60. first part: misery of man without god.

second part: happiness of man with god.

or, first part: that nature is corrupt. proved by nature itself.

second part: that there is a redeemer. proved by scripture.

61. order. — i might well have taken this discourse in an order like this: to show the vanity of all conditions of men, to show the vanity of ordinary lives, and then the vanity of philosophic lives, sceptics, stoics; but the order would not have been kept. i know a little what it is, and how few people understand it. no human science can keep it. saint thomas did not keep it. mathematics keep it, but they are useless on account of their depth.

62. preface to the first part. — to speak of those who have treated of the knowledge of self; of the divisions of charron, which sadden and weary us; of the confusion of montaigne; that he was quite aware of his want of method and shunned it by jumping from subject to subject; that he sought to be fashionable.

his foolish project of describing himself! and this not casually and against his maxims, since every one makes mistakes, but by his maxims themselves, and by first and chief design. for to say silly things by chance and weakness is a common misfortune, but to say them intentionally is intolerable, and to say such as that . . .

63. montaigne. — montaigne’s faults are great. lewd words; this is bad, notwithstanding mademoiselle de gournay. credulous; people without eyes. ignorant; squaring the circle, a greater world. his opinions on suicide, on death. he suggests an indifference about salvation, without fear and without repentance. as his book was not written with a religious purpose, he was not bound to mention religion; but it is always our duty not to turn men from it. one can excuse his rather free and licentious opinions on some relations of life; but one cannot excuse his thoroughly pagan views on death, for a man must renounce piety altogether, if he does not at least wish to die like a christian. now, through the whole of his book his only conception of death is a cowardly and effeminate one.

64. it is not in montaigne, but in myself, that i find all that i see in him.

65. what good there is in montaigne can only have been acquired with difficulty. the evil that is in him, i mean apart from his morality, could have been corrected in a moment, if he had been informed that he made too much of trifles and spoke too much of himself.

66. one must know oneself. if this does not serve to discover truth, it at least serves as a rule of life, and there is nothing better.

67. the vanity of the sciences. — physical science will not console me for the ignorance of morality in the time of affliction. but the science of ethics will always console me for the ignorance of the physical sciences.

68. men are never taught to be gentlemen and are taught everything else; and they never plume themselves so much on the rest of their knowledge as on knowing how to be gentlemen. they only plume themselves on knowing the one thing they do not know.

69. the infinites, the mean. — when we read too fast or too slowly, we understand nothing.

70. nature . . . — nature has set us so well in the centre, that if we change one side of the balance, we change the other also. this makes me believe that the springs in our brain are so adjusted that he who touches one touches also its contrary.

71. too much and too little wine. give him none, he cannot find truth; give him too much, the same.

72. man’s disproportion. — this is where our innate knowledge leads us. if it be not true, there is no truth in man; and if it be true, he finds therein great cause for humiliation, being compelled to abase himself in one way or another. and since he cannot exist without this knowledge, i wish that, before entering on deeper researches into nature, he would consider her both seriously and at leisure, that he would reflect upon himself also, and knowing what proportion there is . . . let man then contemplate the whole of nature in her full and grand majesty, and turn his vision from the low objects which surround him. let him gaze on that brilliant light, set like an eternal lamp to illumine the universe; let the earth appear to him a point in comparison with the vast circle described by the sun; and let him wonder at the fact that this vast circle is itself but a very fine point in comparison with that described by the stars in their revolution round the firmament. but if our view be arrested there, let our imagination pass beyond; it will sooner exhaust the power of conception than nature that of supplying material for conception. the whole visible world is only an imperceptible atom in the ample bosom of nature. no idea approaches it. we may enlarge our conceptions beyond an imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with the reality of things. it is an infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, the circumference nowhere. in short, it is the greatest sensible mark of the almighty power of god that imagination loses itself in that thought.

returning to himself, let man consider what he is in comparison with all existence; let him regard himself as lost in this remote corner of nature; and from the little cell in which he finds himself lodged, i mean the universe, let him estimate at their true value the earth, kingdoms, cities, and himself. what is a man in the infinite?

but to show him another prodigy equally astonishing, let him examine the most delicate things he knows. let a mite be given him, with its minute body and parts incomparably more minute, limbs with their joints, veins in the limbs, blood in the veins, humours in the blood, drops in the humours, vapours in the drops. dividing these last things again, let him exhaust his powers of conception, and let the last object at which he can arrive be now that of our discourse. perhaps he will think that here is the smallest point in nature. i will let him see therein a new abyss. i will paint for him not only the visible universe, but all that he can conceive of nature’s immensity in the womb of this abridged atom. let him see therein an infinity of universes, each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth, in the same proportion as in the visible world; in each earth animals, and in the last mites, in which he will find again all that the first had, finding still in these others the same thing without end and without cessation. let him lose himself in wonders as amazing in their littleness as the others in their vastness. for who will not be astounded at the fact that our body, which a little while ago was imperceptible in the universe, itself imperceptible in the bosom of the whole, is now a colossus, a world, or rather a whole, in respect of the nothingness which we cannot reach? he who regards himself in this light will be afraid of himself, and observing himself sustained in the body given him by nature between those two abysses of the infinite and nothing, will tremble at the sight of these marvels; and i think that, as his curiosity changes into admiration, he will be more disposed to contemplate them in silence than to examine them with presumption.

for, in fact, what is man in nature? a nothing in comparison with the infinite, an all in comparison with the nothing, a mean between nothing and everything. since he is infinitely removed from comprehending the extremes, the end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden from him in an impenetrable secret; he is equally incapable of seeing the nothing from which he was made, and the infinite in which he is swallowed up.

what will he do then, but perceive the appearance of the middle of things, in an eternal despair of knowing either their beginning or their end. all things proceed from the nothing, and are borne towards the infinite. who will follow these marvellous processes? the author of these wonders understands them. none other can do so.

through failure to contemplate these infinites, men have rashly rushed into the examination of nature, as though they bore some proportion to her. it is strange that they have wished to understand the beginnings of things, and thence to arrive at the knowledge of the whole, with a presumption as infinite as their object. for surely this design cannot be formed without presumption or without a capacity infinite like nature.

if we are well informed, we understand that, as nature has graven her image and that of her author on all things, they almost all partake of her double infinity. thus we see that all the sciences are infinite in the extent of their researches. for who doubts that geometry, for instance, has an infinite infinity of problems to solve? they are also infinite in the multitude and fineness of their premises; for it is clear that those which are put forward as ultimate are not self-supporting, but are based on others which, again having others for their support, do not permit of finality. but we represent some as ultimate for reason, in the same way as in regard to material objects we call that an indivisible point beyond which our senses can no longer perceive anything, although by its nature it is infinitely divisible.

of these two infinites of science, that of greatness is the most palpable, and hence a few persons have pretended to know all things. “i will speak of the whole,” said democritus.

