in studying any state of consciousness we first inquire what constitutes its dominant factor; if this is sense of object, we call it a cognition; if effortful action, it is a volition; if the marked feature is pleasure-pain, we term it a feeling. finding that the consciousness is a feeling, we would next inquire whether the pleasure-pain is mainly determined in its colouring by direct presentation, and so is a sensation, or whether this dominant colouring comes indirectly through representation, and is thus what we term an emotion. for example, the distinction between “i feel a pain in my shoulder,” and “i feel pained at your conduct” illustrates the most radical division of feeling. if emotion is founded on an appreciation of the experienceable, which has developed under natural selection, we must look upon the emotional power in general and upon the various emotions in particular as merely advantageous psychoses which are as clearly determined by general evolutionary laws as the merely physical organs like heart, lungs, wings, horns, etc. it is clearly desirable that the organism should look before, should anticipate experience and so direct its way; but bare anticipation has no value in itself unless it powerfully stimulates will through emotion. all conscious life above the most primitive is eminently and increasingly anticipatory, and so becomes more and more infused with emotional powers. among the earliest developed of these 128in the struggle for existence are fear and anger. the fear group, embracing large numbers of allied forms, simple and complex, has been discussed in a general way in the preceding pages, and we now come to some consideration of the correlative anger group.

the rationale of the evolution of anger is not far to seek. we have seen that fear is the spring of defensive action, and it is obvious that anger is the stimulant to offensive action. fear is regressive, anger aggressive. fear is contractile, anger expansive. fear is the emotion of the pursued, of the prey; anger the emotion of the pursuer, of the predacious. emotion in the service of life evidently has two great psychic ramifications from this point, and the whole world of emotion-beings, which compose the greater mass of organisms, is hence divided in two great divisions, a fear class and an anger class. likewise in relation to opposing natural forces as to neighbouring competing and destroying organisms, the same distinction is to be made according as the animal either combats or flees. shyness or fierceness, timidity or irascibility, these are characters which divide the animate world into two grand antagonistic groups. zoology has recognised this psychic differentiation as a marked and essential feature in its nomenclature, thus lepus timidus. in fact, the most important part of evolution is the psychical; in this, indeed, lies the whole significance and value of the organism. the attainment of more and more advantageous psychic qualities is the main trend of evolution, for psychic power as distinct from main force, like that of the elements, is far and away of the most value in the struggle for existence, and ultimately, as in man, it achieves the subduing all lower powers, natural, vegetable and brute, to its own ends. it is psychical quality, moreover, which determines physical, and not vice versa. thus it is not the possession of claws, fangs, etc., that makes an animal fierce, but it is fierceness which 129develops and maintains these weapons of offence. thus it is, though thus far practically overlooked by scientists, that psychic development, especially on the emotional side, is of the utmost importance as the prime factor and motive in organic processes. the central core of life is emotional capacity, and this in its evolution determines the whole external morphological trend of evolution of organisms which is so closely followed by the science of to-day. but the science of the future is comparative psychology, which, when once placed on a secure basis of interpretation, will determine the real and inner law of evolution as a psychic movement incarnating itself in a succession of animate forms. but a sure method of knowing a psychic fact as such when it occurs, and what, how, and why it is, is yet to be discovered and applied, and extra-human and even extra-ego consciousness is a field, so far, for little else than hypothesis. if this remark be turned against us, we say that our work is mainly a deductive interpretation of the course of psychic evolution from the general standpoint of natural selection, reinforced and illustrated by introspective investigation, and merely using the most obvious facts of comparative psychology in a very general and provisional way. we do not profess to show where, how, and when mind originated, or what particular powers any certain organisms possess, but we do endeavour to show how the principle of utility may be made a key to the study of a very perplexing region of mental life—the emotions. we proffer then merely a very general sketch of the history of emotion as a life factor, hoping that it may, at least in its general scope, be of service to future explorers. in taking up this subject of anger we do then thus reiterate the position we occupy and the method we follow.

anger like fear certainly originated at some critical point in some individuals life as an advantageous variation of essential value. a vital issue at some early point 130in the history of life determined the genesis of this new psychic mode and function as a stimulant of aggressive will action. very likely it was in competition of organisms for food that some favoured individual first attained the power of getting mad and violently attacking its fellows, and so obtaining sustenance. however this may be, certain it is that a direct attack is often more self-conservative than attempts at escape when injury threatens; it is a greater advantage to destroy pain-giver than to shun it. fear enables organisms to avoid loss, but it does not accomplish positive gain, as anger does through overcoming hindrance. anger is often also more economical for the forces of the organism, and thus, in general, predacious animals are longer-lived than even those of their prey who may attain a full length of life. even in the face of great odds a direct attack is often more serviceable than attempt at escape. anger is certainly the primitive motive force of all offensive action, though of course we cannot say that the animal got mad because it saw the serviceability. psychic evolution, at least as far as new powers are concerned, never comes by teleologic foresight, and, indeed, cannot by the nature of the case. the animal did not definitely set out to get angry because it foresaw the value, yet in the earliest angers there must have been effort, a certain nisus which marked the new form as a real attainment, a marked achievement. that the provoking occasion gives rise now to anger inevitably and naturally, that anger comes upon us and overcomes us is true enough, but in its earliest phases anger must have been, like other just evolving factors, supported only by powerful will effort. the oftener the early psychism got mad, the easier it got mad. facility came only by practice, and a large variety of occasions, besides the simple critical and original one, were gradually utilized by the anger faculty. but in its original form and occasion anger was, no doubt, akin to 131that we see when an extremely timid animal at the last extremity will turn in anger and fiercely fight for its life. such an attempt, sometimes successful, marks an origin of a new mode of conscious emotion which may never return to the individual again during all its future life for lack of occasion. if often returning and often improved, a definite new habit of emotion is established, and from being a fearful animal it may at length become dominantly irascible, and so belong to a totally distinct psychic genus.

by the evolution of anger then, as in contradistinction to fear, two grand divisions of animate existence were set apart, two great psychical orders as fundamentally distinct and important for evolutionary psychics, as invertebrate and vertebrate for biology. the rise of the back-boned animal is not more important for physiological morphology than the evolution of anger for psychical morphology, and, indeed, as we have before remarked, the psychical growth is ever the broadest and deepest fact in evolution. by the acquirement and predominance of the anger stimulus certain animals became differentiated as a distinct class from their fearful neighbours, and they then by this new impulse gradually attained instruments of offence, and also by increase of size became physically distinct forms. henceforth the animate world becomes divided in a more and more marked way into pursuers and pursued. by mutual interaction fear is increased on one side as anger increases on the other, and the division into timid and fierce, predacious and prey, becomes more and more established and marked.

