methods of

securing command

i. on obtaining a decision

whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, whether it be limited or unlimited, permanent and general command of the sea is the condition of ultimate success. the only way of securing such a command by naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better. that was the old british creed. it is still our creed, and needs no labouring. no one will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass with confidence to the conclusion that the first business of our fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.

no maxim can so well embody the british spirit of making war upon the sea, and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that spirit. to examine its claim to be the logical conclusion of our theory of war will even be held dangerous, yet nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become a substitute for judgment. let us examine its credentials, and as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern instances.

both of them, it must be noted, were instances of limited war, the most usual form of our own activities, and indeed the only one to which our war organisation, with its essential [pg 168] preponderance of the naval element, has ever been really adapted. the first instance is the spanish-american war, and the second that between russia and japan.

in the former case the americans took up arms in order to liberate cuba from spanish domination—a strictly limited object. there is no evidence that the nature of the war was ever clearly formulated by either side, but in just conformity with the general political conditions the american war plan aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial object. at the earliest possible moment they intended to establish themselves in the west of cuba in support of the colonial insurgents. everything depended on the initiative being seized with decision and rapidity. its moral and physical importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the conformation of the sea which the american army had to pass, that a strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet could reduce the risk almost to security. yet so unwisely dominated were the americans by recently rediscovered maxims, that when on the eve of executing the vital movement they heard a spanish squadron was crossing the atlantic, their own covering force was diverted from its defensive position and sent away to "seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it."

puerto rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, and thither admiral sampson was permitted to go, regardless of the elementary truth that in such cases what is obvious to you is also usually obvious to your enemy. the result was that not only did the americans fail to get contact, but they also uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the initial movement. in the end it was only pure chance [pg 169] that permitted them to retrieve the mistake they had made. had the spanish squadron put into a cuban port in railway communication with the main royalist army, such as cienfuegos or havana, instead of hurrying into santiago, the whole campaign must have been lost. "it appears now," wrote admiral mahan, in his lessons of the war with spain, "not only that the eastward voyage of our havana division was unfortunate, but it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake, because inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the conditions. the principle is that which condemns eccentric movements. by the disregard of rule in this case we uncovered both havana and cienfuegos, which it was our object to close to the enemy's division."

whether or not we regard admiral mahan's exposition of the error as penetrating to the real principle that was violated, the movement was in fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. had the americans been content to keep their fleet concentrated in its true defensive position, not only would they have covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of the territorial objective, but they would have had a far better chance of bringing the spaniards to action. the spaniards were bound to come to them or remain outside the theatre of operations where they could in no way affect the issue of the war except adversely to themselves by sapping the spirit of their own cuban garrison. it is a clear case of the letter killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted [pg 170] to shut the door upon judgment. strategical offence in this case was not the best defence. "seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to end in a blow in the air, which not only would fail to gain any offensive result, but would sacrifice the main defensive plank in the american war plan upon which their offensive relied for success. to stigmatise such a movement as merely eccentric is to pass very lenient censure.

in the russo-japanese war we have a converse case, in which judgment kept the aphorism silent. it is true that during the earlier stage of the naval operations the japanese did in a sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so far as they advanced their base close to port arthur; but this was done, not with any fixed intention of destroying the russian fleet—there was small hope of that at sea—but rather because by no other means could they cover the army's lines of passage, which it was the function of the fleet to secure, the true offensive operations being on land. never except once, under express orders from tokio, did either admiral togo or admiral kamimura press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. still less in the later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the baltic fleet, did admiral togo "seek it out." he was content, as the americans should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. so he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby he rendered it, as [pg 171] certain as war can be, that when the moment for the tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent.

clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral exhilaration, for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment. trusty servant as it is, it will make a bad master, as the americans found to their serious jeopardy. yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other aphorism does, the secret of british success at sea. we cannot do without it; we cannot do with it in its nakedness. let us endeavour to clothe it with its real meaning, with the true principles that it connotes. let us endeavour to determine the stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when it was born of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest masters.

the germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned which drake wrote from plymouth at the end of march in 1588. his arguments were not purely naval, for it was a combined problem, a problem of defence against invasion, that had to be solved. what he wished to persuade the government was, that the kernel of the situation was not so much parma's army of invasion in flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in spain to clear its passage. the government appeared to be acting on the opposite view. howard with the bulk of the fleet was at the base in the medway within supporting distance of the light squadron that was blockading the flemish ports in concert with the dutch. drake himself with another light squadron had been sent to the westward [pg 172] with some indeterminate idea of his serving as an observation squadron, or being used in the mediaeval fashion for an eccentric counterstroke. being invited to give his opinion on this disposition, he pronounced it vicious. in his eyes, what was demanded was an offensive movement against the enemy's main fleet. "if there may be such a stay or stop made," he urged, "by any means of this fleet in spain, so that they may not come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the prince of parma have such a check thereby as were meet." what he had in his mind is clearly not so much a decision in the open as an interruption of the enemy's incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected the previous year. for later on he says that "next under god's mighty protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good, wherein i most humbly beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." he does not say "destroy." "impeach" meant "to prevent."

clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the spanish mobilisation and "impeach" the armada from sailing. he did not even ask for a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient. the actual reasons he gave for his advice were purely moral—that is, he dwelt on the enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of waiting to be attacked. the nation, he urged, "will be persuaded that the lord will put [pg 173] into her majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear invasion, but to seek god's enemies and her majesty's where they may be found."

here is the germ of the maxim. the consequence of his despatch was a summons to attend the council. the conference was followed, not by the half measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in such cases. the whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of parma's transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the channel instead of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the armada the weather gage. no movement to the coast of spain was permitted—not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or failure to grasp drake's idea, but for fear that, as in the recent american case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action.

when, however, the sailing of the armada was so long delayed drake's importunity was renewed, with that of howard and all his colleagues to back it. it brought eventually the desired permission. the fleet sailed for coru?a, where it was known the armada, after an abortive start from lisbon, had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the government feared happened. before it could reach its destination it met southerly gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to plymouth impotent for immediate action as the armada finally sailed. when the spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling. it was only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that [pg 174] the situation was saved, and howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy.

so far, then, the government's cautious clinging to a general defensive attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's fleet, was justified, but it must be remembered that drake from the first had insisted it was a question of time as well as place. if he had been permitted to make the movement when he first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the final stages of the spanish mobilisation could not have been carried out that year; that is to say, the various divisions of the armada could not have been assembled into a fleet. but information as to its condition was at the time very uncertain, and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, there were, moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed.

the principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of "seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative, and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation is complete. the idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the elizabethan admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the armada was by its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled down.

in our next naval struggle with the dutch in the latter half of the seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became fully developed. it was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the principles of seeking out and destroying. it was a case of a purely naval struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval strategy. it was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of missing contact which had cramped the elizabethans in their oceanic theatre was a negligible factor. yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out" maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves.

[pg 175]

the first war opened without any trace of the new principle. the first campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely incidental to the process. no one appears to have realised the fallacy of such method except, perhaps, tromp. the general instructions he received were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to the english," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the damage and offence of the english fleet, and also to give convoy to the west." seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked for more definite instructions. what, for instance, was he to do if he found a chance of blockading the main english fleet at its base? was he to devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue his escort duty? full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty—too often forgotten—that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not solve the problem of control of the sea. no fresh instructions were forthcoming to clear his perplexity, and he could only protest again. "i could wish," he wrote, "to be so fortunate as to have only one of these two duties—to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to do both is attended with great difficulties."

the indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this lack of strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an [pg 176] end with tromp's partial defeat of blake off dungeness on 30th november 1652. though charged in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the dutch admiral had sent it back to ostend when he found blake was in the downs, and then, free from all preoccupation, he had gone to seek out his enemy.

it was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the strong military insight of the cromwellian government that led to those famous reforms which made this winter so memorable a landmark in british naval history. monk, the most finished professional soldier in the english service, and deane, another general, were joined in the command with blake, and with their coming was breathed into the sea service the high military spirit of the new model army. to that winter we owe not only the articles of war, which made discipline possible, and the first attempt to formulate fighting instructions, in which a regular tactical system was conceived, but also two other conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval warfare. one was the conviction that war upon the sea meant operations against the enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy his power of naval resistance as distinguished from operations by way of reprisal against his trade; and the other, that such warfare required for its [pg 177] effective use a fleet of state-owned ships specialised for war, with as little assistance as possible from private-owned ships. it was not unnatural that all four ideas should have taken shape together, so closely are they related. the end connotes the means. discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships were indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the term.

