theory of the

method—concentration

and dispersal of

force

from the point of view of the method by which its ends are obtained, strategy is often described as the art of assembling the utmost force at the right time and place; and this method is called "concentration."

at first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, but on analysis it will be found to include several distinct ideas, to all of which the term is applied indifferently. the result is a source of some confusion, even to the most lucid writers. "the word concentration," says one of the most recent of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. we believe, in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into squadrons and squadrons into fleets."11 here in one sentence the word hovers between the formation of fleets and their strategical distribution. similar looseness will embarrass the student at every turn. at one time he will find the word [pg 129] used to express the antithesis of division or dispersal of force; at another, to express strategic deployment, which implies division to a greater or less extent. he will find it used of the process of assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force when the process is complete. the truth is that the term, which is one of the most common and most necessary in strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest causes of conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. no strategical term indeed calls more urgently for a clear determination of the ideas for which it stands.

military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs "concentration" in three senses. it is used for assembling the units of an army after they have been mobilised. in this sense, concentration is mainly an administrative process; logically, it means the complement of the process of mobilisation, whereby the army realises its war organisation and becomes ready to take the field. in a second sense it is used for the process of moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the localities from which operations can best begin. this is a true strategical stage, and it culminates in what is known as strategic deployment. finally, it is used for the ultimate stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a definite line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical deployment—gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated blow.

well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the processes tend to overlap, something more exact is required if we try to extend it to the sea. such extension magnifies the error at every step, and clear thinking becomes difficult. even if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the final stage of mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others which, in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. the essential distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates dispersal with a view to a choice of combinations, [pg 130] is flexibility and free movement. the characteristic of an army massed for a blow is rigidity and restricted mobility. in the one sense of concentration we contemplate a disposal of force which will conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. in the other, strategic concealment is at an end. we have made our choice, and are committed to a definite operation. clearly, then, if we would apply the principles of land concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the term.

which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the ordinary use of the word? the dictionaries define concentration as "the state of being brought to a common point or centre," and this coincides very exactly with the stage of a war plan which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation and the final massing or deployment for battle. it is an incomplete and continuing act. its ultimate consequence is the mass. it is a method of securing mass at the right time and place. as we have seen, the essence of the state of strategic deployment to which it leads is flexibility. in war the choice of time and place will always be influenced by the enemy's dispositions and movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected blow. the merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest number of different points where mass may be required.

it is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline to specialise concentration—qualifying it as "strategic concentration." but even that term scarcely meets the case, for the succeeding process of gathering up the army into a position for tactical deployment is also a strategical concentration. some further specialisation is required. the analytical difference between the two processes is that the first is an operation of major strategy and the other of minor, and if they are [pg 131] to be fully expressed, we have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor strategic concentration."

such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. it serves only to mark that the middle stage differs logically from the third as much as it does from the first. in practice it comes to this. if we are going to use concentration in its natural sense, we must regard it as something that comes after complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of mass.

in naval warfare at least this distinction between concentration and mass is essential to clear appreciation. it leads us to conclusions that are of the first importance. for instance, when once the mass is formed, concealment and flexibility are at an end. the further, therefore, from the formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of concentration the better designed it will be. the less we are committed to any particular mass, and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more formidable our concentration. to concentration, therefore, the idea of division is as essential as the idea of connection. it is this view of the process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has most strongly emphasised. "such," he says, "is concentration reasonably understood—not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will."12 vessels in a state of concentration he compares to a fan that opens and shuts. in this view concentration connotes not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without sacrificing the mutual support of its parts.

