the primary function of mentality, as we have throughout assumed, is as stimulant to activities advantageous to the individual under the conditions of its existence; hence all these activities are in a broad sense expressions of mental state, they are the outflow of psychoses and are indicative of them. in particular, feeling is specially and directly related to motor values, which thus become to the self-observant or to others observant an index or expression of the feeling. thus, i see a deer fleeing from a wolf, and i infer that this is an expression of fear. hence we may rightly say that in a large sense all action is expression, for all such action rises in feeling; in other words, from one point of view expression equals action. not only may exterior bodily phenomena betray the feeling which is their inciting cause, but to a vivisectionist, for example, interior phenomena, cerebral and other, may be noted as indicating a feeling origin. excluding, of course, so-called reflex action, which is really reflex motion, action and expression are but different points of view of the same thing: what we term an action when we dwell upon the motor side, we term an expression when we dwell on the mental prius and stimulus which is revealed.

now as the evolution of mind progresses actions no longer serviceable may survive in connection with given feelings, remain indicative of them; thus the strong beating 346of the heart in fear and the scowl in anger. such survival actions which occur in connection with all kinds of feelings, and especially with those which are pre-human in their origin, are with particular emphasis styled expressions. the scowl in anger is considered as expression rather than the actual blow struck, which is equally the result and indication of anger.[f]

f. wundt says that when in emotion we look “sour” we think we are actually tasting the sour, and so make the repulsing action, “sour” look. (lectures on psychology, p. 283.) i think it more probable that the “sour” look is the survival expression of such an emotion as disappointment. it is likely that the genesis of disappointment was in tasting the sour for the supposedly sweet, e.g., lemon for orange, and the “sour” look has remained as expression of disappointment long since its utility ceased. the genesis and early growth of most emotions is in connection with certain sense experiences and their related actions, and these actions tend to remain as “expressions” long after their real quality as actions has disappeared. hence it is by survival, and not because he thinks himself tasting something sour, that a man looks “soured” by disappointment when i fail to give him money as promised. so also black is gloomy because we are diurnal, and our ancestors were diurnal. if nocturnal, black would seem joyous, white gloomy. (cf. wundt, ibid., p. 375.)

expression is then primarily all action connected with all consciousness, secondarily, it is useless action continued by force of habit and transmitted to descendants. but still many expressions are more than mere actions or their survivals. to be sure, darwin and many darwinists maintain that the expressions do not arise or exist for their own value as such, but they are entirely incidental. expression is not the function of the so-called expressions, but they are entirely functional survivals. while, however, we must admit that many expressions have arisen and been preserved in this manner, yet i think it is altogether hasty to deny the function and value of expression per se. expression has existed as a function from very early phases of life, and it underlies all bisexuality and sociality which have been such important 347elements in evolution. organic sound-producing structures, whose sole utility from the very first is for attracting attention, early appear, and further voice seems to have its origin in the demand for love-call and call to young. gregariousness is made possible in almost all its forms by purposive expression. there comes early, then, a will, not merely in performing some definite act at prompting of a feeling, but also a use in simply expressing it to others, communicating the fact of having pain or pleasure states to others. the cry of pain in young animals is a cry for help, and as such has been favoured in the struggle for existence. the usefulness of this action is solely as expression, and as expression it has arisen and been developed. expression here is not an incidental view of a physiological action, but exists for its own value to the individual. such expressions have their use in their significance, and as the true language of feeling are to be interpreted by the principle of serviceability. an expression which is and continues, by reason of its utility, as a sign-language, visual, auditory, or otherwise, as gesture love-calls, etc., may be termed pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression, like blushing, pallor, etc., which exist, not for their significance, though they are significant. incidental expression includes also the sphere of degraded action. yet what seems mere degraded action may be true expression, as beckoning, which is an abridgement of the action of pulling one to oneself and of movement towards oneself; but this motion of the hands exists, not for this end, nor as survival, but merely as significant of a desire on the part of the gesturer. in the higher ranges of life we well know the large place played by pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression. it is not necessary to suppose that pure expression consists merely in “voluntary and consciously” employing “means of communication” (darwin, expression of the emotions, p. 256); thus, the scream of 348an infant is equally pure expression, whether the infant employs it knowingly or not as such, for screaming of the young has doubtless arisen and been preserved in natural selection because of its utility as significant. there is then, i think, a group of activities which are not merely incidentally expressive, but originate and exist for expression as a useful thing in the battle of life.

