there was but little talking in the middle of the day, in the train, for the heat was excessive. all the men had taken off their coats, and sat in their shirt sleeves. but they were, nevertheless, bathed in perspiration.

late at night, the train arrived at allahabad. here there was a stop, till morning. the men alighted from the train; and lay down on their folded blankets, with their knapsacks for pillows, on the platform or in the waiting rooms. a plentiful supply of water had been prepared for their use, at the station; and outside were several water carriers; and many of the men stripped off their shirts, and had water poured over their heads and bodies. will gale was among these and, greatly refreshed, he enjoyed some fruit and cakes which he purchased from native vendors; and then, lying down on a bench in the station, was soon asleep.

four days' traveling brought them to the end of the railway. they were ferried across the attock, and then their real work began. although it was now late in september, the heat was still intense. tents were struck an hour before daybreak and, by eleven o'clock each day, the column was at its halting place. it was, however, hours before the tents and baggage arrived.

many of the draft cattle were very poor, forage was scarce, and the arrangements far from good. the consequence was that great numbers of the oxen broke down and died, and many of the troops were often obliged to sleep in the air, owing to the non-arrival of their tents. the defects of the transport were aggravated, as the time went on; and the norfolk rangers fared much better than some of the troops which followed them.

the regiment was destined to operate in the khuram valley, under the command of general roberts. the advanced column of this division consisted of the 7th company of bengal sappers, the 23rd bengal pioneers; a battery of horse artillery, one of royal artillery, and two mountain batteries; a squadron of the 10th hussars, and the 12th bengal cavalry. the first brigade of infantry comprised the 2nd battalion of the 8th foot, the 29th bengal native infantry, and the 5th punjaub infantry. the second brigade consisted of the 72nd highlanders, the 21st native infantry, the 2nd punjaub infantry, and the 5th ghoorkas. the place of assembly was kohat. the norfolk rangers were to act as a reserve.

it was on the 2nd of october that the rangers arrived at kohat, heartily glad that their march across the sandy plains of the punjaub was at an end. the other regiments comprising the force poured in rapidly and, on the 9th, the general arrived and assumed the command. the next day the punjaub regiments were sent forward to thull. it was not until the middle of november that the european regiments followed them; and the six weeks were, by the rangers, for the most part employed in drill for, after their voyage and journey up the country, their commanding officer considered it necessary to work them hard, to get them to the highest state of discipline.

william gale was worked exceptionally hard; as he had, in that short time, to learn the manual and platoon exercises, and to pick up enough of drill to enable him to take his place in the ranks. fortunately he carried himself well, and required far less drilling than the majority of the recruits. by the time that the regiment moved forward, he was able to take his place in his company; and had mastered all the movements which were likely to be necessary, in the campaign.

the road between kohat and thull runs in a valley between mountains, those on the right being inhabited by the waziries, a fierce and independent tribe. the regiment which had first marched had exercised every precaution against an attack. the convoys of stores and provisions sent forward had always been accompanied by strong escorts, and orders were issued that officers going forward on duty should not travel without protection. the waziries, however--contrary to expectation--remained quiet; probably waiting to see the turn which matters took for, had we suffered a repulse, they would assuredly have taken part, at once, against us; and would have aided in massacring fugitives, and robbing baggage wagons.

the march to thull occupied five days, which were very pleasant ones to william gale. his heavy work at drill was now over. he was no longer considered a recruit, but ranked as a soldier. the marches were not long and, for many hours in the afternoon, the high hills threw the valley in shade; and the soldiers, after pitching their tents, were able to stroll about, or to lie under the trees in which the valley abounded. the regiment reached thull on the 18th of november and, on the morning of the 21st, the column advanced.

the river, whose bed was 500 yards wide, was fortunately now low, being reduced to a stream of 40 yards wide by 3 deep. a trestle bridge had been thrown across it, for the use of the infantry. the river was distant a mile and a half from the town. no opposition was expected but, as a small afghan garrison was stationed in a fort at kapizang, a short distance beyond the river, an attempt was to be made to capture it.

the 29th punjaub infantry first crossed the river, at the bridge. the 10th hussars forded the river and extended, in skirmishing order, to cut off the retreat of the garrison. when they reached the fort, however--which was a square enclosure, with round towers at the corners--it was found that the garrison, who had doubtless received warning from spies in thull, had abandoned the place in the night.

