palmerston as foreign secretary till his dismissal, in 1851.

lord palmerston achieved his triumph in 1850, and encountered his disgrace, if it is to be so considered, in 1851. there was but the one year and a few months before his foes were too many for him. in describing this second battle, i shall endeavour to tell the story as though the blow had come from lord john russell, the head of the cabinet, with such aid and counsel as may have been given to him by others of his own class. of the action of the court, as told to us in detail by sir theodore martin, i have spoken in the first chapter, and it will be more convenient if i go on with lord palmerston’s career without much further allusion to it. he himself believed that he had been the victim of a foreign conspiracy, aided by those englishmen who agreed that its purpose was good. in september, 1850, he thus wrote to his brother,—after the affair of don pacifico; “i have beaten and put down and silenced, at least for a time, one of the most widespread and malignant and active confederacies that ever conspired against one man without crushing him; but i was in the right, and i was able to fight my battle.” “the death of louis philippe delivers me from my most artful and inveterate enemy, whose position gave him in many ways the power to injure{130} me.” the readers of to-day will dislike the use of the word conspiracy, and will think that the powers brought to bear against the foreign secretary were no more than those of fair political opposition. and it will probably be thought that lord palmerston was becoming too powerful in foreign affairs,—or was wont to express himself too loudly,—as has since come to be the case with another great arranger of european strategy in another country. it was so. it is not within the compass of a man’s nature to stretch his voice afar and yet to control the power of his own hand. looking back, we can understand that palmerston should have fallen; but we all feel that had he not risen to higher place because of his fall, england would have lost much by his falling.

in the autumn of 1850 general haynau came to london, and, among other sights, visited barclay & perkins’ brewery. according to english ideas he had shown himself to be a brute during the hungarian war; and very brutally was he treated by the draymen. his name should not be mentioned here but that all england was in a momentary ferment because of what had been done. it was generally thought that he had been maltreated, and that, as he had not ill-used englishmen or english women, we should have contented ourselves with simply ignoring him when he trusted himself to our hospitality. palmerston’s judgment as to what had been done was lenient. “the draymen were wrong in the particular course they adopted. instead of striking him, which, however, by koller’s account, they did not do much, they ought to have tossed him in a blanket, rolled him in the kennel, and then sent him home in a cab, paying his fare to the hotel.”

in his sixty-seventh year (january, 1851) he wrote to{131} his brother from broadlands. speaking of the christmas just past, he says; “i took a fling, and went out several days hunting and shooting in the fine of the early day, coming home, of course, for work earlier than if i had been only a sportsman.” let gentlemen of sixty-seven who habitually go out hunting and shooting,—for i am aware that there are englishmen of the age who do so,—bethink themselves of the manner in which they pass the remainder of the day after they have come home. are they tired, and do they sleep, or sit over their tea? do they congratulate themselves that at sixty-seven they have been still able to perform so well many of the feats of their youth? i think i may say that they, none of them, betake themselves to the hard thoughtful work of their lives; and that, if such work still falls to their lot, it has to be done before they go out hunting or shooting.

he, however, takes his share in all matters of interest. he knows what is doing as to fortifications, and takes a strong interest in the subject. he writes to the chancellor of the exchequer; “could you but take a sum, however small, to make a beginning, for similar defences at plymouth?” he is very eager as to some system of volunteering. “every other country that deserves to be called a power has this kind of reserved force.” then comes the great exhibition of 1851,—the first of those marvellous palaces of industry which have since been studded thick over the world’s surface. he is writing to lord normanby, and is speaking of the multitude. “the queen, her husband, her eldest son and daughter, gave themselves in full confidence to this multitude, with no other guard than one of honour and the accustomed supply of stick-handed constables.” and the papacy has to be put down. “our papal aggression bill will{132} be carried in spite of the opposition of the irish members who are driven on by the influence of the priests over the irish electors.” as to this bill, however, i do not know that we are now inclined to take much pride to ourselves. then mr. gladstone’s neapolitan letters were written, and so moved naples, through england, that the neapolitan prisons were at last opened. on this subject he tells an excellent story. “walewski told milnes the other day, as a proof of the goodness of heart of the king of naples, that at his, walewski’s request, the king had at one time promised to set free three hundred prisoners against whom no charge or no proof had been established. ‘how grateful,’ said milnes, ‘these men must have been! did they not come and thank you for their release?’ ‘why,’ said walewski, ‘you see, after the king had made the promise, the chief of police came to him, and said that if the men were set free he could not answer for the king’s life. and so, you see, the men were not set free.’”

