these little things are great to little man.

— goldsmith.

the great and the little have, no doubt, a real existence in the nature of things; but they both find pretty much the same level in the mind of man. it is a common measure, which does not always accommodate itself to the size and importance of the objects it represents. it has a certain interest to spare for certain things (and no more) according to its humour and capacity; and neither likes to be stinted in its allowance, nor to muster up an unusual share of sympathy, just as the occasion may require. perhaps, if we could recollect distinctly, we should discover that the two things that have affected us most in the course of our lives have been, one of them of the greatest, and the other of the smallest possible consequence. to let that pass as too fine a speculation, we know well enough that very trifling circumstances do give us great and daily annoyance, and as often prove too much for our philosophy and forbearance, as matters of the highest moment. a lump of soot spoiling a man’s dinner, a plate of toast falling in the ashes, the being disappointed of a ribbon to a cap or a ticket for a ball, have led to serious and almost tragical consequences. friends not unfrequently fall out and never meet again for some idle misunderstanding, ‘some trick not worth an egg,’ who have stood the shock of serious differences of opinion and clashing interests in life; and there is an excellent paper in the tatler, to prove that if a married couple do not quarrel about some point in the first instance not worth contesting, they will seldom find an opportunity afterwards to quarrel about a question of real importance. grave divines, great statesmen, and deep philosophers are put out of their way by very little things: nay, discreet, worthy people, without any pretensions but to good-nature and common sense, readily surrender the happiness of their whole lives sooner than give up an opinion to which they have committed themselves, though in all likelihood it was the mere turn of a feather which side they should take in the argument. it is the being baulked or thwarted in anything that constitutes the grievance, the unpardonable affront, not the value of the thing to which we had made up our minds. is it that we despise little things; that we are not prepared for them; that they take us in our careless, unguarded moments, and tease us out of our ordinary patience by their petty, incessant, insect warfare, buzzing about us and stinging us like gnats, so that we can neither get rid of nor grapple with them; whereas we collect all our fortitude and resolution to meet evils of greater magnitude? or is it that there is a certain stream of irritability that is continually fretting upon the wheels of life, which finds sufficient food to play with in straws and feathers, while great objects are too much for it, either choke it up, or divert its course into serious and thoughtful interest? some attempt might be made to explain this in the following manner.

one is always more vexed at losing a game of any sort by a single hole or ace than if one has never had a chance of winning it. this is no doubt in part or chiefly because the prospect of success irritates the subsequent disappointment. but people have been known to pine and fall sick from holding the next number to the twenty thousand pound prize in the lottery. now this could only arise from their being so near winning in fancy, from there seeming to be so thin a partition between them and success. when they were within one of the right number, why could they not have taken the next — it was so easy: this haunts their minds and will not let them rest, notwithstanding the absurdity of the reasoning. it is that the will here has a slight imaginary obstacle to surmount to attain its end; it should appear it had only an exceedingly trifling effort to make for this purpose, that it was absolutely in its power (had it known) to seize the envied prize, and it is continually harassing itself by making the obvious transition from one number to the other, when it is too late. that is to say, the will acts in proportion to its fancied power, to its superiority over immediate obstacles. now in little or indifferent matters there seems no reason why it should not have its own way, and therefore a disappointment vexes it the more. it grows angry according to the insignificance of the occasion, and frets itself to death about an object, merely because from its very futility there can be supposed to be no real difficulty in the way of its attainment, nor anything more required for this purpose than a determination of the will. the being baulked of this throws the mind off its balance, or puts it into what is called a passion; and as nothing but an act of voluntary power still seems necessary to get rid of every impediment, we indulge our violence more and more, and heighten our impatience by degrees into a sort of frenzy. the object is the same as it was, but we are no longer as we were. the blood is heated, the muscles are strained. the feelings are wound up to a pitch of agony with the vain strife. the temper is tried to the utmost it will bear. the more contemptible the object or the obstructions in the way to it, the more are we provoked at being hindered by them. it looks like witchcraft. we fancy there is a spell upon us, so that we are hampered by straws and entangled in cobwebs. we believe that there is a fatality about our affairs. it is evidently done on purpose to plague us. a demon is at our elbow to torment and defeat us in everything, even in the smallest things. we see him sitting and mocking us, and we rave and gnash our teeth at him in return, it is particularly hard that we cannot succeed in any one point, however trifling, that we set our hearts on. we are the sport of imbecility and mischance. we make another desperate effort, and fly out into all the extravagance of impotent rage once more. our anger runs away with our reason, because, as there is little to give it birth, there is nothing to cheek it or recall us to our senses in the prospect of consequences. we take up and rend in pieces the mere toys of humour, as the gusts of wind take up and whirl about chaff and stubble. passion plays the tyrant, in a grand tragi-comic style, over the lilliputian difficulties and petty disappointments it has to encounter, gives way to all the fretfulness of grief and all the turbulence of resentment, makes a fuss about nothing because there is nothing to make a fuss about — when an impending calamity, an irretrievable loss, would instantly bring it to its recollection, and tame it in its preposterous career. a man may be in a great passion and give himself strange airs at so simple a thing as a game at ball, for instance; may rage like a wild beast, and be ready to dash his head against the wall about nothing, or about that which he will laugh at the next minute, and think no more of ten minutes after, at the same time that a good smart blow from the ball, the effects of which he might feel as a serious inconvenience for a month, would calm him directly —

