meanwhile the turks had reinforced their fleet until their 290 galleys held 120,000 men, counting soldiers and rowers. they had, like the christians, divided the fleet into three divisions: the centre one commanded by the great admiral ali pasha, an arrogant young man, more brave than prudent, in all the pride of his youth and of being the favourite of selim ii; the right wing was under the orders of the king of negroponto, mahomet scirocco, a cautious man of mature years, brave as well as experienced; and the left wing was commanded by the viceroy of algiers, aluch ali, surnamed "el fartass," that is "the mean one," a former calabrian renegade, an old man of sixty-eight, careful, brave and crafty, whom more than forty years of piracy had made familiar with these seas.

at lepanto ali pasha received a message from selim ii, much to his satisfaction, ordering him to give battle, and in order to do this he assembled his council of war on board his galley, "la sultana," on the 4th of october. the council consisted of the two generals of the fleet, mahomet scirocco and aluch ali, the serasker or general of all the troops, perter pasha, and several great dignitaries of the empire, to the number of twenty, among whom were the former king of algiers, hassen pasha, and two sons of ali, who were still children, ahmed bey, who was eighteen, and mahomet bey, aged thirteen, who with their tutor alhamet commanded a galley.

the turkish fleet was undeniably superior to the christian, and wherein lay, perhaps, its greatest advantage was that it was not like the christian fleet compounded of different elements, who might, and in fact did, have different and even opposing interests. far from this, the turks were all vassals of one lord, and neither desired glory or power for anything but the empire. however, selim ii's order to give battle was vigorously opposed in the council, and the first to do so was aluch ali, who, with many weighty reasons, drawn from his experience of christian warfare, showed what harm defeat would entail. the serasker perter pasha and mahomet scirocco agreed with him, being much perturbed over the six formidable galliasses of the christians; these vessels, the greatest of their day, carried twenty cannon, and easily broke through any line of battle which confronted them.

ali pasha's arrogant petulance then turned to insolence; he jeered at the fears of the veterans, and told the council of the information he had received from two spies, kara kodja and kara djali, barbary corsairs, whom he had sent to reconnoitre the christian fleet in corfu; according to them it was so inferior in strength and numbers that it would have difficulty in resisting the attack of the turks. ali, however, did not know that this enumeration had been made while the vanguard of d. juan de cardona and the rearguard of the marqués de santa cruz had been detached at tarento with some other ships, and that, consequently, there only remained at the moment seventy galleys in the fleet of the league. thus the confidence of both generalissimos, ali pasha and d. john of austria, was founded on the same error; d. john supposed that the galleys of aluch ali had separated themselves from the turkish fleet, and were on their way to algiers or tripoli; and ali pasha, not reckoning on the ships of d. juan de cardona, or those of the marqués de santa cruz, and in his ignorance of naval matters, which was great, failed to appreciate the importance of the six galliasses which old mahomet scirocco so much feared.

the discussions became embittered, until there was contention among the ottoman leaders, to which aluch ali put an end by saying, "silence, i am ready, because it is written that the youth of a captain pasha has more weight than my forty-three years of fighting. but the berbers have made sport of you, pasha! remember this when the peril draws nigh."

having said this with impassive oriental gravity, aluch ali left to prepare his fleet. then everyone was for ali pasha; but he, more for appearance than from fear or want of confidence, desired to send the corsair kara kodja to make fresh investigation of the enemy's strength. so the barbary pirate set out from lepanto with two galleys, and began to seek cautiously for the allied fleet; on the 5th he had crossed the long, narrow channel of ithaca, which is at the extreme north of the bay of samos, in cephalonia, having to take refuge in the creek of pilaros, owing to bad weather. d. john proposed to reach the isles of curzolari from the north, and to shelter among these islands to rest the crews on the 6th, and to fall back suddenly on cape scropha on the 7th, surprising the turkish fleet anchored at lepanto. kara kodja, with daring, entered the channel of ithaca with his two galleys, and discovered the allied fleet at pilaros; but he had gone so far that the christians, in their turn, discovered him and gave chase, and it was only by the great strength of his oarsmen, and because the wind favoured him, that he was able to escape. however, again this time god desired to blind this barbary pirate, and in the hurry and fear of his flight his sharp eyes failed to see the ships that were sheltered behind a bend of the bay. so kara kodja thought that the fleet had not altered since he saw it at corfu without its rear or vanguard, and returned triumphant to lepanto, confident in his mistake, and he announced to ali pasha that the christians were at pilaros, in cephalonia, and that there was nothing to diminish the enormous advantage the turks had over them.

ali pasha wanted no second telling; he hurried to leave lepanto, to go and cast anchor in the bay of calydon, at the mouth of the gulf, only twelve miles distant from that fatal cape scropha, to which the turks gave, the next day, the sinister name of cape sangriento.

d. john, meanwhile, was anchored in the port of petala, seven miles from cape scropha, on the opposite side, without suspecting the proximity of the enemy. therefore both fleets were resting on either side of the fatal point, like two enemies who, drawn through hatred, approach without knowing, lie in wait, and suddenly meet each other without expecting to do so, by rounding the same corner. d. john thought the turks were at lepanto, ali imagined the christians to be still in cephalonia, and was going to seek them there. at daybreak on the 7th of october, 1571, d. john of austria ordered the fleet to leave the port of petala, and very carefully to go along the channel between the coast of greece and oxia, the last island of the curzolari; in the latitude of cape scropha the watch on the "real" made signals that two sails were in sight. then the curious at once covered masts and yards, but it was not two sails that they saw; there were dozens and dozens which stood out against the blue of the sky and the blue of the sea, skimming the waves like a flock of white sea-gulls. there was no doubt; the enemy was in sight; the belligerents had met face to face turning the same corner. it was then seven o'clock in the morning.

d. john of austria at once ordered his pilot, cecco pizano, to disembark on one of the high islets, to observe the strength of the enemy. from this height could be seen all the wide bay, and in it pizano spied the turkish fleet advancing, about twice as numerous as had been supposed, favoured by the breeze, which was hindering and embarrassing the man?uvres of the christians. the pilot was horrified at what he saw, and back on the "real" he did not dare say what he had seen at such a critical moment, and contented himself with whispering in the generalissimo's ear, "put out your claws, my lord, for the job will be a tough one."

on hearing this d. john made no sign, and as at that moment several of his captains came to ask him whether he would not hold a last council, he answered blandly, "there is no time for anything but fighting."

and he at once ordered a small cannon on the "real" to be fired, and a white flag to be run up in the centre of the galley, which was, ever since messina, the signal for battle.