[pg 132]

if, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the meaning of the mass, we have left a signification which expresses coherent disposal about a strategical centre, and this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just the working definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic deployment on land. the object of a naval concentration like that of strategic deployment will be to cover the widest possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical centre.

concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any direction. it will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives. concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two tensions—ever shifting in force—which constitutes the greater part of practical strategy.

in naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar significance in the development of a campaign, and at sea it is more clearly detached than ashore. owing to the vast size of modern armies, and the restricted nature of their lines of movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, and forming the battle mass tend to grade into one another without any demarcation of practical value. an army frequently reaches the stage of strategic deployment direct from [pg 133] the mobilisation bases of its units, and on famous occasions its only real concentration has taken place on the battlefield. in continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using the term to cover all three processes. their tendency is always to overlap. but at sea, where communications are free and unrestricted by obstacles, and where mobility is high, they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. the normal course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by a distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre and reaches out in divisions as required. the concentration about that centre may be very far from a mass, and the final formation of the mass will bear no resemblance to either of the previous movements, and will be quite distinct.

but free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, there always exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which clog its freedom of disposition. one source of this friction is commerce protection. however much our war plan may press for close concentration, the need of commerce protection will always be calling for dispersal. the other source is the peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. as the sea knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, so it tells little about those of the enemy. the most distant and widely dispersed points must be kept in view as possible objectives of the enemy. when we add to this that two or more fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is obvious that the variety of combinations is much higher at sea than on land, and variety of combination is in constant opposition to the central mass.

it follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and thereby retains various possibilities of either concentrated or sporadic action, our distribution will be dictated by the need of being able to deal with a variety of combinations and to protect a variety of objectives. our concentrations must therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. history [pg 134] accordingly shows us that the riper and fresher our experience and the surer our grip of war, the looser were our concentrations. the idea of massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. it indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must seek rather to avoid than to inflict defeat. true, advocates of the mass entrench themselves in the plausible conception that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. but this too is an idea of peace. war has proved to the hilt that victories have not only to be won, but worked for. they must be worked for by bold strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent dispersal. they can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and most effective of these is division.

the effect of prolonged peace has been to make "concentration" a kind of shibboleth, so that the division of a fleet tends almost to be regarded as a sure mark of bad leadership. critics have come to lose sight of the old war experience, that without division no strategical combinations are possible. in truth they must be founded on division. division is bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment. it is theoretically wrong to place a section of the fleet in such a position that it may be prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it is encountered by a superior force. such retreats of course can never be made certain; they will always depend in some measure on the skill and resource of the opposing commanders, and on the chances of weather: but risks must be taken. if we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. the great leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he can stretch his concentration. this power of bold and sure adjustment between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory.

in british naval history examples of faulty division are hard to find. the case most commonly cited is an early one. it [pg 135] occurred in 1666 during the second dutch war. monk and rupert were in command of the main fleet, which from its mobilisation bases in the thames and at spithead had concentrated in the downs. there they were awaiting de ruyter's putting to sea in a position from which they could deal with him whether his object was an attack on the thames or to join hands with the french. in this position a rumour reached them that the toulon squadron was on its way to the channel to co-operate with the dutch. upon this false intelligence the fleet was divided, and rupert went back to portsmouth to cover that position in case it might be the french objective. de ruyter at once put to sea with a fleet greatly superior to monk's division. monk, however, taking advantage of thick weather that had supervened, surprised him at [pg 136] anchor, and believing he had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him impetuously. meanwhile the real situation became known. there was no french fleet, and rupert was recalled. he succeeded in rejoining monk after his action with de ruyter had lasted three days. in the course of it monk had been very severely handled and forced to retreat to the thames, and it was generally believed that it was only the belated arrival of rupert that saved us from a real disaster.

the strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand and made to bear the entire blame of the reverse. monk, who as a soldier had proved himself one of the finest strategists of the time, is held to have blundered from sheer ignorance of elementary principles. it is assumed that he should have kept his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least in the opinion of the time this would not have met the case. had he kept the whole to deal with de ruyter, it is probable that de ruyter would not have put to sea, and it is certain portsmouth and the isle of wight would have lain open to the french had they come. if he had moved his mass to deal with the french, he would have exposed the thames to de ruyter. it was a situation that could not be solved by a simple application of what the french call the masse centrale. the only way to secure both places from attack was to divide the fleet, just as in 1801 nelson in the same theatre was compelled to divide his defence force. in neither case was division a fault, because it was a necessity. the fault in monk's and rupert's case was that they extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve cohesion. close cruiser connection should have been maintained between the two divisions, and monk should not have engaged deeply till he felt rupert at his elbow. this we are told was the opinion of most of his flag-officers. they held that he should not have fought when he [pg 137] did. his correct course, on kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on de ruyter so as to prevent his doing anything, and to have slowly fallen back, drawing the dutch after him till his loosened concentration was closed up again. if de ruyter had refused to follow him through the straits, there would have been plenty of time to mass the fleet. if de ruyter had followed, he could have been fought in a position from which there would have been no escape. the fault, in fact, was not strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. monk over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the relative fighting values of the two fleets, and believed he saw his way to victory single-handed. the danger of division is being surprised and forced to fight in inferiority. this was not monk's case. he was not surprised, and he could easily have avoided action had he so desired. to judge such a case simply by using concentration as a touchstone can only tend to set up such questionable habits of thought as have condemned the more famous division which occurred in the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we must deal later.

apart from the general danger of using either words or maxims in this way, it is obviously specially unwise in the case of concentration and division. the current rule is that it is bad to divide unless you have a great superiority; yet there have been numerous occasions when, being at war with an inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the fact that he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to set up something like a deadlock. the main object of our naval operations would then be to break it down. to force an inferior enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost necessary preliminary to securing one of those crushing victories at [pg 138] which we must always aim, but which so seldom are obtained. it is by forcing the enemy to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by sagacious dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. it is by inducing him to mass that we simplify our problem and compel him to choose between leaving to us the exercise of command and putting it to the decision of a great action.

advocates of close concentration will reply that that is true enough. we do often seek to force our enemy to concentrate, but that does not show that concentration is sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must concentrate closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. the maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets concentration, but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim which history flatly contradicts. if the enemy is willing to hazard all on a battle, it is true. but if we are too superior, or our concentration too well arranged for him to hope for victory, then our concentration has almost always had the effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. so certain was this result, that in our old wars, in which we were usually superior, we always adopted the loosest possible concentrations in order to prevent sporadic action. true, the tendency of the french to adopt this mode of warfare is usually set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the irritation which the method caused us, than to sober reasoning. for a comparatively weak belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision which it was our paramount interest to obtain. sporadic action alone could never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of successful minor decisions.

take, now, the leading case of 1805. in that campaign our [pg 139] distribution was very wide, and was based on several concentrations. the first had its centre in the downs, and extended not only athwart the invading army's line of passage, but also over the whole north sea, so as to prevent interference with our trade or our system of coast defence either from the dutch in the texel or from french squadrons arriving north-about. the second, which was known as the western squadron, had its centre off ushant, and was spread over the whole bay of biscay by means of advanced squadrons before ferrol and rochefort. with a further squadron off the coast of ireland, it was able also to reach far out into the atlantic in order to receive our trade. it kept guard, in fact, not only over the french naval ports, but over the approaches to the channel, where were the home terminals of the great southern and western trade-routes. a third concentration was in the mediterranean, whose centre under nelson was at sardinia. it had outlying sub-centres at malta and gibraltar, and covered the whole ground from cape st. vincent outside the straits to toulon, trieste, and the dardanelles. when war broke out with spain in 1804, it was considered advisable to divide this command, and spanish waters outside the straits were held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off cadiz, and whose northern limit was cape finisterre, where it joined the ushant concentration. for reasons which were personal rather than strategical this arrangement was not continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there the same need for it, for the toulon squadron had changed its base to cadiz. by this comprehensive system the whole of the [pg 140] european seas were controlled both for military and trade purposes. in the distant terminal areas, like the east and west indies, there were nucleus concentrations with the necessary connective machinery permanently established, and to render them effective, provision was made by which the various european squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their force to any strength which the movements of the enemy might render necessary.

wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a high degree of cohesion was maintained not only between the parts of each concentration, but between the several concentrations themselves. by means of a minor cruiser centre at the channel islands, the downs and ushant concentrations could rapidly cohere. similarly the cadiz concentration was linked up with that of ushant at finisterre, and but for personal friction and repulsion, the cohesion between the mediterranean and cadiz concentrations would have been equally strong. finally, there was a masterly provision made for all the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the crucial point off ushant before by any calculable chance a hostile mass could gather there.

for napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the sea," the british fleet thus disposed was in a state of concentration that nothing but a stroke of luck beyond the limit of sober calculation could break. decrès and bruix had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered villeneuve [pg 141] when the crisis came. after he had carried the concentration which napoleon had planned so far as to have united three divisions in ferrol, he knew that the outlying sections of our western squadron had disappeared from before ferrol and rochefort. in his eyes, as well as those of the british admiralty, this squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the bay of biscay, had always been in a state of concentration. it was not this which caused his heart to fail. it was the news that nelson had reappeared at gibraltar, and had been seen steering northward. it meant for him that the whole of his enemy's european fleet was in a state of concentration. "their concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the moment more serious than in any previous disposition, and such that they were in a position to meet in superiority the combined forces of brest and ferrol," and for that reason, he explained, he had given up the game as lost. but to napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it was he had to deal with. measuring the elasticity of the british naval distribution by the comparatively cumbrous and restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as a rash and unwarlike dispersal. its looseness seemed to indicate so great a tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open to his scattered squadrons, that he believed by a show of sporadic action he could further disperse our fleet, and then by a close concentration crush the essential part in detail. it was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing us to adopt the loosest concentration, and of our comparative dispersal tempting the enemy to concentrate and hazard a decision. it cannot be said we forced the fatal move upon him intentionally. it was rather the operation of strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. we were determined that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his attack. neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent [pg 142] his attempting to concentrate. every one of his naval ports was watched by a squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration. the escape of one division might well break the chain. but that consideration made no difference. the distribution of our squadrons before his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. their distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force.

the whole of nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main object was the protection of our mediterranean trade and of neapolitan and turkish territory. when villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused not by the prospect of a french concentration, which had no anxieties for him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. it was caused rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate had placed within his reach. he followed villeneuve to the west indies, not to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had missed. lord barham took precisely the same view. when on news of villeneuve's return from the west indies he moved out the three divisions of the western squadron, that is, the ushant concentration, to meet him, he expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but that it was to deter the french from attempting sporadic action. "the interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to europe would be a greater object than any i know. it would damp all future expeditions, and would show to europe that it might be advisable to relax in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting them in our hands at a convenient opportunity."

[pg 143]

indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. it was our best chance of solving effectually the situation we have to confront. our true policy was to secure permanent command by a great naval decision. so long as the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. it was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and its last stage had been reached, that the situation was in our hands. the intricate problem with which we had been struggling was simplified down to closing up our own concentration to the strategical centre off ushant. but at the last stage the enemy could not face the formidable position we held. his concentration was stopped. villeneuve fell back on cadiz, and the problem began to assume for us something of its former intricacy. so long as we held the mass off ushant which our great concentration had produced, we were safe from invasion. but that was not enough. it left the seas open to sporadic action from spanish ports. there were convoys from the east and west indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the mediterranean in jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing from cork. neither barham at the admiralty nor cornwallis in command off ushant hesitated an hour. by a simultaneous induction they both decided the mass must be divided. the concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. napoleon called the move an insigne betise, but it was the move that beat him, and must have beaten him, whatever the skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons never lost touch. he found himself caught in a situation from which there was nothing to hope. his fleet was neither concentrated for a decisive blow nor spread for sporadic action. he had merely simplified his enemy's problem. our hold was surer than ever, and in a desperate attempt to extricate himself he was forced to expose his fleet to the final decision we required.