but we have not exhausted the principles of expression when we refer to present or past serviceability as an action in general or to service as expression. it is plain that in any activity prompted by any feeling there comes at a certain high intensity a more or less pathologic over-functioning of the organs concerned, with under-functioning of others. emotion as action stimulator in any high degree always enhances some physiologic function to the depression of others. the blood, for instance, is forcibly withdrawn from various parts to certain specially active parts, and this withdrawal gives rise to an appearance which may be termed a negative expression, as the pallor in fear. certain other phenomena connected with fear, as change of colour in the hair, cold sweat, and trembling of the muscles, which are mentioned by darwin as unexplained, are probably due to this negative principle (expression of the emotions in man and animals, new york, 1886, p. 350; but compare pp. 81 and 308, where these disturbances are ascribed to direct action of the nervous system. darwin does not, however, distinctly state or treat the principle we here mention as a distinct law). as the body is an inter-related system of organs, stimulation to one organ means an effect upon all, excitation of some, depression of others; thus to an acute observer the whole body is symptomatic of every feeling, and, indeed, of every consciousness. in the natural and normal course emotion, to do its work most effectively, implies little or no marked negative expression, but the nervous energy generated flows freely and directly to the organs which 349are to do service, without greatly impairing general function. fear thus acts at first simply and advantageously; but in its later history fear becomes greatly complicated, and instead of freely issuing in serviceable action with not excessive heightening or depressing of any function, its outlet seems as it were choked, and the nervous energy spends itself within the body in violent disturbances of vital organs. fear becomes then decadent and loses its place as evolutionary factor, becoming impediment rather than aid to progress. negative expression must then be considered as especially notable in the later exhibitions of an emotion when concentration becomes morbid and ineffective, losing its advantageousness, and the emotion is being supplanted by other psychic factors. great injury and death itself may result from the abnormal action of fear and other primarily useful psychoses.

besides the particular organs to serviceable activity with the subsidiary physiological functioning, and the indirect depression, we must still note other principles which may control expression. nervous energy under the incitement of emotion is often in excess of the demand for the required action, and it will then overflow into correlated activities along the line of least resistance. also when the suitable action is checked for any reason, its motive force backs up and overflows in new channels. indefinite and purposeless movements of various kinds thus result which may be expressive of the emotion of which they are incidentally the result. any one who has watched an irish setter tracing game must have remarked the wavings of the tail becoming more rapid when the scent becomes stronger. when the dog is running very fast, the tail-waggings are less noticeable than when moving slowly, although the interest may seemingly be the same in both cases. it is obvious that a fast run uses to a large extent the superfluous energy which was discharging in tail movements, and when the useful running is 350checked the tail motion recommences with greater force, serving as a safety-valve. the frisking of young animals and children is also largely due to diffusion of so-called superfluous nerve-force, and is expressive of general sensations of pleasure. all feeling is motor in its natural value and tendency, and unless the resulting energy is fully used in some special serviceable action, it will discharge itself along the easiest and most habitual lines laid down by inheritance. thus the peculiar ancestral experience of animals is always expressed by their spontaneous diffusive activities. it will be remarked that the principle of diffusion is the reverse of negative expression, being an overflow of force as opposed to withdrawal. excessive generation of energy is certainly uneconomical, and we must consider that at first emotion tended rather to less than the required amount, than more.

the phenomena of diffusive expression, in the strict sense, are thus rather late in appearance. the very lowest forms of life have no infancy or play period, and from the first are directly active in the struggle for existence. yet the play period was certainly evolved through natural selection as a fully educative and preparatory stage, wherein the actions most demanded in actual life are unconsciously practised and a general basis of reserve force is accumulated. play activity is a living on inherited energy and in the inherited modes: the kitten pouncing, the horse prancing, etc. play is then rather a mode of activity than a mode of expression; it is expressive only in the way that all action is expressive. expression proper is only in those modes of action which are carried on, whether consciously or unconsciously, by virtue of their significance value. if everything which is expressive is called an expression, we must include all the bodily actions and phenomena which can in any wise be connected with consciousness. i use the term diffusion in the narrow sense of spontaneous overflow of energy in 351excess of that absolutely required for the advantageous action. i do not refer to the general diffusion of emotional effect throughout the whole organism, which always occurs by the very nature of organism. thus the pain from a pin-prick certainly modifies to some extent every cell in the body; there is a direct wave of influence from the psychic experience, and this is propagated throughout the whole organism by reason of its essential interdependency of parts; it echoes and re-echoes throughout the whole. the physiological result is then in simplest cases extremely complicated. however, this mere general fact of diffusion is a biological truism, and does not explain any expression, but simply asserts that every feeling, by virtue of its physical basis, affects the organism as a whole. emotion issues specially in motor activities because its origin was as stimulant to necessary action, but this action involved internal organs, especially the circulatory and respiratory, and indirectly the whole body in every part. the explanation of an expression must always be in tracing back to the original serviceable actions with their demands on special subsidiary organs, and their depression of certain related organs, and not in reference to the general law of diffusion, which is but another term for the essential continuity of the organism. a useful principle of expression must not merely say that there is by the nature of organism a general bodily result from every emotion, but it must explain the particular expressions.