we take it then that it was a most momentous day in the progress of mind when anger was first achieved, and some individual actually got mad. if the exact date and the particular individual were ascertainable a memorial day set apart for all time would not be too great an honour. in the struggle of existence, other things being equal, the 132most irascible is the most successful, faring the best, securing the best mate, and having the best and most numerous progeny. susceptibility to anger becomes a necessity to a large class of organisms, and those who will not get angry and fight for their interests are surely trampled on or pushed aside to become starveling or outcast.

is now this primitive anger an absolutely new power, a de novo evolution, or is it possible to study its rise as a gradual differentiation from some other factor? must we not view psychical evolution like all evolution as coming under the law of continuity? how then explain the sudden rise of apparently new and distinct forms like anger or fear? anger as a response to the demands of life seems from the very first to be as distinctly and peculiarly anger as at any time in its development. the peculiar quality which makes anger anger, does not seem to appear as a gradual differentiation from other elements as slowly emerging from previous modes, but we can only judge that it bursts suddenly upon the field as a new and unique creation, which does not find its explanation in pre-existent forms and cannot be traced as a gradual evolution from them. on the other hand, while it does not at first sight seem possible to regard anger as being from the first other than a radically new power and activity determined, indeed, by the struggle for existence, but wholly unexplained in its essence and formation as a consciousness related to and differentiated from other consciousnesses, yet we must acknowledge our profound ignorance of the real morphology of mind and what is the real nature of mental differentiation. here the problem is altogether more difficult than in biology, where the appearance of new forms like wings can be readily traced as slow modifications of previous members, the physical possibility and rationale of which is easily seen to be inherent in the physical constitution of the body and its circumambient matter, the air. however, in the present state of our 133psychical knowledge it is quite impossible to attain any similarly clear conception as to the formation of new psychical forms. we may see why they should be called into being by the necessities of animate life, we can perceive their functional importance from the first, but to trace their morphological development as gradually assuming their peculiar qualities as modifications of already existing activities, and as inherently possible in the psychical constitution of things, this is clearly beyond us at present. we can conceive that the earliest anger was weak and rather ineffective as compared with the fully developed anger of later life, but we cannot see that it was any the less anger, any the less purely and wholly sui generis than the very latest and strongest form. has it ever in its earlier stages that hybrid and mixed character which marks it as a modification of existent factors? it is certainly not a modified fear, to which it is, indeed, a polar opposite.

but we may perhaps regard anger, and fear as well, as modified from previous general emotion. we may, indeed, consider it likely that some general emotional phase preceded the special emotions, just as a general indefinite pain and pleasure preceded definite pains and pleasures. it may be considered as probable that emotion first appeared as a purely undifferentiated disturbance sequent on sense of the experienceable pain, this general emotion being neither fear nor anger, but the basis from which both develop. the psychic agitation we term emotional very likely began in a purely general form, yet it is hard to understand how peculiar forms develop therefrom. we are too far from such inchoate experience to readily come to any appreciation of its method or mode. we may be disturbed as to something imminent and know not whether to fear or be angry, but this in general means only a rapid alternation of fear and anger according as the mind runs back and forth between fear and anger-provoking 134elements. it is unlikely that we can trace in any such a purely undifferentiated emotion.

at the best we but throw the difficulty farther back, for emotion per se is then the de novo form to which the principle of continuity does not seem to apply. if anger is a traceable modification of some more general emotion as combined with definite representation and volition modes, yet how the peculiar anger quality is achieved is still unexplained. on the whole it seems simplest and truest to assume the first impulse of anger as a perfectly new and diverse wave of emotion suddenly generated in answer to some extreme urgency in the struggle of existence.

the analogy of organic and psychic evolution may be pressed to a certain extent. it is plainly possible to set in order an evolutionary series of light—sensing organs, eyes—from most elementary to most complex, and it is quite as possible, though yet to be done, to set forth in similar genetic order a series of psychic states as offence-sense, i.e., angers, in their increasing differentiation. but previous to any eye, to local visualization, there is a period of common sensation when an absolutely simple organism is in every part equally responsive to light; in a crude way the whole organism reacts to light, from which stage by traceable specialization the eye as a light-sensing organ is gradually developed. here analogy would seem to fail, unless we consider it to be the stage when any psychosis, e.g., anger, requires the whole consciousness capacity, mind being merely a capacity for the recurrent but isolated single-activities. mind certainly but slowly grows into that sum of organic coincident interdependent yet distinct consciousnesses which we commonly think of under the term, mind. anger in its very earliest and lowest form is no doubt an absorbing na?ve isolated wave, as common to mind as a whole, that is, as making up the whole of mind for the time being, is perhaps 135in its measure an analogy to common sensation. anger may then be but a common emotion, answering in a certain aspect to light-sense, sound-sense, etc., as purely common sensations. but we must remark that general sensation is not to be confounded with common sensation, or general emotion with common emotion. common sensations are, indeed, usually very general in form, and a sensation per se, a purely general sensation, is probably very rarely anything else, yet when we close the eyes and direct them toward the sun, the general sensation of light we receive—very like the original primitive common sensation—is general, yet by a special organ. the word common refers, not to the special nature of the function itself, but the fact that the function, whether special or general, is performed indifferently, or practically so, by the common whole. a sensation of coloured light is more special than a mere sensation of light, and this than mere general sensation of force, but all may be accomplished either by common sensation or special sensation. general emotion may similarly be either common or in organic co-activity. there was certainly a time when consciousness existed which was not and could not be anger or fear or even an emotion per se. pre-emotional and pre-representative consciousness was so absolutely primitive, general, and common, that psychology as a necessarily automorphic science will be very long in coming to any understanding of this field, but yet we must set it off as something which must always receive some consideration. anger is not a property of all consciousness by the nature of consciousness itself, but is merely a possible mode dependent on circumstances for its development at a certain psychic stage.