anon as patient as the female dove,

his silence will sit drooping.

the truth is, we pamper little griefs into great ones, and bear great ones as well as we can. we can afford to dally and play tricks with the one, but the others we have enough to do with, without any of the wantonness and bombast of passion — without the swaggering of pistol or the insolence of king cambyses’ vein. to great evils we submit; we resent little provocations. i have before now been disappointed of a hundred pound job and lost half a crown at rackets on the same day, and been more mortified at the latter than the former. that which is lasting we share with the future, we defer the consideration of till tomorrow: that which belongs to the moment we drink up in all its bitterness, before the spirit evaporates. we probe minute mischiefs to the quick; we lacerate, tear, and mangle our bosoms with misfortune’s finest, brittlest point, and wreak our vengeance on ourselves and it for good and all. small pains are more manageable, ore within our reach; we can fret and worry ourselves about them, can turn them into any shape, can twist and torture them how we please:— a grain of sand in the eye, a thorn in the flesh, only irritates the part, and leaves us strength enough to quarrel and get out of all patience with it: a heavy blow stuns and takes away all power of sense as well as of resistance. the great and mighty reverses of fortune, like the revolutions of nature, may be said to carry their own weight and reason along with them: they seem unavoidable and remediless, and we submit to them without murmuring as to a fatal necessity. the magnitude of the events in which we may happen to be concerned fills the mind, and carries it out of itself, as it were, into the page of history. our thoughts are expanded with the scene on which we have to act, and lend us strength to disregard our own personal share in it. some men are indifferent to the stroke of fate, as before and after earthquakes there is a calm in the air. from the commanding situation whence they have been accustomed to view things, they look down at themselves as only a part of the whole, and can abstract their minds from the pressure of misfortune, by the aid of its very violence. they are projected, in the explosion of events, into a different sphere, far from their former thoughts, purposes, and passions. the greatness of the change anticipates the slow effects of time and reflection:— they at once contemplate themselves from an immense distance, and look up with speculative wonder at the height on which they stood. had the downfall been less complete, it would have been more galling and borne with less resignation, because there might still be a chance of remedying it by farther efforts and farther endurance — but past cure, past hope. it is chiefly this cause (together with something of constitutional character) which has enabled the greatest man in modern history to bear his reverses of fortune with gay magnanimity, and to submit to the loss of the empire of the world with as little discomposure as if he had been playing a game at chess.72 this does not prove by our theory that he did not use to fly into violent passions with talleyrand for plaguing him with bad news when things went wrong. he was mad at uncertain forebodings of disaster, but resigned to its consummation. a man may dislike impertinence, yet have no quarrel with necessity!