but the infinitely little is the least obvious. philosophers have much oftener claimed to have reached it, and it is here they have all stumbled. this has given rise to such common titles as first principles, principles of philosophy, and the like, as ostentatious in fact, though not in appearance, as that one which blinds us, de omni scibili.1

we naturally believe ourselves far more capable of reaching the centre of things than of embracing their circumference. the visible extent of the world visibly exceeds us; but as we exceed little things, we think ourselves more capable of knowing them. and yet we need no less capacity for attaining the nothing than the all. infinite capacity is required for both, and it seems to me that whoever shall have understood the ultimate principles of being might also attain to the knowledge of the infinite. the one depends on the other, and one leads to the other. these extremes meet and reunite by force of distance and find each other in god, and in god alone.

let us, then, take our compass; we are something, and we are not everything. the nature of our existence hides from us the knowledge of first beginnings which are born of the nothing; and the littleness of our being conceals from us the sight of the infinite.

our intellect holds the same position in the world of thought as our body occupies in the expanse of nature.

limited as we are in every way, this state which holds the mean between two extremes is present in all our impotence. our senses perceive no extreme. too much sound deafens us; too much light dazzles us; too great distance or proximity hinders our view. too great length and too great brevity of discourse tend to obscurity; too much truth is paralysing (i know some who cannot understand that to take four from nothing leaves nothing). first principles are too self-evident for us; too much pleasure disagrees with us. too many concords are annoying in music; too many benefits irritate us; we wish to have the wherewithal to overpay our debts. beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur.2 we feel neither extreme heat nor extreme cold. excessive qualities are prejudicial to us and not perceptible by the senses; we do not feel but suffer them. extreme youth and extreme age hinder the mind, as also too much and too little education. in short, extremes are for us as though they were not, and we are not within their notice. they escape us, or we them.

this is our true state; this is what makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. we sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to end. when we think to attach ourselves to any point and to fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. nothing stays for us. this is our natural condition and yet most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the infinite. but our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses.

let us, therefore, not look for certainty and stability. our reason is always deceived by fickle shadows; nothing can fix the finite between the two infinites, which both enclose and fly from it.

if this be well understood, i think that we shall remain at rest, each in the state wherein nature has placed him. as this sphere which has fallen to us as our lot is always distant from either extreme, what matters it that man should have a little more knowledge of the universe? if he has it, he but gets a little higher. is he not always infinitely removed from the end, and is not the duration of our life equally removed from eternity, even if it lasts ten years longer?

in comparison with these infinites, all finites are equal, and i see no reason for fixing our imagination on one more than on another. the only comparison which we make of ourselves to the finite is painful to us.

if man made himself the first object of study, he would see how incapable he is of going further. how can a part know the whole? but he may perhaps aspire to know at least the parts to which he bears some proportion. but the parts of the world are all so related and linked to one another that i believe it impossible to know one without the other and without the whole.

man, for instance, is related to all he knows. he needs a place wherein to abide, time through which to live, motion in order to live, elements to compose him, warmth and food to nourish him, air to breathe. he sees light; he feels bodies; in short, he is in a dependent alliance with everything. to know man, then, it is necessary to know how it happens that he needs air to live, and, to know the air, we must know how it is thus related to the life of man, etc. flame cannot exist without air; therefore, to understand the one, we must understand the other.

since everything, then, is cause and effect, dependent and supporting, mediate and immediate, and all is held together by a natural though imperceptible chain which binds together things most distant and most different, i hold it equally impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole and to know the whole without knowing the parts in detail.

the eternity of things in itself or in god must also astonish our brief duration. the fixed and constant immobility of nature, in comparison with the continual change which goes on within us, must have the same effect.

and what completes our incapability of knowing things is the fact that they are simple and that we are composed of two opposite natures, different in kind, soul and body. for it is impossible that our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if any one maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. it is impossible to imagine how it should know itself.

so, if we are simply material, we can know nothing at all; and if we are composed of mind and matter, we cannot know perfectly things which are simple, whether spiritual or corporeal. hence it comes that almost all philosophers have confused ideas of things, and speak of material things in spiritual terms, and of spiritual things in material terms. for they say boldly that bodies have a tendency to fall, that they seek after their centre, that they fly from destruction, that they fear the void, that they have inclinations, sympathies, antipathies, all of which attributes pertain only to mind. and in speaking of minds, they consider them as in a place, and attribute to them movement from one place to another; and these are qualities which belong only to bodies.

instead of receiving the ideas of these things in their purity, we colour them with our own qualities, and stamp with our composite being all the simple things which we contemplate.

who would not think, seeing us compose all things of mind and body, but that this mixture would be quite intelligible to us? yet it is the very thing we least understand. man is to himself the most wonderful object in nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is, still less what the mind is, and least of all how a body should be united to a mind. this is the consummation of his difficulties, and yet it is his very being. modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus comprehendi ab hominibus non potest, et hoc tamen homo est.3 finally, to complete the proof of our weakness, i shall conclude with these two considerations . . .

73. but perhaps this subject goes beyond the capacity of reason. let us therefore examine her solutions to problems within her powers. if there be anything to which her own interest must have made her apply herself most seriously, it is the inquiry into her own sovereign good. let us see, then, wherein these strong and clear-sighted souls have placed it and whether they agree.

one says that the sovereign good consists in virtue, another in pleasure, another in the knowledge of nature, another in truth, felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,4 another in total ignorance, another in indolence, others in disregarding appearances, another in wondering at nothing, nihil admirari prope res una quae possit facere et servare beatum,5 and the true sceptics in their indifference, doubt, and perpetual suspense, and others, wiser, think to find a better definition. we are well satisfied.

we must see if this fine philosophy has gained nothing certain from so long and so intent study; perhaps at least the soul will know itself. let us hear the rulers of the world on this subject. what have they thought of her substance? 394. have they been more fortunate in locating her? 395. what have they found out about her origin, duration, and departure? harum sententiarum,6 399.7

is, then, the soul too noble a subject for their feeble lights? let us, then, abase her to matter and see if she knows whereof is made the very body which she animates and those others which she contemplates and moves at her will. what have those great dogmatists, who are ignorant of nothing, known of this matter? 393.

this would doubtless suffice, if reason were reasonable. she is reasonable enough to admit that she has been unable to find anything durable, but she does not yet despair of reaching it; she is as ardent as ever in this search, and is confident she has within her the necessary powers for this conquest. we must therefore conclude, and, after having examined her powers in their effects, observe them in themselves, and see if she has a nature and a grasp capable of laying hold of the truth.

74. a letter on the foolishness of human knowledge and philosophy.

this letter before diversion.

felix qui potuit . . . nihil admirari.

280 kinds of sovereign good in montaigne.

75. part i, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.8

probability. — it will not be difficult to put the case a stage lower, and make it appear ridiculous. to begin at the very beginning. what is more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have passions, fears, hatreds — that insensible bodies, lifeless and incapable of life, have passions which presuppose at least a sensitive soul to feel them, nay more, that the object of their dread is the void? what is there in the void that could make them afraid? nothing is more shallow and ridiculous. this is not all; it is said that they have in themselves a source of movement to shun the void. have they arms, legs, muscles, nerves?

76. to write against those who made too profound a study of science: descartes.

77. i cannot forgive descartes. in all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with god. but he had to make him give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of god.

78. descartes useless and uncertain.

