palmerston foreign secretary, november, 1830, to november, 1834.

we here begin the record of that portion of lord palmerston’s life which is of truth important to the english reader. in years, his life was more than half over. he was already forty-five, and had been in office for more than twenty years; but had he then died, he would have passed away as one of those unimportant statesmen whom, though they may do good work for their country, it is not worth their country’s while to remember. but though he was forty-five, lord palmerston’s period of importance was yet to begin, and to be continued during thirty-five additional years of uninterrupted labour.

lord dalling, in the short preface which he has prefixed to his unfinished life of lord palmerston, speaks as follows of the condition of england at this time in reference to the political state of europe. “that period begins with a certain struggle against the resistance of the northern cabinets to any change in the affairs of europe; and a struggle at the same time against that reactionary spirit sprung from the revolution of 1830 in france, which wished to change everything.” the writer means to imply that england was anxious to stand between the despotism of russia, prussia, and austria,{46} and the democratic tendencies of france. in this he describes accurately the position which lord palmerston took as the exponent of english foreign politics, and which from the first to the last he maintained with a consistency which it has been given to few men to achieve, whose concern in the matter has lasted so long, and whose influence has been so great. throughout his career it was his object to repress the personal power of the occupants of thrones; but at the same time so to repress that power as to give no inch of standing ground to demagogues. if that be true, it must be acknowledged that whether his attempts were good or evil, they were made in strict accordance with established english principles. and it will probably be admitted by most who may read these pages, that the efforts were good. that they were pre-eminently successful, it will be my duty to endeavour to show. that in making these efforts lord palmerston fell into various errors of manner, that he was frequently led away by human frailty, and often puffed up by pride and a spirit of personal success, is no doubt true. and it is true also that he seldom rose to any specially exalted view of human nature. he saw all things from a common-sense point of view, with what we may call mundane eyes. but we are not sure that such a point of view and such eyes are not the most useful for a british statesman. and of lord palmerston, it may be said that his followers would always know what political teaching they were expected to follow. he was not gifted with that fine insight into matters which enables a man to discern to-day something better than what he saw yesterday. such still advancing improvement in sight is within the capacity only of the highest genius. but as an english politician can work{47} only by the means of others, and needs many followers, the followers should see as quickly as he does, and if they be left in the dark they will not follow long. lord palmerston left none in the dark, and was therefore successful to the last by means of the true following of an attached party who always knew their man, and were sure that they never would be led whither they did not wish to go.

“as soon as lord grey was commissioned by the king to form an administration, he sent for me.” these are the concluding words of that autobiography, of which mention has been made. lord grey sent for him, and he became foreign minister.

writing to his brother on the 22nd of december, 1830, lord palmerston says; “i’ve been ever since my appointment like a man who has been plumped into a mill race, scarcely able by all his kicking and plunging to keep his head above water.” we can understand that the kicking and plunging must have been very violent. the question had already arisen whether belgium should or should not be made a kingdom of itself, with a king and constitution of its own. by the treaty of vienna in 1815 it had been decreed that for certain purposes which were in themselves no doubt wise, belgium and holland should be one. the united provinces would be strong enough to form a barrier against the encroachments of france, and the balance of power in europe and the maintenance of liberty might be so maintained. but the governing power had been left with the dutch, and it was felt that the dutch had oppressed the belgians. the king of holland had, as a temporary measure, assumed the power of appointing the judges in the two lands, and was unwilling to abandon it. he had then{48} been assisted by the judges in depriving the press of its liberty. and the dutch had insisted that their language should be used in all public documents and all trials, although the belgians had a language of their own, the flemish language, and although french was the language of society, of the courts and shops. and in all matters affecting religion and education, a strong bias was shown in favour of protestant holland over catholic belgium.

it can be understood that here in england feelings on this subject should run strong, and that the entire weight of the opposition to the new government should be enlisted on the side of protestant holland. the treaty of vienna had been partly their work, and lord palmerston, who was now the whig secretary of state for foreign affairs, had co-operated as tory secretary at war in the work which he was now anxious to dissolve. as regards the treaty of vienna, this division of holland and belgium was, no doubt, a breach of that compact; but a treaty can be only binding when taken as a whole, and this breach of it was justified by the breach of one of its terms made by the king of holland in assuming to himself powers which had been expressly taken out of his hands by the treaty. this, however, was understood much less accurately by those out of office than by those in, and lord palmerston no doubt became more hot in his own defence the more he was attacked by his opponents.

