it was a saying of dryden that "anything, though ever so little, which a man speaks of himself, in my opinion, is still too much." this depends upon what a writer says. no man is required to give an opinion of himself. others will do that much better, if he will wait but if a man may not speak of himself at all—reports of adventure, of personal endeavour, or of service, will be largely impossible. to relate is not to praise. the two things are quite distinct. othello's imperishable narrative of his love of desdemona contained no eulogy of himself. a story of observation, of experience, or of effort, or estimate of men or of opinions, i may venture upon—is written for the reader alone. the writer will be an entirely negligible quantity.

lord rosebery, who can make proverbs as well as cite them, lately recalled one which has had great vogue in its day, namely, "let bygones be bygones." life would be impossible or very unpleasant if every one persisted in remembering what had better be forgotten. proverbs are like plants: they have a soil and climate under which alone they flourish. noble maxims have their limitations. few have universal applicability. if, for instance, the advice to "let bygones be bygones" be taken as universally true, strange questions arise. are mistakes never more to teach us what to avoid? are the errors of others no more to be a warning to us? is the book of experience to be closed? is no more history to be written? if so philosophy could no longer teach wisdom by examples, for there would no longer be any examples to go upon. if all the mistakes of mankind and all the miscalculations of circumstance be forgotten, the warnings of the sages will die with them.

he who has debts, or loans not repaid, or promises not kept, or contracts unfulfilled in his memory, had better keep them there until he has made what reparation he can. the bygone proverb does not apply to him. there are other derelictions of greater gravity than fall under the head of intellectual petty larceny, such as the conscious abandonment of principle, or desertion of a just cause, which had better be kept in mind for rectification.

if an admiral wrecked his ships, or a general lost his army, or a statesman ruined his country, by flagrant want of judgment—ever so conscientiously—it is well such things should be borne in mind by those who may renew, by fresh appointment, these opportunities of calamity. it would be to encourage incapacity were such bygones consigned to oblivion. it may be useless to dwell upon "spilt milk," but further employment of the spiller may not be prudent.

slaves of the saying, "let bygones perish," would construct mere political man-traps, which never act when depredators are about. in human affairs bygones have occurred worth remembering as guides for the future.

it is said that "greatness is thrust upon a man"—what is meant is a position of greatness. greatness lies in the quality of the individual, and cannot be "thrust" on any man. it is true that intrinsic greatness is often left unrecognised. it would be a crime against progress were these cases, when known, consigned to forgetfulness. noble thoughts as well as noble acts are worth bearing in mind, however long ago they may have occurred.

my friend joseph cowen, who from his youth had regarded me as a chartered disturber of the unreasoning torpidity of the public conscience, described me as an agitator. all the while i never was a pedlar of opinions. i never asked people to adopt mine, but to reason out their own. i merely explained the nature of what i took to be erroneous in theological and public affairs. neither did i find fault with prevailing ideas, save where i could, or thought i could, suggest other principles of action more conducive to the welfare of all who dwell in cottages or lodgings—for whom i mainly care. i was for equal opportunities for all men, guaranteed by law, and for equitable participation in profit among all who, by toil of hand or brain, contributed to the wealth of the state.

yet, though i never obtruded my convictions, neither did i conceal them. no public questioner ever went empty away,—if his inquiry was relevant and i had the knowledge he sought sometimes, as at cheltenham (in 1842), when an inquiry was malicious and the reply penal, the questioner got his answer. my maxim was that of professor blackie:—

"wear thy heart not on thy sleeve,

but on just occasion

let men know what you believe,

with breezy ventilation."

thus, without intending it, i came to be counted an "agitator."

as to the matter of the following pages, they relate, as all autobiographical reminiscences do, to events that are past. but whether they relate to acts, or events, or opinions, to tragedy or gaiety, they are all meant to fulfil one condition—that of having instruction or guidance of some kind in them—which bring them within the class of "bygones worth remembering."

one day as i was walking briskly along fleet street, a person in greater haste than myself running down johnson's court collided with me, and both of us fell to the ground. on rising, i said, "if you knocked me down, never mind; if i knocked you down, i beg your pardon." he did not reciprocate my forgiveness, thinking i had run against him intentionally. nevertheless, i say to any resenting reader who does me mischief, "never mind." if i have done him any harm it has been unwittingly, and i tender him real apologies.