what now is the inner nature and what the constituent elements of the anger state? comparatively few reflect upon their emotions save from an ethical standpoint, and very few indeed attempt any analysis of them. to determine 136the process and exact psychical constituents of getting mad and being mad, may seem to many a quite useless and foolish introspective endeavour. if a person is angry, he is angry, and that is all there is of it, will be the general verdict of common sense. you can dissect flowers into their parts, you can analyse rocks and soils, but any emotion such as anger is wholly unanalyzable. no one can know what it is to be mad until he has once been mad, and, thereafter, he can only reflect upon it as a peculiar excitement, a powerful agitation, whose occasions and results may be fully traced, but which in itself is sui generis and irresolvable. the form of consciousness we know as being angry, is really a simple wave of emotion which stands by itself as an elementary and ultimate form.

suppose we acknowledge these remarks as true, we may yet maintain that anger, like all emotions, is a highly complex state of manifold factors whose sum total, whose grand resultant, is a seemingly simple and peculiar status. why should one arrangement of atoms produce a peculiar perfume, another a peculiar stench? anger may likewise be merely an unexplainable ensemble of early ascertainable elements.

certain it is, in the first place, that sense of object is necessary to anger. one cannot be mad without being mad at something. the attitude of mind is objective, and even rage in its blindest moment preserves this attitude. blind with rage, means no more than that various definite qualities of the object are lost in the intense emotional reaction at pain-giver. at its height, anger preserves, indeed, only the barest apprehension of object; but this is intense and overpowering in connection with the sense of it as infringing and injuring. in the transports of rage and fury, the movements are wild and reckless enough, but always antagonistic, implying outward destructive activity. anger is the fixation of the mind upon some object in its quality of personal hurtfulness, and 137is revulsion, not from it, as fear, but against it. with early psychisms, all perceptions of objects end in either anger or fear, and a large part of early education consists in learning what objects to be fearful of, and what to be angry at. the alertness of wild animals is determined mainly by either nascent fear or anger. when a dog is suddenly wakened from sleep he generally shows either fear or anger. this is merely an illustration of how the dimmest sense of object immediately connects itself with emotion as primitive and fundamental tendency. the organism perceives the object, and representing its imminent hurtfulness, feels fear and dashes away from it, or feels anger and dashes against it. these are the two simplest possible reactions with sense of the experienceable injurious. in fear there is elimination of oneself from the injury, and in anger the elimination of the injury from oneself. with later anger and fear these processes of elimination themselves become matters of representation, and make a large part in highly-developed forms.

a knowledge which very generally enters into anger is the comparative estimate of power. a cat scratches us, we are angry; a lion threatens us, we are afraid. the progress of the lower psychic life is largely in learning what is best to fear and what should excite anger. that which at first angers will often, when better understood, produce fear, and vice versa. wild animals at first often show merely anger when molested by man, but soon manifest fear as they learn to appreciate his superior power. the african elephant learns to distinguish between the savage with his spear, and the white hunter with his rifle, and is merely irritated or angry with the one, while he manifests genuine fear of the other. the young of animals and of man continually show irrelevant fear and anger. they are generally either over fearful or over irritable. our own feelings are powerfully modified by varying estimates of opposing force and injury. if, in passing through a dark 138street, i am tripped by what i take to be a child’s snare, i am angered, but upon noticing that it is a fuse to a dynamite bomb, i am thrown into intense fear. in general, any sensation, as of sound or light, in its lower grades of intensity produces anger, in higher occasions fear. as a rule when reactions induced by either fear or anger are uniformly unsuccessful, natural selection favours the development of the other.

while the comparative estimate of opposing force with one’s own is general ingredient in anger, anger being fear-limited, it is not, as mercier would indicate (mind, ix., p. 346), a constant element in anger. we often see cases of anger, and have perhaps, ourselves, experienced anger which is totally unrelated to a sense of power. some animals seem at times utterly fearless and utterly unaware of the tremendous crushing force they angrily oppose. it is, moreover, altogether probable that anger and fear originated and received a certain measure of development before any capacity of measuring comparative force of antagonist arose in mind. however, the discrimination between overwhelming and slight force is certainly tolerably early, and is obviously a very necessary factor in self-conservative action. yet it is very unlikely that this was an element in primitive fear or anger, which must have been no more than a simple emotional reaction to perceived injury without any reference to whether pain-giver is more or less strong than pain-receiver. the earliest fears and angers of infants seem to be quite devoid of any guidance from sense of powerlessness or power, but merely direct, unthinking reactions.

a marked and constant element in anger is hostility. this is the aggressive fighting attitude of will which is exercised toward and against the perceived pain-giving object. anger can never subsist without this volition element, and it always appears as direct simple reaction to anger-provoking object. anger always exhibits itself as 139hostility, openly and freely in lower life, and in higher life, which is often disingenuous, the hostility as real psychic act remains, though somewhat concealed in physical manifestation as long as angry mood exists. the will tendency is always toward the violent removing and destroying of the offending object. however, na?ve primitive anger does not include in its hostility giving pain for pain received, making the object suffer in turn, which is, indeed, far removed from the capacity of primitive mind to conceive. anger in its earliest form does, of course, inflict pain where its object is pain-susceptible; but this, it may confidently be said, cannot lie in the intent of the pain-inflicter. the simple original ebullitions of anger do not include intent in any form. volition is powerfully and directly incited by the emotion without the intervention of any idea. the only representation in the simplest anger is the representation of pain experience impending which occasions the excitement, which then directly and violently starts will-activity; but the representations of destructiveness and pain-infliction as ends become guiding ideas only in the slow evolution of anger toward more intelligent forms.

pain is certainly a prominent element in anger. this pain is the emotional pain, the pain at pain, whose nature and origin we have commented on in the chapter on fear. the mere representation of pain to be starts a violent pain quite distinct from the fear-pain, yet like it, pre-eminently central and subjective. precedent, however, to both fear and anger-pain, is the simple pain which immediately arises on representation of pain, the prospect of pain being immediately and peculiarly painful in itself. this commonly continues throughout, and gives a dominant pain tone. but there immediately succeeds a rush of either fear or anger emotion, each intensely painful in opposite ways. the pain which results from the anger, which is by the anger occasioned in me, is again distinct from the pain 140in and of the anger. anger is itself a state of pain. in its earliest forms, as rarely and with difficulty attained, there is still another pain connected with anger, the pain of exertion and stress. but all the pain factors, as more or less continuous, make anger, as emotion in general, a complex pain state. thus, when angered by a man shaking his fist in my face, we trace first a purely subjective pain at prospect of pain, then a rush of aggressive emotion which embodies in it a pain of its own, then a pain which reacts from the peculiar tension of the anger state. of course, in our stage of evolution, anger has become such an inwrought factor that it arises spontaneously, it overtakes and overcomes us, not we reaching it; and so the stress or labour pain is absent. it is never or very rarely an effort for us to get angry, but it must have been for our very remote psychical ancestors.

