the army advance to attack the sikhs in their entrenched camp at ferozeshuhur—the actions of the 21st and 22nd of december—sikhs retreat behind the sutlej—observations.
on the morning of the 19th, intelligence was brought by the spies that the whole forces of the sikhs had resolved upon advancing to attack the british army at moodkee. preparations were made to receive them, and a more advantageous post than that of the former day was taken up, to act on the defensive, as reinforcements were hourly expected.
the spies' reports proved false, as is not unfrequently the case in indian warfare, and on the[pg 92] night of the 19th, the arrival of h.m. 29th regiment, and the company's 1st european regiment, from their hill cantonments, was welcomed with much satisfaction.
the 20th of december was given to the army to recruit their strength, after the toil they had endured, and to prepare for the approaching struggle.
authentic accounts having been received of the enemy being in position at ferozeshuhur, about nine miles from moodkee, and twelve from ferozepore, and on the direct line of communication between those places, orders were sent to sir john littler, commanding at ferozepore, to move out, with his division, from cantonments, and unite with the main column in the attack on the enemy planned for the following day.
early on the morning of the 21st of december, the british forces advanced from moodkee, having left the wounded in charge of a small party in the fort, and marching slowly in order of battle, moved obliquely from the enemy's position towards ferozepore. having marched across about fifteen miles of country, covered mostly with the[pg 93] same stunted trees as at moodkee, and in other places with a sandy soil, on which grain and wheat had been planted, sir john littler's division was descried advancing about one in the afternoon.
sir john littler having left two regiments of native infantry to protect ferozepore, and eluded the vigilance of the enemy's cavalry, who were posted to watch his division, effected a junction with the main column unmolested by the enemy.
the position of ferozeshuhur was then hastily reconnoitred. the sikh camp, consisting of a dense and confused mass of tents, encompassed the village of ferozeshuhur, which occupied a rising ground, and was armed with batteries of heavy guns. the entrenchments, which had been thrown forward to cover the village, were an irregular quadrangular figure, of upwards of eighteen hundred yards in length, and rather more than half that distance in breadth, and consisted of a ditch, about four feet in depth and from six to seven in breadth, the deblai earth from which formed a parapet, protecting the defenders from[pg 94] fire of grape or musketry. batteries of the enemy's lighter guns were disposed at intervals in rear of the parapets, where the ground was uniformly flat, save in the centre of the position, where it rose gradually into the mound, covered by the mud-houses of the village, as before mentioned.
in front of the entrenchment, every obstacle to the range of fire had been removed, and a plain, mostly bare, or producing scanty crops, presented no shelter for the assailants; such trees or shrubs as might have afforded any cover, having been lopped or cleared away by the enemy.
the village of ferozeshuhur is situated on the road between moodkee and ferozepore, but the road is rarely a matter of much consideration in military operations in india, where the country is usually flat, and unobstructed by fences.
it was past four in the afternoon when the british forces advanced to storm this position, defended, as it was conjectured, by an army of more than fifty thousand sikhs. the investing force, numbering altogether about sixteen thousand five hundred men, with sixty-six pieces of artil[pg 95]lery, (six and nine-pounders, twelve and twenty-four-pound howitzers, and two eight-inch mortars,) were formed in two lines; the first consisted of generals gilbert and littler's divisions, and col. wallace's brigade, with the principal force of artillery in the centre, and one troop of horse artillery on each flank.
the reserve force, comprising the division of sir harry smith, the cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, formed a second line.
sir hugh gough personally directed the operations of the right, and sir henry hardinge, who had volunteered his services, as second in command, superintended the movements on the left.
when at a distance of about eleven hundred yards from the works, the oppressive silence was broken by the voice of our mortars hurling their loads of hissing iron through the air. the enemy's batteries opened forthwith, and soon enveloped the works in smoke. the light field batteries now began their part in the fray, at a distance of about eight hundred yards, to cover the advance, and shortly afterwards the whole of[pg 96] our artillery opened at a nearer range; but the sikh fire told with deadly effect, and many of the british light guns were disabled, even before they were unlimbered. it soon became evident that the sikhs had the range of their batteries accurately measured, and that our light guns were unable to cope with the enemy's artillery, which being of very heavy metal, though not of large calibre, they were enabled to use double charges of powder, grape, and round shot.
under cover of the clouds and dust which wrapped the scene of contention, our line of infantry continued to advance, and the commander-in-chief, perceiving that the contest could only be decided by a hand to hand struggle, ordered the entrenchments to be stormed with the bayonet.