in november, 1851, we come to the cause of his fall,—which cause was in truth napoleon’s coup d’etat. the feeling in england, when the coup d’etat was first made known, was very averse to it. there was a belief that napoleon had been guilty of falsehood and treachery. mr. kinglake, in his great work on the invasion of the crimea, translates the words which napoleon had used on the 13th of november, 1850—“the noblest object, and the most worthy of an exalted mind, is not to seek when in power how to perpetuate it, but to labour incessantly to fortify, for the benefit of all, those principles of authority and morality which defy the passions of mankind and the instability of laws.” about a year after he had uttered this philanthropic but sententious{133} idea he had filched the empire. englishmen did not like that; and though they were gradually won by the fealty of the emperor to his english alliance so as to endure him, the stain of the falsehood still stuck to him through his twenty years of governing. such we think has been the english feeling.

such was not the feeling of lord palmerston, who knew more as to the state of europe than any other englishman, and was more keenly alive to the immediate needs of both france and england. he writes to lord normanby; “there is no other person at present competent to be at the head of affairs in france; and if louis napoleon should end by founding a dynasty, i do not see that we need regret it as far as english interests are concerned.” “at all events, i say of louis napoleon, laudo manentem.” but it was known that there had been private friendship between the two men while louis napoleon was living in england, and also that there had been a strong aversion on the part of palmerston to the whole family of bourbons. the bourbons had during the entire period of his career, both before and after the coming of the citizen king, ruled after that mysterious and crafty fashion which had produced at last the spanish marriages. palmerston no doubt desired something better than craft and mystery. the bourbons had been expelled by the revolution; but the republic, as established with louis napoleon as its president, had not acted with much wisdom. to palmerston’s thinking something more nearly akin to the established rule of a dynasty was necessary for france,—and for england also if it was to remain in alliance with france,—than the wild and uninstructed enthusiasm of the assembly. he did believe in louis napoleon, and continued no doubt to{134} believe to the end of his life, justified, as he thought, by the french emperor’s early successes, and also by his friendship for england. he had left the world of politics before napoleon had spun all his thread and run his reel out to the end. to me who write this, even the memory of the emperor is distasteful. but the fall that was about to come upon palmerston may have been in part due to his feeling for a man who stood higher in his estimation than in that of his countrymen. years afterwards, in 1858, he had to retire with his government, of which he was then the head, for a reason which was partly similar. we shall come to that before long; but it afforded another proof of the general tone of his mind towards louis napoleon.

lord normanby was our ambassador in paris; and from some cause, of which i know nothing, entertained different feelings. it may probably be that he, as an honest man, disliked the dishonesty of the president. there was a variance between him and palmerston, and that too no doubt had its effect upon the coming circumstances. and it must be remembered that lord palmerston was already labouring under a sense of the disapprobation of his superior officers in that he would not submit his despatches in time for such surveillance as it was thought that they should receive. he had then against him at this moment the prime minister and his own ambassador in paris, who had been a cabinet minister, and the court influence, and he had the feeling that he himself was on too friendly terms with the man who had achieved the coup d’etat by not the fairest means that ever were used in politics, and not by the cleanest instruments.

on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that{135} palmerston knew himself as few men do, and his own sagacity, and his general popularity in the country. his object was so to administer foreign affairs as might best redound to the honour of his country, and he was aware that there was no man in england who could teach him a lesson in that respect. as to his despatches, it was to him quite impracticable to encounter the required delay. there was an order to that effect, and other orders came. he, however, if he remained foreign secretary, must do so after his own fashion. but there arose at this moment another source of displeasure against him, which, joined to his disobedience as to the despatches, caused his dismissal.[h] lord palmerston had expressed to m. walewski, who was then the ambassador from france in london, his approbation of the coup d’etat. this assent had been given somewhat in an off-hand manner, so as not to have bound him absolutely to the words which he had used. he alleged that it was so. count walewski of course sent home to the new emperor his report of the english foreign secretary’s opinion.