there is another consideration that may take off our wonder at the firmness with which the principals in great vicissitudes of fortune bear their fate, which is, that they are in the secret of its operations, and know that what to others appears chance-medley was unavoidable. the clearness of their perception of all the circumstances converts the uneasiness of doubt into certainty: they have not the qualms of conscience which their admirers have, who cannot tell how much of the event is to be attributed to the leaders, and how much to unforeseen accidents: they are aware either that the result was not to be helped, or that they did all they could to prevent it.

si pergarna dextra

defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.

it is the mist and obscurity through which we view objects that makes us fancy they might have been or might still be otherwise, the precise knowledge of antecedents and consequents makes men practical as well as philosophical necessarians. — it is the want of this knowledge which is the principle and soul of gambling, and of all games of chance or partial skill. the supposition is, that the issue is uncertain, and that there is no positive means of ascertaining it. it is dependent on the turn of a die, on the tossing up of a halfpenny: to be fair it must be a lottery; there is no knowing but by the event; and it is this which keeps the interest alive, and works up the passion little short of madness. there is all the agitation of suspense, all the alternation of hope and fear, of good and bad success, all the eagerness of desire, without the possibility of reducing this to calculation, that is, of subjecting the increased action of the will to a known rule, or restraining the excesses of passion within the bounds of reason. we see no cause beforehand why the run of the cards should not be in our favour: we will hear of none afterwards why it should not have been so. as in the absence of all data to judge by, we wantonly fill up the blank with the most extravagant expectations, so, when all is over, we obstinately recur to the chance we had previously. there is nothing to tame us down to the event, nothing to reconcile us to our hard luck, for so we think it. we see no reason why we failed (and there was none, any more than why we should succeed)— we think that, reason apart, our will is the next best thing; we still try to have it our own way, and fret, torment, and harrow ourselves up with vain imaginations to effect impossibilities.73 we play the game over again: we wonder how it was possible for us to fail. we turn our brain with straining at contradictions, and striving to make things what they are not, or, in other words, to subject the course of nature to our fastastical wishes. ’if it had been so — if we had done such and such a thing’— we try it in a thousand different ways, and are just as far off the mark as ever. we appealed to chance in the first instance, and yet, when it has decided against us, we will not give in, and sit down contented with our loss, but refuse to submit to anything but reason, which has nothing to do with the matter. in drawing two straws, for example, to see which is the longest, there was no apparent necessity we should fix upon the wrong one, it was so easy to have fixed upon the other, nay, at one time we were going to do it — if we had — the mind thus runs back to what was so possible and feasible at one time, while the thing was pending, and would fain give a bias to causes so slender and insignificant, as the skittle-player bends his body to give a bias to the bowl he has already delivered from his hand, not considering that what is once determined, be the causes ever so trivial or evanescent, is in the individual instance unalterable. indeed, to be a great philosopher, in the practical and most important sense of the term, little more seems necessary than to be convinced of the truth of the maxim which the wise man repeated to the daughter of king cophetua, that if a thing is, it is, and there is an end of it!

we often make life unhappy in wishing things to have turned out otherwise than they did, merely because that is possible to the imagination, which is impossible in fact. i remember, when lamb’s farce was damned (for damned it was, that’s certain), i used to dream every night for a month after (and then i vowed i would plague myself no more about it) that it was revived at one of the minor or provincial theatres with great success, that such and such retrenchments and alterations had been made in it, and that it was thought it might do at the other house. i had heard indeed (this was told in confidence to lamb) that gentleman lewis was present on the night of its performance, and said that if he had had it he would have made it, by a few judicious curtailments, ‘the most popular little thing that had been brought out for some time.’ how often did i conjure up in recollection the full diapason of applause at the end of the prologue, and hear my ingenious friend in the first row of the pit roar with laughter at his own wit! then i dwelt with forced complacency on some part in which it had been doing well: then we would consider (in concert) whether the long tedious opera of the travellers, which preceded it, had not tired people beforehand, so that they had not spirits left for the quaint and sparkling ‘wit skirmishes’ of the dialogue; and we all agreed it might have gone down after a tragedy, except lamb himself, who swore he had no hopes of it from the beginning, and that he knew the name of the hero when it came to be discovered could not be got over. mr. h—— thou wert damned! bright shone the morning on the play-bills that announced thy appearance, and the streets were filled with the buzz of persons asking one another if they would go to see mr. h—— and answering that they would certainly; but before night the gaiety, not of the author, but of his friends and the town was eclipsed, for thou were damned! hadst thou been anonymous thou haply mightst have lived. but thou didst come to an untimely end for thy tricks, and for want of a better name to pass them off!