one incessant stream of fire continued to issue from the canopy of smoke which enveloped the works, and the deadly breaks in each regiment told with what murderous effect the enemy served his batteries; yet their assailants, though broken and checked, still approached the entrenchments[pg 97] with invincible resolution; but now, from behind the batteries, poured forth a rolling shower of musketry, which seemed to threaten utter annihilation to the daring and exposed force of britons, now reduced from brigades to regiments.
night was fast approaching; the sikh army continued to pour death into our ranks, and received the roll of our musketry, under cover of their trenches, with comparative impunity.
with that unconquerable determination which has marked the british soldier in the hour of direst carnage, that gallant band rushed onwards, seeking only to close in hand to hand conflict with their galling antagonists, through the iron shower which tore their ranks at every step, checked only where death had made so wide a gap, that time was required to fill the deadly intervals, and give breath to the survivors.
at one point, on the left of the attacking line, where sir john littler's division was engaged, the incessant stream of fire from the batteries, and the rain of musketry from behind them, was such, that one british regiment (the 62nd) was nearly[pg 98] destroyed.[25] one-third of the regiment were stretched on the field, when the brigadier, seeing the utter hopelessness of carrying the enemy's strongest battery, defended by thousands of musketeers, with the shattered remainder of the 62nd, which had been left to do the work single-handed, gave orders to retire.
on the centre and right the attack was more successful, the enemy's entrenchments being penetrated, after a desperate struggle, at several points, by general gilbert's and colonel wallace's attack; but so intermixed were the combatants, and so stunning was the din of battle around the entrenchments, which were enveloped in impenetrable clouds of smoke and dust, that it was impossible for the leaders to ascertain the success or even the position of other brigades. cheering on his men, and just surmounting the enemy's[pg 99] entrenchments, fell colonel taylor, at the head of his regiment, the gallant 9th, which he had led so often to victory, but never before under such a fire as poured from the trenches of ferozeshuhur.
chafing under the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the rash broadfoot, with his characteristic contempt of danger, charged, single-handed, one of the enemy's howitzers with countless defenders, and fell at its mouth.
sir hugh gough and sir henry hardinge were ever with the foremost in the fight, cheering all to renewed exertions, and affording personal examples of contempt for danger which were gloriously followed by their dauntless comrades.
three batteries were captured, and on those points the enemy fell back from their entrenchments; but from the village and the inner trenches on the flanks still streamed forth the iron shower, rendered less deadly by the obscurity of evening. in the meantime, the reserve, under sir harry smith, had forced their way through every obstacle, and, having penetrated the entrenchments, established themselves in the village, un[pg 100]aware of the post of the remainder of the army; but there, in the midst of the enemy's lines, stood the banners of the glorious fiftieth.
hoping that yet, ere night had fallen, the sikhs might be driven from all their entrenchments, an order was issued for colonel white's brigade of cavalry to charge the daring front which was still presented for defence. with alacrity was the order obeyed, and the exhausted british infantry rested for an interval on their arms, whilst a rushing sound, as of a suddenly bursting tempest, was heard approaching the fray, and onwards came h.m. 3rd light dragoons to the charge. the entrenchments and the batteries were equally futile obstacles to oppose those gallant cavaliers, though the former brought many a horse and rider to the ground, and the latter tore a deadly gap through their ranks. onwards poured the glittering squadrons, in spite of all resistance, over the entrenchments, past the batteries, through the very heart of the enemy's camp, the sikhs falling back bewildered at this unexpected mode of warfare.
though paralyzed for a time by the strange[pg 101] onslaught of these bold horsemen charging for a second time resolutely into the midst of their army, yet the sikhs, recovering from their surprise, began to pour a destructive fire of musketry amongst the dragoons,[26] who had been much scattered, owing to the ground over which they had charged; and, as each saddle was emptied, countless knives and tolwars awaited the ill-fated soldier who was dismounted.
having ridden throughout the enemy's lines, and being much broken and thinned in numbers, they now charged back again, though scarcely bringing two thirds of their numbers unwounded out of the enemy's lines.