two days afterwards palmerston instructed lord normanby as to his conduct; “i am commanded by her majesty to instruct your excellency to make no change in your relations with the french government.” and it seems that some ill-feeling was engendered in paris by priority{136} of the private to the official communication made. the private communication had been to the effect that lord palmerston entirely approved of what the president had done. it must be said that he did not admit having gone so far as this. he pointed out that walewski had reported from memory the words spoken; that turgot, the minister in france, had reported the words verbally to lord normanby; and that normanby had written home his remembrance of the anger which m. turgot had expressed. m. turgot was at loggerheads with lord normanby, m. turgot representing the president-emperor. “you need not at all trouble yourself to tell us ‘what you are commanded by her majesty to instruct me,’ because we have known two days since what was our friend lord palmerston’s opinion.” it was thus that turgot answered lord normanby,—with scorn added to acrimony, because lord normanby had ventured to suggest that had the english government pleased, the english government might have interfered with the french government. lord normanby, in his official report, distinctly stated that he had made this communication to m. turgot. but lord palmerston had never so instructed him; “i am commanded by her majesty to instruct your excellency to make no change in your relations with the french government.” there is no message contained in this, and these are lord palmerston’s words; but lord normanby seems to have misunderstood them. at any rate the private communication had reached paris first, and the official despatch two days afterwards. then there were official and semi-angry despatches between the two lords in london and paris, and the question of which was right fell into the hands of lord john russell as prime minister.{137}

the gravamen of the charge now made was that the foreign secretary, without the sanction of the cabinet, had taken upon himself to tell the french ambassador that the president-emperor had done uncommonly well by arranging the coup d’etat. that readers should think that the president did very ill has nothing to do with the question. it is not alleged that there was disagreement in the cabinet on that point,—though no doubt there was either in the cabinet or without the cabinet. this is simply a memoir of lord palmerston, and does not presume to be a vindication of his policy. and the present object is to show why he was dismissed, and how he turned upon those who had dismissed him, and got the better of them. he himself, in a letter written a few days later to his brother, gives a detailed history of the whole affair, in which he takes the trouble to show that as he had expressed himself to walewski, so had other members of the cabinet said the same thing to the same man at the same period; and he quotes lord lansdowne, and charles wood, and john russell himself. am i forbidden to do that which my colleagues did, what all london was doing,—that part of london who knew what they were talking about?

i will quote his own words, in which he tells his brother how he had defended himself to lord john russell. “i answered that his doctrine, so laid down, was new and not practical; that there is a well-known and perfectly understood distinction in diplomatic intercourse between conversations which are official and which bind governments, and conversations which are unofficial and which do not bind governments; that my conversation with walewski was of the latter description, and that i said nothing to him which would in any{138} degree or in any way fetter the action of the government; and that if it was to be held that a secretary of state could never express any opinion to a foreign minister on passing events, except as the organ of a previously-consulted cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar intercourse which tends essentially to promote good understanding between ministers and governments.” but as he goes on he expresses himself more warmly; “it is obvious that the reason assigned for my dismissal was a mere pretext, eagerly caught at for want of any good reason. the real ground was a weak truckling to the hostile intrigues of the orleans family, austria, russia, saxony, and bavaria, and in some degree also of the present prussian government. all these parties found their respective views and systems of policy thwarted by the course pursued by the british government, and they thought that if they could remove the minister they would change the policy.”

the “weak truckling” and the “hostile intrigues” i will lay aside, leaving it to the individual reader to judge of these expressions as he may please. but it is manifest that there were running at the time in great britain two currents as to foreign politics: the one which i can only define as english;—and the other, which i call the policy of absolutism, because i do not wish to descend to abuse, which i must do if i give to it any national name. that both were held with high patriotic ideas we should not doubt. emperors and their ministers naturally believe in emperors and their ministers. those who are opposed to them are, to their thinking, a stubborn revolutionary crowd. if by little tricks the absolute party can gain a point in their own favour, a great stroke of policy is made. but they{139} who maintain that the united opinion of the world at large may be best used for the governance of the world, may be as wise, and at any rate as honest, as their opponents. a comparison of the national success of nations is in their favour. lord palmerston, during his whole life after he had come to think of these things, and especially during the strongest part of his life in which he presided at the foreign office, held the british view, and would not allow himself to be driven from it for a moment. a constitutional king did not, as he thought, rule in the sense of holding the strings of national policy in his own hands. in defence of his view, he was authoritative, imperious, arrogant,—sometimes even tyrannical, if you will. the bull-dog can hardly hold tight by his bone without crushing it. but it is very difficult to get a bone out of the mouth of a bull-dog.[i]

