horse artillery fire effect compared with rifle fire

henderson in science of war, written in 1893–1902, asked the question, whether the necessary fire power should be found by the cavalry itself or by a body of mounted riflemen attached to the brigade or the division? and answered it by proposing trained mounted infantry. to the view that this fire power had better be supplied by the horse artillery he gives little or no consideration. machine guns are also more or less ignored, and yet these in common with horse artillery are what the cavalry attack requires most in support.

those who have frequently had to rely on fire to cover a mounted advance will agree that the fire of two hundred riflemen at eight rounds a minute for five minutes is not to be compared in efficacy with the shells of a q.f. horse artillery battery. their comparative value would work out in projectiles as follows:

that is, the riflemen fire less than 1/8 of the number of projectiles fired by a battery, or 1770 riflemen shoot as many projectiles as a battery in five minutes.

it is superfluous to remark on the range attained by the q.f. gun compared with the rifle, but it is to the point to bring to notice that a q.f. battery is controlled by one individual who is furnished with good glasses, and that the guns have telescopic sights. at a mile he will distinguish his own side. again the battery’s front is 100 yards compared to the mile of front required by 1770 riflemen. the battery is in action within one minute and thirty seconds, whereas from the time the order is given a brigade of mounted riflemen will not be in action under five minutes at least, and will not be shooting with any degree of accuracy under eight minutes. further, the fire of a big line of one mile in length cannot be directed, whereas a battery can be switched on and off, or so many degrees to a flank, and so on, by a simple command.

it is obvious, then, that in the attack of infantry, whether unshaken or shaken, the extended line of charging cavalry will find their most reliable support in horse artillery and machine-gun fire and not in the fire of dismounted men.

henderson would therefore appear to have written at this time under the influence of the then accepted theory that the horse artillery would not be available to assist cavalry in a general engagement. he was also much impressed by the view that mounted infantry119 should supply the fire power for cavalry and prevent cavalry having recourse to fire action as much as possible; since he considered that the élan of the cavalryman would soon disappear, if once accustomed to dismount and fire as an alternative to shock action when the latter was feasible.

to sum up, present-day opinion is not in favour of mounted infantry being attached to cavalry brigades, but on the other hand horse artillery and machine guns will remain with cavalry in the general engagement, ready for any opportunity.

in order once more to emphasize the opinion that these charges of cavalry on infantry demand exceptional arrangements on the part of the general commanding the cavalry and his artillery commander, the case quoted by prince kraft in letters on cavalry, page 64, may be cited. speaking of a french cavalry charge on prussian infantry at woerth, a prussian infantry officer told him that:

at the moment our infantry were falling back down a slope from an attack which had failed, a hail of chassepot and mitrailleuse bullets followed them, and every one felt that he would never reach the cover of the wood which lay below them.

tired to death and resigned to their fate, the whole of the infantry were slowly crawling towards the wood. suddenly the murderous fire ceased. every one stopped, astonished, to see what had saved them from the fate which seemed certain to them. then they saw the french cuirassiers who, as they pushed forward, masked the fire of their infantry and artillery. these cuirassiers appeared120 to them like guardian angels. with the most perfect calm every man halted on the spot where he stood and fired at the cuirassiers, who were soon swept away by the rapid fire.

he adds at p. 67:

we see, moreover, that cavalry charges, if they break out from the front of their own infantry and mask the fire of the latter, enable the infantry which is charged to gain time, owing to the cessation of this fire, to recover their formation.

the above is one more argument in favour of constantly training our cavalry leaders till it is a second nature to apply shock at right angles to fire effect, and on no account whatever to mask the fire of their own artillery and infantry, and thus become the “guardian angels” of the infantry whom they are attacking.

von bernardi appears to lose sight of this, when he says, p. 208, cavalry in peace and war:

it is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the formation, for the attack, must take place beyond the effective range of the enemy’s fire ... and nothing else can be done but to gallop straight to the front. as, however, our infantry will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in close order.

this is what we consider should be avoided in the dispositions of the cavalry leader.

again, p. 200, von bernardi says: “the attack will best take place from the flank.” to this there is the objection that there is not likely to be a121 good rallying-point in the middle of the enemy’s line.

our conclusion is that these attacks will be least costly if they break out from our line in valleys running at right angles to it, or round the contour of a hill, and sweep the enemy by a charge parallel to our front, and that the rallying-point should be outside the flank or within our own line.

on the occasions when our infantry or dismounted riflemen made one of their regular attacks in extended order on the positions taken up by the boers, there were almost invariably not only critical moments, but also opportunities afforded by the lie of the ground which invited a leader at the head of three or four squadrons of lancers to issue from cover in or near the boer lines at a gallop in open order, and to sweep over the widely extended men. three to four minutes at most would have covered the time during which these lancers would have been exposed to fire; then they could have reached a rallying-point in their own lines.

there are good grounds for the belief that such an attack is extremely demoralizing, especially if the troops have not been accustomed in peace-time to undergo it.