i

the first period of the spanish-american war in the west indies

ex-president roosevelt once said that the most striking thing about the war with spain was the preparedness of the navy and the unpreparedness of the army. for fifteen years the united states had been building up a navy, and for months preceding the war every effort was made, with the resources at the command of the navy department, to put it in a state of first-class efficiency. as early as january 11, 1898, instructions were sent to the commanders of the several squadrons to retain in the service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. as the cuban situation grew more threatening, the north atlantic squadron and a torpedo-boat flotilla were rapidly assembled in florida waters; and immediately after the destruction of the maine the ships on the european and south atlantic stations were ordered to key west....

both from a political and a military point of view the blockade of cuba was the first step for the american government to take, and the surest and quickest means of bringing things to an issue. cuba was the point in dispute between the united states and spain, and a blockade would result in one of two things—the surrender of the island or the despatch of a spanish naval force to its358 relief. the navy department had very little apprehension of an attack on our coast, as no squadron could hope to be in condition after crossing the atlantic for offensive operations without coaling, and the only places where spain could coal were in the west indies. the public, however, took a different view of the situation, and no little alarm was felt in the eastern cities. a few coast-defence guns of modern pattern would have relieved the department of the necessity of protecting the coast, and enabled it to concentrate the whole fighting force around cuba. to meet popular demands, however, a northern patrol squadron was organized april 20th, under command of commodore howell, to cover the new england coast; and a more formidable flying squadron, under commodore schley, was assembled at hampton roads, and kept there until the appearance of the spanish fleet in the west indies. the main squadron was stationed at key west under rear-admiral william t. sampson, who had just been promoted to that grade, and given command of the entire naval force in north atlantic waters. his appointment over the heads of schley and other officers of superior rank and longer service created a great deal of criticism, although he was everywhere conceded to be one of the most efficient and progressive officers of the new navy.274

one hundred and twenty-eight ships [steam merchantmen, revenue-cutters, light-house tenders, yachts, and ocean liners] were added to the navy, and the government yards were kept busy transforming them. to man these ships the number of enlisted men was raised from 12,500 to 24,123, and a number of new officers appointed.275 the heavy fighting force consisted of four first-class battle-ships, the indiana, iowa, massachusetts, and oregon; one second-class battle-ship, the texas; and two armored cruisers, the brooklyn and the new york. as against359 these seven armored ships spain had five armored cruisers of modern construction and of greater reputed speed than any of ours except the brooklyn and the new york, and one battle-ship of the indiana type. spain had further a type of vessel unknown to our navy and greatly feared by us—namely, torpedo-boat destroyers, such as the furor, pluton, and terror. it was popularly supposed that the spanish navy was somewhat superior to the american.

as soon as the spanish minister withdrew from washington, a despatch was sent to sampson at key west directing him to blockade the coast of cuba immediately from cardenas to bahia honda, and to blockade cienfuegos if it was considered advisable. on april 29th, admiral cervera’s division of the spanish fleet left the cape de verde islands for an unknown destination, and disappeared for two weeks from the knowledge of the american authorities. this fleet was composed of four armored cruisers, the infanta maria teresa, cristobal colon, oquendo, and vizcaya, and three torpedo-boat destroyers. its appearance in american waters was eagerly looked for, and interest in the war became intense....

[in the next two weeks sampson’s patrol of the windward islands and adjacent waters, and his visit to san juan, porto rico, produced no discoveries, and he started to return to the blockade of havana. at midnight, may 12th–13th, thirty-six hours after the event, the navy department learned that cervera had appeared off martinique. sampson, with his fleet, and schley, with the flying squadron, were ordered to key west, which they reached on may 18th.]

the department had heard that cervera had munitions of war essential to the defence of havana, and that his orders were to reach havana, cienfuegos, or a port connected with havana by rail. as cienfuegos seemed the only place he would be likely to choose, schley was ordered there with the brooklyn, massachusetts, and texas, may360 19th. he was joined later by the iowa, under captain evans, and by several cruisers. the spanish squadron slipped into santiago, unobserved by the cruisers on scouting duty, may 19th, two days before schley arrived at cienfuegos, so that had cervera known the conditions he could easily have made the latter port. on the same day the department received from spies in havana probable information, conveyed by the cable which had been allowed to remain in operation, that cervera had entered santiago. as we now know, he had entered early that morning. several auxiliary cruisers were immediately ordered to assemble before santiago in order to watch cervera and follow him in case he should leave.