the results were seen in the three great actions of the following spring, the first under the three generals, and the other two under monk alone. in the last, he carried the new ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of disabled vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. all were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would permit. in like manner the second war was characterised by three great naval actions, one of which, after monk had resumed command, lasted no less than four days. the new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. so entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. in our own case at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought was given to sustaining it by reliefs. consequently our offensive power suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, and the dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own trade, but to strike severely at ours. their counterstrokes culminated in the famous attack upon sheerness and chatham. that such an opportunity was allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. in the belief of the british government the "st. [pg 178] james's fight"—the last of the three actions—had settled the question of command. negotiations for peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great battles in preying on dutch trade. having done its work, as was believed, the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused doctrine. the lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities.

the truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to destroy the enemy's fleet. the most valuable lesson of the war was that such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. in such conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked for without very special strategical preparation. the new doctrine in fact gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. it was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a way as to lead to decisive action. merely to seek him out on his own coasts was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. measures had to be taken to force him to sea away from his own bases. the favourite device was to substitute organised strategical operations against his trade in place of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a position calculated to stop his trade altogether, not on his own coasts, but far to sea in the main fairway. the operations failed for lack of provision for enabling the fleet by systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it was [pg 179] the germ of the system which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to prove so effective, and to produce such actions as the "glorious first of june."

in the third war, after this device had failed again and again, a new one was tried. it was charles the second's own conception. his idea was to use the threat of a military expedition. some 15,000 men in transports were brought to yarmouth in the hope that the dutch would come out to bar their passage across the open north sea, and would thus permit our fleet to cut in behind them. there was, however, no proper coordination of the two forces, and the project failed.

this method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; anson tried to use it in the seven years' war. for two years every attempt to seek out the enemy's fleet had led to nothing but the exhaustion of our own. but when pitt began his raids on the french coast, anson, who had little faith in their value for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval possibilities. accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in command of the channel fleet to cover the expedition against st. malo, he raised the blockade of brest, and took up a position near the isle of batz between the enemy's main fleet and the army's line of passage. the brest fleet, however, was in no condition to move, and again there was no result. it was not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device succeeding, and then it was not used deliberately. it was a joint anglo-russian expedition in the mediterranean that forced from napoleon his reckless order for villeneuve to put to sea from cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which nelson had seen no issue. lissa may be taken as an analogous [pg 180] case. but there the italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to be surprised by the austrian fleet and defeated.

this instance serves well to introduce the important fact, that although our own military expeditions have seldom succeeded in leading to a naval decision, the converse was almost always true. the attempt of the enemy to use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our great naval victories. the knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or interests, should always be welcomed. unless history belie herself, we know that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. we have the memories of la hogue, quiberon, and the nile to assure us that sooner or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real decision is all we can ask of the fortune of war.

enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. what the maxim really means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will permit. if the main offensive is military, as it was in the japanese and american cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be subordinated to the movement of [pg 181] the army, otherwise we give the defensive precedence of the offensive. if, however, the military offensive cannot be ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move must be to secure naval contact.

the vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. if we assume the maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's dispositions and movements. it is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. it was one of the fallacies that underlay all napoleon's naval combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave in this guileless manner. but nothing was further from their cunning. there is a typical order of cornwallis's which serves well to mark their attitude. it was one he gave to admiral cotton, his second in command, in july 1804 on handing over to his charge the western squadron off ushant: "if the french put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they have taken. if you leave the entrance of the channel without protection, the enemy might profit by it, and assist the invasion which threatens his majesty's dominions, the protection of which is your principal object."

it is indeed a common belief that nelson never permitted himself but a single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and that, ignoring the caution which cornwallis impressed upon cotton, he fell into the simple trap. but it has to be noted that he never suffered himself to be led in pursuit of a fleet away from the position he had been charged to maintain, unless and until he had made that position secure behind him. his famous chase to the west indies is the case [pg 182] which has led to most misconception on the point from an insufficient regard to the surrounding circumstances. nelson did not pursue villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object of bringing him to action. his dominant object was to save jamaica from capture. if it had only been a question of getting contact, he would certainly have felt in a surer position by waiting for villeneuve's return off st. vincent or closing in to the strategical centre off ushant. further, it must be observed that nelson by his pursuit did not uncover what it was his duty to defend. the mediterranean position was rendered quite secure before he ventured on his eccentric movement. finally, we have the important fact that though the moral effect of nelson's implacable persistence and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to show that as a mere strategical movement it had any influence on the course of the campaign. his appearance in the west indies may have saved one or two small islands from ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. it may also have hastened villeneuve's return by a few days, but that was not to our advantage. had he returned even a week later there would have been no need to raise the rochefort blockade. barham would have had enough ships at his command to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended to do till the curieux's news of villeneuve's precipitate return forced his hand before he was ready.