one officer, lieut. burton, having lost his charger amongst hordes of the enemy, and sought hopelessly for another, perceived a party of dragoons close to him, and, seizing the tail of a horse, was dragged by him at full speed through the camp, until, on arriving at the entrenchments, the trooper, bounding over the ditch, dashed the[pg 102] officer with such violence against the counterscarp that he lost the hold he had so desperately retained, but still lives to confirm the tale.[27]
darkness now caused the fire on each side to slacken, part of the enemy's camp and field works being in our possession, whilst the sikhs continued to hold the remainder; but darkness brought no rest to the brave and wearied soldier; for the enemy's expense magazines continued to explode in various parts of the works, the slow matches or burning cartridges falling amongst them, and several were blown up or scorched thereby. the main column of our troops were, in consequence of these disasters, ordered to withdraw outside the trenches, where they lay amongst the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, worn out with their almost unremitted exertions; faint from[pg 103] hunger, but, worse than all, parched with intolerable thirst, as few of the water-carriers who accompany an indian army on active service had ventured to the ground where the britons lay during that awful night.
the enemy had no intention of allowing the time to pass unprofitably while darkness prevailed, but, on ascertaining the position occupied by our soldiers outside the entrenchments, they sent spies who indicated the direction by tinkling a bell and running off, or by affixing a blue light to a stick, which was placed in the ground and lighted to serve as a direction for the sikh guns, which forthwith opened a galling fire. one cannon of heavy metal was plied with such effect that h.m. 80th regiment, and 1st europeans were ordered to advance and take it, which duty they speedily accomplished.
the night of the 21st of december, naturally the longest of the year, seemed almost an eternity to the wearied "army of the sutlej," and unhappily proved so to many, for the sikhs lost no opportunity of inflicting injury.
the thirst which afflicted many was so oppres[pg 104]sive, that it overcame all other considerations, and many of the soldiers strayed in search of water towards the village, heedless of the vicinity of the enemy.
a portion of sir harry smith's division, which had occupied the village in the entrenchments, remained a great part of the night in that post, darkness preventing them from ascertaining the position occupied by the remainder of the army. in the pell-mell assault, regiment had become so intermixed with regiment, that it is difficult to particularize the exploits of an individual corps, as a portion of some other, in all probability, bore a share of the labour.
in the course of the night sir harry smith's division withdrew from their advanced post, and, being unable to discover the commander-in-chief's column, retired to a village at about a mile and a half's distance from the trenches.
sir john littler's division was also unsuccessful in finding head-quarters during this awful night of errors, nor did either of these divisions reach the main column of the army till they had renewed the attack on the following morning.
[pg 105]
the dawn of day on the 22nd of december served to restore some order amongst the troops, and to discover the enemy still occupying the entrenchments. the british soldier was again called to action, sinking with hunger, thirst, and toil, and responded to that call on which hung the fate of the british empire in india, with untiring devotion. a line was formed of our shattered forces, and sir hugh gough, animating all around him by his zeal and example, pressed forwards to clear the entrenchments, and again began the work of death.
the enemy's position, the whole of which was again manned, was for the second time stormed by the british infantry; but, as they were assailed now from a nearer range, the struggle was on more favourable terms, though the overpowering numbers of the enemy rendered his losses comparatively trifling, whilst ours was most severe, considering the small band of warriors now opposed to the foe. the sikh dead, intermixed with our own, strewed the face of the soil, and the footing of the combatants was slippery with blood. never had so resolute an enemy opposed the british[pg 106] arms in india, and never had the aspect of british interests in the east rested on so slender a thread. but the sikh powers of endurance had reached their limit; and, deeming the british indomitable, they fell back, leaving their camp and guns in the hands of the victors. pressing forward upon the retiring enemy, the british line swept the sikh soldiery from the whole position, and rested on the sutlej front of the works.
the resolution and courage of the british troops had probably never undergone a more severe test than on the field of ferozeshuhur, and when victory at length appeared to have crowned their efforts, a heartfelt cheer burst from the ranks. no thoughts were entertained of pursuing the enemy, for both strength and ammunition were expended.
congratulations on the ultimate success of the day went round amongst the victors as they rested on their arms; and perhaps the sudden and successful result was hailed by none with more sense of thankfulness than by the two chiefs of the army.
but this satisfaction was destined to be of short[pg 107] duration; for scarce two hours had elapsed after the retreat, when the enemy were seen advancing again. the british troops were eagerly searching for water in the blood-stained village of ferozeshuhur, having piled their arms outside, when the alarm was given of the enemy's advance. the column which now approached was ascertained to be the reserve force under tej singh, consisting principally of cavalry and horse artillery, with some of the aeen battalions; this force had advanced from their position near the river, to take part in the fray, and were estimated at about twenty-five thousand strong.
again burst the storm of artillery over our army, and apparently with a sure prospect of success for the enemy; for our guns were all crippled, the ammunition was exhausted, and the troops now advancing to attack were fresh, and doubtless well provided with all material for action.