at the same time the department “strongly advised” sampson to send schley to santiago at once with his whole command. sampson replied that he had decided to hold schley at cienfuegos until it was certain that the spanish fleet was in santiago. later he sent a despatch to schley, received may 23d, ordering him to proceed to santiago if satisfied that the enemy were not at cienfuegos.276 the next day277 schley started, encountering on the run much rain and rough weather, which seriously delayed the squadron. at 5.30 p.m., may 26th, he reached a point twenty-two miles south of santiago, where he was joined by several of the auxiliary cruisers on scouting duty. captain sigsbee, of the st. paul, informed him that the scouts knew nothing positively about the spanish fleet. the collier merrimac had been disabled, which increased the difficulty of coaling. at 7.45 p.m., a little over two hours after his arrival, schley without explanation signalled to the squadron: “destination, key west, via south side of cuba and yucatan channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots.”361 thus began the much-discussed retrograde movement which occupied two days. admiral schley states in his book that. sigsbee’s report and other evidence led him to conclude that the spanish squadron was not in santiago; hence the retrograde movement to protect the passage west of cuba.278 but he has never yet given any satisfactory explanation why he did not definitely ascertain the facts before turning back. fortunately the squadron did not proceed very far; the lines towing the collier parted and other delays occurred. the next morning schley received a despatch from the department stating that all the information at hand indicated that cervera was in santiago, but he continued on his westward course slowly and at times drifting while some of the ships coaled. the next day, may 28th, schley returned to santiago, arriving before that port about dusk, and established a blockade.279

admiral sampson arrived off santiago june 1st, and assumed direct command of the squadron. the blockade, which lasted for over a month, was eagerly watched by the whole american people. the most thrilling incident was the daring but unsuccessful attempt made by lieutenant richmond pearson hobson to sink the collier merrimac across the entrance to santiago harbor, undertaken by direction of admiral sampson. electric torpedoes were attached to the hull of the ship, sea-valves were cut, and anchor chains arranged on deck so that she could be brought to a sudden stop. early on the morning of june 3d, hobson, assisted by a crew of seven seamen, took the collier into the entrance of the harbor under heavy fire and sunk her. the unfortunate shooting away of her steering-gear and the failure of some of the torpedoes to explode kept the ship from sinking at the place selected, so that the plan miscarried. hobson362 and his men escaped death as by a miracle, but fell into the hands of the spaniards.280

ii

the land campaign

as soon as cervera was blockaded in santiago and the government was satisfied that all his ships were with him, it was decided to send an army to co-operate with the navy. hitherto the war had been a naval war exclusively, and the two hundred thousand volunteers who had responded to the calls of the president in may had been kept in camp in different parts of the country. most of the regular infantry and cavalry, together with several volunteer regiments, had been assembled at tampa and organized as the fifth army corps, in readiness to land in cuba as soon as the navy had cleared the way. conspicuous among these troops was the first volunteer cavalry, popularly known as roosevelt’s rough riders, a regiment which through the energetic efforts of dr. leonard wood, an army surgeon, who became its colonel, and theodore roosevelt, who resigned the position of assistant secretary of the navy to become its lieutenant-colonel, had been enlisted, officered, and equipped in fifty days. it was recruited largely from arizona, new mexico, and oklahoma, and had in its ranks cowboys, hunters, ranchmen, and more than one hundred and sixty full-blooded indians, together with a few graduates of harvard, yale, and other eastern colleges.

