enabled to plunder as much as they could carry away; and a great portion of the sick men, carried in doolies,[37] fell into the enemy's hands. some were taken prisoners, but the greater part were massacred.

the rear portion of the baggage, by taking to flight, escaped to jugraon; and a few stray camels, with drivers possessed of some presence of mind, by making a circuit, arrived safely at loodiana. a small guard of h.m.'s 53rd regiment, under the command of the quarter-master, kept together, and saved a portion of the regimental stores of that corps, with which they retired on jugraon.

in the meantime, the enemy, having drawn up his forces on the open plain, seemed disposed to follow up his advantage, and the sikh chiefs, galloping along the front of their line, were seen directing the advance, and animating the soldiers. our artillery being advantageously posted behind some low sand-hills, now opened a well-directed fire of shrapnel[pg 149] upon the enemy's left, which soon appeared to check their ardour, and seriously disturb the meditated operations.

brigadier cureton pushed forward with the 16th lancers, in echelon of squadrons, to follow up the confusion which had ensued from the fire of our artillery, and threatened a charge on the left flank of the sikhs, when the movement was countermanded by sir harry smith's orders.

the british general having found himself much outflanked by the enemy's line, (and the infantry being greatly exhausted by the toil they had undergone,) resolved not to hazard an action under such disadvantages, and before a junction with brigadier godby, who had not yet been discovered. orders were therefore sent to the cavalry to retire, but to keep the enemy in check.

the cavalry-brigade having deployed, retired by alternate squadrons, covering the line of infantry, which had, in the meantime, made a partial change of front, to repel a demonstration which the sikhs had made against the[pg 150] british left. the enemy, advancing boldly, when he discovered that sir harry was unwilling to come to close quarters, opened a galling fire of artillery along his whole line; but the front shown by the british cavalry-brigade deterred him from coming up to attack.

under the able direction of the gallant cureton, the cavalry were man?uvred as steadily as at an ordinary field-day. presenting a moveable target, which called forth all the skill of the sikh artillerymen, the 16th lancers, 3rd cavalry, and captain hill's irregulars, continued to menace the enemy, and to despise the deadly missiles which showered around them; whilst, among that overwhelming host of sikh goorcheras, not one effort was made to measure lance or sabre with their opponents. they were content to leave us to be dealt with by the artillery.

the prudence of such a measure on the enemy's part was perhaps unquestionable.

thus, gradually retiring across the plain, and placing on the ammunition carts, or on horseback, the unfortunate men who were[pg 151] wounded by the incessant cannonade to which the sikhs subjected the force, we reached a distance of about two miles from buddewal, when the enemy ceased to advance.

when our retreat was first commenced, nearly all the officers conjectured it was sir harry's object to draw the sikh forces well out of their position, and attack them in the open plain; but as we continued to retire, it soon became evident that no action was to take place, and we were compelled to receive the numerous kicks which were bestowed upon us with all the philosophy that could be mustered. "now we are going at 'em—now for it, lads!" burst from the ranks on many occasions, when the squadrons faced about and confronted the foe; but the fatal "threes about," gradually diminished these hopes, and at last the homely observation of "by g—, if we are not bolting from a parcel of niggers!" called something between a blush and a smile to many a cheek.

about sunset, the troops arrived before the half-burned cantonments of loodiana, and[pg 152] bivouacked on the plain. hardly a tent or a native follower made their appearance in our gloomy lines, and many a bitter lamentation was vented over departed comforts and luxuries seized by the ruthless sikhs. nearly all the hospital stores had fallen into the hands of the philistines, which was a heavy misfortune; but we dwelt with some satisfaction on the probability of their being mistaken for wines and liqueurs, in which event we anticipated, with much glee, the effects likely to ensue, and only regretted we had no chance of witnessing the commotions which would prevail in the sikh camp on the auspicious occasion.