when called upon for his explanation by lord john, lord palmerston gave it, with more precision than accuracy. his letter is dated the 16th of december. he went at length into the question of the president’s conduct, and justified the president’s judgment in the coup d’etat. but it was not that which was now called in question. there was a rejoinder made to him in which{140} he was expected to acknowledge his error in having spoken to walewski. this he refused to do, and then, on the 19th of december, there came the blow. lord john wrote as follows; “i have just received your letter of yesterday. no other course is left to me than to submit the correspondence to the queen, and to ask her majesty to appoint a successor to you in the foreign office.” lord palmerston was dismissed. the dismissal of a cabinet minister, and of such a cabinet minister, was at any rate a most uncommon occurrence. it struck lord macaulay as “rashly, needlessly harsh.” lord john himself repented of it. “my own judgment upon it is, that it was hasty and precipitate,” he says—page 258, of his “recollections and suggestions.” he thought to soften the blow by offering to the dismissed, but ever active secretary of state the fainéant retreat of lord-lieutenant of ireland. one is almost tempted to think that palmerston was right when in his earlier years he spoke of the average minister as one who would “by instinct come round to the oat sieve.”

he, however, would not come round after that fashion. he felt that it had been for some time intended that he should be dismissed; and, now that the blow had come, was by no means prepared to retire into obscurity and silence. but he seems to have experienced great difficulty in making up his mind how he would act. he did nothing;—nor was there anything to be done till parliament should meet early in february. but it was, of course, manifest that lord john should offer to the house his explanation of the most unwonted circumstance. this he did in a very powerful speech; but he could speak, knowing that the court was at his back. lord palmerston answered him, but he did so without{141} such backing; and could hardly have made his points good without a reference to the court which his loyalty would forbid him to use. he seems to have recognized the fact that he must accept his dismissal, and bide his time, and try another fall with lord john on other grounds. he knew his popularity with the country, and did not doubt his own power. could he succeed on other ground, the queen would be bound to accept him. a short time afterwards the queen did accept him very willingly. but in his present difficulty even his popularity would not suffice to put him straight before the parliament. it would not suit him, the old public servant of his country,—him who still hoped to serve his country long,—to take upon himself the r?le of a demagogue, and join as he must have joined the ultra-radicals in a vain endeavour to get a majority against his old chief. he made no effort of the kind, but allowed the matter to pass by, defending himself only on small points,—as to which it was not claimed for him by his friends that he was especially successful.

the debate was thus described by lord dalling, who was especially palmerston’s friend. “his speech,”—john russell’s—“certainly was one of the most powerful i ever heard delivered. it was evidently intended to crush an expected antagonist, and, by the details into which it went, took lord palmerston by surprise. i listened to his reply with the most affectionate interest, since he was kind enough to mention my own name with praise; but i felt, and all his friends felt, that it was feeble as a retort to the tremendous assault that had been made on him.” “‘palmerston is smashed’ was, indeed, the expression generally used at the clubs; but it did not in the least convey the idea that lord palmerston{142} had formed of his own position. i must say, in truth, that i never admired him so much as at this crisis. he evidently thought he had been ill-treated; but i never heard him make an unfair or irritable remark, nor did he seem in anywise stunned by the blow he had received, or dismayed by the isolated position in which he stood.” it was on this occasion that the witty statesman expressed his opinion that “there was a palmerston”—fuit ilium et ingens gloria teucrorum. that statesman intended to express his opinion that the power of palmerston was a thing of the past.

“so sinks the daystar in the ocean bed,

and yet anon repairs his drooping head,

and tricks his beams, and with new-spangled ore

flames in the forehead of the morning sky!”