of all discourse, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end, either by attaining, or by giving over. and in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.

judgement, or sentence final; doubt

if the discourse be meerly mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. so that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans discourse, you leave him in a praesumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. all which is opinion. and that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion in the enquiry of the truth of past, and future. and as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will, so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the judgement, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourseth. and as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good or bad is called deliberation; so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false is called doubt.

no discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. for, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. and for the knowledge of consequence, which i have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditionall. no man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

science opinion conscience

and therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogismes, the end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called science. but if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joyned together into syllogismes, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. when two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. and because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very evill act, for any man to speak against his conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. and last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

beliefe faith

when a mans discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called beleefe, and faith: faith, in the man; beleefe, both of the man, and of the truth of what he sayes. so then in beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. to have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. but wee are to observe that this phrase, i beleeve in; as also the latine, credo in; and the greek, pisteno eis, are never used but in the writings of divines. in stead of them, in other writings are put, i beleeve him; i have faith in him; i rely on him: and in latin, credo illi; fido illi: and in greek, pisteno anto: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the christian faith.

but by beleeving in, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine. for not onely christians, but all manner of men do so believe in god, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.

from whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall reason, but from the authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him onely. and consequently, when wee believe that the scriptures are the word of god, having no immediate revelation from god himselfe, our beleefe, faith, and trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. and they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of god, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false prophet. and so it is also with all other history. for if i should not believe all that is written by historians, of the glorious acts of alexander, or caesar; i do not think the ghost of alexander, or caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the historian. if livy say the gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not god therein, but livy. so that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from god or not, is faith in men onely.