if we desire a typical example of the way the old masters used the doctrine of seeking out, it is to be found, not in [pg 183] nelson's magnificent chase, but in the restrained boldness of barham's orders to cornwallis and calder. their instructions for seeking out villeneuve were to move out on his two possible lines of approach for such a time and such a distance as would make decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if contact were missed, would ensure the preservation of the vital defensive positions. barham was far too astute to play into napoleon's hands, and by blindly following his enemy's lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position which his enemy wished to secure. if our maxim be suffered to usurp the place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable result will be that it will lead us into just the kind of mistake which barham avoided.

ii. blockade

under the term blockade we include operations which vary widely in character and in strategical intention. in the first place, blockade may be either naval or commercial. by naval blockade we seek either to prevent an enemy's armed force leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts to sea. that armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist wholly or in part of a military expedition. if it be purely naval, then our blockade is a method of securing command. if it be purely military, it is a method of exercising command, and as such will be dealt with when we come to consider defence against invasion. but in so far as military expeditions are normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent their sailing are not purely concerned with the exercise of command. naval blockade, therefore, may be regarded for practical purposes as a method of securing command and as a function of battle-squadrons. commercial blockade, on the other hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is mainly an affair of cruisers. its [pg 184] immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's sea-borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying him the use of trade communications.

from the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we have two well-defined categories of blockade, naval and commercial. but our classification must go further; for naval blockade itself is equally varied in intention, and must be subdivided. strictly speaking, the term implies a desire to close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to sea. but this was not always the intention. as often as not our wish was that he should put to sea that we might bring him to action, and in order to do this, before he could effect his purpose, we had to watch the port with a fleet more or less closely. for this operation there was no special name. widely as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually called blockade, and nelson's protest against the consequent confusion of thought is well known. "it is not my intention," he said, "to close-watch toulon"; and again, "my system is the very contrary of blockading. every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea." it is desirable, therefore, to adopt terms to distinguish the two forms. "close" and "open" express the antithesis suggested by nelson's letter, and the two terms serve well enough to mark the characteristic feature of each operation. close blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, is generally regarded as no longer practicable; but the antithetical ideas, which the two forms of blockade connote, can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. it must always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is chiefly concerned.

with regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it [pg 185] should be eliminated from an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and postponed to that section of exercising command which deals with the attack and defence of trade. it is, however, necessary to treat certain of its aspects in conjunction with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a rule naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate commercial blockade; and the other, that the commercial form, though its immediate object is the exercise of control, has almost invariably an ulterior object which is concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports closed, its ulterior object was to force his fleet to sea.

commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation with naval blockade in its open form. we adopt that form when we wish his fleet to put to sea, and commercial blockade is usually the most effective means we have of forcing upon him the movement we leave him free to attempt. by closing his commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which the command of the sea can give us. we choke the flow of his national activity afloat in the same way that military occupation of his territory chokes it ashore. he must, therefore, either tamely submit to the worst which a naval defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release himself. he may see fit to choose the one course or the other, but in any case we can do no more by naval means alone to force our will upon him.

in the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end will be far and costly. as a rule, therefore, we have found that where we had a substantial predominance our enemy preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later on be in a better position to come out into the open. that he should come out and stake the issue in battle was nearly always our wish, and it was obvious that too rigorous [pg 186] a naval blockade was not the way to achieve the desired end, or to reap the strategical result which we might expect from paralysing his commerce. consequently where the desire for a decision at sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in the case of imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an important expedition in hand, it was to our interest to incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder choice.

the means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, either by leading him to believe the blockading force was smaller than it was, or by removing it to such a distance as would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. a leading case of such an open blockade was nelson's disposition of his fleet off cadiz when he was seeking to bring villeneuve to action in 1805. but merely to leave a port open does not fulfil the idea of open blockade, and in this case to opportunity and temptation nelson added the pressure of a commercial blockade of the adjacent ports in hope of starving villeneuve into the necessity of taking to the sea.

finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have to observe that close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and temporary command. its dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a certain area and for a certain purpose. whereas open blockade, in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval force, is a definite step towards securing permanent command.

enough has now been said to show that the question of choice between close and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. our naval literature, it is true, presents the old masters as divided into two schools on the subject, implying that one was in favour of the close form always, and the other of the open form. we are even led to believe that the choice depended on the military spirit of the officer concerned. if his military spirit was high, he chose the close and [pg 187] more exacting form; if it were low, he was content with the open and less exacting form. true, we are told that men of the latter school based their objections to close blockade on the excessive wear and tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often suggested that this attitude was no more than a mask for a defective spirit. seldom if ever are we invited to compare their decisions with the attendant strategical intention, with the risks which the conditions justified, or with the expenditure of energy which the desired result could legitimately demand. yet all these considerations must enter into the choice, and on closer examination of the leading cases it will be found that they bear a striking and almost constant relation to the nature of the blockade employed.

in considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept in mind. firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, our position must be such as will give him an opportunity of doing so. secondly, since we desire contact for a decisive battle, that position must be no further away from his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can effect his purpose. thirdly, there is the idea of economy—that is, the idea of adopting the method which is least exhausting to our fleet, and which will best preserve its battle fitness. it is on the last point that the greatest difference of opinion has existed. a close blockade always tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. but, on the other hand, it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated by the high temper and moral domination which the maintenance of a close blockade produces in a good fleet, whereas the comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended to deterioration. before considering these opposed views, one warning is necessary. it is usually assumed that the alternative to close blockade is watching the enemy from one of our own ports, but this is not essential. what is required is an interior and, if possible, a secret position which will render contact certain; and with modern developments in the means of distant communication, [pg 188] such a position is usually better found at sea than in port. a watching position can in fact be obtained free from the strain of dangerous navigation and incessant liability to attack without sacrifice of sea training. with this very practical point in mind, we may proceed to test the merits of the two forms on abstract principles.

it was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of the weakest and least desirable forms of war. here again when we say "weakest" we do not mean "least effective," but that it was exhausting, and that it tended to occupy a force greater than that against which it was acting. this was not because a blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and with great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on to engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from port, but because in order to maintain its active efficiency it required large reserves for its relief. so severe was the wear and tear both to men and ships, that even the most strenuous exponents of the system considered that at least a fifth of the force should always be refitting, and in every case two admirals were employed to relieve one another. in 1794 one of the highest authorities in the service considered that to maintain an effective close blockade of brest two complete sets of flag-officers were necessary, and that no less than one-fourth of the squadron should always be in port.16

now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily affected the appreciation of its value. the weight [pg 189] of the objection tended of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved, but it was always a factor. it is true also that it seems to have had more weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was far from being the sole determinant.

it was in the seven years' war under anson's administration that continuous and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was hawke who originated it. in the first three campaigns the old system of watching brest from a british western port had been in vogue, but it had twice failed to prevent a french concentration in the vital canadian theatre. in the spring of 1759 hawke was in command of the channel fleet with the usual instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to torbay. his reason was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for the west indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to let it put to sea and try to catch it. in other words, he argued that none of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the usual french route from brest to the west indies.

since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home waters and avoid dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. in spite of extraordinarily bad weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised. with boscawen as relief, the [pg 190] new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire success. but it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact that the french made no further effort to cross the atlantic, than to the fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent their doing so. in certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise the blockade and run to torbay or plymouth. such temporary reversions to the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the french to get away to the southward with two or three days' start. against any attempt, however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was unaffected by the intervals of the open form.

it may have been these considerations which in the war of american independence induced so fine an officer as howe to be strongly in favour of a reversion to the old system. the vital theatre was then again across the atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion. it should also be borne in mind in judging howe against hawke, that in the seven years' war we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically inferior to the hostile coalition. since it was impossible to prevent the french reaching the west indies and north america if they so determined, our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force as low as that policy demanded [pg 191] and as was consistent with a reasonable degree of safety. the force required might well be inferior to the enemy, since it was certain that all attempts upon the channel would be made with an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of spanish and french units.

in howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by attempting to close brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet. he did not consider it was in his power to close the port. the enemy, he held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "an enemy," he said, "is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a barely superior squadron." the experience of 1805 appears to contradict him. then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing ganteaume's exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency. it was, moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to escape. after may 20th, ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. there were certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have escaped to the southward had napoleon wished it.

this case, then, cannot be taken to condemn howe's judgment. [pg 192] his special function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength, to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters. it was certainly not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal. his first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. to this end he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at spithead or st. helen's, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those of the enemy. kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by lack of spirit or love of ease. so far as the summer was concerned there was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells of bad weather. even for the winter the two policies came to much the same thing. thus in hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical month from mid-october to mid-november, he was unable to keep his station for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with conflans it was from torbay and not ushant. still it may be doubted if without the confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of quiberon would have been fought as it was.