the cavalry were now sent forward to reconnoiter, the infantry following; and the advanced force halted at ahmed-i-shama for the night. not a single habitation was passed, during the nine miles march. the road was generally a mere track, 6 feet wide; passing through tangled brakes of dwarf palms, intersected by stony gullies, except when it ran along the steep bank of the river.

the following day the rest of the first brigade marched up to ahmed-i-shama; while the advanced force, under colonel gordon, moved on to hazir-pir. the rangers were with the first brigade, but not with the advanced party. this was composed wholly of native troops, consisting of the pioneer regiments and the sappers and miners. these had hard work, for the road--which was fifteen miles in length--was scarcely passable for wheeled carriages, and the guns could not be taken along until the boulders and blocks of stone, which strewed the way, were removed or blasted into pieces.

on the 23rd the rangers, with the horse artillery battery and two native regiments, marched towards hazir-pir; but the difficulties of the road were so great that they had to camp, for the night, four miles short of that place. general roberts and the headquarters went forward the same day.

as the general passed along the road, the headmen of all the villages near came and paid their respects; and the villagers lined the roads as the troops passed, offering fowls, eggs, milk, and dried fruit for sale. as william gale had brought a supply of money with him, he was able to indulge in all those luxuries and, indeed, as the men had had few opportunities of spending money at thull, all were well supplied with cash.

the halt at hazir-pir was, then, a very pleasant one. supplies of grass, fuel, and provisions were brought in, in considerable quantities, there; but much difficulty arose in settling the terms of purchase, as coin was almost unknown in the valley and, therefore, there was no established price--one native being ready to sell, for a few coppers, articles for which another demanded as many pieces of silver. on the hills around a considerable number of sheep were seen grazing; but the natives did not care about selling these which, indeed, belonged for the most part, not to the turis--the tribe which inhabit the valley--but to nomad ghilzais who, like the swiss shepherds, move about with their charges among the mountains, wherever fodder is to be obtained.

khuram valley, itself, is bare and monotonous. with the exception of fruit trees planted round the villages, scarce a tree is to be found; but each village is marked by a huge chunar--or oriental plane--beneath which the villagers rest during the noonday heat.

but if the valley itself was bare and desolate, the scenery around was lovely. the great range of mountains known as the safaid-koh bound the valley on the east and north. this range averages 14,000 feet high, from which spurs run out at right angles, enclosing narrower valleys, with broiling torrents rushing through boulders. the slopes of these valleys are covered with luxuriant vegetation, till the limit of trees is reached at a height of about 11,000 feet; above which, in winter, the snow lies thick while, in summer, it furnishes the finest pasture to the ghilzai flocks and herds. the valley lands and the lower slopes of the hills are laid out in terraces, and irrigated rice fields extend near the rivers. valley and hill are alike covered with stones and boulders, afghanistan being probably the most stony country in the world.

on the 24th the headquarters, with the cavalry and two regiments, moved forward ten miles and encamped at the south end of the darwazi pass--the road leading to open, broad valleys, covered with dwarf palms, and wholly uncultivated. on the 25th the advanced force crossed the pass, which was a gentle slope and offered no great difficulty and, at night, encamped at the khuram fort, which had been evacuated by the enemy. the buildings--which would have been useful for the troops--had, however, been wrecked by the turis; who have a deadly hate for the afghans--their masters--and who were also animated in their work of destruction by a desire to obtain wood, which is exceedingly scarce there.

at khuram there are two forts, the one 120 yards and the other 100 yards square. inside these were quarters for the governor, and huts for the garrison and officers; and in the smaller forts were stables for the cavalry forces. this place was made the headquarters of the forces in the khuram valley.

the general now rode on, with two squadrons of the 12th bengal cavalry, to reconnoiter in the direction of the peiwar-khotal; towards which the enemy were supposed to be retreating, and where they were expected to make a stand. as they approached the village of peiwar, two villages were seen in flames; and news was brought in that three afghan regiments, with twelve guns, had lately passed through. the natives reported that they were encumbered by their guns, and that forced labor was procured for the purpose of removing them. later on, a rumor came that the twelve guns were stuck in the ravine at the foot of the khotal, or pass.

with but a small force of cavalry at his command, the general could do nothing; and so returned to khuram, and determined to hurry up the troops faster than he had intended, so as to capture the guns reported--as was afterwards proved, falsely--to have been left behind by the afghans. the sick and all superfluous baggage were left behind at khuram and, on the 28th, the troops moved at daybreak; the two brigades marching in parallel columns.