79. descartes. — we must say summarily: “this is made by figure and motion,” for it is true. but to say what these are, and to compose the machine, is ridiculous. for it is useless, uncertain, and painful. and were it true, we do not think all philosophy is worth one hour of pain.

80. how comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool does? because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should feel pity and not anger.

epictetus asks still more strongly: “why are we not angry if we are told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are told that we reason badly, or choose wrongly”? the reason is that we are quite certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so sure that we make a true choice. so, having assurance only because we see with our whole sight, it puts us into suspense and surprise when another with his whole sight sees the opposite, and still more so when a thousand others deride our choice. for we must prefer our own lights to those of so many others, and that is bold and difficult. there is never this contradiction in the feelings towards a cripple.

81. it is natural for the mind to believe and for the will to love; so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false.

82. imagination. — it is that deceitful part in man, that mistress of error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always so; for she would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of falsehood. but being most generally false, she gives no sign of her nature, impressing the same character on the true and the false.

i do not speak of fools, i speak of the wisest men; and it is among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion. reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true value on things.

this arrogant power, the enemy of reason, who likes to rule and dominate it, has established in man a second nature to show how all-powerful she is. she makes men happy and sad, healthy and sick, rich and poor; she compels reason to believe, doubt, and deny; she blunts the senses, or quickens them; she has her fools and sages; and nothing vexes us more than to see that she fills her devotees with a satisfaction far more full and entire than does reason. those who have a lively imagination are a great deal more pleased with themselves than the wise can reasonably be. they look down upon men with haughtiness; they argue with boldness and confidence, others with fear and diffidence; and this gaiety of countenance often gives them the advantage in the opinion of the hearers, such favour have the imaginary wise in the eyes of judges of like nature. imagination cannot make fools wise; but she can make them happy, to the envy of reason which can only make its friends miserable; the one covers them with glory, the other with shame.

what but this faculty of imagination dispenses reputation, awards respect and veneration to persons, works, laws, and the great? how insufficient are all the riches of the earth without her consent!

would you not say that this magistrate, whose venerable age commands the respect of a whole people, is governed by pure and lofty reason, and that he judges causes according to their true nature without considering those mere trifles which only affect the imagination of the weak? see him go to sermon, full of devout zeal, strengthening his reason with the ardour of his love. he is ready to listen with exemplary respect. let the preacher appear, and let nature have given him a hoarse voice or a comical cast of countenance, or let his barber have given him a bad shave, or let by chance his dress be more dirtied than usual, then, however great the truths he announces, i wager our senator loses his gravity.

if the greatest philosopher in the world find himself upon a plank wider than actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his imagination will prevail, though his reason convince him of his safety. many cannot bear the thought without a cold sweat. i will not state all its effects.

every one knows that the sight of cats or rats, the crushing of a coal, etc., may unhinge the reason. the tone of voice affects the wisest, and changes the force of a discourse or a poem.

love or hate alters the aspect of justice. how much greater confidence has an advocate, retained with a large fee, in the justice of his cause! how much better does his bold manner make his case appear to the judges, deceived as they are by appearances! how ludicrous is reason, blown with a breath in every direction!

i should have to enumerate almost every action of men who scarce waver save under her assaults. for reason has been obliged to yield, and the wisest reason takes as her own principles those which the imagination of man has everywhere rashly introduced. he who would follow reason only would be deemed foolish by the generality of men. we must judge by the opinion of the majority of mankind. because it has pleased them, we must work all day for pleasures seen to be imaginary; and, after sleep has refreshed our tired reason, we must forthwith start up and rush after phantoms, and suffer the impressions of this mistress of the world. this is one of the sources of error, but it is not the only one.

our magistrates have known well this mystery. their red robes, the ermine in which they wrap themselves like furry cats, the courts in which they administer justice, the fleurs-de-lis, and all such august apparel were necessary; if the physicians had not their cassocks and their mules, if the doctors had not their square caps and their robes four times too wide, they would never have duped the world, which cannot resist so original an appearance. if magistrates had true justice, and if physicians had the true art of healing, they would have no occasion for square caps; the majesty of these sciences would of itself be venerable enough. but having only imaginary knowledge, they must employ those silly tools that strike the imagination with which they have to deal; and thereby, in fact, they inspire respect. soldiers alone are not disguised in this manner, because indeed their part is the most essential; they establish themselves by force, the others by show.

therefore our kings seek out no disguises. they do not mask themselves in extraordinary costumes to appear such; but they are accompanied by guards and halberdiers. those armed and red-faced puppets who have hands and power for them alone, those trumpets and drums which go before them, and those legions round about them, make the stoutest tremble. they have not dress only, they have might. a very refined reason is required to regard as an ordinary man the grand turk, in his superb seraglio, surrounded by forty thousand janissaries.

we cannot even see an advocate in his robe and with his cap on his head, without a favourable opinion of his ability. the imagination disposes of everything; it makes beauty, justice, and happiness, which is everything in the world. i should much like to see an italian work, of which i only know the title, which alone is worth many books, della opinione regina del mondo. i approve of the book without knowing it, save the evil in it, if any. these are pretty much the effects of that deceptive faculty, which seems to have been expressly given us to lead us into necessary error. we have, however, many other sources of error.

not only are old impressions capable of misleading us; the charms of novelty have the same power. hence arise all the disputes of men, who taunt each other either with following the false impressions of childhood or with running rashly after the new. who keeps the due mean? let him appear and prove it. there is no principle, however natural to us from infancy, which may not be made to pass for a false impression either of education or of sense.

“because,” say some, “you have believed from childhood that a box was empty when you saw nothing in it, you have believed in the possibility of a vacuum. this is an illusion of your senses, strengthened by custom, which science must correct.” “because,” say others, “you have been taught at school that there is no vacuum, you have perverted your common sense which clearly comprehended it, and you must correct this by returning to your first state.” which has deceived you, your senses or your education?

we have another source of error in diseases. they spoil the judgement and the senses; and if the more serious produce a sensible change, i do not doubt that slighter ills produce a proportionate impression.

our own interest is again a marvellous instrument for nicely putting out our eyes. the justest man in the world is not allowed to be judge in his own cause; i know some who, in order not to fall into this self-love, have been perfectly unjust out of opposition. the sure way of losing a just cause has been to get it recommended to these men by their near relatives.

justice and truth are two such subtle points that our tools are too blunt to touch them accurately. if they reach the point, they either crush it, or lean all round, more on the false than on the true.

man is so happily formed that he has no . . . good of the true, and several excellent of the false. let us now see how much . . . but the most powerful cause of error is the war existing between the senses and reason.

83. we must thus begin the chapter on the deceptive powers. man is only a subject full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without grace. nothing shows him the truth. everything deceives him. these two sources of truth, reason and the senses, besides being both wanting in sincerity, deceive each other in turn. the senses mislead the reason with false appearances, and receive from reason in their turn the same trickery which they apply to her; reason has her revenge. the passions of the soul trouble the senses, and make false impressions upon them. they rival each other in falsehood and deception.

but besides those errors which arise accidentally and through lack of intelligence, with these heterogeneous faculties . . .