we make them so far four principles or forms of expression, which we instance in saying that the blow of an angry man is general activity expression, shaking the fist at one, purposive expression, scowling as remnant of watching foe intently in the open air is survival expression, and twitching and trembling of certain muscles is diffusive expression. every emotion commonly issues in all four forms, in direct activity with associated survival tendencies and purposive expression, and a surplus of energy runs 352over into certain natural and easy motions, or a deficiency of energy in certain organs manifests itself, the negative side of diffusive expression.[g]

g. since emotion comes in waves, expression is reduplicated. this may throw some light on such an expression as laughter. landor says the ainu do not in the proper sense laugh, but they roar with delight. it may be that laughter is reiterated roar as resulting from reiterated psychic impulses and feelings. as in the growth of an emotion, waves are multiplied, the expression becomes more reduplicate, and thus laughter tends to become more rippling and articulate. the cachinnation and explosiveness has thus a plausible explanation, which i merely suggest. at least prof. dewey’s explanation (psychological review, i., 559) that “both crying and laughing fall under the same principle of action—the termination of a period of effort”—is quite too general. tension ceasing, effort stopped, we “breathe freely,” take deep inspirations. laughter is far from being the usual outcome of such a status.

darwin makes antithesis a principle of expression. thus the expression of affection in the dog or cat toward its master cannot, says darwin, be traced in any wise to serviceability, and we must seek its explanation merely as unconsciously and instinctively assumed as directly contrary to the serviceable hostile expressions. a dog’s expression of anger is, or has been, directly serviceable action, but the expressions of affectionate pleasure seem never to have had such an origin, but to have arisen merely as antithetic to the former, and so establishing the utmost distinctness of impression. to convey most clearly a motion of its friendliness the dog naturally assumes those attitudes which are most diverse from its expression of hostility. their serviceability as expressions is best attained by being completely antithetical, and the more antithetical the better under natural selection. however, if this be the case, antithesis scarcely deserves, it seems to me, the name of a principle of expression, but it merely denominates the fact that opposite emotions in the struggle for existence tend to exhibit themselves in opposite ways as similar emotions in similar ways; but 353we need neither antithesis nor similarity as a principle. i believe that serviceability past or present either as direct action or as expression is the prime impetus of what we term the expression of the emotions, and i confess i do not see much force in darwin’s chapter on antithesis. if, however, opposition has a meaning for life, as darwin seems to imply, then does not the expression come under the law of serviceability? if there is any opposition in expression, i should explain this in general by utility rather than by antithesis per se. thus take the gestures instanced by darwin (ibid., p. 65), of pushing away with the hand when telling one to go away, and of pulling toward when telling one to come; these gestures are, indeed, antithetic, but their explanation does not lie in the fact of the antithesis, but in the fact of the past serviceable habit, by which individuals disliked or liked were repelled or attracted. in the present instance the person motioned to may be far beyond the reach of the arms, but still the gesture may be more than mere useless survival, for it acts as emphasis of the vocal expression, and has its influence there.

darwin for some reason constantly ignores the serviceability of expression as such—not so much as a fact, but as a principle—and hence its relation to natural selection, whereby he involves himself in needless difficulties. if an expression is of use, why should it not arise through natural selection as well as a limb, a wing, or an eye? like other functions, expression may be incidental or may adapt variations attained originally for other ends, but in the case of the voice, at least, we have an original organ of expression as instrument of intercommunication.

nor can i think darwin’s treatment of the expressions of affection by the dog as due to antithesis a very happy or satisfactory solution. in the first place, the expression of friendliness by the dog is not the complete antithesis of that of hostility. the dog barks both out of friendly 354joy and from anger, as darwin himself states. some dogs also, as i have often observed in my dog, show pleasurable affection by wrinkling up the lips and showing the teeth, an act which is often mistaken for a hostile demonstration. dogs also, as is the habit with my own, will often express affection in the same way as the cat (ibid., fig. 10), by rubbing against one. this is but an instance of a general law of expression of affectionate emotion, i.e., closeness of contact with the beloved object which is liked as promoting pleasure. this instinctive expression of love or liking certainly had its origin in serviceability, the appropriate effort toward the pleasure-giving thing or animal, but specially in the relation of parent and offspring, and in that of alliance in danger. again, the tail of a hostile dog is, as figured by darwin, straight and erect, but the opposite of this is the tail tucked between the legs when fleeing from pursuers in fear, rather than the position when showing friendliness to its master. my own opinion of the rise of the friendly expression of dog, cat, and other animals toward man is that they are in the main, at least, transferred from the serviceable friendly expressions used among themselves in a wild or domesticated state. i have repeatedly seen small dogs, who attach themselves to some large dog as their master, fawn, posture, and lick this master precisely as this master does his human master. dogs and cats also show their affection and care for their offspring in many expressive acts which are transferred to their human owners. these expressions were primarily either directly serviceable actions, as the licking, or serviceable for expression as such, as various sounds made to give assurance of presence of food, or of safety. in general, it seems to me that when antithesis has occurred, it has arisen out of serviceability and not vice versa.

