these singular instances of bygone experience of a religious student, of which few similar have ever been given, must be suggestive—perhaps instructive—to religious teachers in church and chapel, engaged in inculcating their views. how much happier had been my life had there then existed that tolerance of social effort, that regard of social needs, that consideration of individual aspiration, which happily now prevail. this chapter will conclude what herbert spencer would call the "natural history" of a mind, or, as lord westbury would say, "what i am pleased to call my mind."
one evening, at the mechanics' institution, birmingham, i was told that robert owen, who had unexpectedly arrived in town, was likely to speak in well lane, allison street, and was asked "would i go?" mistaking the name for robert hall, i said i would. of robert owen i had scarcely heard; of the rev. robert hall (who had denounced all deflectors from the baptist standard with brilliant bitterness) i had heard, admired (and do still), and much desired to see. great was my disappointment when i discovered the mistake. as mr. owen passed me on entering the room, i—a mere youth—looked at the aged philosopher (who had been working for human welfare long before i was born) with an impertinent pity. i felt also some real terror for his future, as i thought what a "wicked old man" he must be. i had been assured by robert hall that morality without faith was of no avail in the eye of god.
eventually it became known at the works where i was employed that i had been to hear robert owen, and remarks were made. in those days (1837-8) advocates of social reform were called "socialists." some of the remarks made against them were unjust some "socialists" were fellow-students at the mechanics' institution. these commentators made the usual mistake of concluding that the social thinkers in question must hold the opinions it was inferred that they held. at that time i did not understand this way of reasoning, though no doubt i used it myself, as those among whom i was reared knew no better. everybody was sure that an opponent must mean what you inferred he meant, and charged against him the inference as a fact—never thinking of inquiring whether it was so. if i was not misled by those confident arguments, it was because i knew that the persons accused were leal and kind in daily life. out of mere love of fairness i defended them to my working associates, as far as my knowledge went. being told that "i did not know what their principles were" caused me to read their pamphlets and to hear some lectures. for a year or more i used the knowledge thus gained against the uninformed impressions of their aspersers around me.
well do i remember that one day, as i passed two workmen in the mill-yard, one said to the other, "that is young holyoake the sceptic." they did not know that "sceptic" merely meant a doubter in search of evidence. they used the word in the brutal sense of one who disbelieved the truth, knowing it to be the truth. the term startled me, as i neither believed nor assumed to believe what i had reported as the opinions of my friends. for myself, i had no thought of holding their opinions. the heresy supposed to be included in them was, indeed, my aversion. then i made the resolution to examine their principles, with a view to show what arguments i could myself bring against them. great was my dismay when, after months of thought, i found that the questioned tenets seemed, on the whole, to be true. these tenets were that wise material circumstances were likely to have a better influence on men than bad ones; and that, men having general qualities which they have inherited, the treatment of the worst should be tempered by compassion for their ill-fortune. then it concerned me no more what any one said of me. it was as though i had passed into a new country, leaving behind me the barren land of supplication for a land of self-effort and improvement; and entered into the fruitful kingdom of material endeavour, where help and hope dwelt. heretofore doubt and perturbation as to whether i was of the "elect" had oft agitated me. now, i had no bonds in the death of my disproved opinions—no struggle, no misgivings. without wish or effort of mine, i was delivered by reason alone from the prison-house in which i had dwelt with its many terrors. not all at once did the terrors go. they long hovered about the mind like evil spirits tempting me to distrust the truth written in the book of nature, of which i believed god to be the author.
some time before this change in my opinion occurred i had taken in, out of my slender savings, the beautiful diamond edition of the rev. mr. stebbing's bible in parts. the type was very fine, the outline illustrations seemed to me very beautiful; they affect me with admiration still. it was the first book with marks of art about it that i had possessed. i had it bound in morocco, with silver clasps. it was quite a wonder in the workshop when i took it there. to possess many things i never cared, but if i had only one, and it had some beauty and finish in it, it was to me as though i had a light in my room at night, and the thought of it made me glad in the dark. a fellow-workman of sincere piety, whom i respected very much, coveted this bible, and induced me to sell it to him, which i did, as i had it in my mind to get another bound in a yet daintier way.
simple and natural as was this transaction, it was misconstrued. it was said i had "sold" my bible, as though it was my act instead of being the act of another. next it was reported that i had "burnt" it. thus i became a founder of myths without knowing it. nevertheless, it gave me pain—for nothing was more alien to my mind, my taste and reverence, than the act imputed to me. but what made a greater impression upon me, it being inconceivable, and unforeseen, was that he who induced me to part with my valued volume never came forward to say so. the inspiration of christianism i had taken to be personal truth which could be trusted. in the noblest minds it is so still. but for the first time i found a christian could be mean.
it was about this period that a poor woman i knew drew near to death from consumption. at times i visited and read the scriptures to her. one night i asked her if she would like some one to pray with her. as she wished it, i induced one with whom i had been a sunday school teacher to come with me one evening and pray by her side.
the consolation was very precious to her, and that is why i sought it for her. at no time did it seem to me that everybody should be of one opinion, since honesty of life consists in living and dying in that opinion of the truth of which you are convinced. this man whom i took with me was a workman, poor, mean, and utterly uninformed. in religious sympathy he inclined to the ranters, who are not at all melodious christians. yet heaven might respect his prayer as much as a bishop's, for he had given up his night, after a hard day's labour, to afford what humble consolation he could to this poor woman.