84. the imagination enlarges little objects so as to fill our souls with a fantastic estimate; and, with rash insolence, it belittles the great to its own measure, as when talking of god.

85. things which have most hold on us, as the concealment of our few possessions, are often a mere nothing. it is a nothing which our imagination magnifies into a mountain. another turn of the imagination would make us discover this without difficulty.

86. my fancy makes me hate a croaker, and one who pants when eating. fancy has great weight. shall we profit by it? shall we yield to this weight because it is natural? no, but by resisting it . . .

87. nae iste magno conatu magnas nugas dixerit.9

583.10 quasi quidquam infelicius sit homini cui sua figmenta dominantur.11

88. children who are frightened at the face they have blackened are but children. but how shall one who is so weak in his childhood become really strong when he grows older? we only change our fancies. all that is made perfect by progress perishes also by progress. all that has been weak can never become absolutely strong. we say in vain, “he has grown, he has changed”; he is also the same.

89. custom is our nature. he who is accustomed to the faith believes in it, can no longer fear hell, and believes in nothing else. he who is accustomed to believe that the king is terrible . . . etc. who doubts, then, that our soul, being accustomed to see number, space, motion, believes that and nothing else?

90. quod crebro videt non miratur, etiamsi cur fiat nescit; quod ante non viderit, id si evenerit, ostentum esse censet.12

91. spongia solis. — when we see the same effect always recur, we infer a natural necessity in it, as that there will be a tomorrow, etc. but nature often deceives us, and does not subject herself to her own rules.

92. what are our natural principles but principles of custom? in children they are those which they have received from the habits of their fathers, as hunting in animals. a different custom will cause different natural principles. this is seen in experience; and if there are some natural principles ineradicable by custom, there are also some customs opposed to nature, ineradicable by nature or by a second custom. this depends on disposition.

93. parents fear lest the natural love of their children may fade away. what kind of nature is that which is subject to decay? custom is a second nature which destroys the former. but what is nature? for is custom not natural? i am much afraid that nature is itself only a first custom, as custom is a second nature.

94. the nature of man is wholly natural, omne animal.13

there is nothing he may not make natural; there is nothing natural he may not lose.

95. memory, joy, are intuitions; and even mathematical propositions become intuitions, for education produces natural intuitions, and natural intuitions are erased by education.

96. when we are accustomed to use bad reasons for proving natural effects, we are not willing to receive good reasons when they are discovered. an example may be given from the circulation of the blood as a reason why the vein swells below the ligature.

97. the most important affair in life is the choice of a calling; chance decides it. custom makes men masons, soldiers, slaters. “he is a good slater,” says one, and, speaking of soldiers, remarks, “they are perfect fools.” but others affirm, “there is nothing great but war; the rest of men are good for nothing.” we choose our callings according as we hear this or that praised or despised in our childhood, for we naturally love truth and hate folly. these words move us; the only error is in their application. so great is the force of custom that, out of those whom nature has only made men, are created all conditions of men. for some districts are full of masons, others of soldiers, etc. certainly nature is not so uniform. it is custom then which does this, for it constrains nature. but sometimes nature gains the ascendancy and preserves man’s instinct, in spite of all custom, good or bad.

98. bias leading to error. — it is a deplorable thing to see all men deliberating on means alone, and not on the end. each thinks how he will acquit himself in his condition; but as for the choice of condition, or of country, chance gives them to us.

it is a pitiable thing to see so many turks, heretics, and infidels follow the way of their fathers for the sole reason that each has been imbued with the prejudice that it is the best. and that fixes for each man his condition of locksmith, soldier, etc.

hence savages care nothing for providence.

99. there is an universal and essential difference between the actions of the will and all other actions.

the will is one of the chief factors in belief, not that it creates belief, but because things are true or false according to the aspect in which we look at them. the will, which prefers one aspect to another, turns away the mind from considering the qualities of all that it does not like to see; and thus the mind, moving in accord with the will, stops to consider the aspect which it likes and so judges by what it sees.

100. self-love. the nature of self-love and of this human ego is to love self only and consider self only. but what will man do? he cannot prevent this object that he loves from being full of faults and wants. he wants to be great, and he sees himself small. he wants to be happy, and he sees himself miserable. he wants to be perfect, and he sees himself full of imperfections. he wants to be the object of love and esteem among men, and he sees that his faults merit only their hatred and contempt. this embarrassment in which he finds himself produces in him the most unrighteous and criminal passion that can be imagined; for he conceives a mortal enmity against that truth which reproves him and which convinces him of his faults. he would annihilate it, but, unable to destroy it in its essence, he destroys it as far as possible in his own knowledge and in that of others; that is to say, he devotes all his attention to hiding his faults both from others and from himself, and he cannot endure either that others should point them out to him, or that they should see them.

truly it is an evil to be full of faults; but it is a still greater evil to be full of them and to be unwilling to recognise them, since that is to add the further fault of a voluntary illusion. we do not like others to deceive us; we do not think it fair that they should be held in higher esteem by us than they deserve; it is not, then, fair that we should deceive them and should wish them to esteem us more highly than we deserve.

thus, when they discover only the imperfections and vices which we really have, it is plain they do us no wrong, since it is not they who cause them; they rather do us good, since they help us to free ourselves from an evil, namely, the ignorance of these imperfections. we ought not to be angry at their knowing our faults and despising us; it is but right that they should know us for what we are and should despise us, if we are contemptible.

such are the feelings that would arise in a heart full of equity and justice. what must we say then of our own heart, when we see it in a wholly different disposition? for is it not true that we hate truth and those who tell it us, and that we like them to be deceived in our favour, and prefer to be esteemed by them as being other than what we are in fact? one proof of this makes me shudder. the catholic religion does not bind us to confess our sins indiscriminately to everybody; it allows them to remain hidden from all other men save one, to whom she bids us reveal the innermost recesses of our heart and show ourselves as we are. there is only this one man in the world whom she orders us to undeceive, and she binds him to an inviolable secrecy, which makes this knowledge to him as if it were not. can we imagine anything more charitable and pleasant? and yet the corruption of man is such that he finds even this law harsh; and it is one of the main reasons which has caused a great part of europe to rebel against the church.

how unjust and unreasonable is the heart of man, which feels it disagreeable to be obliged to do in regard to one man what in some measure it were right to do to all men! for is it right that we should deceive men?

there are different degrees in this aversion to truth; but all may perhaps be said to have it in some degree, because it is inseparable from self-love. it is this false delicacy which makes those who are under the necessity of reproving others choose so many windings and middle courses to avoid offence. they must lessen our faults, appear to excuse them, intersperse praises and evidence of love and esteem. despite all this, the medicine does not cease to be bitter to self-love. it takes as little as it can, always with disgust, and often with a secret spite against those who administer it.

hence it happens that, if any have some interest in being loved by us, they are averse to render us a service which they know to be disagreeable. they treat us as we wish to be treated. we hate the truth, and they hide it from us. we desire flattery, and they flatter us. we like to be deceived, and they deceive us.

so each degree of good fortune which raises us in the world removes us farther from truth, because we are most afraid of wounding those whose affection is most useful and whose dislike is most dangerous. a prince may be the byword of all europe, and he alone will know nothing of it. i am not astonished. to tell the truth is useful to those to whom it is spoken, but disadvantageous to those who tell it, because it makes them disliked. now those who live with princes love their own interests more than that of the prince whom they serve; and so they take care not to confer on him a benefit so as to injure themselves.

this evil is no doubt greater and more common among the higher classes; but the lower are not exempt from it, since there is always some advantage in making men love us. human life is thus only a perpetual illusion; men deceive and flatter each other. no one speaks of us in our presence as he does of us in our absence. human society is founded on mutual deceit; few friendships would endure if each knew what his friend said of him in his absence, although he then spoke in sincerity and without passion.

man is, then, only disguise, falsehood, and hypocrisy, both in himself and in regard to others. he does not wish any one to tell him the truth; he avoids telling it to others, and all these dispositions, so removed from justice and reason, have a natural root in his heart.