we have his correspondence respecting the affairs of belgium with lord granville, our ambassador at paris, and it is interesting to see how speedily and how warmly he takes up the belgian question. an englishman reading this should of course remember that lord palmerston was an english minister, filled with english convictions{49} at the moment, and that he (the reader) will of course only get the english view. but the letters do leave the impression that the english minister only wanted what was just; and our history tells us that his views have been carried out, and that the measure, as directed by him, has been pre-eminently successful. but there is from the very first a tone of superiority in them which, though they were addressed to our own ambassador, must have been offensive to french ministers as they trickled through to their ears. talleyrand, who was the french ambassador in london, had asked that, as part of the arrangement, “luxembourg might be given to france.” but palmerston would not hear of it, and he then writes to lord granville; “it may not be amiss for you to hint, upon any fitting occasion, that though we are anxious to cultivate the best understanding with france, and to be on terms of the most intimate friendship with her, yet that it is only on the supposition that she contents herself with the finest territory in europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter of encroachment and conquest.” then we are told that, when the luxembourg question had been given up, talleyrand “fights like a dragon” for two belgian fortresses,—philippeville and marienburg. “we had no power,” says palmerston, “to give what belongs to belgium and not to us, and we could not, under the pretence of settling the quarrel between holland and belgium, proceed to plunder one of the parties, and that, too, for the benefit of one of the mediators.” talleyrand has asked questions about some increased force to our navy. “you may as well mention this conversation to sebastiani, and take that opportunity of asking again about the toulon ships. it is no harm,{50} however, that the french should think that we are a little upon the alert with respect to our navy.” then there is the question, who shall be the new king of belgium? as to which our minister had at first wished that a son of the king of holland should be named. louis philippe wished that one of his sons should have the new throne. but lord palmerston will not hear of it. “i must say that if the choice falls on nemours, and the king of the french accepts, it will be a proof that the policy of france is like an infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling, and breaking out in every successive occupant.” “we are reluctant even to think of war; but if ever we are to make another effort, this is a legitimate occasion; and we find we could not submit to the placing of the duc de nemours on the throne of belgium without danger to the safety, and a sacrifice of the honour of the country.” “if they are straightforward in their intentions, why cannot they be so in their proceedings? why such endless intrigues and plots, and such change of plans, all tending to the same object.” then there comes a letter, purposely written and sent in an unusual way, that it may certainly be read by sebastiani. for it was sent through the french foreign office, and not by our own messengers; as to which lord granville observes that it will have the desired effect. “sebastiani should really be made to understand that he must have the goodness to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill-humour upon some other quarter, and not bestow it upon england. we are not used to being accused of making people dupes.” what was sebastiani’s personal nature, we do not know. this may have made him keep his temper. but it must surely have taught him to think that our minister was very uncivil,{51} as he of course knew well why the letter had been sent through the french foreign office.

other attempts are made by the french to get other morsels of territory into their hands, and a strong french feeling is roused in belgium, which troubles lord palmerston almost as much as the french overtures made for direct french objects. a regent, in the interests of france, was appointed during the vacancy of the throne, of whom palmerston refuses to take any notice. “the greater part of our difficulties with the belgians have arisen from the double diplomacy, double dealing infirmity of purpose, and want of principle in the french government.” a m. d’arschot is sent to england as a diplomate, but lord palmerston refuses to see him officially. “i shall be happy to receive m. d’arschot at my house as an individual; i cannot ask him to the office.” then he goes on. “the moment we give france a cabbage garden or a vineyard, we lose all our vantage-ground of principle; and it becomes then a mere question of degree or the relative value of the different things which, one after the other, she will demand.” and he lays down a general principle, by which it will be found that he always acted. “you don’t stave off war or stop demands by yielding to urgent demands, however small, from fear of war. the maxim of giving way to have an easy life will, if you follow it, lead to your having a life without a moment’s ease.”

at length the question as to what king should be chosen was settled by the election of leopold to the throne of belgium,—altogether with the good-will of palmerston, though a dutch prince had been his first choice, as has been already said. but this had been done without the assent of the king of holland; and{52} dutch troops marched into belgium on one side, and french troops on the other to support belgium. the french obtained some success, and immediately there arose the renewal of french encroachments. “as to the fortresses,” says lord palmerston, still writing to lord granville, “if they expected that we were to sign a treaty with them for the destruction of those fortresses, i would tell him that i would never put my hand to such a treaty, even if the government agreed to it.” “one thing is certain,—the french must go out of belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of days.” “i told him we never would agree to mix up the two questions, the departure of the french troops, and the question of the fortresses. i asked him whether his government wished that people hereafter should believe the french government or its word.” “i have seldom seen a stronger feeling than that of the cabinet about the question of the fortresses.” “but let us stave off all these nibblings,” he says in reference to a demand expressed by prussia that philippeville and marienburg should be given up to france. “if once these great powers begin to taste blood, they will never be satisfied with one bite, but will speedily devour their victim.”