with reference to the wagging of the tail in the dog, this is far from being an expression of affection alone. i have already mentioned the case of the setter where the 355movement of the tail is largely due to diffusion of superfluous energy, analogous to nervous habits like pacing the floor or biting the nails in human beings. with some dogs at least, as i have noticed in my own st. bernard, the tail is switched slowly back and forth when approaching another dog with hostile intent. we have not as yet a sufficient number of facts at hand with reference to the history of the dog to pronounce the tail wagging as originating by virtue of its use as expression. and what is the rationale of the origin of the tail in the dog and cat, and for what reason has it been perpetuated? is it a prehensile survival—which has been taken advantage of in the breeding of the pug—or is it a sexual characteristic, or did it originate to perform some directly advantageous action, as the tail of the cow and horse, or did it come into being as an organ of expression? is the tail-wagging recognised by animals themselves as an expression as it is by man? these are questions on which we must have more data than we now possess in order to make any sufficient answers.

again, the rise of the barking by dogs under domestication is another problem on which little can be said with certainty for lack of data. darwin’s remark that it may arise by imitation of the loquacity of man seems to me ludicrously inadequate, and there seems no element of imitation in the noise produced. domesticated animals in general tend to use the vocal organs for louder sounds than when in the wild state, for with wild animals the value of a loud noise as expression in any way is largely counterbalanced by its betraying presence to enemies. when natural enemies of the dog are driven out by man there will be a tendency toward a larger use of the vocal organs, both with reference to companion dogs and also to man. the particular sound, the bark, is determined by the nature of the whole vocal apparatus. the bark was, no doubt, originally to frighten aggressors, 356as i have often seen a large dog frighten a small dog from a piece of meat by a sudden resounding bark. gradually attained as a mode of terrifying his competitive associates and certain game which it follows under domestication, and so preserved and developed by natural selection, the tendency is also powerfully strengthened by artificial selection, the best barker, other things being equal, being chosen for breeding by man. when the bark has become a common and habitual practice, it becomes a vent for superfluous energy developed by joy and other emotions. like snarling or grinning, it is also a play form, and thus becomes denotative of joy by association. to impress one’s friendliness or hostility upon others, to appease or terrify, are the two main ends of expression with both man and animals, and this function is excited in various ways by different species, as determined by environment. the danger signal and the safety signal, the beware or welcome, is amplified and varied according to particular requirements which must be fully investigated before we can give any complete rationale of any expression. conciliatory and menacing expressions and gestures have been evolved and matured in strict correlation under the same general law of natural selection, and neither one nor the other is due to antithesis. it is entirely unlikely that of such expressions, one, the hostility side, was first developed by natural selection, the other owing its rise to a distinct principle, antithesis.

however, i am not ready to deny antithesis all force as principle of expression, but it seems to me it should be ranged with law of similarity or analogy as subsidiary, and largely influential only in the higher types of expression, especially the teleologic human, as in gesture. thus, if thumbs up means pity, thumbs down would naturally be used to denote pitilessness. to nod the head means assent or yes, to shake the head means dissent or no, though the exact antithesis would be to throw the head 357backward—assent signal with some tribes. however, while it may be asserted that, as a general law, that like emotions express themselves in like ways, unlike in unlike, this can hardly be used to throw much light on expression. given a particular emotion and its expression, we can by no means deduce immediately the expression of the opposition emotion. particular conditions and special organic limitations will always make this impracticable, and it is the office of the scientist to study expression in the course of evolution as of service under a multitude of conflicting interests and distracting difficulties.

we view expression then as mainly due to the principle of advantageous variation in the struggle for existence. expression is the action required in the battle for life, or accompaniments to assist this action, or the call for aid to bring it about. natural selection is the first and fundamental law of expression, negative expression and superfluous energy both being secondary and often pathologic in tendency.