tampa was ill-suited for an instruction camp, and the preparations made by the department for the accommodation and provisioning of such large bodies of men were363 wholly inadequate. one of the main difficulties was the inability of the commissary and quartermaster departments, hampered by red tape, senseless regulations, and political appointees, to distribute the train-loads of supplies which blocked the tracks leading to tampa; so great was the congestion that the soldiers could not even get their mail. this condition continued for weeks. the great majority of the troops were finally sent to santiago to fight under a tropical sun in heavy woollen clothes; lighter clothing was not supplied to them until they were ready to return to montauk point, where they needed the woollen. the sanitation of the camp was poor and the water-supply bad; dysentery, malaria, and typhoid soon made their appearance. similar conditions prevailed at the other camps. the administrative inefficiency of the war department was everywhere revealed in striking contrast with the fine record of the navy department. secretary alger had been too much occupied with questions of patronage to look after the real needs of the service. although war had been regarded for months as inevitable, when it finally came the department was found to be utterly unprepared to equip troops for service in cuba. as the result of this neglect, for which it should be said congress was partly responsible, it was necessary to improvise an army—a rather serious undertaking!

it had been the original intention to land the fifth army corps at mariel, near havana, and begin operations against the capital city under the direct supervision of general miles; but the bottling-up of cervera at santiago caused a change of plan, and general miles, who still expected the heavy fighting to take place at havana, selected major-general william r. shafter for the movement against santiago. by june 1st the battle-ship indiana, under captain henry c. taylor, with a dozen smaller vessels, was ready to convoy the expedition. the army was very slow in embarking, and it364 was not until june 8th that the force was ready to depart. further delay was caused by the unfounded rumor that a spanish cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroyers had been sighted off the north coast of cuba.281 in order to ascertain whether all the spanish ships were at santiago, lieutenant victor blue, of the navy, landed, and by personal observation from the hills back of the city located cervera’s entire division in the harbor. on june 14th the transports, about thirty in number, sailed from tampa with their convoy. they were crowded and ill-provided with supplies, the whole movement showing lack of experience in handling large bodies of men. the expedition consisted of 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men, regulars except the seventy-first new york, second massachusetts, and the first volunteer cavalry.282

the expedition under shafter began disembarking at daiquiri on the morning of june 22d, and by night six thousand men had with great difficulty been put ashore. no lighters or launches had been provided, and the only wharf, a small wooden one, had been stripped of its flooring: the war department expected the navy to look after these matters. in addition, the troops had been crowded into the transports without any reference to order, officers separated from their commands, artillery-pieces on one transport, horses on another, harness on a third, and no means of finding out where any of them were. by the aid of a few launches borrowed from the battle-ships, the men were put ashore, or near enough to wade through the surf, but the animals had to be thrown into the sea, where many of them perished, some in their bewilderment swimming out to sea instead of to shore.

general lawton advanced and seized siboney next day, and kent’s division landed here, eight miles nearer santiago. general wheeler pushed on with part of365 young’s brigade, and on the morning of the 24th defeated the spanish force at las guasimas, with a loss of one officer and fifteen men killed, six officers and forty-six men wounded.283 during the next week the army, including garcia’s cuban command, was concentrated at sevilla. these were trying days. the troops suffered from the heavy rains, poor rations, and bad camp accommodations. no adequate provision had been made for landing supplies or for transporting them to the camps, so that with an abundance, such as they were, aboard the transports, the soldiers were in actual want.

on june 30th it was decided to advance. san juan hill, a strategic point on the direct road to santiago, could not be taken or held while the spaniards occupied el caney, on the right of the american advance. the country was a jungle, and the roads from the coast little more than bridle-paths. lawton moved out to a position south of el caney that afternoon, so as to begin the attack early next morning. wheeler’s division of dismounted cavalry and kent’s division of infantry advanced toward el poso, accompanied by grimes’ battery, which was to take position early in the morning and open the way for the advance toward san juan. the attack at this point was to be delayed until lawton’s infantry fire was heard at el caney. after forcing the enemy from this position, lawton was to move toward santiago and take position on wheeler’s right. little was known of the ground over which the troops were to move or the position and strength of the forces they were to meet, consequently they went into battle without knowing what they were about and fought without any generalship being displayed. general shafter was too ill to leave his headquarters in the rear.