at last the belgian question was settled, and a kingdom was formed, which has since remained, respected by all men, and the strongest in its circumstances among the lesser nations of the earth. to name belgium, is to speak of good faith and constitutional well-being. the love for it which england bears was strongly evinced during the german and french war in 1870, when bernal osborne asked a question in the house of commons as to the part which england would take if either party carried their armies over the frontier into belgium. the{53} french at that moment had been driven up into a corner at sedan, and were compelled either to surrender or to trespass on the belgian territory. but the question asked in the house of commons, and the answer given, sufficed for the purpose; and no armed frenchman and no armed german trod upon the soil which had become the kingdom of belgium.

lord palmerston had no doubt done his work well in helping the arrangement. he was disinterested throughout on the part of england, and wise, and honest, and very brave. he had allowed no foreign diplomate to hoodwink him. england, looking back at his conduct, has reason to be proud of him. but there can be no doubt that he did make himself very offensive to his french colleagues in the arrangements, and took upon himself to speak, as though he were the only honest man concerned in the work. whether it was essential to his purpose that he should do so must now be a matter of opinion; but there can be no doubt that he made himself odious to louis philippe and the french ministers, who must have looked upon him as an english bear altogether unacquainted with diplomatic courtesies. such i think must have been the opinion held by louis philippe to the end. for in these years of his life it seems to have been palmerston’s business to have thwarted louis philippe in all his politics.

but, during the period in which the kingdom of belgium was being formed, the english reform bill was passed, a measure of such vital importance to england as almost, in english eyes, to obliterate these first struggles of belgian infancy. but lord palmerston, true to his theory of political life, took but little heed of the reform bill. he did speak on the subject, as it was{54} essential that he should do so; and explained how it had come to pass with him, as with others, that he had grown wiser as he had grown older. it was necessary that one, who had come into power among lord liverpool’s tories, should defend his vote by such an argument. but there is nothing to make us think that his heart was with the reformers. indeed, as long as he remained at the foreign office his heart was with foreign affairs. and though, as a member of a cabinet, he was bound to support that cabinet’s measures, i should doubt whether he asked many questions on the subject. his heart was then in belgium, and in the quadruple alliance for establishing free institutions in spain and portugal, and afterwards in creating the kingdom of greece, and in endeavouring to stop the abominable iniquities of louis philippe in reference to the spanish marriages. but he supported the reform bill, and in consequence of his doing so,—or in consequence, rather, of his belonging to a whig ministry,—he lost his seat for the university of cambridge, and, at the general election 1832, was returned to parliament by south hampshire, his own county.

allusion has been made to the pride which lord palmerston took in the quadruple alliance. the quadruple alliance was a compact made between england, france, spain, and portugal, for preserving the thrones of spain and portugal on behalf of isabella and maria, and defending the two princesses from the machinations of their uncles, don carlos and don miguel. that the two princesses were the legitimate heirs to the thrones need not now, specially in england, be more than stated. but the collateral object was to ensure freedom under the rule of the two queens, instead of despotism, with all its{55} bitterness, under the two kings. that at least was lord palmerston’s object; though, when we come to the story of the spanish marriages, we shall find that louis philippe had a further object of his own. for some account of the kind of misery to be looked for under don miguel, to whom palmerston was specially hostile, i may refer my readers to an article in the edinburgh review of september, 1831, on the condition of portugal.

in looking back at lord palmerston’s career, and the entire success of his political life, we have to own that it was due to the teaching, or rather to the genius, of mr. canning. he had fallen into mr. canning’s hands, and though without that fine intellect which would have enabled him to imitate the lessons which he had so learned, he was quick enough to perceive their merit, and wise enough to follow them, whether he were called whig or tory. canning died, and in carrying out his lessons palmerston had become a member of lord grey’s cabinet. it was not much to him whether men called him whig or tory. but he saw the wisdom of going still on; and whether he were member for the university which demanded a tory to represent it, or for his own county, which afterwards in turn again repudiated him, or for the borough of tiverton, where he could be one or the other, he remained always true to the precepts of the school which he had adopted. “a tory government,” he says, writing to his brother, in june, 1833, “is an utter impossibility in the present state of the public feeling; the country would not stand it.” then he goes on to speak of what he and the cabinet had just done for the abolition of slavery. “to be sure, we give the west indians a tolerably good compensation. i really believe that the twenty millions which are to be voted for{56} them are about the whole value of all the estates at the present market price; so that they will receive nearly the value of their estates, and keep their estates into the bargain. i must say it is a splendid instance of generosity and justice, unexampled in the history of the world, to see a nation (for it is the national will, and not merely the resolve of the government or the parliament) emancipate seven hundred and fifty thousand slaves, and pay twenty millions sterling to their owners as compensation for the loss they will sustain. people sometimes are greatly generous at the expense of others, but it is not often that men are found to pay so high a price for the luxury of doing a noble action.”