101. i set it down as a fact that if all men knew what each said of the other, there would not be four friends in the world. this is apparent from the quarrels which arise from the indiscreet tales told from time to time. i say, further, all men would be . . .

102. some vices only lay hold of us by means of others, and these, like branches, fall on removal of the trunk.

103. the example of alexander’s chastity has not made so many continent as that of his drunkenness has made intemperate. it is not shameful not to be as virtuous as he, and it seems excusable to be no more vicious. we do not believe ourselves to be exactly sharing in the vices of the vulgar when we see that we are sharing in those of great men; and yet we do not observe that in these matters they are ordinary men. we hold on to them by the same end by which they hold on to the rabble; for, however exalted they are, they are still united at some point to the lowest of men. they are not suspended in the air, quite removed from our society. no, no; if they are greater than we, it is because their heads are higher; but their feet are as low as ours. they are all on the same level, and rest on the same earth; and by that extremity they are as low as we are, as the meanest folk, as infants, and as the beasts.

104. when our passion leads us to do something, we forget our duty; for example, we like a book and read it, when we ought to be doing something else. now, to remind ourselves of our duty, we must set ourselves a task we dislike; we then plead that we have something else to do and by this means remember our duty.

105. how difficult it is to submit anything to the judgement of another, without prejudicing his judgement by the manner in which we submit it! if we say, “i think it beautiful,” “i think it obscure,” or the like, we either entice the imagination into that view, or irritate it to the contrary. it is better to say nothing; and then the other judges according to what really is, that is to say, according as it then is and according as the other circumstances, not of our making, have placed it. but we at least shall have added nothing, unless it be that silence also produces an effect, according to the turn and the interpretation which the other will be disposed to give it, or as he will guess it from gestures or countenance, or from the tone of the voice, if he is a physiognomist. so difficult is it not to upset a judgement from its natural place, or, rather, so rarely is it firm and stable!

106. by knowing each man’s ruling passion, we are sure of pleasing him; and yet each has his fancies, opposed to his true good, in the very idea which he has of the good. it is a singularly puzzling fact.

107. lustravit lampade terras.14 — the weather and my mood have little connection. i have my foggy and my fine days within me; my prosperity or misfortune has little to do with the matter. i sometimes struggle against luck, the glory of mastering it makes me master it gaily; whereas i am sometimes surfeited in the midst of good fortune.

108. although people may have no interest in what they are saying, we must not absolutely conclude from this that they are not lying; for there are some people who lie for the mere sake of lying.

109. when we are well we wonder what we would do if we were ill, but when we are ill we take medicine cheerfully; the illness persuades us to do so. we have no longer the passions and desires for amusements and promenades which health gave to us, but which are incompatible with the necessities of illness. nature gives us, then, passions and desires suitable to our present state. we are only troubled by the fears which we, and not nature, give ourselves, for they add to the state in which we are the passions of the state in which we are not.

as nature makes us always unhappy in every state, our desires picture to us a happy state; because they add to the state in which we are the pleasures of the state in which we are not. and if we attained to these pleasures, we should not be happy after all; because we should have other desires natural to this new state.

we must particularise this general proposition. . . .

110. the consciousness of the falsity of present pleasures, and the ignorance of the vanity of absent pleasures, cause inconstancy.

111. inconstancy. — we think we are playing on ordinary organs when playing upon man. men are organs, it is true, but, odd, changeable, variable with pipes not arranged in proper order. those who only know how to play on ordinary organs will not produce barmonies on these. we must know where are.

112. inconstancy. — things have different qualities, and the soul different inclinations; for nothing is simple which is presented to the soul, and the soul never presents itself simply to any object. hence it comes that we weep and laugh at the same thing.

113. inconstancy and oddity. — to live only by work, and to rule over the most powerful state in the world, are very opposite things. they are united in the person of the great sultan of the turks.

114. variety is as abundant as all tones of the voice, all ways of walking, coughing, blowing the nose, sneezing. we distinguish vines by their fruit, and call them the condrien, the desargues, and such and such a stock. is this all? has a vine ever produced two bunches exactly the same, and has a bunch two grapes alike, etc.?

i can never judge of the same thing exactly in the same way. i cannot judge of my work, while doing it. i must do as the artists, stand at a distance, but not too far. how far, then? guess.

115. variety. — theology is a science, but at the same time how many sciences? a man is a whole; but if we dissect him, will he be the head, the heart, the stomach, the veins, each vein, each portion of a vein, the blood, each humour in the blood?

a town, a country-place, is from afar a town and a country-place. but, as we draw near, there are houses, trees, tiles, leaves, grass, ants, limbs of ants, in infinity. all this is contained under the name of country-place.

116. thoughts. — all is one, all is different. how many natures exist in man? how many vocations? and by what chance does each man ordinarily choose what he has heard praised? a well-turned heel.

117. the heel of a slipper. —“ah! how well this is turned! here is a clever workman! how brave is this soldier!” this is the source of our inclinations and of the choice of conditions. “how much this man drinks! how little that one”! this makes people sober or drunk, soldiers, cowards, etc.

118. chief talent, that which rules the rest.

119. nature imitates herself a seed grown in good ground brings forth fruit. a principle instilled into a good mind brings forth fruit. numbers imitate space, which is of a different nature.

all is made and led by the same master, root, branches, and fruits; principles and consequences.

120. nature diversifies and imitates; art imitates and diversifies.

121. nature always begins the same things again, the years, the days, the hours; in like manner spaces and numbers follow each other from beginning to end. thus is made a kind of infinity and eternity. not that anything in all this is infinite and eternal, but these finite realities are infinitely multiplied. thus it seems to me to be only the number which multiplies them that is infinite.

122. time heals griefs and quarrels, for we change and are no longer the same persons. neither the offender nor the offended are any more themselves. it is like a nation which we have provoked, but meet again after two generations. they are still frenchmen, but not the same.

123. he no longer loves the person whom he loved ten years ago. i quite believe it. she is no longer the same, nor is he. he was young, and she also; she is quite different. he would perhaps love her yet, if she were what she was then.

124. we view things not only from different sides, but with different eyes; we have no wish to find them alike.

