one of the principal effects of a conscript system such as that of france is that the great majority of the population of the country is characterised by fixed habits and ideas with regard to the way in which work should be done. the latin races are all marked by a certain flexibility and dexterity of mind, a quickness of apprehension which is absent, for the most part, from other caucasian stock, and military training increases this and applies it to physical use as well as to mental qualities. the conscript, back in civilian life at the end of his training, is to be compared to the sailor of the british navy in many respects; he has learned a certain handiness, a dexterity in connection with his daily work, and it is a lesson that stays with him, as a rule, to the end of his life.

while military service alters, it does not create; the stolid breton—stolid by comparison with the men of central and southern france, remains stolid as before he went up for training, for the army has grafted on him nothing that is new—it has merely added to his knowledge and developed, in the way of characteristics, what was already there. but the breton is the better for his two years—without them he would be a very stolid and unimaginative person indeed, and he has learned to stir himself, to make the best of himself and the work that is his to perform. similarly the traditional frenchman, coming from the wine-growing districts of the south, and a hot-headed and impetuous individual, has his eccentricities modified, for hot-headedness does not pay in military service, and this man has learned to control himself just as the breton has acquired a little more rapidity of movement. yet the individual characteristics of the two types remain; personal traits have been modified by discipline, but not destroyed, for while the army of the republic creates nothing, it also annihilates nothing. the men have been moulded to a pattern, but they are the same men in essence, with no quality removed altogether. usually, they are vastly improved.

especially is this last true of the many youths who think—it is a common failing of youth—that they know everything and are capable of all things. the army modifies their self-conceit; it teaches them that they are but as other men, needing to learn. it first of all destroys the unhealthy growth of unjustifiable self-confidence, reducing these men to utter self-abasement; then, on this foundation, the army and the training it involves gradually build up, not a belief in self-powers, but a knowledge of the capacities and powers of self, of their limitations as well as their extent. the braggart who goes to his military training comes back chastened and, if he still boasts, it is of things that he is really capable of doing, knowledge that he has actually obtained—he makes no claims that he cannot justify, as a rule. this much the army of france does for the men who pass through it and back to their normal tasks in life.

the life of the conscripts has been charged with blunting the finer sensibilities of those who have to undergo its rigours, but the charge cannot be allowed. for one might as well say that the engineer is rendered incapable of appreciating music, or the doctor has no conception of the beauty of a garden, by reason of the mathematical nature of the work accomplished by the one and the physical repulsiveness of much that the other has to perform. the army and the training that it involves never injured a frenchman yet, so long as the laws governing the army received proper interpretation. in the end of the last century there were injustices prevalent both among men and officers, but the world and france gain wisdom with experience; the republican army as at present constituted is a growth of only forty years, and its predecessor, the army of napoleon the futile, showed by the war of 1870 what an immense amount of reform was necessary before french arms could regain their lustre. in the history of an army, forty years is a very short time, and, rather than cavil at the slowness with which reforms have been accomplished, it is due to france that one should admire the way in which the army has been built up from so sorry a foundation into the great and effective machine of to-day.

in civilian france, military ways persist. habits of neatness and method, and accuracy in trifles, attest the military training that men have undergone. the very step of a frenchman walking is reminiscent of the days when he was taught to march, and he has a respect for and knowledge of firearms which the average civilian of english life—unless he be addicted to some form of sport—never acquires. the frenchman is never at a loss with a sporting gun, knows better than to point the weapon at the head of another man when loading, and in other ways betrays familiarity with the tool of a craft—one that many englishmen regard as something to be handled carelessly or passed by as a thing of mystery. this is given only as an instance of the many ways in which the conscript system modifies men, for there are many ways in which modifications are effected. some students of the subject question whether the french flexuousness and adaptability are results of the military system of the republic or whether they are ingrained in the race independently of military training. since practically every citizen is a soldier, this is a point that cannot be easily determined, but there can be no doubt that the characteristics in question are increased by military service.

every frenchman who has passed through the army is in possession of a little book which he guards most jealously, since in that book are inserted full particulars of his term of service with the colours, and all things relating to his military history, as well as details of his duties in case of mobilisation of the army. the little book of the ex-conscript is to him what "marriage lines" are to a woman—except that the ex-conscript incurs penalties if he loses his book, while the woman who loses her "marriage lines" can always get another copy as long as the register containing particulars of the ceremony is in existence.