there remained now only the prospect of allowing as many of the enemy's missiles to fly over the soldiers' heads as would take that desirable course, and to bring the matter as speedily as possible to the final issue of a hand to hand[pg 108] struggle. this the enemy also seemed resolved to expedite; for having altered his front of attack, he appeared desirous of turning the left of the british, and intercepting all retreat, while the main attack was directed on the village.
a partial change of front was made on the british side to meet this, and the cavalry advanced against the enemy's right flank; which threatened attack, sir hugh gough states, in his despatch, he intended to have supported with infantry. the fatal crisis had now apparently arrived; but our soldiers had become of late too intimate with death to think of avoiding it. at all events, the sikhs would not have obtained a bloodless victory, though our ammunition was expended; but at this critical moment the battle was ended in the most unexpected and sudden manner, by tej singh withdrawing his forces from the field. although not suffering from a hostile fire, nor in any way incommoded in his operations or intentions, the enemy suddenly converted his threatened attack into a precipitate retreat, and fell back towards the fords of the sutlej, where[pg 109] the main column of his army had already preceded him.
this extraordinary conclusion of the battle was soon ascertained by our cavalry reconnoitring parties to be no feint on the part of the enemy, but a final retreat.
the only means of accounting for tej singh's extraordinary departure, after having beforehand stood his ground so manfully, is on the supposition that his second advance with the reserve force under his personal direction, was meant only to cover the retreat of the main column, and that he knew not the extent to which the british forces were crippled.
the supposition that the movement of colonel harriott's brigade of cavalry towards ferozepore alarmed the sikh general, lest we should intercept his retreat by that man?uvre, is almost too wild a conjecture to be entertained.
no attempt, of course, was made to pursue the enemy: he had already been sufficiently obliging, and such a proceeding would have been ungrateful.
the cannon taken from the enemy in this ac[pg 110]tion amounted to seventy-three pieces, which, added to their loss at moodkee, made a total of eighty-eight captured during the two actions. some were afterwards discovered thrown into wells in the village, when rendered unserviceable.
the return of killed and wounded on the british side was not published for some time afterwards, which caused an injurious effect, when the news of the battle reached the provinces, as it opened a path for much exaggeration. it was confidently whispered amongst the natives of hindostan that the british had met with their match at last; and though the sikhs had recrossed the river, that they had left their opponents in such a condition, as to be unable to reap any advantages from their victory. the state of suspense in which the friends and families of those engaged at ferozeshuhur were kept, for want of authenticated returns of the casualties may be well imagined; but the mystery which enveloped this sanguinary engagement was, for a time, so impenetrable, that the reserve force under sir john grey were actually unaware of the killed[pg 111] and wounded amongst their comrades, when they crossed the field of battle a fortnight afterwards, and recognised amongst the corpses many of which yet lay unburied, the friends of whose fate they had been ignorant.
the forces engaged on the british side in this action were, seven troops of horse artillery, and four companies of foot; one regiment of british dragoons, seven regiments of british infantry, seven regiments of native cavalry, and fourteen regiments of native infantry.
the casualties were, 694 killed, and 1721 wounded; but, of these, the british regiments suffered a heavy proportion, losing nearly 500 killed, and more than 1100 wounded. these losses, added to those at moodkee, gave a sum total of 3287 hors de combat, out of an army amounting altogether to about 16,000 actually engaged.
those who had fallen in action were only partly interred in the trenches, for the wounded demanded all the attention that could be bestowed.
the enemies' bodies were left to the disposal of the jackals and vultures, who fulfilled their[pg 112] task very imperfectly, satiety having made them epicures.
the country, from the field of ferozeshuhur to the fords of hureeka, marked the track of the enemy's retreat by the corpses of soldiers wounded in the battle, who had died on the road, but the actual number of the enemy's loss could not have exceeded our own.
the whole army with which tej singh crossed the sutlej has been estimated at sixty thousand men; but more than this number must be allowed them if the entrenchments of ferozeshuhur held fifty thousand defenders, as conjectured; for sir hugh gough conceives that tej singh, when renewing the action of the 22nd of december, brought up several fresh battalions, supported by thirty thousand goorcheras, and the greater portion of these must have constituted the force which was placed to watch ferozepore, or to cover their retreat.
a field hospital was established for the wounded: those regiments which had suffered most severely were moved to ferozepore, where they were enabled to receive medical attention under[pg 113] better cover than could be provided in camp. the main column of the army under sir hugh gough proceeded towards the river, and encamped about twelve miles north-east of ferozepore, and three miles from the banks of the sutlej.