“some persons on the continent want to have it supposed that the english are so bent upon economy and retrenchment that no provocation or injury would rouse them to incur the expense of another war. this vote of so large a sum for the satisfaction of a principle ought to show those persons that it would not be safe to rely too much upon their calculation.” in this he takes great pride to himself; but it is a pride in the glory of his country; and it is exhibited in private letters in which an absence of reticence is not unbecoming.

some time previous to this he had shown the same determined spirit. writing to our minister in spain in march, 1831, he says, “it is well known that every river on the coast of africa, where slaves are obtained, still swarms with slave ships, bearing openly the flag of spain; while vessel after vessel sails for that coast from the havannah, returns laden with these slaves, of whom even the number on board is probably known, lands them unmolested at the back of the island of cuba, re-enters the port of the havannah in ballast, and is again fitted up, rapidly and{57} without impediment, for a fresh expedition in this prohibited traffic.”

in 1834 the slave commissioner, at sierra leone, writes to him on the subject. “the traffic under the portuguese flag, which for years past had been almost unheard of, appears now to be carried on to as great an extent as it was before brazil ceased to belong to portugal.” in the same year mr. macleay, our british commissioner at the havannah, complains to him on the same subject,—of the trade as carried on under the new captain-general of cuba. from this we may see that our foreign minister found ample matters on which to write to the servants of other crowns so as to make himself enemies. it is not to be doubted but that he did write with all the pertinacity of purpose which is apt to be odious to people who entertain opinions opposed to those who exercise it.

the above references have been taken from the quarterly review of december, 1835. if we turn to the july number of the edinburgh review for 1836, we shall find him and the slave trade spoken of in the same spirit; but the tone is so hearty that i will venture to quote the passage:—“every power in europe has acknowledged that a solemn obligation is upon them to contribute to the abolition of the accursed traffic in our fellow creatures. each also admits that their formal declaration to that effect, made more than twenty years ago, has to this hour been fruitless, and the pledges then given to use every means in the power of each to effect it, still unredeemed. the frivolous pretexts which have been advanced by some for not adopting the only means which experience has shown to be effectual, require only to be refuted, and the object to be sincerely and heartily pursued by us, and complete success cannot be far distant. we have abundant{58} evidence before us that no exertions will be wanting on the part of lord palmerston. his urgent remonstrances and representations have been poured into every country of the civilized world. his tone has been firm and decisive when our slave treaties have been infringed. he has used argument and persuasion where as yet there had been no obligation. after a careful perusal of the documents before us, we hesitate not to say that his zealous, consistent, and able advocacy of this great cause, while it tends to raise his country high among nations for enlightened humanity and for moral worth, will constitute, next to the preservation of peace, his worthiest title to a lasting reputation.”

his work is incessant, and he can hardly allow himself a few days of holiday when the session is over. “i may then manage to get down to broadlands for a week, and i long for a little rest.” at the end of the year he joins a shooting party, but is not able “to get out of town for more than four days at a time. i had three days shooting at woburn last week, and pretty good sport. an official party, grey, brougham, lansdowne (now combatants), althorp, melbourne, ripon, graham, john russell, auckland, ellice, myself, young ellice and lord charles russell, were the sharpshooters.” we see from the names above given, that he had now fallen entirely among the whigs; for sir james graham was then a whig. “i must say that this reformed house of commons is growing to be wonderfully like its predecessors; impatient of fools, intolerant of blackguards.” it is much the same thing at present, though now the blackguards have to be tolerated. then he speaks exultingly of the quadruple alliance between england, france, spain and portugal for the expulsion of carlos and miguel. he{59} speaks almost boastingly of his own power. “i carried it through the cabinet by a coup de main, taking them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections.” this is the spirit in which he looks at all his own doings as minister for foreign affairs, and though we may be angry at the boasting, we cannot but acknowledge that it was this spirit which kept him up. then we have him for a week down in hampshire among his race-horses. but his papers follow him. “i was a week at broadlands entirely by myself, working all day, and almost every day, at f. o. boxes and holmes’s accounts for the last three years, which i had not before been able to look at; they were all right, however.” after this he tells us of that wicked thresher who only provided sixteen pheasants for five guns to kill in yew tree. after that he speaks again of the quadruple alliance, and again exults. “this treaty was a capital hit, and all my own doing.” mr. ashley, however, adds that “this treaty was a full completion of mr. canning’s policy.”