while it may be said with truth that some people are never so happy as when mad, yet we must remember this does not alter the fact that anger is radically a pain state. there may be a pleasure from anger excitement, and from successful anger; there may be a pleasure in the mere exercise of aggressive power; but the happiness meant is mostly the excitement pleasure plus the delight which always comes from freely following out one’s nature. especially when the outflow of natural force in an irascible man has been pent up and restrained for some time, a fit of anger is altogether a delightful experience, the pleasure of relief in a habitual function. thus an occasional fight is necessary to the pugnacious amongst both animals and men; it is an inbred function and tendency which must work itself out, or render the being as miserable as a rodent kept from gnawing. but all this does not interfere with the analysis of anger as fundamentally painful. happiness is a very late evolution, and, as the reaction from freely working out one’s strongest tendency, it is unfelt by early minds, which only gradually attain 141inwrought tendencies and so the capacity for being happy or unhappy. to witness a fight is likewise to a large class of minds a supreme felicity. this is largely the pleasure which comes at second hand from representation of participancy. and so, to have a fight described, or to read about it even, is a source of considerable representative pleasure to many, a spurious and reflected anger, and an ideal fighting in the fray. however, all this leads far away from primitive emotion, which is now our main concern.

we may grant then that sense of the object giving pain, sense of comparative power, hostility, and pains of various kinds, are usual elements in anger; yet it is evident that anger is explained by no one or all of them. it is not a mere aggregation and mixture of states, it is essentially a compound which has in some unexplained way a peculiar quality which is not in any of its constituent elements. when i am angry, there occurs a phenomenon which, while based on and inclusive of these factors, is yet peculiar in itself. the flush of anger, the wave of emotion, the tempest of passion, bases itself on and includes cognition, hostility, and pain; but it is more—it is a deep psychic disturbance of a peculiar and undefinable kind which we recognise when we have it, but which we cannot analyse. we express the nature of anger metaphorically, indeed, when we speak of an angry man being “hot,” “boiling with rage,” etc., as opposed to being chilled and frozen stiff by fear. the being angry is obviously a kind of being pained at pain quite opposite to that of fear. it is also true that i may see threatening injury, i may be pained, i may combat, but not be angry. there are other and higher motives which may bring about the violent will offensive activity so often required in the struggle of life; but we may take it that anger is the most primitive, and throughout the whole range of psychism the most common offensive motive, and so of the utmost importance as a life factor.

142which shall we regard as the more primitive, anger or fear? were animals at first universally timid, and subsequently acquired anger as an advantageous variation, or was anger the first, and fear the complementary and later evolution, or may we suppose that they developed in strict correlation? the earliest manifestations of emotion with some animals, and with some human infants, seem to be anger. everything perceived to be painful irritates and makes them mad, and they are quite fearless in the presence of overwhelming danger. these but slowly learn to fear; by hard experience they learn the hurtfulness and inutility of combatting in many cases, and occasions which would once make them mad now cause them to fear. on the other hand, we observe many of the very young who seem to be universally fearful, and but slowly acquire “spunk” and spirit. mental embryology thus, at least with our present very imperfect knowledge, is quite indecisive on the question. if fear and anger were wholly determined by relation of predacious and prey, then we might suppose correlated simultaneous origin; but we know that obstacles and injuries, not from competitors, but from elements, forces, and objects of nature, were the first environment and the first field for struggle. organism began as a weak thing planted amongst manifold opposing forces, where fear was quite the most salutary emotion and anger useless. if, as we must deem probable, mental function in general and emotion in particular reaches back toward primitive organism, it is likely, on merely general grounds, that fear is the more ancient and original emotion, though anger was closely subsequent. the general conditions of life at the first would demand the development of fear more imperatively than anger. certainly, however, both emotions are sufficiently primitive, as is shown by their being so ingrained and dominant forces in the whole range of lower psychic life.

all higher animals, moreover, are peculiarly sensitive to 143and observant of signs of anger and fear. rarey, a most excellent judge, made it an axiom of his method that horses are extremely acute in detecting either fear or anger in those who deal with them, and this is also noticeably true of animals in general. these are also the emotional attitudes which are earliest interpreted by children. now what is soonest, easiest and surest interpreted by psychisms above the lowest may be taken to be fundamentally primitive and such are fear and anger. to discover with readiness and certainty the emotional states of organisms about them, because these states are the motives of very important activities, is clearly an advantage early gained in the struggle of existence. it means preparedness, and there is a nascent anger to break forth against the fearful, or fear or counter-anger prepared against the fear discerned or suspected. the inter-related activity of these two emotions is the chiefest and most interesting spectacle we see in all lower psychic phases.

but we must notice now a form which seems on the whole to belong to the anger group, and that is hate. hate often precedes and succeeds anger, and the object of anger is peculiarly apt to be the object of hate. the man whom we hate very easily angers us, and he who provokes us is one whom we are apt to hate. yet a person may be very provoking, even exasperating, and not be hateful, and vice versa for hate. it is obvious then that while the object of anger and hate is apt to be the same, yet it is viewed from very different standpoints, and the emotion reactions are somehow very different. “i hate him,” and “i am angry at him,”—these expressions denote very distinct emotions. while anger and hate are both aggressive emotion reactions against the pain-giver, yet in their nature they are essentially diverse. in general we hate him who deliberately and constantly provokes us, who establishes himself as a deliberate enemy. it is harmful, 144opposed intent that particularly stimulates hate. but anger is most generally a sudden flash of feeling leading to violent repulsive effort against pain-giver, but without any insight into intent. the immediacy of reaction is accomplished through anger; but hate, having more of insight and foresight, is more slowly generated, and is not so directly and promptly active. i may be angry at one who casually pinches me in sport, but i will hate him who continually pinches me in spite. i may be angry at the child who in its childish play often interrupts my studies, but i do not hate it; this i reserve for the malicious boys who continually put tick-tacks on my windows. and so also inanimate things often arouse anger; but we hate only the animate, and then mainly when we discern deliberate, purposed offence. to be sure we often hear some such expression as, “i hate the very sight of that house”; but here the term hate denotes loathing, and is only a little less flagrant misuse than when i say “i hate ham, but love beefsteak.”