the enemy, immediately after crossing, had taken up the position he now occupied near the fords of hureeka, anticipating, no doubt, that an immediate passage of the river would be attempted by the british generals. the sikhs, in coming to this conclusion, were evidently ignorant of the amount of injury which they had inflicted, and of the state of our magazines on the north-western frontier.
immediately after the action of ferozeshuhur, when thanks had been returned to the supreme being for deliverance, every available regiment was ordered to the frontier, and an ample siege train from the delhi magazine, with abundant supplies of ammunition, and every requisite for the prosecution of the campaign, were ordered forward with the most urgent despatch.
[pg 114]
regiments of irregular cavalry,[28] and large levies of infantry, were ordered to be forthwith raised with all the energy which the critical situation of affairs demanded, for a golden opportunity now offered itself to any malcontent chiefs in hindostan to take advantage of the concentration of the bengal army on the far-distant frontier. these orders were now enabled to reach the provinces in safety, as the population of the protected sikh states no longer considered it prudent to interrupt the communication after their friends had recrossed the sutlej.
the 21st and 22nd of december will ever be the most memorable (if it be not also deemed the most critical) epoch since the establishment of british supremacy in india.
had the british forces been overwhelmed by the continual influx of fresh troops from the enemy's reserve force, and the failure of ammunition on their own, the sole barrier to the advance[pg 115] of the sikh army into the british territories was the merut force, less than five thousand strong, under sir john grey. and, that such a casualty had been deemed more than possible, may be concluded from the fact of count ravensberg, who accompanied the governor-general's camp (and of whom continual mention is made in the despatches) being requested to quit the field, that he might not be a witness of, or a sufferer in, the issue which was anticipated. that nobleman, following the request which had been conveyed to him, proceeded reluctantly to ferozepore, and thence to buhawalpore on the indus, before news reached him of the unexpected issue of the struggle.
in entering upon a consideration of the tactics adopted, let me not be judged guilty of such unpardonable presumption as that of canvassing the measures of officers whose conduct has been rewarded by the highest honours their country could bestow. my humble remarks are addressed to my brother officers of the subordinate ranks; and if these casual observations should succeed in meriting the attention of any one who takes[pg 116] sufficient interest in his profession to discuss such topics, i profess my readiness to give up my imaginary line of operations as soon as i am convinced that the position is untenable. these subjects, when we had little else to think of, or talk about, formed an ample theme for discussion; and though they have often provoked the remark that "all the subalterns of the army had promoted themselves to generals," the cavil did not produce any argument against so advantageous and extensive a brevet. indeed, such a line of promotion might give an opportunity to the military chiefs of later days to earn the applause of their countrymen before the weight of years should finally consign the military hero to the family physician or the nursery.
when the sikh forces fell back, on the night of the 18th of december, from the battle-field of moodkee upon the main body in the entrenchments of ferozeshuhur, the reserve force, stationed to watch ferozepore by the sikh general's orders, continued to occupy the same position.
the avowed object in the hasty attack on the enemy's strong position at ferozeshuhur was to[pg 117] prevent the sikh forces from forming a junction, and to relieve ferozepore.
had the enemy been desirous to effect the junction alluded to, it would appear difficult to account for his not taking advantage of the respite on the 19th and 20th of december to ensure the movement. but, perhaps, a strong reason for his not doing so may be adduced by the fact of the area of his entrenchments being already so crowded with defenders, that it is almost difficult to assign places within the dimensions[29] of the works for such hordes of sikh soldiery as, by the published estimates, would seem to have occupied the position.
in the next place, had the sikhs been anxious to attack ferozepore, it is strange that they neglected to attempt the siege or investment between the 13th and 18th of december. nay, instead of doing so, they immediately advanced and took up a strong position, leaving a reserve force to watch the garrison, and perhaps to cover their[pg 118] own retreat in case of a reverse, whilst they pushed boldly forward to occupy a position in the direct route of our forces, which post, judging from former military transactions in india, they expected would be immediately stormed.
the force detached to moodkee, having failed in their object, fell back upon ferozeshuhur, where no disposition was manifested for a farther retreat; but the enemy calmly awaited, in that advantageous position, the attack which they doubtless hoped would ensue.
by following the line of operations expected by the sikhs, the british forces came into action late in the afternoon, having been under arms and marching the whole of that day, and weakened from want of food and water; whilst the horses, already much jaded, were ill prepared for the work they had to undergo. these evils, great on the night of the 21st, were not alleviated after the sanguinary struggle; and on the 22nd, being far from all resources and supplies, the failure of ammunition might be viewed as an almost desperate misfortune.