in this manner we go back to the critical minutes on which the turn of our fate, or that of any one else in whom we are interested; depended; try them over again with new knowledge and sharpened sensibility; and thus think to alter what is irrevocable, and ease for a moment the pang of lasting regret. so in a game at rackets74 (to compare small things with great), i think if at such a point i had followed up my success, if i had not been too secure or over-anxious in another part, if i had played for such an opening — in short, if i had done anything but what i did and what has proved unfortunate in the result, the chances were all in my favour. but it is merely because i do not know what would have happened in the other case that i interpret it so readily to my own advantage. i have sometimes lain awake a whole night, trying to serve out the last ball of an interesting game in a particular corner of the court, which i had missed from a nervous feeling. rackets (i might observe, for the sake of the uninformed reader) is, like any other athletic game, very much a thing of skill and practice; but it is also a thing of opinion, ‘subject to all the skyey influences.’ if you think you can win, you can win. faith is necessary to victory. if you hesitate in striking at the ball, it is ten to one but you miss it. if you are apprehensive of committing some particular error (such as striking the ball foul) you will be nearly sure to do it. while thinking of that which you are so earnestly bent upon avoiding, your hand mechanically follows the strongest idea, and obeys the imagination rather than the intention of the striker. a run of luck is a forerunner of success, and courage is as much wanted as skill. no one is, however, free from nervous sensations at times. a good player may not be able to strike a single stroke if another comes into the court that he has a particular dread of; and it frequently so happens that a player cannot beat another, even though he can give half the game to an equal player, because he has some associations of jealousy or personal pique against the first which he has not towards the last. sed haec hactenus. chess is a game i do not understand, and have not comprehension enough to play at. but i believe, though it is so much less a thing of chance than science or skill, eager players pass whole nights in marching and countermarching their men and checkmating a successful adversary, supposing that at a certain point of the game they had determined upon making a particular move instead of the one which they actually did make. i have heard a story of two persons playing at backgammon, one of whom was so enraged at losing his match at a particular point of the game that he took the board and threw it out of the window. it fell upon the head of one of the passengers in the street, who came up to demand instant satisfaction for the affront and injury he had sustained. the losing gamester only asked him if he understood backgammon, and finding that he did, said, that if upon seeing the state of the game he did not excuse the extravagance of his conduct, he would give him any other satisfaction he wished for. the tables were accordingly brought, and the situation of the two contending parties being explained, the gentleman put up his sword and went away perfectly satisfied. to return from this, which to some will seem a digression, and to others will serve as a confirmation of the doctrine i am insisting on.

it is not, then, the value of the object, but the time and pains bestowed upon it, that determines the sense and degree of our loss. many men set their minds only on trifles, and have not a compass of soul to take an interest in anything truly great and important beyond forms and minutiae. such persons are really men of little minds, or may be complimented with the title of great children,

pleased with a feather, tickled with a straw.