hate, then, marks in a very noticeable way the growth of psychic responsiveness. a prevision of psychic attitude of others, especially the emotional and volitional, is of the utmost service as helping to and preparing for an appropriate response. thus we may believe that quite early in mental evolution there came an appreciation and interpretation of the psychic modes of others as affecting the interests of the individual. we may judge that this is probable by the very apparent difference of reaction of even certain of the lower animals in the presence of threatening dangers from common material things, and from animate beings capable of being not merely crushed or pushed away, but intimidated and frightened away. young children learn quickly to distinguish between mere physical events and psychic expressions, and to feel and to act toward the psychic in the peculiar manner which will best serve them. thus it becomes of very 145definite value to excite fear in enemies, but even a low animal learns speedily that it cannot terrify a large stone which prevents access to food. now fear and anger obviously do not specially belong to the rather advanced class of emotions which are always psychically responsive, for, in earliest phases at least, both fear and anger may be taken to have no reference to the psychic quality of the object, but only to the physical quality as painful and injurious. however, later fear and anger become cognizant of the psychic attitude and responsive thereto; but it may be said that hate from the first is a psychic responsive, it is an answer to the psychic attitude of others as interpreted by the individual as turned towards itself. hate is always against evil intent; anger and fear may be. hate and anger are both intensified by hate and anger in the object—though this may often occasion fear—but fear, on the contrary, is greatly weakened, and sometimes turned into hate or anger, by perceiving its object as fearing it. i naturally hate those and am angered with those whom i perceive as having the same passions against me; but he whom i see fearing me does not thereby inspire my fear for him, but tends in quite the contrary direction. yet mutual fear in equally matched opponents is consistent with mutual anger and hate. fear, with those who are capable of inflicting about equal losses on each other, acts as a check upon anger and hate, and gives caution and wariness to passion itself.

the object of hate then differs from that of anger and fear, as being invariably a psychic quality in another as injurious to one’s own interests. injuriousness per se does not excite hate as it may anger and fear. animals, indeed, often seem to hate that which has no psychic attitude toward them, and may be wholly incapable of it; but this is error of judgment, just as we ourselves often find ourselves wrong in hating where we supposed there was evil feeling toward us, but where we now see there is 146none. hate disappears the moment we discover our mistake of interpretation.

while hate often views its object very largely from the retrospective side, as opposed to fear and anger, which are generally prospective, yet hate originally must have applied to the present or latent potency of the object for harm, for only in this wise does it reach self-conservative value. in early psychic life there is no time or place for purely retrospective emotion like revenge and resentment. hate is not essentially a paying back for the past offence, but a will-inciting emotion of immediate, or imminently prospective value. in fact, though we say, “he has done me injury and i hate him for it,” yet we do not hate the dead injurer or the one so crippled as to be entirely powerless against us. certainly there is no value for our interests in injuring the one who is past injuring us, and from the self-conservative point of view to exercise ourselves in hate or anger in such a case is to waste energy. feeling for what has been done against us, purely as such, is plainly sheer waste of force. the past is irretrievable, and emotion about it is valuable for life only so far as the past implies the future. thus it is that hate, arising because of self-conservative value, and developing under natural selection, never becomes wholly retrospective.

hate then is at first much the same in its elements as anger. it is always objective. hate is always of something, though extreme passion dulls perception, yet at its normal tension hate, like other emotions, is incentive to beneficial cognition. we are closely observant of those we hate. beside sense of object, there is the will-stirring, the hostility, which is prominent in anger, though here more controlled and not so impetuous and na?ve. hate thus often allies itself with fear, but anger is very rarely coincident with it, though there may be rapid alternations. there is also a hate pain which is a parallel complex to the anger pain already analysed. we might term hate a 147distilled anger, and yet this signifies little, for the innermost emotion seems very distinct. like fear and anger, hate seems a genus by itself, and in its essential feature as emotion-reaction, quite beyond scientific analysis, which can point out its conditions, but not account for their total value or for the peculiar quality of hate disturbance by which hate is hate. hate can be appreciated only by realization, but no matter how long we reflect upon and try to catch its exact nature in some definite formula, the essence of hate always eludes, and presents itself as only a bare simple psychosis wholly indefinable and inexplicable in its essential nature.

but if we turn now to the origin and development of hate, shall we arrive at anything more satisfactory? is hate a modified anger, or is it from the first a wholly distinct emotion and not slowly differentiated from any preceding psychosis? hate evidently belongs with anger as aggressive emotional reaction, but it is very hard to see how it could originate by any slow growth, and it seems easier and simpler to regard it as being a unique response to some very pressing demand in the struggle of existence.

the whole subject of mental differentiation needs clarifying. are we to consider mind merely as a sum of many distinct modes each of which has, in the course of evolution, appeared suddenly in answer to the demands of life at a critical period, and is faint, indeed, yet from the first having a distinct and peculiar quality by which it suitably stimulates will, and that the sole growth of these diverse forms has been in intensity and by various associations with other states? or are we to consider that mind was originally a very general vague state, which, by a continuous and traceable differentiation, has slowly developed into many different modes? certainly the latter seems the more rational. to conceive that there are no essential and radical subdivisions in mind, that not even knowing, 148feeling, and willing, are fundamentally primitive, but each, and each form of each, but modifications of precedent modes, this is a theory which is enticing in its simplicity and in its analogy to physical evolution from a single underlying material element. but when we come to particular investigations, as this of the origin and development of hate, we cannot well discover any modes intermediate between it and say, anger, which are the links in a continuous evolution, but for aught we can see or conceive, hate is as much hate the first time it appears as at any subsequent time. the links in the evolution of mind from phase to phase are all missing, and how are we to supply them? of necessity as subjective facts they must first be realized, before they can be known, but how can this be done by a consciousness which has long outgrown them? we cannot discover these fossil and extinct forms objectively, as the paleontologist discovers extinct species, but in some way we must re-enact and re-experience them in our own consciousness before we can know anything about them. if every mind embryologically passes through the several stages of its general evolution in the race, still the strange intermediate forms which might then have existed are beyond the recall of the reflective stage, when we first demand to know the history of mind. and when we appeal to comparative psychology we are equally in the dark, for we must judge animals by ourselves, we can interpret their consciousness only by our own, and they may have very rude and peculiar forms which are unknown and unknowable by us. thus the limitations and difficulties of subjective research are especially brought up to us in evolutionary study which thus seems wholly confined to a priori speculation. while we can conceive it likely that hate was suddenly brought into full being by the demands of life, yet it is hardly a rational view of emotion to regard it as a per saltum series of 149distinct psychical species called successively into being by the exigencies of existence, which indeed, is a view almost as ultra-scientific as that which regards all mental modes as direct endowments from deity.

