before starting for his drive frank telegraphed to his mother: “have not found him here. i do not yet despair. have a faint clue that may lead to something.”

that evening he wrote a long letter, acknowledging that he had been bitterly disappointed, but saying that signor forli had found out that some of the prisoners had been sent away to capua before garibaldi entered the town, and that he still hoped his father might be among the number. he gave no detail as to these prisoners, for he was anxious not to raise hopes that might not be fulfilled; indeed, he had in all his letters said little on the subject. he knew his mother had refused to allow herself to cherish any hope, and he had written almost entirely of matters concerning the events of the march, the country through which he had travelled, and the scenes in which he had taken a part. he and signor forli had at salerno received long letters from home full of the delight which the news of the discovery and release of the latter had given them. his mother had said:—

“this is a joy indeed, my boy—one that i had never expected, or even hoped for. but do not let yourself anticipate for a moment that because this unlooked-for happiness has been given to us our other dear lost one will similarly be recovered. that my father had been thrown into a neapolitan prison we never doubted for a moment; and i believed that, should he have survived, garibaldi’s success would open his prison doors. but it is not so in the case of your father. the evidence is almost overwhelming that he died in the hands of the brigands who carried him off, and nothing short of knowing that he is alive will induce me to abandon the conviction i have all along felt that this was so. i pray you not to indulge in any false hopes, which can but end in bitter disappointment. you will, of course, search until absolutely convinced that he is not in any of the prisons of the country. the search will at least have been useful, for it will remove the last dread which, in spite of myself, i have occasionally felt ever since he has been missing, that he has been wearing his life out in one of these horrible dungeons.”

the next ten days passed slowly. frank and the other members of the staff had bought fresh horses a few days after the capture of reggio; and he was now constantly in the saddle, carrying messages between garibaldi’s headquarters and the army. garibaldi himself had been distracted by the intrigues going on around him, and had been obliged to go to sicily. depretis, who had been appointed head of the government there, was inclined to the annexational policy, which was opposed by crispi and the other garibaldians, and the consequence was that an alarming state of affairs existed there. garibaldi was therefore obliged to hurry over there himself, and having appointed mordeni, a determined partisan of his own, pro-dictator, and arranged affairs generally, he returned to naples, where his presence was urgently required.

position round capua

the neapolitan army at capua had been very largely reinforced, and had taken post along the river volturno. turr, who was in command of the garibaldian army, had in consequence, taken up a defensive position at madelone, caserta and aversa, thereby barring any advance on the part of the royal army. the latter’s position was an extremely formidable one: its right rested on gaeta near the sea, and forty thousand men were massed on the right bank of the volturno, a river which was here from fifty to a hundred yards in width, their left was at cajazzo, in the mountains of the abruzzi, where the inhabitants were favourable to the royal cause.

capua itself, on the left bank of the river, afforded them a means of moving forward to the attack of the garibaldians. three sides of its fortifications were surrounded by the river, which here makes a great loop, and around the town twenty thousand men were massed, one half of whom were in position in front of it. the only bridge across the river was at capua, but there was a ferry near caserta. the position was so threatening that turr, who had under him about seventeen thousand men, pushed a force up to the town of santa maria and the heights of sant’angelo, both of which points were occupied after a skirmish.

on the 17th, six hundred men were sent off to march far up the river, to cross it, and to throw themselves into the mountains above cajazzo, which was occupied by two thousand two hundred men with four guns. garibaldi arrived at caserta on the night of the 18th, but did not interfere with turr’s command. in order to attract the attention of the enemy, and keep them from sending reinforcements to cajazzo, it was arranged that a feint should be made against capua: two battalions were to advance from aversa to menace the southwest of that town, six battalions were to advance directly against it from santa maria, and ebor’s brigade was to march to sant’angelo, and then to drive the neapolitans on their left into capua, and to extend on the right along the hills as far as the road to cajazzo.

the movement was completely successful. cajazzo was captured, and the force in front of capua obliged to retire under the guns of the citadel. some loss, however, was sustained, owing to the division from santa maria, instead of returning as soon as the work was done, being kept for four hours under the fire of the guns of the fortress, owing to a misconception of orders. the positions now taken were occupied in strength. the next day, six hundred and fifty men were sent off to cajazzo to strengthen the small force of three hundred there, as the place was attacked by no fewer than twelve thousand neapolitan troops. although without artillery, the town was desperately defended for four hours. the barricades at the end of the main streets were held, in spite of repeated attacks and the fire from eight guns. not until two hundred of the little force had fallen, did the garibaldians fall back, and they succeeded in crossing the river at the ferry, covered by two companies and a couple of guns, which had been posted at that point to prevent the neapolitans from crossing.