125. contraries. — man is naturally credulous and incredulous, timid and rash.

126. description of man: dependency, desire of independence, need.

127. condition of man: inconstancy, weariness, unrest.

128. the weariness which is felt by us in leaving pursuits to which we are attached. a man dwells at home with pleasure; but if he sees a woman who charms him, or if he enjoys himself in play for five or six days, he is miserable if he returns to his former way of living. nothing is more common than that.

129. our nature consists in motion; complete rest is death.

130. restlessness. — if a soldier, or labourer, complain of the hardship of his lot, set him to do nothing.

131. weariness. — nothing is so insufferable to man as to be completely at rest, without passions, without business, without diversion, without study. he then feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. there will immediately arise from the depth of his heart weariness, gloom, sadness, fretfulness, vexation, despair.

132. methinks caesar was too old to set about amusing himself with conquering the world. such sport was good for augustus or alexander. they were still young men and thus difficult to restrain. but caesar should have been more mature.

133. two faces which resemble each other make us laugh, when together, by their resemblance, though neither of them by itself makes us laugh.

134. how useless is painting, which attracts admiration by the resemblance of things, the originals of which we do not admire!

135. the struggle alone pleases us, not the victory. we love to see animals fighting, not the victor infuriated over the vanquished. we would only see the victorious end; and, as soon as it comes, we are satiated. it is the same in play, and the same in the search for truth. in disputes we like to see the clash of opinions, but not at all to contemplate truth when found. to observe it with pleasure, we have to see it emerge out of strife. so in the passions, there is pleasure in seeing the collision of two contraries; but when one acquires the mastery, it becomes only brutality. we never seek things for themselves, but for the search. likewise in plays, scenes which do not rouse the emotion of fear are worthless, so are extreme and hopeless misery, brutal lust, and extreme cruelty.

136. a mere trifle consoles us, for a mere trifle distresses us.

137. without examining every particular pursuit, it is enough to comprehend them under diversion.

138. men naturally slaters and of all callings, save in their own rooms.

139. diversion. — when i have occasionally set myself to consider the different distractions of men, the pains and perils to which they expose themselves at court or in war, whence arise so many quarrels, passions, bold and often bad ventures, etc., i have discovered that all the unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber. a man who has enough to live on, if he knew how to stay with pleasure at home, would not leave it to go to sea or to besiege a town. a commission in the army would not be bought so dearly, but that it is found insufferable not to budge from the town; and men only seek conversation and entering games, because they cannot remain with pleasure at home.

but, on further consideration, when, after finding the cause of all our ills, i have sought to discover the reason of it, i have found that there is one very real reason, namely, the natural poverty of our feeble and mortal condition, so miserable that nothing can comfort us when we think of it closely.

whatever condition we picture to ourselves, if we muster all the good things which it is possible to possess, royalty is the finest position in the world. yet, when we imagine a king attended with every pleasure he can feel, if he be without diversion and be left to consider and reflect on what he is, this feeble happiness will not sustain him; he will necessarily fall into forebodings of dangers, of revolutions which may happen, and, finally, of death and inevitable disease; so that, if he be without what is called diversion, he is unhappy and more unhappy than the least of his subjects who plays and diverts himself.

hence it comes that play and the society of women, war and high posts, are so sought after. not that there is in fact any happiness in them, or that men imagine true bliss to consist in money won at play, or in the hare which they hunt; we would not take these as a gift. we do not seek that easy and peaceful lot which permits us to think of our unhappy condition, nor the dangers of war, nor the labour of office, but the bustle which averts these thoughts of ours and amuses us.

reasons why we like the chase better than the quarry.

hence it comes that men so much love noise and stir; hence it comes that the prison is so horrible a punishment; hence it comes that the pleasure of solitude is a thing incomprehensible. and it is, in fact, the greatest source of happiness in the condition of kings that men try incessantly to divert them and to procure for them all kinds of pleasures.

the king is surrounded by persons whose only thought is to divert the king and to prevent his thinking of self. for he is unhappy, king though he be, if he think of himself.

this is all that men have been able to discover to make themselves happy. and those who philosophise on the matter, and who think men unreasonable for spending a whole day in chasing a hare which they would not have bought, scarce know our nature. the hare in itself would not screen us from the sight of death and calamities; but the chase, which turns away our attention from these, does screen us.

the advice given to pyrrhus, to take the rest which he was about to seek with so much labour, was full of difficulties.

to bid a man live quietly is to bid him live happily. it is to advise him to be in a state perfectly happy, in which he can think at leisure without finding therein a cause of distress. this is to misunderstand nature.

as men who naturally understand their own condition avoid nothing so much as rest, so there is nothing they leave undone in seeking turmoil. not that they have an instinctive knowledge of true happiness . . .

so we are wrong in blaming them. their error does not lie in seeking excitement, if they seek it only as a diversion; the evil is that they seek it as if the possession of the objects of their quest would make them really happy. in this respect it is right to call their quest a vain one. hence in all this both the censurers and the censured do not understand man’s true nature.

and thus, when we take the exception against them, that what they seek with such fervour cannot satisfy them, if they replied — as they should do if they considered the matter thoroughly — that they sought in it only a violent and impetuous occupation which turned their thoughts from self, and that they therefore chose an attractive object to charm and ardently attract them, they would leave their opponents without a reply. but they do not make this reply, because they do not know themselves. they do not know that it is the chase, and not the quarry, which they seek.

dancing: we must consider rightly where to place our feet. — a gentleman sincerely believes that hunting is great and royal sport; but a beater is not of this opinion.

they imagine that, if they obtained such a post, they would then rest with pleasure and are insensible of the insatiable nature of the if desire. they think they are truly seeking quiet, and they are only seeking excitement.

they have a secret instinct which impels them to seek amusement and occupation abroad, and which arises from the sense of their constant unhappiness. they have another secret instinct, a remnant of the greatness of our original nature, which teaches them that happiness in reality consists only in rest and not in stir. and of these two contrary instincts they form within themselves a confused idea, which hides itself from their view in the depths of their soul, inciting them to aim at rest through excitement, and always to fancy that the satisfaction which they have not will come to them, if, by surmounting whatever difficulties confront them, they can thereby open the door to rest.

thus passes away all man’s life. men seek rest in a struggle against difficulties; and when they have conquered these, rest becomes insufferable. for we think either of the misfortunes we have or of those which threaten us. and even if we should see ourselves sufficiently sheltered on all sides, weariness of its own accord would not fail to arise from the depths of the heart wherein it has its natural roots and to fill the mind with its poison.

thus so wretched is man that he would weary even without any cause for weariness from the peculiar state of his disposition; and so frivolous is he that, though full of a thousand reasons for weariness, the least thing, such as playing billiards or hitting a ball, is sufficient to amuse him.

but will you say what object has he in all this? the pleasure of bragging tomorrow among his friends that he has played better than another. so others sweat in their own rooms to show to the learned that they have solved a problem in algebra, which no one had hitherto been able to solve. many more expose themselves to extreme perils, in my opinion as foolishly, in order to boast afterwards that they have captured a town. lastly, others wear themselves out in studying all these things, not in order to become wiser, but only in order to prove that they know them; and these are the most senseless of the band, since they are so knowingly, whereas one may suppose of the others that, if they knew it, they would no longer be foolish.