the struggle for existence is itself on the very face of it an expression of mind, namely, activity significant of certain will and feeling experience. whatever shows mind is expression, and thus in a large sense every movement in the physical universe—and what is the universe but motion—and every organic activity may be construed as expression. whether all force, motion, action, is or must be expression is, however, a philosophic investigation which we need not now discuss, though we may suspect that the height and depth of mind and so the range of expression is enormously beyond the science of to-day. however, restricting ourselves to the domain of animal life, it is obviously very difficult to determine just what activities of a given organism betray mind, and still more just what form of mentality is manifesting itself. man, being the measure of all things, interprets himself in all, 358and even when he becomes aware of the dangers of anthropomorphism he cannot wholly disengage himself from the tendency. the subjective analogical interpretation is a necessary evil. still man is the keenest sighted of all beings for expression, and actions in a very wide range which had not in fact the real function of expression become expressive to him. the primary value of fear for the deer is to make it run from danger, and the running becomes expressive of the fear to observers, though the running is not for the expression. thus vital activities of many kinds are expressive, though their primary value is not in the expression. activities whose sole or main value is to give expression are comparatively late, the value of expression in this narrow sense being in the mental impression thereby made upon other organisms. thus actions which serve purely to frighten others, in making one’s self formidable by loud noises, as roar of lion, bark of dog, by erecting the hair, displaying claws, teeth, and other such actions are pure expressions.

there is a constant growth in the value of expressiveness as we ascend the scale of life, expression playing a larger and larger part till with man certain individuals become specialized as expressionists, artists, poets, and orators. further, fine art is expression which has its value, not in any exterior utility, but in itself alone, the subjective emotion seeking in a manner perfectly free from the common utilities of life to find itself a complete and perfect embodiment. art here does not serve life, but life, art. the experience has in itself its own vindication for being, in that it expresses. expression is no longer bare action nor yet a function to serve life, but it becomes a life in itself. in this ideal life of pure expression we recognise the necessity that the expressionist be emancipated from the struggle for existence, be freed from the sordid cares of life, and given up wholly to expressing his individuality with characteristic force; hence the state often pensions 359writers and artists. but apart from this ideal life, in the evolution of intricate sociality and industry and complex culture, expression becomes a more and more potent factor. man in society must not only be, he must reveal himself, he must show what he is in order to achieve the most. many fail, not for lack of faculty, but for lack of expressive ability. expression, then, in general, is a function which, starting from the most minute beginnings in the lower animals, culminates in man. in large part man is man by reason of his superior power of expression, especially by speech, oral and written. evolution in man is on the mental side in particular, but a large part of this mentality has been given to the improvement of expression in making it more facile, full and rapid. the complete natural history of expression is yet to be written, and all that i attempt is to indicate the point of view for such an investigation.

there are two points further with reference to expression which merit a few remarks. the first is as to the reaction of expression on emotion. we have treated to some extent the relation of emotion to its expression, but we have also to consider the relation of an expression to its emotion and to emotion in general. we have all along assumed that the emotion as a factor in the evolution of life is an internal stimulus to a serviceable activity, which may be viewed as its expression, or may even have its value as such. that emotion, as stimulus of action, determines expression is, i think, a primary law. however, prof. james maintains (mind, xxxiv., 188) the reverse—that expression determines the emotion.[h] we do not strike because we are angry, but we are angry because we strike. hence, in reality, the emotion is really the expression, that is, the emotion is the consciousness result of the so-called expression—it expresses the “expression” in terms of 360consciousness. we commonly speak of expressing our emotions, but we should rather speak of emotions as expressions in consciousness of certain bodily activities. but if we make emotion but a psychological incident and off-shoot of certain activities, i take it we run directly counter to the general function of mind in evolution as internal stimulant to useful activity. emotion is, i judge, fundamentally a motive force and has its function, and so its rise and development as such. it is more than a by-product, but even if it were, how should we account for it? after the serviceable activity has actually been brought about, after a man has really struck down his adversary, what is the utility of emotion? we take it that the value of emotion lies in starting and supporting the activity, and it is advantageous economy that it cease immediately on the accomplishment of its end. while we must always suppose that emotion has its physical support in central neutral changes, yet the expression is truly such; that is, it is from a different impulse as determined by the emotional brain excitement. in the light merely of a theory of natural selection, mind in general, and emotion in particular, is more than incidental concomitant of physical changes, more than echo of corporeality: it has a vital and central function in the evolution of life. prof. james points to the fact that exercising the expressions or imagining the feeling calls up the feeling, as a proof of his theory. this, however, is merely a matter of association, and can prove neither a real precedent nor resultant. we may call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated activities. in the interdependence of the conscious life, emotion, perception and willing call up each other without reference to causative order. any one element of consciousness may be regarded either as resultant or stimulant, according as we look at preceding or following state of consciousness. in the order of evolution, pain and pleasure arise from certain actions in order to inhibit or stimulate 361repetition of actions. feeling is then, both resultant and stimulant. the emotions may arise from the expressions by association, but the original dependence is that of expression on emotion. the further test, that we cannot imagine an emotion without bringing in bodily presentation, is simply a necessity of the imaging faculty as such, an image by its very nature being concrete.