the cold was now severe at night, although it was hot in the daytime. it had been intended to halt at halid-kitta, four miles from the khotal; but the intelligence arriving--that the ameer's troops had abandoned their guns, and were in disorderly retreat--decided the general to push forward at once to the peiwar-khotal--seven miles further--instead of waiting, and giving the enemy time to strengthen their position. a mile from the foot of the actual ascent of the khotal lies the village of turrai, two miles and a half beyond peiwar. turrai is situated in a valley, the ground at whose entrance is very much broken up by the shoulders and spurs of the hill.

the left column--the 5th and 29th punjaub in advance, with the 2nd battalion of the 8th and the 23rd pioneers, the rangers, and two guns of the number 1 mountain battery in support--were sent to the left, with instructions to turn a ridge forming the south boundary of the valley, and to seize the village of turrai. they were also to follow up, closely, any body of retreating afghan troops that they might come across. the light brigade were to march up the regular road to the peiwar, thus supporting the attack of the left brigade.

the left brigade followed out its orders, except that the regiment in support did not go round the southern side of the spur, but kept to the north. no enemy was seen on the south side of the spur so, when a track leading across to turrai was reached, the troops moved down towards the village; the regiments in support advancing at the foot of the open, on the north side. the mountain path that the advanced troops were now filing down did not lead directly to the village, but fell into the valley ahead of it, at a point where it widens out into what was known as the "punch bowl valley," at the foot of the peiwar-khotal.

as soon as the head of the column reached this spot, they came in sight of the afghans; who showed themselves in great numbers on the crest of the mountain, far above their heads. as the troops had no orders to attack so formidable a position, they fell back towards turrai, which was about a quarter of a mile to the rear. at the sight of this movement, the afghans swarmed down a spur of the hill, and commenced an attack on the regiments that were moving towards the village. the 29th punjaubees climbed the hill and a sharp skirmish ensued, the two mounted guns coming into action.

while this was going on, the main body of the troops arrived at turrai. the advanced troops were recalled, and the 5th ghoorkas were advanced to cover the movement. as it was now seen that the story of the abandonment of the guns was false, orders were given to pile arms in the village, and to encamp there.

this step was an imprudent one, as the afghans speedily showed. while our men were sitting or lying upon the ground, waiting for the baggage to arrive, the afghans brought up a mountain gun from the main ridge--about three-quarters of a mile distant--to the point of the spur overlooking the village of turrai, and opened fire at 1700 yards range.

the astonishment of the troops, when the first shell fell among them, was great. every one jumped to his feet, and seized his rifle; and the guns of the royal horse artillery were brought at once into action. it was four o'clock in the afternoon when the afghans opened fire. had they waited for a few hours, brought up another gun or two, and made a night attack immediately after opening fire, it is morally certain that the imprudence of camping in such a position would have been punished by a disaster, which might have vied with that of isandula. huddled together in a small village surrounded by scrub; and impeded, as the troops would have been, by the baggage animals and native followers, rushing in terror in all directions, our men would have been taken at an immense disadvantage.

fortunate was it that the enemy opened fire before the darkness set in. the troops were at once ordered to fall back a mile and a half, and to pitch on fresh ground. there was much confusion in the retreat, as the road in the rear was crowded with the baggage animals. the spot chosen for the camp was a rough one; for the ground was covered with scrub, and a scattered growth of hill oak and thorny bushes, and was broken by the remains of some ancient terraces but, as the jungle and broken ground extended for three and a half miles, there was nothing for it but to take up the best position possible, under the circumstances. the troops bivouacked on the ridge of a ravine, with steep banks; which formed a line of defense in front of the camp, while the view in every other direction was obscured by trees.

the regiments passed a wretched night on the rough ground. most of them were unable to find their baggage, which was wandering in the scrub in the dark; and the greater part of the troops lay down on the bare ground, and went supperless to sleep, after their fatiguing march of twenty-one miles.

in the morning, both men and cattle were greatly exhausted by their long marches and almost sleepless nights; and general roberts determined to wait, for a day or two, to reconnoiter the formidable position of the enemy before undertaking its attack. the camp was shifted to a more secure site, the brushwood and trees were cleared away, the tents pitched, and the troops were again comfortable.

a reconnaissance was made by colonel perkins--commanding the royal engineers--with two companies of the pioneers. he ascertained that a deep ravine lay between the ridge on which they were encamped and the khotal itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack on that side.