larger objects elude their grasp, while they fasten eagerly on the light and insignificant. they fidget themselves and others to death with incessant anxiety about nothing. a part of their dress that is awry keeps them in a fever of restlessness and impatience; they sit picking their teeth, or paring their nails, or stirring the fire, or brushing a speck of dirt off their coats, while the house or the world tumbling about their ears would not rouse them from their morbid insensibility. they cannot sit still on their chairs for their lives, though if there were anything for them to do they would become immovable. their nerves are as irritable as their imaginations are callous and inert. they are addicted to an inveterate habit of littleness and perversity, which rejects every other motive to action or object of contemplation but the daily, teasing, contemptible, familiar, favourite sources of uneasiness and dissatisfaction. when they are of a sanguine instead of a morbid temperament, they become quid-nuncs and virtuosos — collectors of caterpillars and odd volumes, makers of fishing-rods and curious in watch-chains. will wimble dabbled in this way, to his immortal honour. but many others have been less successful. there are those who build their fame on epigrams or epitaphs, and others who devote their lives to writing the lord’s prayer in little. some poets compose and sing their own verses. which character would they have us think most highly of — the poet or the musician? the great is one. some there are who feel more pride in sealing a letter with a head of homer than ever that old blind bard did in reciting his iliad. these raise a huge opinion of themselves out of nothing, as there are those who shrink from their own merits into the shade of unconquerable humility. i know one person at least, who would rather be the author of an unsuccessful farce than of a successful tragedy. repeated mortification has produced an inverted ambition in his mind, and made failure the bitter test of desert. he cannot lift his drooping head to gaze on the gaudy crown of popularity placed within his reach, but casts a pensive, riveted look downwards to the modest flowers which the multitude trample under their feet. if he had a piece likely to succeed, coming out under all advantages, he would damn it by some ill-timed, wilful jest, and lose the favour of the public, to preserve the sense of his personal identity. ‘misfortune,’ shakespear says, ‘brings a man acquainted with strange bedfellows’; and it makes our thoughts traitors to ourselves. — it is a maxim with many —‘take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves.’ those only put it in practice successfully who think more of the pence than of the pounds. to such, a large sum is less than a small one. great speculations, great returns are to them extravagant or imaginary: a few hundreds a year are something snug and comfortable. persons who have been used to a petty, huckstering way of life cannot enlarge their apprehensions to a notion of anything better. instead of launching out into greater expense and liberality with the tide of fortune, they draw back with the fear of consequences, and think to succeed on a broader scale by dint of meanness and parsimony. my uncle toby frequently caught trim standing up behind his chair, when he had told him to be seated. what the corporal did out of respect, others would do out of servility. the menial character does not wear out in three or four generations. you cannot keep some people out of the kitchen, merely because their grandfathers or grandmothers came out of it. a poor man and his wife walking along in the neighbourhood of portland place, he said to her peevishly, ‘what is the use of walking along these fine streets and squares? let us turn down some alley!’ he felt he should be more at home there. lamb said of an old acquaintance of his, that when he was young he wanted to be a tailor, but had not spirit! this is the misery of unequal matches. the woman cannot easily forget, or think that others forget, her origin; and, with perhaps superior sense and beauty, keeps painfully in the background. it is worse when she braves this conscious feeling, and displays all the insolence of the upstart and affected fine lady. but shouldst thou ever, my infelice, grace my home with thy loved presence, as thou hast cheered my hopes with thy smile, thou wilt conquer all hearts with thy prevailing gentleness, and i will show the world what shakespear’s women were! — some gallants set their hearts on princesses; others descend in imagination to women of quality; others are mad after opera-singers. for my part, i am shy even of actresses, and should not think of leaving my card with madame vestris. i am for none of these bonnes fortunes; but for a list of humble beauties, servant-maids and shepherd-girls, with their red elbows, hard hands, black stockings and mob-caps, i could furnish out a gallery equal to cowley’s, and paint them half as well. oh! might i but attempt a description of some of them in poetic prose, don juan would forget his julia, and mr. davison might both print and publish this volume. i agree so far with horace, and differ with montaigne. i admire the clementinas and clarissas at a distance: the pamelas and fannys of richardson and fielding make my blood tingle. i have written love-letters to such in my time, d’un pathetique a faire fendre les rochers, and with about as much effect as if they had been addressed to stone. the simpletons only laughed, and said that ‘those were not the sort of things to gain the affections.’ i wish i had kept copies in my own justification. what is worse, i have an utter aversion to blue-stockings. i do not care a fig for any woman that knows even what an author means. if i know that she has read anything i have written, i cut her acquaintance immediately. this sort of literary intercourse with me passes for nothing. her critical and scientific acquirements are carrying coals to newcastle. i do not want to be told that i have published such or such a work. i knew all this before. it makes no addition to my sense of power. i do not wish the affair to be brought about in that way. i would have her read my soul: she should understand the language of the heart: she should know what i am, as if she were another self! she should love me for myself alone. i like myself without any reason: i would have her do so too. this is not very reasonable. i abstract from my temptations to admire all the circumstances of dress, birth, breeding, fortune; and i would not willingly put forward my own pretensions, whatever they may be. the image of some fair creature is engraven on my inmost soul; it is on that i build my claim to her regard, and expect her to see into my heart, as i see her form always before me. wherever she treads, pale primroses, like her face, vernal hyacinths, like her brow, spring up beneath her feet, and music hangs on every bough; but all is cold, barren, and desolate without her. thus i feel, and thus i think. but have i over told her so? no. or if i did, would she understand it? no. i ‘hunt the wind, i worship a statue, cry aloud to the desert.’ to see beauty is not to be beautiful, to pine in love is not to be loved again — i always was inclined to raise and magnify the power of love. i thought that his sweet power should only be exerted to join together the loveliest forms and fondest hearts; that none but those in whom his godhead shone outwardly, and was inly felt, should ever partake of his triumphs; and i stood and gazed at a distance, as unworthy to mingle in so bright a throng, and did not (even for a moment) wish to tarnish the glory of so fair a vision by being myself admitted into it. i say this was my notion once, but god knows it was one of the errors of my youth. for coming nearer to look, i saw the maimed, the blind, and the halt enter in, the crooked and the dwarf, the ugly, the old and impotent, the man of pleasure and the man of the world, the dapper and the pert, the vain and shallow boaster, the fool and the pedant, the ignorant and brutal, and all that is farthest removed from earth’s fairest-born, and the pride of human life. seeing all these enter the courts of love, and thinking that i also might venture in under favour of the crowd, but finding myself rejected, i fancied (i might be wrong) that it was not so much because i was below, as above the common standard. i did feel, but i was ashamed to feel, mortified at my repulse, when i saw the meanest of mankind, the very scum and refuse, all creeping things and every obscene creature, enter in before me. i seemed a species by myself, i took a pride even in my disgrace; and concluded i had elsewhere my inheritance! the only thing i ever piqued myself upon was the writing the essay on the principles of human action— a work that no woman ever read, or would ever comprehend the meaning of. but if i do not build my claim to regard on the pretensions i have, how can i build it on those i am totally without? or why do i complain and expect to gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? thought has in me cancelled pleasure; and this dark forehead, bent upon truth, is the rock on which all affection has split. and thus i waste my life in one long sigh; nor ever (till too late) beheld a gentle face turned gently upon mine! . . . but no! not too late, if that face, pure, modest, downcast, tender, with angel sweetness, not only gladdens the prospect of the future, but sheds its radiance on the past, smiling in tears. a purple light hovers round my head. the air of love is in the room. as i look at my long-neglected copy of the death of clorinda, golden gleams play upon the canvas, as they used when i painted it. the flowers of hope and joy springing up in my mind, recall the time when they first bloomed there. the years that are fled knock at the door and enter. i am in the louvre once more. the sun of austerlitz has not set. it still shines here — in my heart; and he, the son of glory, is not dead, nor ever shall, to me. i am as when my life began. the rainbow is in the sky again. i see the skirts of the departed years. all that i have thought and felt has not been in vain. i am not utterly worthless, unregarded; nor shall i die and wither of pure scorn. now could i sit on the tomb of liberty, and write a hymn to love. oh! if i am deceived, let me be deceived still. let me live in the elysium of those soft looks; poison me with kisses, kill me with smiles; but still mock me with thy love!75