this man spends his life without weariness in playing every day for a small stake. give him each morning the money he can win each day, on condition he does not play; you make him miserable. it will perhaps be said that he seeks the amusement of play and not the winnings. make him, then, play for nothing; he will not become excited over it and will feel bored. it is, then, not the amusement alone that he seeks; a languid and passionless amusement will weary him. he must get excited over it and deceive himself by the fancy that he will be happy to win what he would not have as a gift on condition of not playing; and he must make for himself an object of passion, and excite over it his desire, his anger, his fear, to obtain his imagined end, as children are frightened at the face they have blackened.

whence comes it that this man, who lost his only son a few months ago, or who this morning was in such trouble through being distressed by lawsuits and quarrels, now no longer thinks of them? do not wonder; he is quite taken up in looking out for the boar which his dogs have been hunting so hotly for the last six hours. he requires nothing more. however full of sadness a man may be, he is happy for the time, if you can prevail upon him to enter into some amusement; and however happy a man may be, he will soon be discontented and wretched, if he be not diverted and occupied by some passion or pursuit which prevents weariness from overcoming him. without amusement there is no joy; with amusement there is no sadness. and this also constitutes the happiness of persons in high position, that they have a number of people to amuse them and have the power to keep themselves in this state.

consider this. what is it to be superintendent, chancellor, first president, but to be in a condition wherein from early morning a large number of people come from all quarters to see them, so as not to leave them an hour in the day in which they can think of themselves? and when they are in disgrace and sent back to their country houses, where they lack neither wealth nor servants to help them on occasion, they do not fail to be wretched and desolate, because no one prevents them from thinking of themselves.

140. how does it happen that this man, so distressed at the death of his wife and his only son, or who has some great lawsuit which annoys him, is not at this moment sad, and that he seems so free from all painful and disquieting thoughts? we need not wonder; for a ball has been served him, and he must return it to his companion. he is occupied in catching it in its fall from the roof, to win a game. how can he think of his own affairs, pray, when he has this other matter in hand? here is a care worthy of occupying this great soul and taking away from him every other thought of the mind. this man, born to know the universe, to judge all causes, to govern a whole state, is altogether occupied and taken up with the business of catching a hare. and if he does not lower himself to this and wants always to be on the strain, he will be more foolish still, because he would raise himself above humanity; and after all, he is only a man, that is to say capable of little and of much, of all and of nothing; he is neither angel nor brute, but man.

141. men spend their time in following a ball or a hare; it is the pleasure even of kings.

142. diversion — is not the royal dignity sufficiently great in itself to make its possessor happy by the mere contemplation of what he is? must he be diverted from this thought like ordinary folk? i see well that a man is made happy by diverting him from the view of his domestic sorrows so as to occupy all his thoughts with the care of dancing well. but will it be the same with a king, and will he be happier in the pursuit of these idle amusements than in the contemplation of his greatness? and what more satisfactory object could be presented to his mind? would it not be a deprivation of his delight for him to occupy his soul with the thought of how to adjust his steps to the cadence of an air, or of how to throw a ball skilfully, instead of leaving it to enjoy quietly the contemplation of the majestic glory which encompasses him? let us make the trial; let us leave a king all alone to reflect on himself quite at leisure, without any gratification of the senses, without any care in his mind, without society; and we will see that a king without diversion is a man full of wretchedness. so this is carefully avoided, and near the persons of kings there never fail to be a great number of people who see to it that amusement follows business, and who watch all the time of their leisure to supply them with delights and games, so that there is no blank in it. in fact, kings are surrounded with persons who are wonderfully attentive in taking care that the king be not alone and in a state to think of himself, knowing well that he will be miserable, king though he be, if he meditate on self.

in all this i am not talking of christian kings as christians, but only as kings.

143. diversion. — men are entrusted from infancy with the care of their honour, their property, their friends, and even with the property and the honour of their friends. they are overwhelmed with business, with the study of languages, and with physical exercise; and they are made to understand that they cannot be happy unless their health, their honour, their fortune and that of their friends be in good condition, and that a single thing wanting will make them unhappy. thus they are given cares and business which make them bustle about from break of day. it is, you will exclaim, a strange way to make them happy! what more could be done to make them miserable? — indeed! what could be done? we should only have to relieve them from all these cares; for then they would see themselves: they would reflect on what they are, whence they came, whither they go, and thus we cannot employ and divert them too much. and this is why, after having given them so much business, we advise them, if they have some time for relaxation, to employ it in amusement, in play, and to be always fully occupied.

how hollow and full of ribaldry is the heart of man!

144. i spent a long time in the study of the abstract sciences, and was disheartened by the small number of fellow-students in them. when i commenced the study of man, i saw that these abstract sciences are not suited to man and that i was wandering farther from my own state in examining them than others in not knowing them. i pardoned their little knowledge; but i thought at least to find many companions in the study of man and that it was the true study which is suited to him. i have been deceived; still fewer study it than geometry. it is only from the want of knowing how to study this that we seek the other studies. but is it not that even here is not the knowledge which man should have and that for the purpose of happiness it is better for him not to know himself.?

145. one thought alone occupies us; we cannot think of two things at the same time. this is lucky for us according to the world, not according to god.

146. man is obviously made to think. it is his whole dignity and his whole merit; and his whole duty is to think as he ought. now, the order of thought is to begin with self, and with its author and its end.

now, of what does the world think? never of this, but of dancing, playing the lute, singing, making verses, running at the ring, etc., fighting, making oneself king, without thinking what it is to be a king and what to be a man.

147. we do not content ourselves with the life we have in ourselves and in our own being; we desire to live an imaginary life in the mind of others, and for this purpose we endeavour to shine. we labour unceasingly to adorn and preserve this imaginary existence and neglect the real. and if we possess calmness, or generosity, or truthfulness, we are eager to make it known, so as to attach these virtues to that imaginary existence. we would rather separate them from ourselves to join them to it; and we would willingly be cowards in order to acquire the reputation of being brave. a great proof of the nothingness of our being, not to be satisfied with the one without the other, and to renounce the one for the other! for he would be infamous who would not die to preserve his honour.

148. we are so presumptuous that we would wish to be known by all the world, even by people who shall come after, when we shall be no more; and we are so vain that the esteem of five or six neighbours delights and contents us.

149. we do not trouble ourselves about being esteemed in the towns through which we pass. but if we are to remain a little while there, we are so concerned. how long is necessary? a time commensurate with our vain and paltry life.

150. vanity is so anchored in the heart of man that a soldier, a soldier’s servant, a cook, a porter brags and wishes to have his admirers. even philosophers wish for them. those who write against it want to have the glory of having written well; and those who read it desire the glory of having read it. i who write this have perhaps this desire, and perhaps those who will read it . . .

151. glory. — admiration spoils all from infancy. ah! how well said! ah! how well done! how well-behaved he is! etc.

the children of port-royal, who do not receive this stimulus of envy and glory, fall into carelessness.