h. professor james has of late largely modified his view (see psychological review, sept., 1894).

while, then, i believe that emotion is the spring of expression, i am far from denying that the expression may not react upon the emotion. whenever the will in any wise controls expression we mark modifications in the feeling. in the later evolution of life the directing of expression is of great importance, and expression is gradually subjected to the will. hence, especially with man, it becomes possible to feel in certain ways and yet to repress the signs of feeling, to have strong emotions, and yet not betray them to those who might take advantage of them. when a strong emotion is forcibly and completely checked in its expression there is commonly rankling. at least it is not true, as darwin states (ibid., p. 360), that “repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions.” very often, as we all know by personal experience and by observation, the checking the free expression of emotion tends to intensify, rather than soften, the emotion. the school-girl, who, on hearing sad news, rushes away to have a good cry, weeps away her grief, and experiences a deep sense of relief; while the man who sternly represses the expression of grief often suffers acutely and long. grief, of course, sometimes lies too deep for tears, and we often long to be able to express the pent-up emotion which chokes us. this state is the opposite of the free, natural expression of feeling such as we see in children. children express themselves without self-control, for this is beyond them; but here is the power to will expression, but the effort is always futile.

by promoting or repressing expression we do certainly 362influence emotion; but this volition is always for reason, and implies, then, a conflict of feelings. thus, a feeling for propriety leads the man to control his tears, and this feeling in itself must tend to diminish the strength of the concomitant grief. however, though there is a measure of interference, we would be wrong in supposing that complex mental life is always comparatively weak in its component elements. the distraction of interest due to new feelings checking expression is not always equal to the relieving power of free or promoted expression. the direct checking of the expressional act certainly keeps back the current of energy from its natural channel, and the feeling has increased in duration, if not in quantity. the evanescent character of emotion with young children and with demonstrative people is well known.

but besides the changes which may come to the feeling through direct will-effected changes in the expression, we must also note that the mere consciousness of expression has often a definite influence. thus, when greatly frightened, i may become conscious of the heart leaping into the throat, the trembling, etc.; and this consciousness of the expression acts in general as a diversion in the feeling which is expressed. sometimes, indeed, it seems to add to the feeling, as when a girl blushes for her blushes. there is an intensification of self-consciousness which but heightens and renews the expression with renewed sense of expression, and then another flood of embarrassing self-consciousness, and so on in a long series. here, however, the sense of expression does not in strictness add to the intensity of the original feeling, but it develops a new feeling of the same kind; at each step there is new occasion and a renewed feeling, but a total quantity is constituted, so that we are right enough in saying that the consciousness of her own blushing but added to her embarrassment. yet it may be stated as a general law that a consciousness of our expressive acts as such tends to decrease the original 363feeling from which the expression arises, inasmuch as the field of consciousness is thereby divided.

when the will attains control over expression we may not merely repress the impulse to expression when we feel strongly, but having no feeling of a given kind we may voluntarily adopt its expression, and this adoption of the expression very often leads by association to the real feeling. again, when experiencing a feeling we may simulate the expression of another or even opposite feeling. it is often advantageous in the struggle for existence to throw others off their guard by deceiving them as to the real emotional state; hence, craft and guile have from a tolerably early stage in evolution played a part in the history of life. animals and men alike soon appreciate the distinction between appearance and reality, that a kind and pleasant expression is often but the lure of malice and hostility, that injury is often meant where there is the show of benefit. plants, as well as animals, often are quite other than they appear, both for offence and defence; and there is the wide field of mimetic protection which cannot, however, at present be brought under our subject.

simulation of expression probably arose as an economical makeshift; a mere show which costs the organism little often attains ends which would otherwise require a vast deal of mental force. thus we see children scared into desired behaviour by assumed anger, grief, etc.; and even animals, as i have noticed with dogs, likewise frequently affect expressions which have no support in real emotion. the unsophisticated, however, learn with great rapidity to distinguish between assumed and real emotion. any one who has made a pretence of crying before little children must have remarked this. simulation of expression in order to easily reach desired ends is thus rather limited, but still has a real value and a considerable place under natural selection.