[pg 144]

the whole campaign serves well to show what was understood by concentration at the end of the great naval wars. to lord barham and the able admirals who interpreted his plans it meant the possibility of massing at the right time and place. it meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, the disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets could condense for massed action in any required direction, and upon which they could fall back when unduly pressed. in this case the ultimate centre was the narrows of the channel, where napoleon's army lay ready to cross, but there was no massing there. so crude a distribution would have meant a purely defensive attitude. it would have meant waiting to be struck instead of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old masters of war.

so far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. the leading case is the home campaign of 1782. it was strictly on defensive lines. our information was that france and spain intended to end the war with a great combined effort against our west indian islands, and particularly jamaica. it was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for offensive action in the caribbean sea everything that was not absolutely needed for home defence. instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the area that was most critical. to do this the home fleet had to be reduced so low relatively to what the enemy had in european waters that offence was out of the question.

while rodney took the offensive area, lord howe was [pg 145] given the other. his task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely to prove a light one. we knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their attack on the west indies with an attempt to control the north sea, and possibly the straits of dover, with a dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen of the line, while a combined franco-spanish fleet of at least forty sail would occupy the mouth of the channel. it was also possible that these two forces would endeavour to form a junction. in any case the object of the joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and thereby force us to neglect the west indian area and the two spanish objectives, minorca and gibraltar. all told we had only about thirty of the line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer.

inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely passive defence. it would not meet the case. something must be done to interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the west indies and against gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home campaign. it was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their line of communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. it would mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we were determined to do what we could to prevent reinforcements from reaching the west indies from brest, to intercept [pg 146] french trade as occasion offered, and, finally, at almost any risk to relieve gibraltar.

in these conditions the defensive concentration was based on a central mass or reserve at spithead, a squadron in the downs to watch the texel for the safety of the north sea trade, and another to the westward to watch brest and interrupt its transatlantic communications. kempenfelt in command of the latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great exploit of capturing guichen's convoy of military and naval stores for the west indies. early in the spring he was relieved by barrington, who sailed on april 5th to resume the ushant position. his instructions were not to fight a superior enemy unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on spithead. he was away three weeks, and returned with a french east india convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line which formed its escort.

up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the great movement from the south. the franco-spanish fleet which had assembled at cadiz was occupied ineffectually in trying to stop small reliefs reaching gibraltar and in covering their own homeward-bound trade. the dutch, however, [pg 147] were becoming active, and the season was approaching for our baltic trade to come home. ross in the north sea had but four of the line to watch the texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger. accordingly early in may the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the north sea. on the 10th howe sailed with barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join ross in the downs, while kempenfelt again took the ushant position. only about half the brest squadron had gone down to join the spaniards at cadiz, and he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, as in barrington's instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to retire up channel under the english coast and join hands with howe. in spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded in holding the french inactive. howe with the same difficulty to face was equally successful. the dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they knew of his movement, and cruising off the texel, he held them there, and kept complete command of the north sea till our baltic trade was safe home.

by the end of may it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the great movement from cadiz was at last about to begin, howe, to whom a certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight to his other wing and close on kempenfelt. the government, however, seemed to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive operations against dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion this was to lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach. he informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from his squadron against the trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be [pg 148] a call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward." in accordance, therefore, with his general instructions he left with ross a strong squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even "to take and destroy," the comparatively weak ships of the dutch, and with the rest returned to the westward.13 his intention was to proceed with all possible expedition to join kempenfelt on the coast of france, but this, owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. kempenfelt was forced to come in, and on june 5th the junction was made at spithead.