poets choose mistresses who have the fewest charms, that they may make something out of nothing. they succeed best in fiction, and they apply this rule to love. they make a goddess of any dowdy. as don quixote said, in answer to the matter-of-fact remonstrances of sancho, that dulcinea del toboso answered the purpose of signalising his valour just as well as the ‘fairest princess under sky,’ so any of the fair sex will serve them to write about just as well as another. they take some awkward thing and dress her up in fine words, as children dress up a wooden doll in fine clothes. perhaps a fine head of hair, a taper waist, or some other circumstance strikes them, and they make the rest out according to their fancies. they have a wonderful knack of supplying deficiencies in the subjects of their idolatry out of the storehouse of their imaginations. they presently translate their favourites to the skies, where they figure with berenice’s locks and ariadne’s crown. this predilection for the unprepossessing and insignificant, i take to arise not merely from a desire in poets to have some subject to exercise their inventive talents upon, but from their jealousy of any pretensions (even those of beauty in the other sex) that might interfere with the continual incense offered to their personal vanity.

cardinal mazarine never thought anything of cardinal de retz after he told him that he had written for the last thirty years of his life with the same pen. some italian poet going to present a copy of verses to the pope, and finding, as he was looking them over in the coach as he went, a mistake of a single letter in the printing, broke his heart of vexation and chagrin. a still more remarkable case of literary disappointment occurs in the history of a countryman of his, which i cannot refrain from giving here, as i find it related. ‘anthony codrus urceus, a most learned and unfortunate italian, born near modena, 1446, was a striking instance,’ says his biographer, ‘of the miseries men bring upon themselves by setting their affections unreasonably on trifles. this learned man lived at forli, and had an apartment in the palace. his room was so very dark that he was forced to use a candle in the daytime; and one day, going abroad without putting it out, his library was set on fire, and some papers which he had prepared for the press were burned. the instant he was informed of this ill news he was affected even to madness. he ran furiously to the palace, and stopping at the door of his apartment, he cried aloud, “christ jesus! what mighty crime have i committed! whom of your followers have i ever injured, that you thus rage with inexpiable hatred against me?” then turning himself to an image of the virgin mary near at hand, “virgin (says he), hear what i have to say, for i speak in earnest, and with a composed spirit: if i shall happen to address you in my dying moments, i humbly entreat you not to hear me, nor receive me into heaven, for i am determined to spend all eternity in hell!” those who heard these blasphemous expressions endeavoured to comfort him; but all to no purpose: for, the society of mankind being no longer supportable to him, he left the city, and retired, like savage, to the deep solitude of a wood. some say that he was murdered there by ruffians: others, that he died at bologna in 1500, after much contrition and penitence.’

perhaps the censure passed at the outset of the anecdote on this unfortunate person is unfounded and severe, when it is said that he brought his miseries on himself ‘by having set his affections unreasonably on trifles.’ to others it might appear so; but to himself the labour of a whole life was hardly a trifle. his passion was not a causeless one, though carried to such frantic excess. the story of sir isaac newton presents a strong contrast to the last-mentioned one, who, on going into his study and finding that his dog tray had thrown down a candle on the table, and burnt some papers of great value, contented himself with exclaiming, ‘ah! tray, you don’t know the mischief you have done!’ many persons would not forgive the overturning a cup of chocolate so soon.

i remember hearing an instance some years ago of a man of character and property, who through unexpected losses had been condemned to a long and heartbreaking imprisonment, which he bore with exemplary fortitude. at the end of four years, by the interest and exertions of friends, he obtained his discharge, with every prospect of beginning the world afresh, and had made his arrangements for leaving his irksome abode, and meeting his wife and family at a distance of two hundred miles by a certain day. owing to the miscarriage of a letter, some signature necessary to the completion of the business did not arrive in time, and on account of the informality which had thus arisen, he could not set out home till the return of the post, which was four days longer. his spirit could not brook the delay. he had wound himself up to the last pitch of expectation; he had, as it were, calculated his patience to hold out to a certain point, and then to throw down his load for ever, and he could not find resolution to resume it for a few hours beyond this. he put an end to the intolerable conflict of hope and disappointment in a fit of excruciating anguish. woes that we have time to foresee and leisure to contemplate break their force by being spread over a larger surface and borne at intervals; but those that come upon us suddenly, for however short a time, seem to insult us by their unnecessary and uncalled-for intrusion; and the very prospect of relief, when held out and then withdrawn from us, to however small a distance, only frets impatience into agony by tantalising our hopes and wishes; and to rend asunder the thin partition that separates us from our favourite object, we are ready to burst even the fetters of life itself!