major collett also, with two companies of the 23rd, proceeded to reconnoiter the route known as the spingawi--or cow--pass. this, instead of going straight up the hill in front, wound round its foot to the right of the valley. ascending the mountain at a point some three or four miles to the east of the peiwar-khotal, the reconnaissance reached the summit of a ridge about five miles distant from the camp, and overlooking the spingawi-khotal. it was ascertained that the road up the pass seemed easy and practicable, for all arms; that the top of the pass appeared to be on the same ridge as the peiwar-khotal; and that a force, working from it towards the peiwar, would pass over a series of dominating positions. it did not appear to major collett that the enemy held the peiwar-khotal in force; although there was a gun on a commanding knoll on the south, and there seemed to be one at the top of the pass. the road from the village of peiwar to the top of the spingawi pass seemed perfectly easy, for troops of all arms.

the next two days were spent in clearing the camp and, so far as possible, improving its military position; but it was still surrounded by thick oak jungle, which would have afforded cover for an enemy making a sudden attack.

a further reconnaissance was made of the spingawi pass and, as the examination confirmed major collett's report, it was determined to attack by it. orders were issued, on the 1st of december, for a march that night. the regiments which were to form the main attack, by the spingawi plateau route, were the 29th punjaub infantry and the 5th ghoorkas--commanded by colonel gordon--in advance; these were to be followed by the mountain battery, a wing of the 72nd highlanders, a company of the rangers, the 2nd punjaubees, and the 23rd pioneers, under brigadier general thelwall. four guns, on elephants, were to proceed with the column. the 5th punjaub infantry, the 8th regiment, two guns royal horse artillery, three guns royal artillery, and the 5th bengal cavalry--the whole under the command of brigadier general cobbe--were to make an attack on the peiwar-khotal direct.

the rest of the force was to remain to guard the camp and--in order to convince the enemy that a front attack upon the peiwar-khotal was intended--a party of pioneers, with an engineer officer and a covering party of the 8th regiment, were to construct a battery near the village of turrai. frequent reconnoitering parties had also been sent out in this direction and, so well was the secret of the general's intention to attack by the spingawi khotal kept, that everyone in camp who had not been let into the secret was confident that the peiwar-khotal would be stormed, on the morrow.

the enemy--although those in camp were ignorant of the fact--were reinforced, on the 1st, by four regiments of infantry, with a mountain battery and, on their side, were meditating an attack upon the british camp. the regiments which had freshly arrived were, however, fatigued by their long march; and the assault on our camp was postponed until the next day, and the chance of its coming off was, therefore, lost for ever.

to william gale's great satisfaction, a company of the rangers--that to which he had been posted--was the one selected by the colonel to accompany the column marching up the pass. he did not, indeed, know that this was the route by which they were to advance; but he was pleased at not being left behind, with the regiment, in charge of the camp.

"well, young 'un," a corporal said to him, that evening, "we are going to be under fire, at last; and a nice climb we shall have of it. it puts one out of breath, to look at that steep road running up the hill and, when it comes to fighting one's way up it, with cannon and afghans on the top, we shall find it hard work."

"i expect," william answered, "that we sha'n't go up it at any extraordinary pace. if we skirmish up--as i expect we shall--from rock to rock, we shall have plenty of time to get our wind, at each halt. we are not to take our knapsacks; so we shall fight light, and we have not much extra weight to carry. what with the heat, and what with the long marches, i should think i must have lost a stone in weight, since we landed in calcutta."

"i don't think you have lost weight at all," the corporal said; "it seems to me that you have grown and widened out, in the two months and, only yesterday, when i was sizing the company, i had to move you two men higher; for a young 'un, you stand the fatigues well."

"i am all right," will said, "except that i have got some frightful blisters on my feet. i was not going to say anything about it, because i should have been kept in hospital, and left behind at khuram; but i have hardly known how to march, the last few days. i don't think i could possibly have managed it, if i had not adopted the native dodge of wearing putties--which i have greased well on the inside, and wear instead of stockings."

putties, it may be said, are slips of woolen cloth, about two and a half yards long and three inches wide, with a tape sewn into one end. they are wound round and round the leg, from the ankle to below the knee, and secured by the end being tied with the tape. nearly every one, officers and men, wore them through the campaign. for a long march there could be no doubt that these bandages--wound round the foot instead of stockings--are very preferable, as they obviate the liability to foot sores. even with well-made boots all pedestrians may, at times, suffer from sore feet; but the liability is immensely increased when--as in the case of the british soldier--the boots are coarse, roughly sewn, and frequently ill fitted.