there was an interval now: the garibaldians were far too weak to attack their numerous enemy, posted in an almost impregnable position. garibaldi was so much harassed by the political intriguers, that he left caserta every morning long before daybreak, and remained the whole day at a cottage on the heights of san antonio. he had already done all in his power to satisfy the royal party that he had no intention of favouring a republic. bertram, who had done so much for him as chief organiser and agent, was requested to leave rome. mazzini also was sent away, and other appointments were made, showing how bent he was on handing over his conquest to victor emmanuel. there can be no doubt now that it would have been far better had he from the first abandoned his wish not to present his conquests to the king until they were completed. had he, on his arrival at messina, at once declared victor emmanuel king of the island, and requested him to take possession, he would have allayed the jealousy and suspicion with which his movements were viewed by cavour and the piedmontese ministry.

a similar course, as soon as naples was occupied, would have had a still greater effect, and both garibaldi himself and his brave followers would have been spared the bitter humiliations and the gross display of ingratitude, which, however, disgraced those who inflicted them far more than those so undeservedly treated.

turr remained idle during the next six days, and beyond throwing up two or three small intrenchments, did nothing to strengthen the position. in fact, it was daily becoming more probable that there would be no further fighting. cialdini’s division had landed near alcona, had defeated the army of lamoriciere, and was advancing westwards without opposition. fanti, with another army, had crossed the northern frontier of the neapolitan territory, and was marching south. thus, in a short time, the neapolitans would be surrounded by three armies, and would be forced to lay down their arms.

on the 29th it became evident that a considerable movement was in progress on the other side of the river and fort. forty thousand men were being concentrated at capua and cajazzo.

garibaldi’s force, available in case of attack, was about twenty-four thousand men, of whom thirteen thousand were northern italians, eleven thousand calabrians and sicilians, and one inhabitant of naples. of these, two thousand five hundred were with conti at aversa, and over seven thousand at caserta; the remainder being at santa maria, sant’angelo, the village of santa lucia, and madalone. the position occupied was nearly thirty miles long, but the reserves at caserta and madalone, lying behind the centre, could be despatched speedily to any point required. frank had come out with garibaldi to caserta, and spent the whole of his time riding between the different points occupied, with communications from garibaldi to his generals.

at three o’clock on the morning of october 1st, garibaldi started as usual for the front. frank, with two or three of the younger staff-officers, rode, and three carriages carried the general and the older members of the staff. they had scarcely left the town when a scattered fire of musketry was heard near santa maria. this rapidly increased in volume; and soon afterwards the guns at sant’angelo opened vigorously. when approaching the town, a mounted soldier, riding at a furious gallop, overtook them. he was the bearer of a message that a telegram had just been received from bixio, who was in command at madalone, saying that he was being assailed in great force. this was even more serious than the attack in front, for, if successful, it would have cut the communication between the garibaldians and naples.

galloping on to santa maria, garibaldi sent a telegram to sartori, who commanded at caserta, to tell him to hold a brigade in readiness to support bixio if the latter was pressed; and that turr, with the rest of the reserves, was to hold himself in readiness to move to the front, but was only to send forward a single brigade, till quite assured of bixio’s success. at santa maria were the greater part of the old cacciatori, with four thousand other good troops, and garibaldi felt confident that the town was in no danger of being taken. he accordingly started at once for sant’angelo, which was the key of his position. morning had broken now, but a heavy mist, rising from the low ground near the river, rendered it impossible to see more than a few yards. the din of conflict was prodigious. the garibaldian guns at santa maria kept up a desultory fire, answered by those of the neapolitans, and the rattle of musketry was incessant ahead, and, as it seemed, the fight was raging all round; but it was impossible to tell whether santa lucia and other posts to the right were also attacked. suddenly a volley was fired from an invisible enemy within a hundred yards. the balls whistled overhead.

“this is uncomfortable,” frank said to the officer riding next to him. “they have evidently broken through our line connecting sant’angelo with santa maria. if we had had a few earthworks thrown up this would not have happened. now they will be able to take sant’angelo in rear; and, what is much more important, we may at any moment run right into the middle of them, and the loss of garibaldi would be more serious than that of all our positions put together.”

the neapolitans had indeed issued out in three columns. one of them, pushing out under cover of the deep water-courses, had broken through the weak line, had captured a battery of four guns and a barricade, and had then mounted one of the spurs of tifata and taken sant’angelo in rear; while a second column, attacking it in front, had captured another four-gun battery and a barricade two hundred and fifty yards below the village on the capua road, and had taken two or three hundred prisoners, the rest of medici’s division taking up their position in and around the abbey, which stood on the hillside above the village.

map of the battle of the volturno

october 1860.

three of the guides, who had accompanied garibaldi to carry messages, and the three mounted staff officers, took their place in front of the carriages in readiness to charge should they come suddenly upon the enemy, and so give time to their occupants to escape. the horses were all galloping at full speed; and though occasionally caught sight of by the enemy, and exposed to a fire, not only of musketry but of round shot, they remained uninjured until two-thirds of the distance to sant’angelo, which garibaldi believed to be still in possession of his troops, had been covered. presently, however, they saw, but sixty or seventy yards away, a strong body of neapolitans on the road.