it must be understood that, in case of need arising for the mobilisation of the army, the body of men brought to the colours is so great that some system must be followed in bringing them on to a war footing. the little book contains particulars of the place at which the conscript on the reserve is to report himself, together with the day of mobilisation on which he will be required to join the colours—the actual mobilisation is spread over a period of days, in order that some men—the first line troops—may be drafted out to their posts before the rest come in. when the order for mobilisation has been given out—by the ringing of bells, proclamation by criers, and in various other ways—the reservist immediately consults his little book, and ascertains on what date he will have to present himself to the authorities, and at what station he is expected to rejoin. his wife or his mother or sister cooks him food for the day of his going, and, after a prayer at some wayside shrine or in some sanctuary, and perhaps an offering vowed to the virgin or to the patron saint, the citizen sets out to become a soldier again. august, 1914, was the first time of complete mobilisation in the history of the third republic, and the system under which the men were gathered back to the colours worked smoothly in all its details. there was no confusion anywhere; to each man his place, to each unit its place, and the army corps went out to the belgian frontier or to the edge of the provinces that slope down toward the rhine, with ominous celerity, and with those interminable regimental songs sounding as they sound when men go out to man?uvres at the end of the soldiers' year. the hour for which this army had been prepared had come, and the army was found ready to meet the hour.

although the effective strength of the french army, when the last man has been armed and placed in the field, is about 4,800,000 men, it must not be supposed that the republic maintains all these numbers as a fighting force in the field throughout the campaign. about a million and a half of men go out as the "first line," and from those who remain this line is strengthened as and where required. it has become clear since the battle of the marne that almost a second army was collected under the shelter of the paris forts to reinforce the retreating line of men who fell back from the belgian frontier, and in this connection it may be noted that the traditional french method of conducting war is with sixty per cent of the men in the firing line, and the remaining forty per cent in rear as reserves. france's conduct of the war against germany has shown that this method of fighting—diametrically opposed to the german conception of war—is still being adhered to, and the troops in the firing line by no means compose the whole of the french striking force.

as to active service in the french army, the general english view is that the french soldier, with the exception of the algerian garrison, sees no service outside european bounds, and the deeds of french soldiers are ignored as regards french colonial possessions and expeditions. in the expedition to tonquin, to which reference has already been made in connection with the foreign legion of the french army, there were deeds done by individuals and by regiments that are worthy of memory besides the brilliant exploits of our own army. it is not only to the war in the crimea and the present campaign that we must look for evidence of the indomitable courage that the french undoubtedly possess, but also to service on the french colonial battlefields, in chinese swamps and african wilds.

the present campaign has proved that french soldiers are capable of retreating in good order when strategy renders a retreat necessary—a feat hitherto deemed impossible to the army whose sole strength was supposed to consist in its power of impetuous attack. the retreat from the belgian frontier has rendered necessary a reconstruction of ideas as regards french psychology, and has shown that the training imposed on the conscripts of france in time of peace was the best that could be applied. just as in the field the best general is the best psychologist, so in time of peace the best administration is that which, regardless of criticism of its methods, prepares its men most effectively for war, selecting the form of training to be applied in a way that takes into consideration the mental characteristics and temperament of the material required to be trained. the merits of the form of training selected can only be determined by the effectiveness of the trained material in action, and, granting these things, the conduct of the french army in the present campaign is a splendid vindication of the peace training of that army. the first stages of the war have been all against the french way of fighting—the way in which the french soldier is supposed to exhibit himself at his best; yet in retreat, and in action approximating in length and tedium to the monotony and continued exertion of siege warfare, the french soldier has given his commanders cause for pride.

let it be remembered that the men who are fighting the battles of france, and of all civilisation, on french soil in these closing months of 1914 are not like the veterans with whom napoleon won his battles. the wars of the napoleonic era, lasting for years as they did, brought into the field a host of trained men—trained in war by the practice of war, rather than by experiments under peace conditions; from the time of the revolution onward there were sufficient veteran soldiers, seasoned in real warfare, to stiffen the ranks of any army that might be raised to attack—neither to retreat nor to defend, but to attack in accordance with french tradition. the army of the republic to-day is made up of men who have had two years' training apiece (with the exception of the small percentage of re-engagés, who also have had no war service) under peace conditions, and who for the most part have never seen a shot fired in anger, as the phrase goes. yet out of this semi-raw material (semi-raw as far as war experience goes) france has raised an army which may without exaggeration be termed magnificent, an army that has kept the field under harder circumstances than those which brought about the surrender of sedan, an army that no more knows when it is beaten than does the british force fighting by its side.