at el caney, which was surrounded by trenches and block-houses, the spaniards developed unexpected366 strength, and held lawton in check until late in the afternoon, when he finally carried the position. in this fight about thirty-five hundred americans were engaged, and not more than six hundred or one thousand spaniards. the american loss was four officers and seventy-seven men killed, and twenty-five officers and three hundred and thirty-five men wounded. about one hundred and fifty spaniards were captured, and between three hundred and four hundred killed and wounded.284

the capture of the block-house at san juan

meanwhile there had been a desperate fight at san juan hill. as soon as lawton’s musket-fire was heard at el caney, grimes’ battery opened fire from el poso on the san juan block-house. this fire was immediately returned by the enemy’s artillery, who had the range, and a number of men were killed. the spaniards used smokeless powder, which made it difficult to locate them, while some of the americans had black powder, which quickly indicated their position. the road along which the troops had to advance was so narrow and rough that at times they had to proceed in column of twos. the progress made was very slow, and the long-range guns of the enemy killed numbers of men before they could get into position to return the fire. by the middle of the day the advance had crossed the river, the cavalry division under sumner deploying to the right in front of kettle hill, and kent’s division of infantry deploying to the left directly in front of san juan hill. during this movement the troops were exposed to a galling artillery and rifle fire and suffered greatly, especially the third brigade of kent’s division, which lost three commanders in fifteen minutes, general wikoff being killed and colonels worth and liscum disabled. the suffering of the wounded,367 many of whom lay in the brush for hours without succor, was the most terrible feature of the situation.

finally the long-expected order to advance was given. the first regular cavalry, the rough riders, and the negro troopers of the ninth and a part of the tenth advanced up kettle hill and drove the spaniards from the ranch-house, while the infantry division with the sixth and sixteenth regiments under hawkins in the lead charged up san juan hill in the face of a destructive fire and captured the block-house. then the cavalry under sumner and roosevelt advanced from kettle hill and occupied the trenches on san juan hill north of the block-house. the spaniards fled to their second line of trenches, six or eight hundred yards in the rear.

plan of military operations around santiago

after occupying san juan hill, the cavalry were still exposed to a constant fire, and many were discouraged and wanted to retire, but general wheeler, who, though ill, had come to the front early in the afternoon, put a stop to this and set the men to work fortifying themselves. the next day lawton came up and advanced to a strong position on wheeler’s right. the fighting was resumed on the two following days, but about noon, july 3d, the spaniards ceased firing. the losses in the three days’ fight were eighteen officers and one hundred and twenty-seven men killed, sixty-five officers and eight hundred and forty-nine men wounded, and seventy-two men missing.285 the condition of the troops after the battle was very bad; many of them were down with fever, and all were suffering from lack of suitable equipment and supplies. general shafter cabled to the secretary of war, july 3d, that it would be impossible to take santiago by storm with the forces he then had, and that he was “seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between369 the san juan river and siboney.”286 the destruction of cervera’s fleet the same day materially changed the situation.

iii

the destruction of cervera’s fleet

the advance made by the american troops around santiago on july 1st and 2d forced the spanish authorities to come to a decision in regard to cervera’s fleet. captain-general blanco insisted that the fleet should not be captured or destroyed without a fight. cervera refused to assume the responsibility of leaving the harbor, and when ordered to do so went out with consummate bravery, knowing that he was leading a forlorn-hope. sampson seems to have been under the impression all along that the spanish squadron would attempt to escape at night, but the american ships kept in so close to the shore, with dazzling search-lights directed against the entrance of the harbor, as to render it almost impossible to steer a ship out. on the morning of july 3d, at 8.55, sampson started east to meet general shafter in conference at siboney, signalling to the fleet as he left: “disregard movements commander-in-chief.” the massachusetts had also left her place in the blockade to go to guantanamo for coal. the remaining ships formed a semicircle around the entrance of the harbor, the brooklyn to the west, holding the left of the line, then the texas, next the iowa in the centre and at the south of the curve, then, as the line curved in to the coast on the right, the oregon and the indiana. the brooklyn and the indiana, holding the left and the right of the line, were about two miles and one and a half miles respectively from the shore, and near them, closer in, lay the converted gunboats vixen and gloucester.