one sentiment that had always possessed me was a pleasure in vengeance. i had quite a distinct passion of hatred where i was wronged, and had no means of resistance or redress. a man in my father's employ did something very unfair to me when i was quite a youth, and during nine years that i worked by his side i did not forget it or forgive it. the lord's prayer taught me that i should "forgive those who trespassed against me," and at times i thought i had forgiven him, but i never had. christian as i was, the revengeful lines of byron long influenced me:—
"if we do but watch the hour,
there never yet was human power,
that could evade, if unforgiven,
the patient search and vigil long
of him who treasures up a wrong."
no sermon, no prayer, no belief, no divine command, rendered me neutral towards those i disliked. neither authority nor precept had force which gave no reason for amity. but when i came to understand coleridge's saying that "human affairs are a process," i could see that patience and wise adaptation of condition was the true method of improvement, since the tendency to nobleness or baseness was alike an inheritance nurtured by environment. if tempest of the human kind came, precaution and not anger—which means ignorance taken by surprise—was the remedy. pity takes the place of resentment. clearly, vengeance did but add to the misfortune of destiny.
i oft pondered hooker's saying, that "anger is the sinew of the soul, and he that lacketh it hath a maimed mind." nevertheless, i am content to be without that "sinew." anger is rather the epilepsy of the understanding than the dictate of reason. i had come to see that there are no bad weeds in nature—but much bad gardening. the reasons of amity had become clear to me, and that helvetius was right. we should "go on loving men, but not expecting too much from them." even hooker could not win me back to the profitless pursuits of anger and retaliation.
these bygone days left their instruction with me evermore. in them i learned consideration for others. whatever my convictions, i was always the same to my mother. the wish to change her views never entered my mind. she had chosen her own. i respected her choice, and she respected mine. in after years, when i visited birmingham, i would read the bible to her. she liked to hear my voice again as she had heard it in earlier days. when her eyes became dim by time i would send her large type editions of the new testament, and of religious works which dwelt upon the human tenderness of christ. the piety of parents should be sacred in the eyes of children. convictions are the food of the soul, which perisheth on any other diet than that which can be assimilated by the conscience.
one of the bygones which had popularity in my day was silence, where explicitness was needed. nothing is more grateful to the young understanding than clear, definite outlines. the spectator (july 23, 1891) said that "dean stanley could not at any time have exactly defined what his own theology really was." george dawson, who charmed so many audiences and was under no official restraint, never attempted it. emerson, who criticised everybody who had an opinion, never disclosed his. carlyle, who filled the air with adjurations to sincerity of conviction, carefully concealed his own. they who take credit for advising the public what to believe should avow their own belief. otway, crossing the street to dryden's house, wrote upon his door: "here lives dryden, a poet and a wit." seeing these words as he came out, dryden wrote under them: "written by otway opposite," which might mean: "this is but a partial and friendly estimate written by my neighbour who lives over the way, opposite to me"; or, it might mean that "it is written by otway—the very 'opposite' of 'a poet and a wit.'" janus sentences are the very grace of satire, because they offer a mitigating or a complimentary construction; but in questions of conscience, ethics, or politics, uncertainty is an evil—an evil worth remembering where it can be avoided.
"socialists" were liable to indictment who officiated in a place not licensed as a place of worship. such a license could be obtained on making a declaration on oath that their discourses were founded on belief in the cardinal tenets of the church. two social speakers were summoned to swear this. one was the father of the late robert buchanan. he and his colleague did so swear to avoid penalties, though they swore the contrary of the truth. i joined with other colleagues in protesting against this humiliation and ignominy. and in another way imprisonment came to all of us. silence or the oath was the alternative from which there was no escape. the question then arose, "was the existence of deity so certainly known to men that inability to affirm it justified exclusion from citizenship?" thus it was of the first moment to inquire whether it was so or not, and what was regarded as an atheistical investigation became a political necessity in self-defence. was there such conclusive knowledge of the unknowable as to warrant the law in making the possession of it a condition of justice and civil equality? thus the refutation of theism became a form of self-defence, and without foreseeing it, or intending it, or wishing it, i was, without any act of my own, engaged in it.
this narrative concerns those who deplore the rise and popularity of independent thinkers, alien to received doctrine. few persons are aware how or why agnostic advocacy was welcomed and extended. surely this is worth remembering. the tenet bore statute fruit, for the affirmation act came out of it.
it will be a satisfaction to students of spiritual progress to know that the extension and legalisation of the rights of conscience, brought no irreverence with it. the sense that the nature of deity was beyond the capacity of dogmatism to define, created a feeling of profound humility in the mind; the incapacity which disabled me from asserting the infinite premises of theism rendered denial an equal temerity. what tongue can speak, what eye can see, what imagination can conceive the marvels of the inscrutable? i think of deity as i think of time, which is with us daily. who can explain to us that mystery? time—noiseless, impalpable, yet absolute—marshals the everlasting procession of nature. it touches us in the present with the hand of eternity, and we know it only by finding that we were changed as it passed by us.