152. pride. — curiosity is only vanity. most frequently we wish to know but to talk. otherwise we would not take a sea voyage in order never to talk of it, and for the sole pleasure of seeing without hope of ever communicating it.

153. of the desire of being esteemed by those with whom we are. — pride takes such natural possession of us in the midst of our woes, errors, etc. we even lose our life with joy, provided people talk of it.

vanity: play, hunting, visiting, false shame, a lasting name.

154. i have no friends to your advantage.

155. a true friend is so great an advantage, even for the greatest lords, in order that he may speak well of them and back them in their absence, that they should do all to have one. but they should choose well; for, if they spend all their efforts in the interests of fools, it will be of no use, however well these may speak of them; and these will not even speak well of them if they find themselves on the weakest side, for they have no influence; and thus they will speak ill of them in company.

156. ferox gens, nullam esse vitam sine armis rati.15 — they prefer death to peace; others prefer death to war.

every opinion may be held preferable to life, the love of which is so strong and so natural.

157. contradiction: contempt for our existence, to die for nothing, hatred of our existence.

158. pursuits. — the charm of fame is so great that we like every object to which it is attached, even death.

159. noble deeds are most estimable when hidden. when i see some of these in history, they please me greatly. but after all they have not been quite hidden, since they have been known; and though people have done what they could to hide them, the little publication of them spoils all, for what was best in them was the wish to hide them.

160. sneezing absorbs all the functions of the soul, as well as work does; but we do not draw therefrom the same conclusions against the greatness of man, because it is against his will. and although we bring it on ourselves, it is nevertheless against our will that we sneeze. it is not in view of the act itself; it is for another end. and thus it is not a proof of the weakness of man and of his slavery under that action.

it is not disgraceful for man to yield to pain, and it is disgraceful to yield to pleasure. this is not because pain comes to us from without, and we ourselves seek pleasure; for it is possible to seek pain, and yield to it purposely, without this kind of baseness. whence comes it, then, that reason thinks it honourable to succumb under stress of pain, and disgraceful to yield to the attack of pleasure? it is because pain does not tempt and attract us. it is we ourselves who choose it voluntarily, and will it to prevail over us. so that we are masters of the situation; and in this man yields to himself. but in pleasure it is man who yields to pleasure. now only mastery and sovereignty bring glory, and only slavery brings shame.

161. vanity. — how wonderful it is that a thing so evident as the vanity of the world is so little known, that it is a strange and surprising thing to say that it is foolish to seek greatness?

162. he who will know fully the vanity of man has only to consider the causes and effects of love. the cause is a je ne sais quoi (corneille), and the effects are dreadful. this je ne sais quoi, so small an object that we cannot recognise it, agitates a whole country, princes, armies, the entire world.

cleopatra’s nose: had it been shorter, the whole aspect of the world would have been altered.

163. vanity. — the cause and the effects of love: cleopatra.

164. he who does not see the vanity of the world is himself very vain. indeed who do not see it but youths who are absorbed in fame, diversion, and the thought of the future? but take away diversion, and you will see them dried up with weariness. they feel then their nothingness without knowing it; for it is indeed to be unhappy to be in insufferable sadness as soon as we are reduced to thinking of self and have no diversion.

165. thoughts. — in omnibus requiem quaesivi.16 if our condition were truly happy, we not need diversion from thinking of it in order to make ourselves happy.

166. diversion. — death is easier to bear without thinking of it than is the thought of death without peril.

167. the miseries of human life has established all this: as men have seen this, they have taken up diversion.

168. diversion. — as men are not able to fight against death, misery, ignorance, they have taken it into their heads, in order to be happy, not to think of them at all.

169. despite these miseries, man wishes to be happy, and only wishes to be happy, and cannot wish not to be so. but how will he set about it? to be happy he would have to make himself immortal; but, not being able to do so, it has occurred to him to prevent himself from thinking of death.

170. diversion. — if man were happy, he would be the more so, the less he was diverted, like the saints and god. yes; but is it not to be happy to have a faculty of being amused by diversion? no; for that comes from elsewhere and from without, and thus is dependent, and therefore subject to be disturbed by a thousand accidents, which bring inevitable griefs.

171. misery. — the only thing which consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the greatest of our miseries. for it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon ourselves and which makes us insensibly ruin ourselves. without this we should be in a state of weariness, and this weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of escaping from it. but diversion amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.

172. we do not rest satisfied with the present. we anticipate the future as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its course; or we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. so imprudent are we that we wander in the times which are not ours and do not think of the only one which belongs to us; and so idle are we that we dream of those times which are no more and thoughtlessly overlook that which alone exists. for the present is generally painful to us. we conceal it from our sight, because it troubles us; and, if it be delightful to us, we regret to see it pass away. we try to sustain it by the future and think of arranging matters which are not in our power, for a time which we have no certainty of reaching.

let each one examine his thoughts, and he will find them all occupied with the past and the future. we scarcely ever think of the present; and if we think of it, it is only to take light from it to arrange the future. the present is never our end. the past and the present are our means; the future alone is our end. so we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always preparing to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.

173. they say that eclipses foretoken misfortune, because misfortunes are common, so that, as evil happens so often, they often foretell it; whereas if they said that they predict good fortune, they would often be wrong. they attribute good fortune only to rare conjunctions of the heavens; so they seldom fail in prediction.

174. misery. — solomon and job have best known and best spoken of the misery of man; the former the most fortunate, and the latter the most unfortunate of men; the former knowing the vanity of pleasures from experience, the latter the reality of evils.

175. we know ourselves so little that many think they are about to die when they are well, and many think they are well when they are near death, unconscious of approaching fever, or of the abscess ready to form itself.

176. cromwell was about to ravage all christendom; the royal family was undone, and his own for ever established, save for a little grain of sand which formed in his ureter. rome herself was trembling under him; but this small piece of gravel having formed there, he is dead, his family cast down, all is peaceful, and the king is restored.

177. three hosts. would he who had possessed the friendship of the king of england, the king of poland, and the queen of sweden, have believed he would lack a refuge and shelter in the world?

178. macrobius: on the innocents slain by herod.

179. when augustus learnt that herod’s own son was amongst the infants under two years of age, whom he had caused to be slain, he said that it was better to be herod’s pig than his son. macrobius, saturnalia, ii. 4.

180. the great and the humble have the same misfortunes, the same griefs, the same passions; but the one is at the top of the wheel, and the other near the centre, and so less disturbed by the same revolutions.

181. we are so unfortunate that we can only take pleasure in a thing on condition of being annoyed if it turn out ill, as a thousand things can do, and do every hour. he who should find the secret of rejoicing in the good, without troubling himself with its contrary evil, would have hit the mark. it is perpetual motion.

182. those who have always good hope in the midst of misfortunes, and who are delighted with good luck, are suspected of being very pleased with the ill success of the affair, if they are not equally distressed by bad luck; and they are overjoyed to find these pretexts of hope, in order to show that they are concerned and to conceal by the joy which they feign to feel that which they have at seeing the failure of the matter.

183. we run carelessly to the precipice, after we have put something before us to prevent us seeing it.