370 at 9.35 a.m., while most of the men were at sunday inspection, the enemy’s ships were discovered slowly steaming down the narrow channel of the harbor. in the lead was the maria teresa, followed by the vizcaya, the colon, the oquendo, and the two torpedo-boat destroyers. the iowa was the first to signal that the enemy were escaping, though the fact was noted on several ships at almost the same moment, and no orders were necessary. the american ships at once closed in and directed their fire against the teresa. for a moment there was doubt as to whether the spanish ships would separate and try to scatter the fire of our fleet or whether they would stick together. this was quickly settled when cervera turned west, followed by the remainder of his command. at this point commodore schley’s flag-ship, the brooklyn, which was farthest west, turned to the eastward, away from the hostile fleet, making a loop, at the end of which she again steamed westward farther out to sea but still ahead of any of the american vessels. the sudden and unexpected turn of the brooklyn caused the texas, which was behind her, to reverse her engines in order to avoid a collision and to come to a standstill, thus losing position, the oregon and the iowa both passing her. the two destroyers, which came out last, were attacked by the indiana and the gloucester, the commander of the latter, wainwright, dashing toward them in utter disregard of the fragile character of his vessel. the furor was sunk and the pluton was run ashore. the teresa, struck by several shells which exploded and set her on fire, turned to the shore at 10.15 and was beached about six miles west of the morro. the oquendo was riddled by shell and likewise soon on fire. she was beached about half a mile west of the teresa at 10.20. the vizcaya and colon were now left to bear the fire of the pursuing american ships, which were practically uninjured. in this running fight the indiana dropped behind, owing to the defective condition of her machinery, but kept up her371 fire. at 11.05 the vizcaya turned to run ashore about fifteen miles west of the morro. the brooklyn and the oregon, followed at some distance by the texas, continued the chase of the colon. the indiana and the iowa, at the order of sampson, who had come up, went back to guard the transports. at 1.15 p.m. the colon turned to shore thirty miles west of the vizcaya and surrendered.287

the relative positions of the ships in the battle of july 3, 1898, off santiago

abbreviations:—n. y., new york; b., brooklyn; tx., texas; a., iowa; i., indiana; o., oregon; g., gloucester; vx., vixen; h., hist.; e., ericsson; t., teresa; v., vizcaya; c., colon; oq., oquendo; p., pluton; f., furor.

(full size)

the fight was over, one of the most remarkable naval battles on record. on the american side, though the ships were struck many times, only one man was killed and one wounded. these casualties both occurred on commodore schley’s flag-ship, the brooklyn. the spaniards lost about six hundred in killed and wounded. the american sailors took an active part in the rescue of the officers and crews of the burning spanish ships.

only one hundred and twenty-three out of about eight thousand american projectiles hit the spanish ships.

iv

the spanish surrender

on july 3d, general shafter demanded the surrender of the spanish forces in santiago. this being refused, he notified general toral that the bombardment of santiago would begin at noon of the 5th, thus giving two days for the women and children to leave the city. nearly twenty thousand people came out and filled the villages and roads around. they were in an utterly destitute condition, and had to be taken care of largely by the american army—a great drain on their supplies. on the 10th and 11th the city was bombarded by the squadron. at this point general miles arrived off santiago with additional troops intended for porto rico. he and shafter met general toral under a flag of truce and arranged terms for the surrender, which took place on the 17th. shafter’s373 command was by this time in a serious state of health and anxious to return home. malarial fevers had so weakened the men that an epidemic of yellow-fever, which had appeared sporadically throughout the command, was greatly feared. the situation was desperate, and the war department apparently deaf to all representations of the case. under these circumstances the division and brigade commanders and the surgeons met at general shafter’s headquarters early in august and signed a round-robin addressed to the secretary of war urging the immediate removal of the corps to the united states. this action was much criticised at the time, but it had the desired effect, and on august 4th orders were given to remove the command to montauk point, long island. the movement was begun at once and completed before the end of the month.