for three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move. then came news that the cadiz fleet under langara had sailed the day howe had reached spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea to cut it off from brest. he was too late. before he could get into position the junction between langara and the brest squadron was made, and in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the channel. with the addition of the brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the line, while all [pg 149] howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. three of ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly ready, but for these howe could not wait. the homeward-bound jamaica convoy was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved.

what was to be done? so soon as he sighted the enemy he realised that a successful action was out of the question. early in the morning of july 12th, "being fifteen leagues s.s.e. from scilly," langara with thirty-six of the line was seen to the westward. "as soon," wrote howe, "as their force had been ascertained, i thought proper to avoid coming to battle with them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered to the north to pass between scilly and the land's end. my purpose therein was to get to the westward of the enemy, both for protecting the jamaica convoy and to gain the advantage of situation for bringing them to action which the difference in our numbers renders desirable."

by a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous movement was effected safely that night, and it proved an entire success. till howe was met with and defeated, the allies would not venture into the channel, and his unprecedented feat had effectually thrown them off. assuming apparently that he must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him to the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in ineffective search. meanwhile howe, sending his cruisers ahead to the convoy's rendezvous off the south-west coast of iceland, had taken his whole fleet [pg 150] about two hundred miles west of the skelligs to meet it. northerly winds prevented his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered little. the convoy passed in between him and the south of ireland, and as the enemy had taken a cast down to ushant, it was able to enter the channel in safety without sighting an enemy's sail. ignorant of what had happened, howe cruised for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so particularly necessary on the present occasion." then with his fleet in fine condition to carry out preventive tactics in accordance with kempenfelt's well-known exposition,14 he returned to seek the enemy to the eastward, in order to try to draw them from their station at scilly and open the channel. on his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and with this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the lizard, where his reinforcements were awaiting him. there he found the channel was free. from lack of supplies the enemy had been forced to retire to port, and he returned to spithead to make preparations for the relief of gibraltar. while this work was going on, the north sea squadron was again strengthened that it might resume the blockade of the texel and cover the arrival of the autumn convoys from the baltic. it was done with complete success. not a single ship fell into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the war, ended by howe taking the mass of his force down to gibraltar and performing his remarkable feat of relieving it in the face of the spanish squadron. for the power and reach of a well-designed concentration there can be no finer example.

[pg 151]

if, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for principles to serve as a guide between concentration and division we shall find, firstly, this one. the degree of division we shall require is in proportion to the number of naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are spread. it is a principle which springs from the soul of our old tradition that we must always seek, not merely to prevent the enemy striking at our heart, but also to strike him the moment he attempts to do anything. we must make of his every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. the distribution this aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. in our wars with france, and particularly when spain and holland were in alliance with her, the number of the ports to be dealt with was very considerable and their distribution very wide. in our wars with the dutch alone, on the other hand, the number and distribution were comparatively small, and in this case our concentration was always close.

this measure of distribution, however, will never stand alone. concentration will not depend solely upon the number and position of the enemy's naval ports. it will be modified by the extent to which the lines of operation starting from those ports traverse our own home waters. the reason is plain. whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature of the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. in any circumstances it is essential for the defence of our home trade terminals, and it is essential as a central reserve from which divisions can be thrown off to reinforce distant terminals and to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. it is "the mainspring," as lord barham put it, "from which all offensive operations must proceed." this squadron, then, being permanent and fixed as the foundation of our whole system, it is clear that if, as in the case of the french wars, the enemy's lines of operation do not traverse our home waters, close concentration upon it will not serve our turn. if, on the [pg 152] other hand, as in the case of the dutch wars, the lines do traverse home waters, a home concentration is all that is required. our division will then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he moves. these remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. if such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade, minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas.

next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the number of ports to be watched. for if we do this, we leave the unwatched squadrons free for sporadic action. unless we are sure he intends to concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere effectually with sporadic action. then, sporadic action being denied him, the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate.

the next principle is flexibility. concentration should be so arranged that any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. the object of holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that is open to him. further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. the ideal concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of strength.