“turn off to the right!” garibaldi shouted. as the carriage left the road a round shot struck one of the horses. garibaldi and the other occupants at once jumped out, and shouting to the carriages behind to follow them, ran across the fields. fortunately there was a deep watercourse close by; and the others, leaving their carriages, all ran down into this. the mist was too thick for the movement to be observed, and the neapolitans kept up a heavy fire in the direction in which they had seen the carriages through the mist. as soon as they entered the watercourse garibaldi told frank and his companions to dismount, as, although the bank was high enough to conceal the men on foot, those on horseback could be seen above it. all ran along at the top of their speed. as they did so, frank told his companions and the guides, if they came upon any force of the enemy, to throw themselves into their saddles again and charge, so as to give time to the general to turn off and escape.

they had gone but a few hundred yards when a party of the enemy, who were standing on the left bank of the watercourse, ran suddenly down into it. frank and the others sprang into their saddles, and with a shout rode at them; there was a hurried discharge of musketry, and then they were in the midst of the neapolitans. these were but some twenty in number. they had already emptied their muskets, but for a minute there was a hand-to-hand contest. the horsemen first used their revolvers with deadly effect, and then fell on with their swords so fiercely that the survivors of their opponents scrambled out of the watercourse and fled, just as garibaldi and his staff ran up to take part in the conflict. it was well for the general that he had found the road to the village blocked, for, had he ridden straight on, he must have been captured by the enemy, who were already in full possession of it, with the exception of the abbey church and a few houses round it, and the slope of the hill.

two of the mounted party were missing. one of the guides had fallen when the neapolitans fired, and an officer had been killed by the thrust of a bayonet. one of garibaldi’s party was also missing; but whether he had been killed by a chance shot or had fallen behind and been taken prisoner none knew. as they ascended the slope of the hill they got above the mist, and could now see what had happened. a part of the column that had broken through the line of outposts had pressed on some distance, and then moved to its left, until in the rear of sant’angelo, where its attack had taken the defenders wholly by surprise. the force had then mounted the hill, and from there opened fire upon the defenders of the abbey and the houses round it.

these were stoutly held. the houses were solidly-built structures in which resided the priests and servitors of the church, and the only road leading up from the village to it was swept by two twenty-four-pounders, while from the windows of the houses and from the roof of the abbey a steady musketry fire was maintained. garibaldi ordered frank to gallop to the pass, a short distance behind the village, where two companies of genoese carbineers and two mountain howitzers were posted, and to direct them to mount the hill and take up a position on the heights above that occupied by the enemy. with a cheer the men ran forward as soon as they received the order. ignorant of what was taking place in front, but certain from the roar of battle that it was raging round the village, they had been eager to advance to take part in the struggle; but their orders to hold the pass had been imperative, as their presence here was indispensable to cover the retreat of the garibaldians in sant’angelo, and to check pursuit until reinforcements came up from the rear.

the movement was unobserved by the enemy, who were fully occupied in their attempts to capture the abbey; and it was not until the two companies were established on a ridge well above that occupied by the neapolitans, and opened a heavy musketry fire, aided by their two guns, that the latter were aware that they had been taken in rear. their position was altogether untenable, as they were unable to reply effectively to the fire of their opponents, and, descending the slopes, they joined their comrades in the village. several desperate attacks were made upon the abbey, but each was repulsed with heavy loss; and as the carbineers had now moved lower down, and their guns commanded the village, the neapolitans lost heart and fell back.

a battalion of garibaldi’s bersaglieri now came up. they were commanded by colonel wyndham, and occupied the village as the neapolitans fell back, quickened their retreat, and then, descending to the four-gun battery that had first been taken, turned the guns, which the enemy had forgotten to spike, upon them.

in the meantime the fighting had been fierce round santa maria. at first the garibaldians had been hard pressed, and the neapolitans had carried all before them, until they came under the fire of the batteries placed on the railway and in front of the gate facing capua. these were well served, and although the assailants several times advanced with both cavalry and infantry, they never succeeded in getting within a hundred yards of the guns. the left wing, however, swept round the town, and captured all the out-buildings, except a farmhouse, which was gallantly defended by a company of frenchmen.

