wars of

intervention—limited

interference

in unlimited war

before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we have still to deal with a form of it that has not yet been mentioned. clausewitz gave it provisionally the name of "war limited by contingent," and could find no place for it in his system. it appeared to him to differ essentially from war limited by its political object, or as jomini put it, war with a territorial object. yet it had to be taken into account and explained, if only for the part it had played in european history.

for us it calls for the most careful examination, not only because it baffled the great german strategist to reconcile it with his theory of war, but also because it is the form in which great britain most successfully demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a small army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.

the combined operations which were the normal expression of the british method of making war on the limited basis were of two main classes. firstly, there were those designed purely for the conquest of the objects for which we went to war, which were usually colonial or distant oversea territory; [pg 61] and secondly, operations more or less upon the european seaboard designed not for permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and our own position. such operations might take the form of insignificant coastal diversions, or they might rise through all degrees of importance till, as in wellington's operations in the peninsula, they became indistinguishable in form from regular continental warfare.

it would seem, therefore, that these operations were distinguished not so much by the nature of the object as by the fact that we devoted to them, not the whole of our military strength, but only a certain part of it which was known as our "disposal force." consequently, they appear to call for some such special classification, and to fall naturally into the category which clausewitz called "war limited by contingent."

it was a nature of war well enough known in another form on the continent. during the eighteenth century there had been a large number of cases of war actually limited by contingent—that is, cases where a country not having a vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief belligerent with an auxiliary force of a stipulated strength.

it was in the sixth chapter of his last book that clausewitz intended to deal with this anomalous form of hostility. his untimely death, however, has left us with no more than a fragment, in which he confesses that such cases are "embarrassing to his theory." if, he adds, the auxiliary force were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief belligerent, the problem would be simple enough. it would then, in effect, be the same thing as unlimited war with the aid of a subsidised force. but in fact, as he observes, this seldom happened, for the contingent was always more or less controlled in [pg 62] accordance with the special political aims of the government which furnished it. consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in reaching was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into account, and that it was a form of limited war that appeared to differ essentially from war limited by object. we are left, in fact, with an impression that there must be two kinds of limited war.

but if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases in which this nature of war was successful, and those in which it was unsuccessful, we shall find that wherever success is taken as an index of its legitimate employment, the practical distinction between the two kinds of limited war tends to disappear. the indications are that where the essential factors which justify the use of war limited by object are present in war limited by contingent, then that form of war tends to succeed, but not otherwise. we are brought, in fact, to this proposition, that the distinction "limited by contingent" is not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line with the theory in hand—that, in reality, it is not a form of war, but a method which may be employed either for limited or unlimited war. in other words, war limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a legitimate form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the other. either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the force making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should be given a definite territorial object, with an independent organisation and an independent limited function.

our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent or war with "a disposal force" attains the highest success when it approaches most closely to true limited war—that is, as in the case of the peninsula and the crimea, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite piece of territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by naval action. its operative power, in fact, appears to bear some direct relation to the intimacy with which naval and [pg 63] military action can be combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its intrinsic power.

if, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited by contingent, it seems necessary to distinguish between the continental and the british form of it. the continental form, as we have seen, differs but little in conception from unlimited war. the contingent is furnished at least ostensibly with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its objective will be the enemy's organised forces or his capital. or it may be that the contingent is to be used as an army of observation to prevent a counterstroke, so as to facilitate and secure the main offensive movement of the chief belligerent. in either case, however small may be our contribution to the allied force, we are using the unlimited form and aiming at an unlimited and not a mere territorial object.

if now we turn to british experience of war limited by contingent, we find that the continental form has frequently been used, but we also find it almost invariably accompanied by a popular repugnance, as though there were something in it antagonistic to the national instinct. a leading case is the assistance we sent to frederick the great in the seven years' war. at the opening of the war, so great was the popular repugnance that the measure was found impossible, and it was not till frederick's dazzling resistance to the catholic powers had clothed him with the glory of a protestant hero, that pitt could do what he wanted. the old religious fire was stirred. the most potent of all national instincts kindled the people to a generous warmth which overcame their inborn [pg 64] antipathy to continental operations, and it was possible to send a substantial contingent to frederick's assistance. in the end the support fully achieved its purpose, but it must be noted that even in this case the operations were limited not only by contingent but also by object. it is true that frederick was engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence of prussia was at stake, and that the british force was an organic element in his war plan. nevertheless, it formed part of a british subsidised army under prince ferdinand of brunswick, who though nominated by frederick was a british commander-in-chief. his army was in organisation entirely distinct from that of frederick, and it was assigned the very definite and limited function of preventing the french occupying hanover and so turning the prussian right flank. finally it must be noted that its ability to perform this function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations assigned to it was such that in no probable event could it lose touch with the sea, nor could the enemy cut its lines of supply and retreat.

these features of the enterprise should be noted. they differentiate it from our earlier use of war limited by contingent in the continental manner, of which marlborough's campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the special form which marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies permitted and which was to become characteristic of british effort from pitt's time onward. in the method of our greatest war minister we have not only the limit by contingent but [pg 65] also the limit of a definite and independent function, and finally we have touch with the sea. this is the really vital factor, and upon it, as will presently appear, depends the strength of the method.