late in the evening, a few camp-followers, and a very few baggage-animals, came straggling into the lines, having made a detour, and avoided the plunderers. with the usual native propensity for exaggeration, they expatiated on their own hairbreadth escapes, and gave mournful details of the tragic sufferings and deaths of most of those who were missing. one man was describing in glowing terms the[pg 153] resolute defence of a fellow-servant, who fell, covered with innumerable wounds, when the innocent hero of the tale actually walked up, and had the honesty to confess that he owed his safety to his fleetness of foot.

very few of our camp-followers were maltreated by the enemy, beyond taking away any property found on their persons, and keeping some of them prisoners a few days, whilst they extracted any intelligence they were able to afford. most of the prisoners were then turned loose, and furnished with the information that the sikhs entertained no animosity towards the natives of hindostan, but had resolved to conquer and rule the country, and would not fail to massacre every feringhee who was foolhardy enough to give them an opportunity. at the same time, with the candour becoming true chivalry, they strongly recommended the british to abandon all useless resistance, to submit to the modest khalsas, or take to flight—in fact, to do anything rather than fight, as that might be inconvenient.

[pg 154]

the actual loss at buddewal has never been published, as a great portion of those reported missing had escaped to jugraon, and six or seven were carried prisoners to lahore.[38] the total amount of killed, wounded, and missing, were between three and four hundred, but more than half this number subsequently made their appearance. the report which prevailed in india, that the losses were amalgamated in one return with those killed at aliwal, is a stupid fabrication.

early in the day, captain a.w. campbell, of h.m. 14th regiment, was killed by a cannon-shot, whilst acting as aide-de-camp to sir harry smith. he had only succeeded in reaching the army the preceding night, after a hasty journey from calcutta, and was struck down on his first field of action: but whoever accompanies sir harry smith in battle, must be prepared to encounter the thickest of the fire.

in our destitute condition, we were most[pg 155] hospitably treated by col. godby's brigade, who had marched out in the morning to meet us, according to the instructions received, but we had missed each other, owing to the brigadier supposing that we should not march directly under the guns of the enemy's position.

on the day succeeding our arrival, some of the scared merchants of loodiana disclosed their hidden stores in cellars and outhouses, and we were enabled to replace many deficiencies.

the fort of loodiana was garrisoned by a few convalescents from the 50th regiment, and a small detail of native troops; but being on the outskirts of the town, the sikhs had not ventured within sweep of its guns to pillage, and had satisfied themselves with burning the furthest and most exposed part of the cantonments.

the puttealah rajah's troops, who were stationed as a protection for the buildings, viewed the proceedings with indifference, nor was it to be expected they would be very[pg 156] energetic in our cause, against their own countrymen. the small party of sepoys then at loodiana were quite insufficient for hostile measures, but the damages have been much exaggerated. the brunt of the losses fell on the officers and men of h.m. 50th, and if ever a regiment deserved to be indemnified, the gallant half hundred have earned the claim.

our spies, returning from the enemy's post at buddewal, reported that the sikhs had come to the determination of attacking us immediately, most probably that night, as the stars were propitious. being now reduced to the lightest possible marching order, it was impossible to find us better prepared for an active campaign; and we looked forward with much satisfaction to the visit, which was promised on the fine open plain on which we were bivouacked. to ascertain the time of arrival, our pickets were posted far in advance, and patrols and reconnoitring parties were constantly on the move.

at sunrise, on the 23rd of january, news arrived of the enemy being in motion, and the[pg 157] forces immediately turned out with much alacrity. the cavalry and horse artillery moved under a ridge nearly parallel with the sutlej, and marking the limits of its extreme course, whilst the infantry shortly afterwards took the upper route on the same line. about 9 a.m. we were informed that the whole sikh forces had quitted buddewal, and were marching towards the heights of valore, which flank the direct road between loodiana and ferozepore, and extend to the waters of the sutlej.