the last of cervera’s fleet

(the colon’s final effort)

the surrender of santiago left general miles free to carry out plans already matured for the invasion of porto rico. he left guantanamo, july 21st, with 3415 men, mostly volunteers, convoyed by a fleet under the command of captain higginson, and landed at guanica on the 25th. early next morning general garretson pushed forward with part of his brigade and drove the spanish forces from yauco, thus getting possession of the railroad to ponce. general miles was reinforced in a few days by the commands of generals wilson, brooke, and schwan, raising his entire force to 16,973 officers and men. in about two weeks they had gained control of all the southern and western portions of the island, but hostilities were suspended by the peace protocol before the conquest of porto rico was completed. the american losses in this campaign were three killed and forty wounded.288

the last engagement of the war was the assault on manila, which was captured august 13, 1898, by the forces under general merritt, assisted by admiral dewey’s374 squadron. this occurred the day after the signing of the peace protocol, the news of which did not reach the philippines until several days later.

v

controversies caused by the war

two controversies growing out of the war with spain assumed such importance that they cannot be passed by. the first related to the conduct of the war department, which was charged with inefficiency resulting from political appointments and corruption in the purchase of supplies. the most serious charge was that made by major-general miles, commanding the army, who declared that much of the refrigerated beef furnished the troops was “embalmed beef,” preserved with secret chemicals of an injurious character. in september, 1898, president mckinley appointed a commission to investigate these charges, and the hearings held were sensational in the extreme. commissary-general eagan read a statement before the commission which was so violent in its abuse of the commanding general that he was later court-martialled and sentenced to dismissal for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, though this sentence was commuted by the president to suspension from rank and duty, but without loss of pay. the report of the commission289 failed to substantiate general miles’ charges, but it was not satisfactory or convincing. in spite of its efforts to whitewash things, the commission had to report that the secretary of war had failed to “grasp the situation.” many leading newspapers demanded alger’s resignation, but president mckinley feared to discredit the administration by dismissing him.375 nevertheless, a coolness sprang up between them; and several months later, when alger became a candidate for the michigan senatorship, with the open support of elements distinctly hostile to the administration, the president asked for his resignation, which was tendered july 19, 1899.290

the other controversy, which waged in the papers for months, was as to whether sampson or schley was in command at the battle of santiago. as a reward for their work on that day, the president advanced sampson eight numbers, schley six, captain clark of the oregon six, and the other captains five. these promotions were all confirmed by the senate save those of sampson and schley, a number of senators holding that schley should have received at least equal recognition with sampson. the controversy was waged inside and outside of congress for three years. the officials of the navy department were for the most part stanch supporters of sampson, while a large part of the public, under the impression that the department was trying to discredit schley, eagerly championed his cause. finally, at the request of admiral schley, who was charged in certain publications with inefficiency and even cowardice, a court of inquiry was appointed july 26, 1901, with admiral dewey as president, for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of schley during the war with spain. the opinion of the court was that his service prior to june 1st was “characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.” admiral dewey differed from the opinions of his colleagues on certain points, and delivered a separate opinion, in the course of which he took up the question as to who was in command at santiago, a point which had not been considered by the court. his conclusion was that schley “was in absolute command and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for376 the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the spanish ships.” this made matters worse than ever. secretary long approved the findings of the majority of the court, and disapproved dewey’s separate opinion. schley appealed from the findings of the court to the president. february 18, 1902, president roosevelt’s memorandum, in which he reviewed the whole controversy, was made public. he declared that the court had done substantial justice to schley. as regards the question of command at santiago, he said that technically sampson commanded the fleet, and schley the western division, but that after the battle began not a ship took orders from either sampson or schley, except their own two vessels. “it was a captains’ fight.”291

the spanish war revealed many serious defects in the american military system, some of which have been remedied by the reorganization of the army and the creation of a general staff.292 it demonstrated the necessity of military evolutions on a large scale in time of peace, so as to give the general officers experience in handling and the quartermaster and commissary departments experience in equipping and supplying large bodies of troops; it showed the folly and danger of appointing men from civil life through political influence to positions of responsibility in any branch of the military or naval service; it showed the value of field-artillery, of smokeless powder, and of high-power rifles of the latest model; it also showed the necessity of having on hand a large supply of the best war material ready for use. while every american is proud of the magnificent record of the navy, it must not be imagined that the war with spain was a conclusive test of its invincibility, for, however377 formidable the spanish cruisers appeared at the time, later information revealed the fact that through the neglect of the spanish government they were very far from being in a state of first-class efficiency.