i am not aware that any one has demonstrated how it is that a stronger capacity is required for the conduct of great affairs than of small ones. the organs of the mind, like the pupil of the eye, may be contracted or dilated to view a broader or a narrower surface, and yet find sufficient variety to occupy its attention in each. the material universe is infinitely divisible, and so is the texture of human affairs. we take things in the gross or in the detail, according to the occasion. i think i could as soon get up the budget of ways and means for the current year, as be sure of making both ends meet, and paying my rent at quarter-day in a paltry huckster’s shop. great objects move on by their own weight and impulse; great power turns aside petty obstacles; and he who wields it is often but the puppet of circumstances, like the fly on the wheel that said, ‘what a dust we raise!’ it is easier to ruin a kingdom and aggrandise one’s own pride and prejudices than to set up a greengrocer’s stall. an idiot or a madman may do this at any time, whose word is law, and whose nod is fate. nay, he whose look is obedience, and who understands the silent wishes of the great, may easily trample on the necks and tread out the liberties of a mighty nation, deriding their strength, and hating it the more from a consciousness of his own meanness. power is not wisdom, it is true; but it equally ensures its own objects. it does not exact, but dispenses with talent. when a man creates this power, or new-moulds the state by sage counsels and bold enterprises, it is a different thing from overturning it with the levers that are put into his baby hands. in general, however, it may be argued that great transactions and complicated concerns ask more genius to conduct them than smaller ones, for this reason, viz. that the mind must be able either to embrace a greater variety of details in a more extensive range of objects, or must have a greater faculty of generalising, or a greater depth of insight into ruling principles, and so come at true results in that way. buonaparte knew everything, even to the names of our cadets in the east india service; but he failed in this, that he did not calculate the resistance which barbarism makes to refinement. he thought that the russians could not burn moscow, because the parisians could not burn paris. the french think everything must be french. the cossacks, alas! do not conform to etiquette: the rudeness of the seasons knows no rules of politeness! some artists think it a test of genius to paint a large picture; and i grant the truth of this position, if the large picture contains more than a small one. it is not the size of the canvas, but the quantity of truth and nature put into it, that settles the point. it is a mistake, common enough on this subject, to suppose that a miniature is more finished than an oil-picture. the miniature is inferior to the oil-picture only because it is less finished, because it cannot follow nature into so many individual and exact particulars. the proof of which is, that the copy of a good portrait will always make a highly finished miniature (see for example mr. bone’s enamels), whereas the copy of a good miniature, if enlarged to the size of life, will make but a very sorry portrait. several of our best artists, who are fond of painting large figures, invert this reasoning. they make the whole figure gigantic, not that they may have room for nature, but for the motion of their brush (as if they were painting the side of a house), regarding the extent of canvas they have to cover as an excuse for their slovenly and hasty manner of getting over it; and thus, in fact, leave their pictures nothing at last but overgrown miniatures, but huge caricatures. it is not necessary in any case (either in a larger or a smaller compass) to go into the details, so as to lose sight of the effect, and decompound the face into porous and transparent molecules, in the manner of denner, who painted what he saw through a magnifying-glass. the painter’s eye need not be a microscope, but i contend that it should be a looking-glass, bright, clear, lucid. the little in art begins with insignificant parts, with what does not tell in connection with other parts. the true artist will paint not material points, but moral qualities. in a word, wherever there is feeling or expression in a muscle or a vein, there is grandeur and refinement too. — i will conclude these remarks with an account of the manner in which the ancient sculptors combined great and little things in such matters. ‘that the name of phidias,’ says pliny, ‘is illustrious among all the nations that have heard of the fame of the olympian jupiter, no one doubts; but in order that those may know that he is deservedly praised who have not even seen his works, we shall offer a few arguments, and those of his genius only: nor to this purpose shall we insist on the beauty of the olympian jupiter, nor on the magnitude of the minerva at athens, though it is twenty-six cubits in height (about thirty-five feet), and is made of ivory and gold; but we shall refer to the shield, on which the battle of the amazons is carved on the outer side; on the inside of the same is the fight of the gods and giants; and on the sandals, that between the centaurs and lapithae; so well did every part of that work display the powers of the art. again, the sculptures on the pedestal he called the birth of pandora: there are to be seen in number thirty gods, the figure of victory being particularly admirable: the learned also admire the figures of the serpent and the brazen sphinx, writhing under the spear. these things are mentioned, in passing, of an artist never enough to be commended, that it may be seen that he showed the same magnificence even in small things.