the veni, vidi, vici principle has been in some[pg 119] measure warranted, in indian campaigns, by the great precedents of assye and lord hastings's mahratta campaigns. it had been employed with considerably less success during the goorkha war, where the reverses of other divisions of the army were fortunately counteracted by general ochterlony's prudence and foresight. but the sikhs were a far different enemy[30] from the mahrattas or any power we had hitherto encountered in india, and worthy of the respect which they inspired after the first two engagements.
to view the subject under its various phases, i will now proceed to consider the probable results had the army been advanced to a position in the vicinity of ferozeshuhur, where free communication could have been maintained with the garrison of ferozepore, and where, as the enemy had established himself in a fixed position, his intercourse with lahore might have been threatened at the same time that we had free range of the country.
in such a position, the enemy might have been[pg 120] safely watched, whilst preparations were made to attack his entrenchments in due form,[31] and our troops would have been fresh, and ought not to have been without ammunition in case of being suddenly brought into action. the merut reserve force, with the 9th and 16th lancers, h.m. 10th regiment, and four regiments of native troops, accompanied by three troops of artillery and the elephant battery of twelve pounders, would, by using despatch, have arrived in less than ten days[32] had an order been forwarded from bussean, and such a force would have been beyond the reach of any coup-de-main of a detachment from the enemy's camp. then, with properly constructed batteries, (for the fort at ferozepore contained some heavy guns) and with regular approaches, the sikh position would have been[pg 121] advantageously assailed, and there is little doubt that a well directed fire of artillery, poured into such crowded works, would have been severe in its effect, and would ultimately have compelled the enemy to evacuate them. when the sikhs should have been once compelled to take to the open ground, their heavy siege guns would have been too unwieldly to man?uvre, whilst our light artillery would have been on advantageous ground, and, with an effective force of cavalry, the victory ought to have been speedy, and the enemy's retreat to the ford not altogether unmolested.
to all this, perhaps it may be objected that the sikhs would assuredly not have awaited a concentration of our forces, and these preparations for attack. in reply, it must be borne in mind that the choice of battle rested with the british, unless the enemy vacated his post, when the advantages to be derived in the open plain would have been ours, and rendered a much easier victory a matter beyond a question with an army like our own, whose whole "materiel" were expressly qualified for action in the open plain, where superior dis[pg 122]cipline and rapidity of movement, with a fresh and well appointed army of sixteen thousand men, ought to have ensured success upon easier terms than when storming the same enemy in a strong position.
with an effective british force of 16,000 or 20,000 men in the open plain, i conceive it to be a matter of unimportance whether a native enemy be double or treble that amount; for when confusion once ensues amongst a half-disciplined multitude, it doubtless is greater in proportion to the number.
in the battle of ferozeshuhur, the fate of the day was committed to the gallantry and bull-dog qualities of the british soldiers, and the issue proved that they had not been over-rated; but as these were resources which would always have remained in reserve, and ready for action when called upon, a question may be raised as to the policy of employing this reserve before the advantages of strategy had been employed.
the result of this action would hardly answer to establish a precedent for the repetition of similar measures under similar circumstances;[pg 123] for three or four such battles would have used all the european material, and british regiments cannot be hastily recruited or replaced in india.
return of killed and wounded at ferozeshuhur, dec. 21st and 22nd.
killed. wounded.
officers. native & non-
commissioned. trumpeters, drummers,
privates. officers. native & non-
commissioned. privates.
personal staff 2
general staff 1 1
artillery division.
(col. brooke, com.)
staff 2
horse 2 1 26 1 7 54
foot 2 10 1 5 18
cavalry division.
(col. white.)
staff 3
1st brig. h.m. 3rd lt. drag. 3 2 55 6 6 80
" 8th native cavalry 1 3 2 7
" 9th irregulars 2 8 11
2nd ditto, body-guard 2
" 5th native cavalry 1 2
" 8th irregular horse 1 4
3rd do. 4th native cavalry 9 2 6
" 3rd irregulars 3 13
1st infantry division.
(sir harry smith.)
staff 3
1st brigade, h.m. 31st rgt. 2 2 57 5 4 92
" 24th n. i. 1 3 4 1 2 24
" 47th ditto 9 2 24
2nd ditto h.m. 50th rgt. 27 6 5 86
" 42nd native infantry 1 4 10 2 5 35
" 48th ditto 2 13 2 3 46
2nd infantry division.