however, expression may sometimes be simulated in 364order to attain the associated emotion. if we act mad, we often get mad, and thus, as we see in the plays of animals and children, merely assumed expression may lead to the real emotion. this way of attaining emotion by purposely enacting its known expression, we may call impression as the reverse of the expression order. men may work themselves up into a fury, as well as vigorously express an anger directly occasioned. actors and public speakers often take advantage of this reaction of expression on emotion, and thereby not merely affect an emotion, but have a certain real emotion, which cannot ever be na?ve. thus macready as shylock used to prepare himself and get up “the proper state of white heat” by violently shaking a ladder. poe in one of his tales makes a detective say, when wishing to know the thoughts of a wicked man, “i fashion the expression of my face as accurately as possible in accordance with the expression of his, and then wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in my mind or heart, as if to match or correspond with the expression.” this method of acting like another, that we may have and so know his thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult way of mind-reading.

but expression is often simulated on one or both sides with full understanding of it as such. this enters into play, and is the essence of the dramatic art. that the word play denotes both the sportive imitative actions of animals and men, and also a dramatic representation is not fortuitous or arbitrary. it is noticeable that among the lower animals the earliest and commonest play is playing at being angry or frightened, which corroborates the view of these emotions as probably the earliest and most fundamental in life. the correlated nature of fear and anger is shown by the way they are played at; thus you often see one dog with a show of anger chasing another who simulates fear, and then the parts are exchanged.

the great relation of pursuer and pursued is constantly 365mimicked among animals with interchanging of parts. so also among children the commonest plays are those of fleeing and chasing, as tag, hare and hound, hide and seek, etc., the fundamental elements of life being re-enacted under the superfluous energy which tends to flow most easily into the oldest and most habitual channels. thus play has a high historic psychic importance. to attack and to run away are the most necessary and essential of life activities, and play has a certain pedagogic and preparative value, and has thereby been sanctioned by natural selection, for we see that in the evolution of life the tendency has constantly been to lengthen the play period. among the lowest animals the individual at birth is immediately thrown into the struggle for existence and must battle for itself; there is no play time for it, but at once it enters upon direct life struggle; but in higher life there is a period of spontaneous free dramatic activity.

but not only is anger and fear shammed as a prominent and primitive play, but it is most common to stimulate to real anger or fear, and then in glee to show the inadequacy of the occasion to the victim. every one has observed how frequently young animals play by teasing and scaring each other. the tricks of boys and practical jokes of men both point to the deep inbred power of anger and fear in life, and are at the same time symptomatic of their decline in power as dominant life factors. all children delight in scaring one another on pretence, in seeing the real expression and feeling themselves the moving powers in bringing it about. this satisfaction, which is aboriginal, which is the reflex of the original pleasure sanction when power to scare others for one’s own benefit was being evolved in life, makes a large part of the enjoyment of such action. a large part of play-pleasure must, indeed, be set down to reflex of the earliest hard-earned pleasure experience; but a large part is also due to the thrill of excitement and the delight in activity per se. later forms of plays are largely 366due to pure imitative propensity, though often helped by reversal tendencies.

we note also that this perceived groundlessness of the action becomes a large element in later forms of play, as wit and humour, but the pleasure is plainly based on the power and the superiority of intelligence implied. it amuses the tyrant to throw his companions into mortal fear by the slightest suggestion, the smaller the occasion the more amusing the fright. and in general the slighter the real cause in relation to the effect produced, the more acute the pleasure, by reason of the supremacy thereby emphasized. it is always more amusing to scare a child by a slight movement of a finger than by a vigorous act of the whole body. it seems to me that it is by this association that disproportion, incongruity, irrelevance, however induced, become in themselves amusing, ludicrous, laughable. so the incongruous, in which i have no part whatever, becomes a comic spectacle and the basis of all comedy, yet also of the tragic and tragedy. in the tragic the discordance between what is and what ought to be, instead of pleasing, pains. what is comic to a coarse mind may seem tragic to the refined. a bird, distressed by the death of its mate, offering it food, might amuse a savage or a boy, but must be a pathetic sight to a civilized and cultured man, though both might be amused to see a child presenting food to its doll.

not only may the incongruous which is comparatively unrelated to me be amusing as well as that which i myself bring about, but even when i am the victim i may be highly delighted by the intrinsic disproportion of my experience to the exciting cause. with some persons, perhaps rather few in number, the next best thing to playing a joke is having one played on them. this amusement at oneself occurs even among savages. when stanley was on the congo, he was at one time greatly annoyed by the number of native visitors. in vain he 367tried to repel them, but one morning when a crowd had assembled at the river side, at some little distance, waiting an opportunity to board his vessel, some of his men put on lion skins which were at hand, and acted the part so well that the intending visitors fled in abject terror. having retired to a safe distance they looked back to see the men walking the deck with the lion skins in their hands and laughing most heartily. seeing then the groundlessness of their alarm the whole crowd burst into roars of laughter and shouted in merriment for a long time. exhibitions of fright, we may remark, seem to be especially amusing to savages, as when an assembly of africans of the lowest type went into ecstasies of uproarious delight on seeing a stereopticon picture of a frightened negro hastily climbing a tree to get out of the way of the gaping jaws of a crocodile.