but though on general scientific analogy we are led to believe in fossil mental forms, in missing psychic links now extinct as regards our own consciousness, but which were the germs of our present distinct emotions, perceptions, etc., how are we to discover and investigate them? can we work our own consciousness back through the multitudinous stages of its past evolution, through myriads of human and pre-human forms to the confused, primal, undifferentiated psychoses?

certainly the forms which lead up to such an emotion as hate and from which it is gradually evolved must be realized, must be actually felt in some measure before they can be understood and analyzed. here then seems a great barrier to introspective evolutionary psychology, perhaps insuperable, for how can mind retrace itself, involute itself, in the interests of science? mind is fundamentally action, motive-feeling, which, in connection with cognitive forms gradually achieved, becomes from mere pure pleasure-pain a very complex manifold. we feel many of these forms in our own experience, and we can say of some that they are the higher, of others that they are the lower and more primitive. thus fear, anger, and hate are generally regarded as low action-motives as compared with love of truth or justice. but while we distinguish in our own consciousness and by analogy in the consciousness of others a considerable variety of psychic forms, they are, so far as we are able to see—and we have given some special attention to this in discussing fear and other emotions—invariably distinct, and each has its own peculiar quality, and we do not find, and we should not expect to find, the intermediate forms any more than the 150anatomist would expect to find in man a radial starfish structure. the hazy, indefinite phases which mark evolving consciousness into new forms have been long done away with for such emotions as hate, and it would seem an impossible task to ever bring them back. when we let consciousness lapse of its own regressive tendency—and undirected consciousness tends always to revert to wild states—we fall down through a series, but it is by steps, and no gradual descent, that is, defined mental forms succeed each other, with no transitional phases which are both as differentiating into either. we have mixed states, indeed, but these have no evolutionary value in this line, being merely coincident distinct psychoses, and not an intermediate differentiating mode. the psychoses which we call lower and which we naturally fall into, were really a higher level once for some remote ancestors, and it was only by occasional great efforts that fear, anger, hate, etc., were reached, by just such efforts as now are required by many a worldling who would be religious and would attain a feeling for holiness, or that of a philistine, ambitious of reaching ?sthetic feeling, who endeavours to appreciate the refined, elaborate power in a poem by rossetti, or the simple human grandeur in a painting by millet. in some forms we know what it is to try to feel, to have dim and vague stirring of ?sthetic emotion, and to reach new levels in emotion generally, and we know the stages of differentiation and the severe nisus of the earlier realizations. on the nisus side of our psychic life there is abundant opportunity for every one to observe the process of mental differentiation, and how slowly evolving a new emotion is, for instance, before it reaches a definite form, but there is the great range of purely natural, spontaneous life, deriving its whole impetus from ancestral minds, where, as in hate and anger, it is impossible to study the slowly modifying forms precursory 151to the distinct mode. how can we find or produce in ourselves a state which is not yet hate, but merely hate in becoming, a half-differentiated, half-evolved hate? if we could put ourselves on the nisus side, and look up to hate as something to be reached, instead of something we may fall into, we might attain some idea of its process of formation. but since hate, anger, and so forth, invariably come upon us and overcome us, how can we appreciate their evolutionary stages? if we could trace these old intermediate disused forms which merely lead up to others, we should find them very strange, and should need an entirely new nomenclature for them. but to reach back and realize long outgrown and fossil psychoses, will, if ever possible, require more exertion and ability than even the intense struggle of the actual psychical advances which adds, by the efforts of exceptional individuals—“geniuses”—new modes of cognition and feeling to the mind of a race. to regress beyond a certain point is harder than to progress.

how then hate developed from non-hate, from anger, or from any other emotion, is obviously a very difficult problem. it would seem to us in our present stage of mentality that the first hate phenomenon was definitely and inexplicably such. we cannot perceive or conceive how the origin of hate is other than a sudden apparition of a new and elementary emotion in response to an extraordinary call upon some extraordinary organism in its life career. yet we may easily believe that the direct occasion of its rise and progress was as complement to anger. anger is certainly in general a very advantageous self-conservative factor, but by reason of its violence it requires a vast amount of vital energy to accomplish its end, and it thus also tends to disturb the cognitive power in its clear and cool actions. a burst of passion, though it may succeed in destroying the injurious, is both uneconomical 152and unintelligent. it is also a very transient phase. anger will be defeated and supplanted in the evolution of life by some factor which has not these incidental disadvantages. hate is such a superior psychosis, and is surer, steadier, and more economical than anger, and defeats it in the long run.

hate then may be taken to exemplify the principle of antithetic evolution. we are careful not to raise the anger of some men and of some animals, and thus anger, or the capacity for anger, serves them as advantage and defence. we fear to make them mad. however, the antagonists of many individuals, knowing the weakening effect of such a strong emotion as anger, and knowing also how apt the angry one is to “lose his head,” purposely stimulate anger to their own advantage, and the disadvantage of the angered. thus, cunning and wary animals, impelled by hate, often tease and torment their stronger and larger adversaries and competitors into a furious rage, which is so rash and unintelligent that they are completely at the mercy of the weaker. where in such a way as this an advantageous variation is turned into disadvantageous by an opposing form, as anger by hate, we have what may be called an antithetic evolution. new psychic variations are then continually stimulated by the earlier, and it is only for a short time that any variation maintains itself as purely beneficial, but an answering one soon takes advantage of its weak points and turns it from self-conservative into self-destructive. under the constant success of opposing factors, there is gradual loss of value and soon disuse, with the inception of some new form to combat more effectively the opponent. this opposing form meanwhile attains dominancy, culminates, and is gradually ousted by some variation which has been attained in order to meet the new weapons on the other side. thus, in the battle of life, offence and defence, attack versus retreat and 153counter-attack, mutually stimulate to a series of new and higher antithetic psychic variations.