(gen. gilbert.)
staff 2 1
1st brigade, h.m. 29th rgt. 2 1 67 2 6 110
" 45th n.i. 2 14 1 2 30
2nd do 1st european regt.. 2 2 43 6 12 139
" 2nd native infantry 1 2 15 2 5 43
" 16th ditto 1 2 11 1 10 51
3rd infantry division.
(brigadier wallace)
staff 1
1st brigade, h.m.'s 9th rgt. 3 1 66 6 5 192
" 26th native infantry 2 1 8 3 42
" 73rd ditto 1 1 19 6 31
h.m.'s 80th regiment 4 20 3 1 53
4th infantry division.
(sir j. littler.)
staff 1 2
1st brigade, h.m. 62nd rgt. 7 6 76 10 5 156
" 12th native infantry 1 10 4 5 61
" 14th ditto 3 12 5 5 59
2nd ditto, 33rd ditto 2 6 8 32
" 44th ditto 9 2 14
" 54th ditto 2 6
grand total 73 44 613 78 120 1523
[pg 125]
killed.
personal staff capt. hare, deputy secretary.
artillery—
2nd troop, 1st bat. capt. todd.
3rd " 3rd " lieut lambert.
cavalry—
h.m. 3rd lt. drag. capt. codd.
" cornet ellis.
" cornet bruce, 16th lancers.
1st. division (infantry)—
h.m. 31st regt. lieut. pollard.
" lieut. and adjutant bernard.
24th n.i. brevet-major griffin.
42nd n.i. lieut. woollen.
2nd division—
staff capt. lucas, b.m.
" capt. burnett, ditto.
h.m. 29th regt. capt. molle.
" lieut. simmons.
1st european regt. capt. box.
" ensign moxon.
2nd n.i. ensign armstrong.
16th n.i. major hull.
3rd division—
lieut.-col. wallace, b.
h.m. 9th regt. lieut.-col. taylor.
" capt. dunn.
" capt. field.
h.m. 80th regt.[pg 126] capt. best.
" capt. scheberras.
" lieut. warren.
" lieut. bythesea.
26th n.i. lieut. croly.
" lieut. eatwell.
72nd n.i. capt. hunter.
4th division—
staff lieut. harvey, a.d.c.
h.m. 62nd regt. capt. clarke.
" capt. wells.
" lieut. scott.
" lieut. m'nair.
" lieut. gubbins.
" lieut. kelly.
" lieut. and adjutant sims.
wounded.
personal staff lieut.-col. wood, a.d.c., severely.
" lieut. haines, a.d.c., ditto.
" major f. somerset, military secretary, since dead.
artillery—
staff capt. warner, commissary of ordnance, slightly.
" capt. mackenzie, b.m., ditto.
1st troop, 3rd bat. 1st lieut. paton, ditto.
3rd company 1st lieut. atlay, ditto.
cavalry—
staff lieut.-col. harriott, ditto.
"[pg 127] capt. havelock, h.m. 9th regt., assistant quartermaster-gen., ditto.
" lieut.-col. white, 3rd light dragoons, brigadier, ditto.
h.m. 3rd lt. drag. major balders, ditto.
" lieut. morgan, severely.
" lieut. burton, slightly.
" cornet orme, severely.
" lieut. white, slightly.
" lieut. rathwell, ditto.
1st division (infantry)—
staff capt. lugard, 31st regt., a.a.g.
" lieut. galloway, assistant quartermaster-general.
" lieut. holdich, a.d.c.
h.m. 31st regt. major baldwin, severely.
" lieut. plasket, ditto.
" lieut. pilkington, ditto.
" ensign paul, slightly.
" ensign hutton, ditto.
h.m. 50th regt. capt. knowles, ditto.
" lieut. chambers, ditto.
" lieut. moualt, ditto.
" lieut. barnes, ditto.
" ensign white, ditto.
" lieut. and adjutant mullen, ditto.
24th n.i. ensign grubb, ditto.
42nd n.i. lieut. and adjutant ford, ditto.
48th n.i. ensign wardlaw, ditto.
" lieut. litchford, ditto.
" lieut. taylor, ditto.
2nd division—[pg 128]
staff lieut.-colonel taylor, h.m. 29th regt., brigadier.
h.m. 29th regt. major congreve.
" capt. stepney.
1st european regt. capt. clerk, severely.
" capt. kendall, dangerously.
" lieut. beatson, severely.
" lieut. fanshaw, slightly.