on the right the neapolitans fared still more badly, for when their attack upon the battery failed, the garibaldian force at san tamaro, nearly three thousand five hundred strong, advanced and took them in flank, and drove them back with heavy loss. by eight o’clock the attack had ceased all along the line; but as the enemy, while falling back, preserved good order, no attempt was made to follow them.

the battle had lasted four hours, and the garibaldians were now strengthened by the arrival of a brigade with four guns from caserta, where the news had just arrived that bixio was confident of being able to hold his ground at madalone. two of the newly-arrived regiments were ordered to endeavour to reopen communications with sant’angelo, and fighting went on with the force still threatening santa maria; these, after suffering heavy loss, the garibaldians, at ten o’clock, drove some distance back, and captured three guns and many prisoners.

at eleven a fresh attack was made, count trani, one of the king’s brothers, having brought some fresh battalions from the town. this attack was also repulsed, the garibaldians maintaining their strong positions. but the neapolitan troops were still full of spirit, and at a quarter-past one made another determined effort: their field batteries advanced within three hundred yards of the town, and their cavalry charged almost up to the railway battery, but were received with so heavy an infantry fire by the troops protecting the guns, that they were forced to fall back. the infantry, however, pressed on, covered by a storm of fire from their field artillery, while the guns of capua aided them by firing shell into the town. the garibaldians serving the guns at the gate and at the railway suffered very heavily, but volunteers from the infantry regiments took their place, although at one time their fire was arrested by the explosion of a magazine which killed many of the men, and dismounted two or three of the guns.

all this time, fighting was going on fiercely round sant’angelo. the two regiments that had been sent out from santa maria to open communications with the village had been unable to effect their object, the enemy’s force being too strong for them to move far from the town. at eleven o’clock, the neapolitans being largely reinforced, made a fresh attack on the battery and barricades in front of sant’angelo, and an obstinate struggle took place here; but superior force triumphed, and the royal troops again captured the battery, killing or taking prisoners almost the whole of the force that defended it.

infantry and cavalry then advanced against the village; but the garibaldians, having their leader among them, fought with extraordinary bravery, and for three hours maintained themselves, as did those in the abbey, although the enemy brought up their cannon and rocket batteries to within a short distance of it. the walls of the abbey were, however, so massive that even the artillery failed to make much impression upon them. seeing that the assault upon santa maria had been repulsed, garibaldi sallied out with his entire force, retook the houses that had been captured by the enemy, drove them back to the battery, and at last captured this also. knowing that some of the reserve would soon be up, garibaldi at half-past two rode out from the rear of sant’angelo, and making a wide détour, entered santa maria, and at once ordered a general advance. ebor’s brigade sallied out by the capua gate, and advanced against the carthusian convent and cemetery on the capuan road, while a brigade moved out to endeavour once more to clear the way to sant’angelo.

the former attack was successful. a small squadron of hungarian hussars charged three squadrons of the enemy’s dragoons, defeated them, and captured the two guns that accompanied them. the infantry went on at a run, but it required an hour’s hard fighting to gain possession of the convent and cemetery. by this time five thousand men with thirteen guns had arrived from caserta, and the advance became general. medici issued out from sant’angelo, and the whole force from santa maria advanced, the neapolitans falling back from all points; and by five o’clock the whole had re-entered capua, abandoning all their positions outside it, and the garibaldian sentries were posted along the edge of a wood half a mile from the ramparts. until the arrival of the five thousand men of the reserve, the garibaldians had throughout the day, although but nine thousand five hundred strong, maintained themselves successfully against thirty thousand men supported by a powerful artillery.

at madalone bixio had routed seven thousand men who had advanced against his position, and had captured four guns. the only reverse sustained was at castel morone, which was garrisoned by only two hundred and twenty-seven men of one of garibaldi’s bersaglieri regiments. they held out for some hours against a neapolitan column three thousand strong, and then, having expended all their ammunition, were obliged to surrender. the battle of the volturno cost the garibaldians one thousand two hundred and eighty killed and wounded, and seven hundred taken prisoners, while the enemy lost about two thousand five hundred killed and wounded, five hundred prisoners, and nine guns. at two o’clock a detachment of sardinian artillery, which, with a regiment of bersaglieri, had been landed a few days before at garibaldi’s request, had arrived at santa maria, and did good service by taking the places of the gunners who had been almost annihilated by the enemy’s fire. the bersaglieri did not arrive at caserta till the battle was over. wearied by the day’s fight, the garibaldians, as soon as the long work of searching for and bringing in the wounded was over, lay down to sleep.