brigadier cureton, who was in advance with a small party of cavalry, sent an urgent request for the cavalry brigade to push forward, as he had come up with the enemy's rear guard, and could cut them off with a large quantity of baggage and ammunition under their care; but sir harry smith was unwilling to make the experiment. after halting for about two hours, information was sent from the reconnoitring party that the sikhs had taken up a position near valore. on receipt of this intelligence sir harry smith ordered his forces to advance and occupy the enemy's vacated position at[pg 158] buddewal. on arriving at that place in the afternoon, we found the fort and town completely deserted, the sikhs having marched out during the night and left quantities of grain and stores behind them, for which they had no carriage, as we had encumbered them with a superfluity of valuables, which were, no doubt, ere then safely lodged in the punjaub.

buddewal was speedily and thoroughly ransacked, but very little was found worth carrying off. tents, empty trunks, and crazy furniture abounded in and around the palace (as it was called) of our friend the ladwa rajah, the author of the sikh expedition into this neighbourhood, and a quantity of grain and cattle were found in the town.

our camp followers soon made the place a wreck; nor did their vengeance stay here, but, wandering in parties about the country, they set fire to several villages in the vicinity, and nightfall exhibited a long series of conflagrations marking their track. this was condemned in the severest terms by sir harry smith, and all officers of the army were called[pg 159] upon to exert themselves in suppressing a system which tended to engender a spirit of animosity towards us among the inhabitants of this country, who were not guilty of the origin of these hostilities.

our camp followers, in palliation of their conduct, declared that the inhabitants of all these villages had taken an active part in plundering them and our camels on the 21st, which was not at all improbable.

the bodies of several soldiers who had fallen in the recent skirmish were found on the plain near buddewal, and interred. amongst the slain, captain campbell's body was found, and buried by two officers, who went for the purpose of discovering the body of their fallen comrade.

many of our servants, who had escaped to jugraon with part of the baggage, now rejoined us, and also a great portion of the sick under protection of the shekawattee brigade, which added one thousand native troops to our force.

some of our servants, having escaped from the sikhs, came to the outposts with their mouths full of the extensive armament which[pg 160] the sikhs were preparing for our destruction; but all united in asserting that reinforcements were pouring into their camp from the opposite side of the river. our best spies were furnished by captain hill's corps of irregular horse, many of whom, disguised as faqueers, entered the sikh camp and brought accounts of the enemy being about forty thousand strong, with seventy or eighty guns, and of their being employed in throwing up entrenchments similar to those of ferozeshuhur. this burrowing system was universally practised by the enemy, even when they were meditating offensive measures, and therefore it formed no clue to their present intentions.

our cavalry reconnoitring parties were daily in the enemy's vicinity, and officers were employed to form plans of their position; but our adversaries had great objections to this inquisitive practice, and threw forward their outposts to check the intruders. but, amongst the whole army, for constant activity and careful observation of the enemy's proceedings, none, even in the prime of life, displayed more[pg 161] alacrity than the two generals, sir harry smith and brigadier cureton.

daily, at the first peep of dawn, our indefatigable commanders were hovering around the enemy's post, whilst the whole of the troops stood ready accoutred for immediate action in case of the enemy being equally vigilant; but our opponents testified less appetite for the keen morning air.

the sikhs talked boldly in their own lines of their daily intention of coming out to attack us, and the spies failed not to report the resolution; but as it had now been deferred so many days, there appeared some probability of their being anticipated.

the main object of the sikh's change of position seemed to be to secure a post on the river where they could receive reinforcements which had been sent from their head-quarter camp, and at the same time occupy our direct[39] road of communication with the main column.[pg 162] the siege train, which was approaching from delhi with a very small escort of native troops, was also, beyond doubt, the ultimate object of their man?uvres, although it had not yet approached within reach of a safe "dour."

by advancing from loodiana to buddewal, sir harry smith was better enabled to watch the enemy until the time for action; and the post being (as we recently experienced) on the line of communication with our head-quarters, by jugraon and dhurrumkote, the main object of the sikhs was, in a great measure, neutralized, and we had much reason to be thankful to them for having given us so eligible a lodgment without a struggle. in the meantime, reinforcements were in full march, to join sir harry smith, from head-quarters by the jugraon route; and two eight inch howitzers were being equipped for field service, having been hastily mounted and brought to buddewal from the fort of loodiana.