the so-called problem of evil is, then, tolerably easy to a thorough-going evolutionist. all developments, all perversions which are self-destructive rather than self-conservative to the individual, have received their original stimulus from other antagonistic individuals to whose interest it is to promote these evils to the utmost. what is an evil to me is first so much of a good to him whose interest lies in defeating and destroying me, and he will take advantage of all my weaknesses to his own profit. competition and struggle involve the existence of evils to individuals who are conquered and maltreated in the battle of life. disease and death itself is necessary to evolution on a finite sphere. as long as the good and desirable is limited as compared with the number of those who want, competition must exist, and this competition must be by both cultivating advantageous variations in ourselves, and also by cultivating the disadvantageous variations latent in our enemies. thus, evil sown in others that our own good may be advanced is the general law of all life. to injure as much as possible all those who oppose, and to get as many as possible well affected towards us, and to be subservient to our ends, this is the meaning of psychical evolution in all its earlier, and most of its later, course. on any scheme of evolution by struggle, evil to particular individuals is a necessary fact. we throw, then, the problem back to how and why life arose and developed through this competition mode; and all science at present can say is that it is the “nature of things,” an expression which covers ignorance and is really metaphysical.

in all its later stages anger, and likewise hate as well, and all the allied emotions, attach only to what is distinctly known as animate. the futility and self-destructiveness of anger against the inanimate and insentient comes to be 154fully recognised. but early anger is quite undiscriminating. the hunter, who, pursued by an enraged bear, scatters his clothes and accoutrements behind him for the bear to tear in pieces, takes advantage of the unintelligent anger of the bear for his own ends. since animals do not wear clothes they have no conception of what they are as independent insentient things distinct from the wearer. to the bear the weapons and clothes dropped by the hunter appear not as inanimate beings, but as living, vitally-connected parts of the creature pursued. the error arose, not from senselessness, but from lack of range of experience, and it is akin to the error of the ancient mexicans who, having never seen a horse by itself, regarded a man on horseback as a single creature. a dog, the first time he sees his master unclothed, is greatly puzzled, and but slowly learns that clothes are something the master has and not what he is. when weapons, clothes, etc., are at length distinguished as property, there is yet a natural and right impulse to destroy them as injuring the owner; but the animal which stops to do this commits an error of judgment, as it is usually of more importance to despatch the hunter than to destroy his implements. it is the tendency of anger to destroy all which is in any wise connected with its object. this is true, not only of the animal world, but also of the lower human development. a savage in a fit of fury will slay, not only an offending fellow, but also his family and relations, and also destroy all his property. the uselessness, not to say the injustice, of such an indulgence of anger is only recognised at a comparatively late stage of evolution. anger in its later form concerns itself only with purposive offence in its object, and vents itself solely on the individual offending. a clear distinction is drawn between animate and inanimate. thus, my dog, playing with another, hurt itself by running into a tree, and gave an angry growl; but noticing the real nature of the paingiver 155as, not the other dog, but an inoffensive tree, his attitude immediately changed, and he seemed to take the injury as a matter of course. a puppy would in like case senselessly continue its demonstrations of anger to no good and perhaps to its own injury.

as to the function of anger and hate, this has already been intimated in the remarks we have just made on its origin and development. for function it is which gives rise to organ and activity; in some unknown, mysterious way the pressing life-struggle for useful mental activity determines ultimately its appearance. we know that extremely hard conditions, which would threaten the continued existence of animate life as a whole, or of any large subdivision, would give rise to new perceptions and emotions by which a saving remnant would escape; and on this principle we must expect the most signal psychic advance of the future at that seemingly remote period when mankind will be threatened with extinction by the slow refrigeration of the earth. a long-continued uniformity of easy conditions of life, as in the tropics, is distinctly unfavourable to psychic progress; but let a glacial period invade that zone, and the changed conditions would awaken such a struggle for existence in all organisms, man included, that new organic and mental types would be developed. the necessities of existence and the self-interest of the individual in an unceasingly sharp competition develop slowly in the few those mental modes which, from their functional importance, become the heritage of a race and genus; and these “sports” thereby secure to themselves a certain temporary dominancy. this is the history of life in general, and of man in particular. how demand determines supply, how necessity is the mother of invention, is obvious enough in man, who, clearly conceiving the function, sets about by his knowledge of means to accomplish the needed improvement; but in the lower life, which is incapable of such 156teleological foresight, we can only say that through pain of lack in the altered conditions of existence there is stimulated a blind, intense struggle, which, moving out in all lines, somewhere, at sometime, by mere chance hitting on the right variation, sticks to it and accomplishes its own salvation, and leaves descendants who tend in the same direction. new psychic qualities, as well as new physical organs, are in some way gradually determined through struggle which is practically blind. that mental variation, that bodily variation, which was incessantly demanded in the struggle of existence does somehow ultimately appear, is, indeed, a fact which, for the present at least, we can only state in this indefinite, unsatisfactory manner. blind, pain-impelled will, fiercely striking out in every direction, does at length, achieve those new psychical and physical forms which are most needed by life. the chance serviceable variation is fixed and continued by reason of its serviceability; but when its utility wanes by reason of new life factors appearing or new conditions of existence, it is lost by disuse, or survives in rudimentary forms.

the function of hate is, like anger, to injure and eliminate the injurious; but what anger accomplishes by a sudden volcanic outburst, hate accomplishes in a slower, but surer and more subtle way. hate is, as previously pointed out, a manifest improvement over anger as a method of offensive warfare. other things being equal, the best hater is the most successful individual. dr. johnson had reason on his side when he said that he loved a good hater. a strong hater, who pertinaciously assails and injures his enemies, strengthens his own position and makes the largest place for himself in life. hate, as a permanent, economically aggressive motion, marks certainly a great advance, and is of the highest import for life. if now hate has its own function as direct stimulus to offensive action toward those who will be injurious, 157toward those who are capable and likely to pain and harm us, how shall we explain the hate—and we might say anger as well—which arises at mere remembrance of injury, and which seems to have no immediate value for life?

in the first place we may well doubt whether any purely retrospective emotion exists, at least in early psychic life. the past, of course, has no value in and by itself; it is irretrievable, and emotional force spent upon it as such wasted—“no use crying for spilled milk.” it may well be that for simple psychisms the past never exists as such; at least, it is never a stopping point, but a mere datum for interpreting the inexperienceable. the sense of experience, especially in its temporal aspect, is very difficult of analysis; yet we may say with some confidence that at first it does not imply a sense of either the past or future as such. the mind is immediately impressed by the injuriousness of the injurious, which, though coming, of course, in terms of the experienced, is not relegated thereby to a past time, nor is it at all dwelt upon as such for emotion reaction. primitive emotion is not backward looking; for this is in itself entirely futile, and primitive life depends for its existence and progress upon utility. the value of emotion is in stimulating preparedness for defence and offence. the representation of injury inflicted comes up to early mind as some injury being inflicted, or imminently so, or is applied at once in interpretation of the experienceable, with no thought or emotion for it as merely past fact. advanced psychic life may stop at the first step, may indulge in retrospection for its own sake, and not for its immediate value in understanding the experienceable, but primitive emotion is ever an alertness and anticipatory readiness.