[pg 193]

with all this experience fresh in his mind kempenfelt frankly advocated keeping the fleet in port for the winter. "suppose," he wrote from torbay in november 1779, "the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is, from brest)—a thing much to be wished for by us—let us act wisely and keep ours in port. leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales. they will do more in favour of you than your fleet can." far better he thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign so as to have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "let us," he concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the motions of the enemy. i don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at torbay ready to act as intelligence may suggest."17 it will be seen, therefore, that the conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be accepted too hastily. the reasons which induced howe and kempenfelt to prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration. having in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the force available.

on the other hand, we have the fact that during the war of american independence the open system was not very successful. but before condemning it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not all inherent in the system. in the first place, the need of relieving gibraltar from time to time prevented the western squadron devoting [pg 194] itself entirely to its watch. in the next place, owing to defective administration the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet to be first in the field in the spring. finally, we have to recognise that the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the french to cross the atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact was obtained at their destination. obviously there is nothing to be said for the policy of "seeking out" as against that of preventing exit unless you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. it was here that rodney and his fellows were found wanting. the system failed from defective execution quite as much as from defective design.

in the next war howe was still in the ascendant and in command of the channel fleet. he retained his system. leaving brest open he forced the french by operating against their trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded with the battle of the first of june. no attempt was made to maintain a close blockade during the following winter. the french were allowed to sail, and their disastrous cruise of january 1795 fully justified kempenfelt's anticipations. so great was the damage done that they abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. howe's system was continued, but no longer with entirely successful results. in 1796 the french were able to make descents upon ireland, and howe in consequence has come in for the severest castigations. his method is contemptuously contrasted with that which st. vincent adopted [pg 195] four years later, without any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and again on the assumption that the closing of brest would have solved the one problem as well as it did the other.

in 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. the french fleet had been practically destroyed. no invasion threatened. with a view to forcing peace our policy was directed to offensive action against french trade and territory in order by general pressure to back our overtures for a settlement. the policy may have been mistaken, but that is not the question. the question is, whether or not the strategy fitted the policy. we were also, it must be remembered, at war with holland and expecting war with spain, an eventuality which forced us to keep an eye on the defence of portugal. in these circumstances nothing was further from our desire than to keep what was left of the brest fleet in port. our hope was by our offensive action against french maritime interests to force it to expose itself for their defence. to devote the fleet to the closing of brest was to cripple it for offensive action and to play the enemy's game. the actual disposition of the home fleet was designed so as to preserve its offensive activity, and at the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the home waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. it was distributed in three active squadrons, one in the north sea, one before brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a strong reserve at portsmouth. it is the location of the reserve that has been most lightly ridiculed, on the hasty assumption that it was merely the reserve of the squadron before brest; whereas in truth it was a general reserve [pg 196] designed to act in the north sea or wherever else it might be needed. at the same time it served as a training and depot squadron for increasing our power at sea in view of the probable addition of the spanish fleet to napoleon's naval force. to have exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving brest which might equally well leave the texel or dunkirk was just what the enemy would have desired. the disposition was in fact a good example of concentration—that is, disposal about a strategical centre to preserve flexibility for offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive that howe's dispositions at this time have been most roundly condemned.

in the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing of part of the force intended for ireland, but it made the venture so difficult that it had to be deferred till mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered evasion possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of serious success. it was, in fact, another example of the working of kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. so far as naval defence can go, the disposition was all that was required. the irish expedition was seen leaving brest by our inshore cruiser squadron. it was reported to colpoys, who had the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog that enabled it to escape. it was, in fact, nothing more than the evasion of a small raiding force—an eventuality against which no naval defence can provide certain guarantee, especially in winter.

it was under wholly different conditions that at the end of 1800 hawke's system was revived. st. vincent's succession [pg 197] to the control of the fleet coincided with napoleon's definite assumption of the control of the destinies of france. our great duel with him had begun. the measures he was taking made it obvious we were once more facing the old life and death struggle for naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, and we had a distinct preponderance at sea. in short, we have to recognize the fact that the methods of the seven years' war were revived when the problems and factors of that war were renewed. as those problems grew more intense, as they did after the peace of amiens, and the threat of invasion became really formidable, so did the rigour of the close blockade increase. under cornwallis and gardner it was maintained in such a way as to deny, so far as human effort could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. in spite of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in detail no risks were taken to bring ganteaume to decisive action. our first necessity was absolute local command. the acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded that the brest fleet should be kept in port, and every time ganteaume showed a foot the british admiral flew at him and drove him back. once only during the continuation of the crisis was the rigour of this attitude relaxed, and that was to deal with what for the moment was the higher object. it was to meet villeneuve on his return from the west indies, but even then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that ganteaume was given no time to take advantage of it.