play is then very largely either a mutual shamming of expression, or a stimulating real expression in one by pretended expression in the other. the pleasure in deceiving others by simulating expression points to ancestral experience, for deceit has been one of the greatest factors in life evolution. that an individual seems to be an entirely different being from what he really is, has often been most advantageous in the struggle for existence, and hence a large variety of simulated expression has been employed. children then, as repeating in play form the race history, take great delight in masquerading and so deceiving their acquaintances as to their identity, making false pleas for charity, etc. the drama has its roots in this form of play. to make others take us for quite different than we are gives us a high pleasure of power, and early man was often moved, in the breathing spells of the struggle for existence, to play at false personalities simply for the pleasure in itself of being a successful actor. there is also the counter pleasure of the spectators in piercing the simulated expression. it is only 368in latest phases of dramatic art that simulation comes to be appreciated for its own sake, that there is on both sides full and complete feeling of the illusory nature of the whole transaction, and an enjoyment of the art per se. simulating expression is the actor’s art; but when the simulation is forgotten by either actor or audience, nature appears and art disappears.

while it is the province of the actor’s art to simulate expression, it is in general the office of fine art to imitate and render the expressive by image, picture, musical notes, etc. the artist is the expresser and simulator par excellence, and complete and perfect expressiveness is his constant aim, though not for utility or amusement, but for the sake of awakening the ?sthetic emotion. i cannot then agree with bosanquet, who, as i understand, makes ?sthetic feeling the emotion of expression, expression for expression’s sake. for expression by its very nature is such only as expressive, that is, as going beyond itself, as being a means, and not an end in itself, hence expression for expression’s sake is meaningless phrase. expression, so far as it attempts to stand merely for itself, is an empty mannerism and a barren technique. expression is only such as it is backed by the emotion expressed, as significant of some psychosis; and artistic expression or art is the expression of the artistic or ?sthetic emotion, a peculiar feeling about things, as apple blossoms, a sunset, a child playing. this emotion is often awakened by cognizance of an expression, as an expression of joy or horror by a child, and may thus be an emotion of or at expression, as also in the case where it is roused by the skill in purposive expression of any kind, ?sthetic or other, but expression is obviously not the only way of exciting the emotion, its object may be a mere patch of colour, a pure musical note, etc. ?sthetic emotion tends to manifest or express itself just like all emotions, and in attaining perfect expression it strengthens itself. likewise 369language, as an instrument of thought, a logical expression, has strengthened thought, but a purely formal logic is as barren and void as a purely formal ?sthetic. language as expressive of thought and as expressive of ?sthetic emotion is equally dependent upon what it expresses, and ?sthetics is thus not peculiar in its relation to expression.

the interpretation of expression in nature and art is often a hard matter and has given rise to much variance. for instance, take the much discussed laoko?n group; winckelmann says the father sheds pity from his eyes like mist upon his sons; lessing finds grief and noble endurance expressed; goethe thinks the father shows pity for his youngest son, apprehension for the older son, and terror for himself; lübke finds only mere pain manifested. coming to a single feature, the mouth, we find the most diverse interpretation. winckelmann says that here is an heroic soul who disdains to shriek, and gives forth only “an anxious and suppressed sigh.” lessing maintains also that here is a shriek softened into a sigh, but not “because a shriek would have betrayed an ignoble soul, but because it would have produced a hideous contortion of the countenance.” later critics have generally followed lessing. it is obvious, i think, that the expression of the mouth is not shrieking, but is moaning, groaning, or sighing. on this quite a number of competent witnesses, physicians and psychologists whom i consulted, are practically agreed. however, it has occurred to me that the sighing or moaning of laoko?n may not be a softened form at all, but the actual expression designed by the artists. it is generally supposed that the artist here desired to show mortal agony, and it is assumed that shrieking is the expression of mortal agony. this assumption seems to me correct when extreme pain is suddenly inflicted; but when, as in the case of laoko?n, the mortal wound is received only after the most exhausting 370struggle, the natural expression is moaning. the realistic sculptor would surely not give any softened form, but, shrinking from nothing, has expressed laoko?n in this death grasp in the very act of giving up the ghost. though the muscles of the limbs and trunk are still tense, yet the closing eyes, the head falling back, and the arm thrown toward the base of the brain indicate that the struggle is over, and the death moment has come, expressed vocally only by a moan. we do not need to find here then any conflict between realism and the artistic sense, but the simplest and most obvious interpretation is what the expression gives, sighing and moaning, which is the true one under the circumstances, and is so meant by the artist.