in the earlier part of the great war we employed the same form in our operations in north-western europe. there we had also the limited function of securing holland, and also complete touch with the sea, but our theatre of operations was not independent. intimate concerted action with other forces was involved, and the result in every case was failure. later on in sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the strength of the method enabled us to achieve a lasting result with very slender means. but the result was purely defensive. it was not till the peninsular war developed that we found a theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the conditions that make for success were present. even there so long as our army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the spanish army the usual failure ensued. only in portugal, the defence of which was a true limited object, and where we had a sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous allies, was success achieved from the first. so strong was the method here, and so exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the local balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able to pass to a drastic offensive.

the real secret of wellington's success—apart from his own genius—was that in perfect conditions he was applying the limited form to an unlimited war. our object was unlimited. it was nothing less than the overthrow of napoleon. complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most decisive form of offence within our means. its [pg 66] substantial contribution to the final achievement of the object is now universally recognised.

the general result, then, of these considerations is that war by contingent in the continental form seldom or never differs generically from unlimited war, for the conditions required by limited war are seldom or never present. but what may be called the british or maritime form is in fact the application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as ancillary to the larger operations of our allies—a method which has usually been open to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in effect truly limited.5

but what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish to intervene are such that no truly limited theatre is available? in that case we have to choose between placing a contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, or confining ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at frederick the great's request in the early campaigns of the seven years' war. such operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. the small positive results of our efforts to intervene in this way have indeed done more than anything to discredit this form of war, and to brand it as unworthy of a first-class power. yet the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war have feared or valued british intervention of this character even in the most unfavourable conditions. it was because [pg 67] they looked for its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. they did not reckon for positive results at all. so long as such intervention took an amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a european situation was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the positive results it could give. its operative action was that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly met. its effect, in short, was negative. its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its own. that is all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is required. it is not the most drastic method of intervention, but it has proved itself the most drastic for a power whose forces are not adapted for the higher method. frederick the great was the first great soldier to recognise it, and napoleon was the last. for years he shut his eyes to it, laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever more irritable. in 1805 he called craig's expedition a "pygmy combination," yet the preparation of another combined force for an entirely different destination caused him to see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to deal with it.

[pg 68]

it was not, however, till four years later that he was forced to place on record his recognition of the principle. then, curiously enough, he was convinced by an expedition which we have come to regard as above all others condemnatory of amphibious operations against the continent. the walcheren expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous war administration. historians can find no words too bad for it. they ignore the fact that it was a step—the final and most difficult step—in our post-trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect our command of the sea against a fleet acting stubbornly on the defensive. it began with copenhagen in 1807. it failed at the dardanelles because fleet and army were separated; it succeeded at lisbon and at cadiz by demonstration alone. walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the last as the most formidable and the least pressing. napoleon had been looking for the attempt ever since the idea was first broached in this country, but as time passed and the blow did not fall, the danger came to be more and more ignored. finally, the moment came when he was heavily engaged in austria and forced to call up [pg 69] the bulk of his strength to deal with the archduke charles. the risks were still great, but the british government faced them boldly with open eyes. it was now or never. they were bent on developing their utmost military strength in the peninsula, and so long as a potent and growing fleet remained in the north sea it would always act as an increasing drag on such development. the prospective gain of success was in the eyes of the government out of all proportion to the probable loss by failure. so when napoleon least expected it they determined to act, and caught him napping. the defences of antwerp had been left incomplete. there was no army to meet the blow—nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff or even officers. for a week at least success was in our hands. napoleon's fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet the failure was not only complete but disastrous. still so entirely were the causes of failure accidental, and so near had it come to success, that napoleon received a thorough shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. so seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he found himself driven to reconsider his whole system of home defence. not only did he deem it necessary to spend large sums in increasing the fixed defences of antwerp and toulon, but his director of conscription was called upon to work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than 300,000 men from the national guard to defend the french coasts. "with 30,000 men in transports at the downs," the emperor wrote, "the english can paralyse 300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class power."6

[pg 70]

the concentration of the british efforts in the peninsula apparently rendered the realisation of this project unnecessary—that is, our line of operation was declared and the threat ceased. but none the less napoleon's recognition of the principle remains on record—not in one of his speeches made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order to the principal officer concerned.

it is generally held that modern developments in military organisation and transport will enable a great continental power to ignore such threats. napoleon ignored them in the past, but only to verify the truth that in war to ignore a threat is too often to create an opportunity. such opportunities may occur late or early. as both lord ligonier and wolfe laid it down for such operations, surprise is not necessarily to be looked for at the beginning. we have usually had to create or wait for our opportunity—too often because we were either not ready or not bold enough to seize the first that occurred.

the cases in which such intervention has been most potent have been of two classes. firstly, there is the intrusion into a war plan which our enemy has designed without allowing for our intervention, and to which he is irrevocably committed by his opening movements. secondly, there is intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. this form finds its efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by the destruction of armies. there usually remains the difficult work of conquering the people afterwards with an exhausted army. the intrusion of a small fresh force from the sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, as it did in [pg 71] the peninsula, and as, in the opinion of some high authorities, it might have done in france in 1871.

such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as sinning against the principle which condemns a strategical reserve. we say that the whole available force should be developed for the vital period of the struggle. no one can be found to dispute it nowadays. it is too obviously true when it is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in the absence of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is true for that exhausting and demoralising period which lies beyond the shock of armies.