" ensign wriford, ditto.
2nd n.i. ensign salusbury, severely.
" capt. bolton, ditto.
" ensign hodson, slightly.
16th n.i. ensign o'bryen, ditto.
" lieut. hamilton.
3rd division—
h.m. 9th regt. capt. barton, severely.
" lieut. taylor.
" lieut. vigors.
" lieut. sievewright, dangerously.
" lieut. cassidy.
h.m. 80th regt. ensign forster, contused.
" major lockhart.
" capt. fraser, since dead.
" lieut. freeman.
4th division—
staff capt. egerton.
" capt. burnett, b.m., slightly.
h.m. 62nd regt. lieut.-col. reed, brigadier, ditto.
" major short, ditto.
" capt. graves, badly.
"[pg 129] capt. sibley.
" capt. garroch, slightly.
" lieut. gregorson, badly.
" lieut. craig, ditto.
" lieut. ingall, slightly.
" ensign roberts, severely.
" ensign hewett, slightly.
" lieut.-col. bruce, very severely.
" capt. holmes, ditto.
" lieut. tulloch, ditto.
" ensign ewart, slightly.
" capt. struthers.
" capt. walsh.
" lieut. wood, severely.
" lieut. lukin, slightly.
" ensign weld, severely.
[pg 130]
return of ordnance captured at ferozeshuhur.
number. calibre. length. weight of
shot.
inch. tenths. feet. inch.
1 gun 4 5 5 10 9 lbs.
2 howitzer 7 0 14 10 42
3 gun 5 0 7 0 18
4 " 5 0 6 9 18
5 " 5 0 6 0 18
6 " 4 5 5 10 9
7 " 4 5 5 10 9
8 " 4 5 8 4 9
9 " 4 0 6 4 8
10 " 4 5 7 0 9
11 " 4 5 6 0 9
12 " 4 5 6 0 9
13 " 5 0 6 9 18
14 " 4 2? 6 0 9
15 " 4 2? 6 0 9
16 " 5 5 7 6 18
17 " 4 0 7 9 8
18 " 4 0 5 9 8
19 " 4 0 5 6 8
20 " 3 7? 4 7 6
21 " 4 5 5 9 9
22 " 4 7? 6 0 12
23 " 3 8 4 11 7
24 " 3 8 4 11 7
25 " 4 0 6 5 8
26 " 5 3 10 0 18
27 " 5 0 7 6 15
28 " 4 7 6 6? 11
29 " 5 7 2 1 24
30 " 2 8 3 11 3
31 " 2 8 3 11 3
32 " 3 7 7 11? 6
33 " 5 7 3 11? 24
34 " 3 7 4 11? 6
35 " 3 8 4 11 6
36 " 4 0 6 6 9
37 " 2 7 3 0 3
38 " 3 9 4 11? 8
39 " 3 7 4 11 6
40 " 4 0 6 0 9
41 " 4 2 6 1 9
42 " 4 0 6 2 9
43 " 4 5 6 1 12
44 " 4 3 6 1 10
45 " 3 5 6 4? 6
46 " 3 8 4 11? 8
47 " 4 7 7 11 12
48 " 4 3 6 1 10
49 " 4 3 6 9? 10
[pg 131] 50 " 4 7 4 10 12
51 " 3 8 4 11 8
52 " 2 7 3 11? 8
53 " 4 2 7 11? 10
54 " 4 3 7 11? 9
55 " 3 8 4 11 8
56 " 3 8 4 11 8
57 " 4 2 5 8 9
58 " 2 7 3 0 2
59 mortar 9 5 2 5 10 in.
60 gun 2 8 3 11? 3 lbs.
61 " 3 6 4 6 6
62 " 3 8 4 11 8
63 " 3 7 4 11? 7
64 " 2 8 2 11 3
65 " 3 8 4 11 8
66 " 3 8 4 11 8
67 " 6 0 3 9 32
68 " 4 3 7 10? 9
69 mortar 5 7 2 0 24
70 gun 4 3 7 10? 9
71 howitzer 4 3 3 9 9
72 gun 5 2 8 8? 18
73 " 6 0 8 9 30
many of these guns have long persian inscriptions,[33] and very old dates, some are highly ornamented. the carriages are closely assimilating to those in use with the bengal artillery, the whole well fitted for post guns. the metal is much heavier than those of a similar calibre in use with the bengal artillery.
two more guns were discovered at sooltan khan wallah, of which no return has yet been received.
(signed) g. brooke,
brigadier, &c. &c.