frank and the two other aides-de-camp of garibaldi were, however, aroused, within an hour of their lying down. the news had arrived that the neapolitan column, which had captured castel morone had suddenly appeared on the heights above caserta: their number was estimated at three thousand. orders were sent to bixio to occupy a strong position. columns were directed to start from sant’angelo and santa maria for caserta, while another brigade was to reinforce the garrison of santa lucia. at two in the morning garibaldi himself started for caserta, and moved out with two thousand five hundred calabrians and four companies of piedmontese bersaglieri. the latter soon found themselves obliged to take off their knapsacks, hats, and useless accoutrements, finding themselves, picked men as they were, unable to keep up with the garibaldians, clad only in shirt and trousers, and carrying nothing but ninety rounds of ammunition.

there was but little fighting. the garibaldians lost but seven or eight men, among whom were three piedmontese, who were the first men of the sardinian army to shed their blood for the emancipation of naples. by evening over two thousand five hundred prisoners were taken, and this number was doubled in the course of the next few days by the capture of a large portion of the force which, after being defeated by bixio in their attempt to seize madalone, had scattered over the country pillaging and burning. thus, including the fugitives who escaped, the neapolitan army was weakened by the loss of nearly ten thousand men. the explanation of the singular attack upon caserta, after the defeat of the neapolitan army, was that, after capturing castel morone, their commander had received a despatch stating that a complete defeat had been inflicted on garibaldi, and urging him to cut off the retreat of the fugitives by occupying caserta.

now that the work was over, and that there was nothing to be done until the royal army advanced from ancona, and, brushing aside all opposition, arrived to undertake the siege of capua, frank broke down. he had not fully recovered from the effects of the two long days spent in the pestilential atmosphere of the prisons; but had stuck to his work until the neapolitans surrendered; then he rode up to garibaldi, and said,—

“general, i must ask you to spare me from my duties, for i feel so strangely giddy that i can scarce keep my seat.”

“you look ill, lad. hand your horse over to one of the guides. i have sent for my carriage; it will be up in a few minutes. sit down in the shade of that tree. i will take you down to caserta with me, and one of bixio’s doctors shall see you at once.”

on arriving at caserta, the doctor at once pronounced that it was a case of malarial fever, the result of the miasma from the low ground, increased, no doubt, by over-fatigue. garibaldi immediately ordered another carriage to be brought round, instructed two of his men to take their places in it with frank, and despatched a telegram to professor forli at naples, telling him to have four men in readiness to carry him up to his room as soon as he reached the palace, and to have a doctor in waiting. frank was almost unconscious by the time he arrived at the city. everything was ready, and he was soon undressed and in bed, ice applied to his head, and a draught of medicine poured down his throat. in a week the fever left him, but he was so much weakened that it was another fortnight before he could move about again unassisted.

“you have lost nothing: things have been very quiet,” his grandfather said. “to-day the voting takes place. of course that is a mere farce, and the country will declare for victor emmanuel by a thousand votes to one. medici has been occupied in putting down an insurrection in the mountains, and cialdini has won two battles on his way west; and a large piedmontese force has landed here, and undertaken the work of the garrison.”

“how long will it be before cialdini arrives with his army before capua?”

“i should think that it would be another week.”

“i must be able to go forward again by that time,” frank said. “i must be at capua when it is taken.”

“i quite understand your feelings, and i am eager to be there myself; but we must have patience. the neapolitans have withdrawn their forces from cajazzo, and the country round, into the town. there are now some nine thousand men there, and if the commander is obstinate he ought to be able to defend the place for some months. still i grant that obstinacy has not been the strong point of the neapolitan generals hitherto; though it must be said that their troops fought gallantly the other day, coming back again and again to the attack. but the commander of the town, however brave he may be, must see that even if he can hold out for the next ten years he would not benefit francesco. the game is already hopelessly lost. the garibaldians, single-handed, have proved themselves capable of defeating the neapolitan troops; and with the army that cialdini has brought from ancona, and that which has marched down from the north, the cause is beyond hope. the army now in gaeta and the garrison of capua alone remain in arms; and i should say that, ere another fortnight has passed, francesco is likely to have left this country for ever.”

“quite so, grandfather,” frank replied; “that is what i have been thinking for the last week, and that is why i am so anxious to go forward again as soon as possible.”

“that you shall certainly do; at any rate you have a few more days to stay here, then we will get a carriage and go to santa lucia, lying high in the mountains. the change to the splendid air there will benefit you, while a stay at santa maria or caserta would at once throw you back.”