if, now, we turn to some classification of the anger group in itself and in its general relation to emotion, we obtain something like the following:—

158

emotion. reaction to injurious. regressive—fear.

aggressive—anger.

reaction to beneficial. receptive.

appropriative.

anger simple anger or wrath.

intensive—rage or fury.

incipient—displeasure.

mild—irritation.

response to purposive injury—hate.

altruistic—indignation.

sentiment—indignation and hate.

retrospective—resentment.

revenge.

sub-hate—detestation.

despite.

scorn.

but few remarks need to be added to elucidate the outline. exasperation is plainly a late form of anger. it belongs to the period when anger has been subjected to will restraint, and when something passes all bounds of forbearance—is “perfectly maddening”—we are exasperated. anger of a high and peculiar intensity produced by special and repeated provocation is known as exasperation. for intensive hate there seems no special word, at least, in english, though we denote it by adjective as bitter, malignant, virulent. detest sometimes means strong hatred. malice is not an emotion; it is a state of mind which is implied in hate, namely, deliberate intent to injure. we do not say we feel malicious; but if we hate, we are malicious. malice is merely an objective term for a will element in hate, and denotes character of act.

the sight of injury done to others produces indignation. when law or principle injured and violated excites indignation or hate, we have that feeling for the abstract—rarely 159pure—which is termed sentiment. he who is indignant at injustice and he who hates sin have risen to the highest evolution of the anger group. for an account of resentment and revenge see chapter on retrospective emotion. in the earlier stages both anger and hate are rather undiscriminating as to rank or status of opposing object, but in later evolution there must be a sense of equality. when we consider the offending ones as entirely below us, as unworthy of our anger or hate, we detest or despise. our relations with them may compel us to notice them and to have some feeling toward them, but we would not lower ourselves to fight them. to detest is to feel a strong revulsion, but it also in measure has a direct objective movement. still, although detestation, despising, scorn, contempt, are by no means so actively aggressive as the other members of the group, they have evidently a direct affiliation with hate and anger. in all these there is direct repulse of all relation with what is below us, a position holding off and looking down upon the offending object as too small and mean for us to seriously oppose.

we cannot at present elaborate more fully an analysis, a genetic investigation, nor a classification, of what must appear to every attentive student of mind as a most important and extraordinary group of psychic phenomena. in all the lower psychic life with every perception comes an emotion reaction, very generally either of a fear or anger character. everything perceived has a definite life meaning, nothing is indifferent, and, in fact, primitive perception cannot exist except as prompting and being prompted by emotion or feeling. for the low psychism there is no such vast collection of practically indifferent objects, a world of things, as maintains a constant and large place in advanced psychism. lower mental life is piecemeal, inconsequent and broken, and wholly directed by feeling phases. every object has its place only in relation to self-interest, as favouring or injuring. this is 160impressed upon those who have made any study of lower human types, and of wild animals, where your very presence, no matter how accidental and really meaningless, is construed as suggesting detriment, and suspicion is aroused, a preparatory stage to some fear or anger exhibition, one of those being often nascent, though sometimes not very active owing to the lack of full certainty as to your injuriousness. for the savage, who is incapable of disinterestedness, and wholly given up to self-seeking, the missionary and scientist must have some hidden personal motive, some intent to take advantage of them, and profit by them. from the first they are regarded with fear, anger, or hate. the strange and peculiar is hated merely for being unlike the self, and all non-conformity means personal slight and insult. with primitive psychism all objects are coloured by a strong emotion light, and this remains a tendency till the latest stages of evolution.

anger and hate have by no means spent their force, even for human evolution in some of its more advanced forms. we all recognise the necessity of “spirit” to success. the one who is incapable of anger and of venting it powerfully is a weakling, and will be trodden under foot in the battle of life. the high sense of personal honour and advantage, which will brook no insult with impunity, or allow no injury to go unpunished and unresented, is still the sine qua non of worldly success. show anger, hate, and defiance to all those who invade your rights; stand up and fight the battle of life against every oncomer, and secure and hold the position against all competitors. in the natural course of events—the struggle for self-conservation and self-aggrandizement—the meek do not inherit the earth, but rather those who are irascibly aggressive.

the most notable revolution in human history against the general course of evolution which we have been considering has come from christianity. the world says, “if any one smite you on the cheek, hit him between the 161eyes”; the nazarene says, “offer him the other cheek also”; the world says, “if any one takes away your cloak, fall upon him and despoil him of his all”; the nazarene says, “give him your coat also”; the world says, “hate your enemies”; the nazarene says, “love your enemies, bless them which curse you, and do good to them that despitefully use you.” the law of natural evolution by fear, anger, hate, strife, is replaced by a new law of a spiritual evolution through forbearance, humility, love, loyalty to truth, to beauty, to goodness, and to holiness in a kingdom not of this “world.” life consists, not in making friends and fighting enemies, but in a fight with one’s self to realize unselfish ideals, to exemplify the highest principles and laws, and to achieve the largest and best work, without regard to self-conservation or self-aggrandizement. in this radically new evolution the mind is for itself, and is not, as in the lower evolution, merely a utilitarian factor, subservient to the general demands of life. life, on the contrary, here becomes subservient to the development of mentality purely for its own sake. thus pure science, art for art’s sake, an independent morality and religion, become possible. the greatest minds of the race are those who have lived most completely this highest life; but this new form scarcely touches the great bulk of humanity, and is very partially developed even in the so-called highest classes.

but it is not our present purpose to survey the higher evolution, or to point out its rationale. for the lower evolution, however, it is tolerably evident that fear, anger and hate, give the dominant tone to psychic life. these strong, direct emotions act as fundamental life factors; without them the individual would be quickly overwhelmed in the struggle for existence. the conditions of early life absolutely require these simple, na?ve emotions to stimulate advantageous reactions. emotional indifferentism is possible only as an artificial and by-product, a 162sort of disease or abnormal symptom even in the very latest phases of human evolution. the comparative psychology of the future will show more and more clearly and fully the nature and function of both the fear and anger groups as factors in biologic evolution.