[pg 198]

the analogy between the conditions of the blockade which st. vincent inaugurated and those of the seven years' war becomes all the more significant when we note that while cornwallis and gardner in home waters were pressing close blockade to its utmost limit of rigour, nelson in the mediterranean was not using it at all. yet with him also the chief concern was to prevent an invasion. his main function, as he and his government saw it, was to prevent a descent from southern france upon neapolitan or levantine territory. why, then, did he not employ close blockade? it is usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the toulon squadron to action. occasional expressions in his letters give colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the defensive duty with which he was charged. close blockade was the most effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close blockade, was absent. he had no such preponderance of force as would enable him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. in the circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with the force at his disposal.

if this case be not considered conclusive as to nelson's views, we have a perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in 1801. it is a particularly strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence against the invasion of england. with several cruiser squadrons he had to prevent the enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from flushing to dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the downs. on the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the admiralty as follows: "i am of opinion, and submit to their lordships' better judgment, that care should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and [pg 199] in good order ... under dungeness to be their principal station.... in fine weather our squadrons to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or drawn into the north sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."18

the case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command. its value is that it gives nelson's views on the broad question of balancing the risks—that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously.

with nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as 1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion. just a year before trafalgar was fought, cornwallis pressed the admiralty for more strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient. lord melville, who at this time had barham at his elbow, replied recommending the "policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to." he protested the means available were insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of [pg 200] winter."19 melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain. "allow me to remind you," he added, "that the occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally been when we were at a distance from the blockading station." in the end, as we know, cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to approve the decision for its moral effect alone. such conflicts must always arise. "war," as wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop the respective advantages of each form. we can never say that close blockade is better than open, or the reverse. it must always be a matter of judgment.

are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice for the strengthening of judgment? certain broad lines of guidance at least are to be traced. the main question will be, is it to our advantage, in regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him to sea for a decision? presumably it will always be our policy to get a decision as soon as possible. still that desire may be overridden by the necessity or special advantage of closely [pg 201] blockading one or more of his squadrons. this situation may arise in two ways. firstly, it may be essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. secondly, even where we are seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade. in this way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to concentrate where we desire his concentration.

for any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there. we have still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the fullest potentialities of that force. close blockade being the more exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade.

finally, there is the question of risk. in the old days, before free movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the flotilla had acquired battle power, there was always to be faced the risk of not getting contact in time to prevent mischief. this consideration was specially dominant where the enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of operations. therefore when the invasion threatened, our developed policy was to blockade brest closely at almost any sacrifice. [pg 202] there was always a vague possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so close to the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary command in the vital area before it could be brought to action. it was a possibility that was never realised in the narrow seas, and since mobility of fleets and means of distant communication have so greatly increased in range and certainty, and since the power of resistance in the flotilla has become so high, the risk is probably much less than ever, and the field for open blockade is consequently less restricted.

there is no need, however, to accept these principles as incontrovertible. even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, which has most firmly dominated thought on the subject ever since, it may be argued with some plausibility that the situation could have been solved more quickly and effectually by letting ganteaume get out from brest into the open, at least as far as admiral togo was forced to permit the russians to emerge from port arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in were even stronger than ours in 1805. but in any case, the whole trend of the evidence will admit no doubt as to the inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. as under modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade have certainly not decreased. it is also probable that certain advantages which in the sailing era went far to compensate for its weakness have lost much of their force. a sailing fleet cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, but, being barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to the highest temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that was its incessant portion. so long as the strain did not pass the limit of human endurance, it was all to the good. in the old days, with very moderate [pg 203] reliefs, the limit was never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant confidence on the day of battle. can we expect the same compensation now? will the balance of strength and weakness remain as it used to be? in the face of the vast change of conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general principles we must turn for the answer.

what, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? strategical theory will at once reply that it is an operation which involves "an arrest of the offensive," a situation which is usually taken to exhibit every kind of drawback. close blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although its object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement to prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation either direct or by way of counterstroke. so far the common tendency to confuse "seeking out the enemy's fleet" with "making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be condoned. but the two operations are widely different in that they have different objectives. in "seeking out," our objective is the enemy's armed force. in "making the enemy's coast our frontier," the objective is inseparable from the ulterior object of the naval war. in this case the objective is the common communications. by establishing a blockade we operate offensively against those communications. we occupy them, and then we can do no more. our offensive is arrested; we cannot carry it on to the destruction of the enemy's fleet. we have to wait in a defensive attitude, holding the communications we have seized, till he chooses to attack in order to break our hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of surprise—the all-important advantage in war—passes by a well recognised rule to our enemy. we, in fact, are held upon the defensive, with none of the material advantages of the defensive. the moral advantage of having taken the initiative remains, but that is all. the advantage which we thus gain will of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the [pg 204] blockaded fleet as it had of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. the degradation of a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart handling of sails. for the blockading fleet it is also true that the effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear, can scarcely be so severe. but, on the other hand, the physical strain to officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so long at least as coal is the chief fuel. the wind no longer sets a measure on the enemy's movements. vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise. furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. it is unnecessary to labour the point. it is too obvious that a close blockade of the old type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use.

what, then, can be done? must we rest content in all situations with howe's system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity? cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? assuredly it can. in old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by means of an inshore squadron. in these days of mobile defence that limit is by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines, that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be established. a blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the japanese blockade of port arthur, will its incidents be materially different. the distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact—the essence [pg 205] of close blockade. but in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that distance relatively. quicker and more certain means of communication between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to bring things back to their old relations. at port arthur they did so entirely. if then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make our dispositions on the principle of close blockade. distances will be greater, but that is all.

nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station off a port in the old manner is not the only means of close blockade. it may still effect its purpose, at least temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block ships—"sinkers," as they used to be called. the latter expedient, it is true, had little success in the latest experiments, but even in the russo-japanese war its possibilities were by no means exhausted. we have therefore to conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in that direction with the means still at our disposal.

if, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in spite of our desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to take risks in order to bring about a decision, the case is not so clear. it will be observed that the looseness which the new conditions force upon close blockade-increasing as they are in intensity year by year-must tend more and more to approximate it in practice to open blockade. the question will therefore present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with the fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade frankly for all purposes. we should thus substitute a true defensive disposition for an arrested offence, and, theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. the practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are [pg 206] equally clear, nor are they less great now than they appeared to howe and kempenfelt. we avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, and this, at least for the necessary flotilla screen, will be greater than anything that had to be faced in former days. we have at least the opportunity of occupying a position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet continually up to its highest striking energy. finally, assuming the geographical conditions give reasonable promise of contact, a quick decision, which modern war demands with ever greater insistence, is more probable. in such a disposition of course contact can rarely be made certain. the enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be anxious to avoid action, will always have a chance of evasion, but this will always be so, even with the closest blockade now possible. we may even go further and claim for open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the better chance of contact. for by adopting the principle of open blockade we shall have, in accordance with the theory of defence, the further advantages of being able the better to conceal our dispositions, and consequently to lay traps for our enemy, such as that which nelson prepared for villeneuve in the gulf of lyons in 1805.

the objection to such a course which appears to have the most weight with current opinion is the moral one, which is inseparable from all deliberate choices of the defensive. if the watching fleet remains in a home fortified base, it may be assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. but the method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. a sound position may well be found at a spot such as admiral [pg 207] togo occupied while waiting for the baltic fleet, and in that case there was no observable degradation of any kind. nor is there much evidence that this objection weighed materially with the opponents of howe's view. their objection was of a purely physical kind. open blockade left the enemy too much freedom to raid our trade routes. the watching system might be sufficient to keep an unwilling battle-fleet in port or to bring a more adventurous one to action, but it could not control raiding squadrons. this was certainly barham's objection. "if," he wrote to pitt in 1794, "the french should have any intention of sending their fleet to sea with this easterly wind, and lord howe continues at torbay, our mediterranean and jamaica convoys are in a very critical situation. both fleets must by this time be drawing near the channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." this danger must always be with us, especially in narrow waters such as the north sea. in more open theatres the difficulty is not so obtrusive, for with sufficient sea room trade may take naturally or by direction a course which our watching dispositions will cover. thus with nelson in the case of toulon, his normal positions on the sardinian coast covered effectually the flow of our trade to the levant and the two sicilies, which was all there was at the time.

the truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open and close blockade we find ourselves confronted with those special difficulties which so sharply distinguish naval warfare from warfare on land. we cannot choose on purely naval considerations. in naval warfare, however great may be our desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, the ulterior object will always obtrude itself. we must from the first do our best to control sea communications, and since those communications are usually common, we cannot refrain [pg 208] from occupying those of the enemy without at the same time neglecting and exposing our own. thus in the case of brest a close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the port were all common, whereas in the region of toulon the main lines were not common except along the coasts of africa and southern italy, and these nelson's open blockade amply secured.

the general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open method. we must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit.