as this book leaves the hands of the printer, the columns of the daily press are conveying to the world the terms of the indictment of the chief characters mentioned in it for their share in the surrender of the fortress of port arthur to the japanese. as this constitutes an official confirmation of much that i have written, i include it in my book, so that the reader may be in a position to judge if the title of my work is justified.
this indictment, i may add, has been drawn up by three separate commissions, composed of the highest government officials and experts in military law.
official indictment.
lieutenant-general st?ssel, of the retired list, is charged as follows:
1. in that he, having on july 3, 1904, received an order from the commander-in-chief of the army in manchuria to hand over command of the fortress of port arthur to its commandant, lieutenant-general smirnoff, and to leave the fortress, disobeyed, and, remaining in the fortress, retained command of it—an action provided for under article 255, book xxii., of the 'military code of 1869,' third edition.
2. in that he, in defiance of order no. 339 of april 27, 1904, by the viceroy in the far east, did interfere with[pg 337] the powers and duties of the commandant of the fortress, thus undermining the latter's authority, shaking public confidence in him, and so diminishing the defensive capabilities of the fortress. the following are instances of such interference:
(a) granting permission over the commandant's head, and against his orders, for supplies to be taken out of the fortress.
(b) appointing civilian counsellor riabinin to the charge of the medical department without making him subordinate to the commandant of the fortress.
(c) transferring the dalny hospital, in opposition to the commandant's orders and to the detriment of the public service, to a site selected by himself.
(d) removing the chief of the fire brigade, weykanen, from duty.
(e) sending the gendarmerie to liao-tieh-shan.
(f) closing the printing-offices of the novy kry, and ordering the arrest of m. nojine, who was on the staff of that journal.
(g) stopping work on the second and third lines of defence.
provided for under, etc.
3. in that he did not in time take proper steps to increase the quantity of supplies in the fortress, as follows:
(a) by not supplementing the reserve of vegetables, although this was quite possible.
(b) by not arranging to requisition horses, in accordance with the mobilization regulations, and to increase the number of cattle in the fortress.
(c) by not sanctioning the commandant's request[pg 338] that the rations of horse-flesh might be increased, a course which was absolutely necessary to maintain the strength of the worn-out garrison.
provided for under, etc.
4. in that he, during the siege, received and read certain 'memoranda,' written by lieutenant-general fock, which were composed in a derisive and offensive spirit, and of a nature calculated to undermine the authority of, and bring odium upon, several of the commanders, subvert discipline, and lower the moral of the garrison; and, in spite of their harmful influence upon the defence, took no steps to prevent their publication and circulation among the troops.
provided for under, etc.
5. in that he, for his personal ends, sent reports to the commander-in-chief of the army in manchuria on may 27 and 31, and to the viceroy on may 30, referring to the battle at kinchou, in which he, in contradiction to the actual facts and to the actions of himself and those present, asserted that 'in this warm corner we fired every shell we had got,' and that 'we retired in perfect order on nangalin,' and drew up these reports in such a manner as to make it appear that he, general st?ssel, had in person acted with great energy and directed operations, while—
(a) during the battle at kinchou, he—general st?ssel—remained in port arthur, and personally took no part in the action.
(b) there was a large quantity of ammunition at nangalin station for the quick-firing guns, as was known to all the artillery units.
(c) the retirement on nangalin was carried out in [pg 339]great haste and in complete disorder—so much so that certain units rushed through and broke down the wire entanglement obstacle.
provided for under, etc.
6. in that he, for his own advantage, and in order to place the actions of his subordinates in the most favourable light, on may 28, 1904, reported to the commander-in-chief of the army in manchuria that the force under lieutenant-general fock 'was falling back gradually towards wolfs hills'—a statement directly opposed to facts, as the retirement of the force direct on to wolf's hills (the last of the advanced positions) was effected in complete disorder and in great haste along a hilly road, blocked with transport and by the inhabitants of dalny retreating to port arthur.
provided for under, etc.
7. in that he, for his own advantage, and in order to represent himself as taking a part in various actions (which did not take place), on june 14, 1904, reported in writing to the commander-in-chief of the manchurian army as to his own great activity in the conduct of the defence, in which report he stated, in opposition to facts: ' ... i always make a point of being in every possible engagement ...'; while from february 8, 1904, to june 14—i.e., up to the date of his letter to general kuropatkin—not a single engagement with the japanese took place (except the battle at kinchou, in which he—general st?ssel—took no part) but the bombardments, during which the whole population of port arthur were in equal danger.
provided for under, etc.
8. in that he, in the hope of justifying the prearranged surrender of the fortress to the enemy, on december 29, 1904, reported to the tsar in a telegram that: 'by the[pg 340] capture of fort no. 3 the japanese have become masters of the whole north-east front, and the fortress can only hold out for a very few days. we have no artillery ammunition ...'—a report which was not in accordance with the facts, as at the council of war held on that day (december 29), when the members by a large majority declared themselves in favour of holding out to the last moment, both major-generals biely and nickitin declared that there was sufficient ammunition in hand for a further defence.
provided for under, etc.
9. in that he intentionally, improperly, and with false statements recommended:
(a) lieutenant-general fock for promotion to the third class order of st. george for the battle which he lost at kinchou, and in which he displayed complete incompetence;
(b) major-general nadein for promotion to the third class order of st. george for the same battle, in which he in no way distinguished himself;
(c) major-general reuss for the fourth class of the same order, this officer himself asserting that he had done nothing whatever to merit such a reward.
provided for under, etc.
10. in that he, while in command of the district, and being the senior officer in a fortress which was being besieged by the japanese, and of which the commandant was subordinate to him, decided to surrender the fortress to the enemy, and, in order to do so, in spite of the opinion of the great majority of the council of war held on december 29, 1904, in favour of the continuation of the defence (which was in every way possible), and without, in accordance with the regulations, convening a[pg 341] fresh council of war, did between 3 and 4 p.m. on january 1, 1905, despatch a parlementaire to general nogi, commanding the besieging army, proposing to enter into negotiations for the surrender of the fortress, although all means of defence had not been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of war material and of supplies permitted of a continuation of it.
in that he, after this, agreed to the proposal of lieutenant-general fock, commanding the land defences, to abandon little eagle's nest, kuropatkin lunette, and b battery without a fight, which action greatly diminished the power of resistance of the fortress.
in that he, on the following day—january 2, 1905—authorized colonel reuss, his chief of the staff, to conclude definitely the capitulation without giving him any precise instructions as to the terms to be insisted upon on our side, in consequence of which colonel reuss signed, in the village of siu-shuing, to terms which were disadvantageous and derogatory to the dignity of russia, in which action general st?ssel himself failed to perform his duty according to his oath and to the honour of a soldier.
in that he, having surrendered the fortress to the enemy, did not share the fate of the garrison by accompanying it into military confinement.
provided for under, etc.
major-general reuss is charged as follows:
1. in that he, while chief of the staff of the kwantun district, and being aware of general st?ssel's intention to surrender the fortress of port arthur to the japanese at a time when the fighting strength of the garrison and the quantity of munitions of war and of supplies assured the possibility of a continuance of the defence, concurred in this intention, and assisted general st?ssel in the execution of it—for instance:
[pg 342]
(a) at the meeting of the defence committee on december 8, 1904, and at the council of war on december 29, 1904, exaggerating the critical state of affairs, and declaring that further opposition was useless, and that the fortress should be surrendered.
(b) prematurely composing and despatching at general st?ssel's direction on january 1, 1905, a letter to general nogi, commanding the japanese besieging army, in which proposals were made for negotiations for a capitulation.
(c) on the following day, january 2, 1905, without demanding definite instructions from general st?ssel regarding the conditions to be insisted on for surrender, going to siu-shuing village—the place appointed for the negotiations—and raising no objections to the demands put forward by the japanese representatives, signing that same day to the capitulation of the fortress upon terms disadvantageous to russia and derogatory to her dignity, and by such action co-operating with general st?ssel in the surrender of the fortress to the enemy.
provided for under, etc.
lieutenant-general fock is charged as follows:
1. in that he, having received categorical instructions on february 27 and may 19, 1904, to make an obstinate defence, even to a defence with the bayonet, at the kinchou position, not only with the 5th east siberian rifle regiment, but with the 13th and 14th regiments, which were close at hand, and disregarding these orders and the fact that general st?ssel had himself undertaken the defence of inchenzy bay, which was in rear of the position—
[pg 343]
(a) when the battle had begun on the morning of may 26, 1904, instead of taking command, did go away to inchenzy bay to select a position there for the 15th regiment, in case the japanese should land there, and did not arrive at the attacked position till 2 p.m.
(b) did only send one of the four regiments present at kinchou into action, and thus did cause its separate destruction.
(c) did not only fail to make any use of his reserves during the battle, but did stop two battalions which were going up into the fighting line, under orders from general nadein.
(d) without having exhausted every means of defence, and without having recourse to the bayonet, did telegraph to general st?ssel in port arthur, in order to induce him to order a retirement, as to 'the critical position,' and the complete lack of gun ammunition, there being at the time a large quantity of ammunition at the station of nangalin.
(e) having, in consequence of this, received instructions from general st?ssel to retire at dusk, did commence the retirement in daylight, thus causing many casualties, and ceding to the japanese the fortified position at kinchou, without having made use of all the means at his disposal for its protracted defence.
provided for under, etc.
2. in that he, during the battle of august 21, 1904, having received an order from his immediate commanding officer—the commandant of the fortress—to send two battalions of the 14th east siberian rifle regiment to the advanced forts on the north-east front, did not at once obey the order, but entered into an untimely argument[pg 344] with the commandant, and did not himself accompany the last unit of the reserve under his command.
provided for under, etc.
3. in that he, having no official position in the defence from august 22, 1904, to december 16, 1904, and going round the positions on his own initiative, under the pretext of assisting the defence, but really in a cowardly desire to prove himself superior in bravery, knowledge and ability to the other commanders, did allow himself to discuss affairs and to issue 'memoranda,' in which he not only offensively criticized the actions of those who were not under his orders—accusing them of incompetence and cowardice—but also spread abroad the idea that the defence of the forts and fortified positions should not be carried to such a length as to cause many casualties, and did act in such a manner that his views and 'memoranda' became known to the garrison at large (including the soldiers), by which he shook the belief of the troops in the necessity for, and the possibility of, holding the defences to the very last.
provided for under, etc.
4. in that he, having on december 16, 1904, taken over the duties of commander of the land defences of the fortress of port arthur, and finding it impossible to hold fort no. 2 any longer, did report this fact personally to the officer commanding the district, and did not report it to the commandant of the fortress, to whom he was directly subordinate, and having received general st?ssel's permission on december 18, 1904, did order that this fort should be abandoned and blown up without informing the commandant.
provided for under, etc.
5. in that he, while commander of the land defences of the fortress, and being aware of general st?ssel's[pg 345] intention to surrender the fortress of port arthur to the japanese before all means of defence had been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of supplies and munitions of war assured the possibility of a continuance, concurred in this intention, and assisted general st?ssel in the execution of it. for instance:
on december 1, 1904,[46] reporting to general st?ssel that it was necessary to send a parlementaire at once to general nogi with proposals to capitulate, and then, after its despatch, upon his own responsibility, and in spite of the orders of the commandant, ordering, under threats, general gorbatovsky, who was in command of the defences on the east front, to abandon little eagle's nest, kuropatkin lunette, and b battery without a fight, which works were accordingly in the evening abandoned by our troops, he—lieutenant-general fock—knowing full well that by these dispositions of his he had placed the defence of the fortress under most disadvantageous conditions should the negotiations for surrender be for any reason broken off, and had enabled the japanese representatives to demand from us most disadvantageous and degrading terms of capitulation.
provided for under, etc.
lieutenant-general smirnoff is charged as follows:
1. in that he, suspecting, after the surrender to the japanese of fort no. 2, the existence of an understanding between generals st?ssel and fock to reduce the fortress to such a state as to justify capitulation, and in despite of the responsibility resting upon him under the terms of article 57 of the 'regulations for the guidance of com[pg 346]manders of fortresses,' did not immediately deprive general fock of his command, did not take energetic action to prevent the above-named officers carrying out their plan, and confined himself to despatching a telegram to the commander-in-chief, in which he requested that he might be either given full power as commandant or relieved from all responsibility as such for the future defence of the fortress.
provided for under, etc.
2. in that he, having learned on january 1, 1905, of the despatch by general st?ssel of a letter to general nogi containing proposals for negotiations for surrender, in spite of article 69, book xxii., of the 'military code of 1869,' third edition, and article 57 of the 'regulations for the guidance of commanders of fortresses,' did not convene a meeting of the committee of defence, did not insist that general st?ssel should act in accordance with article 62 of the above 'regulations,' and did not carry out the resolution of the council of war of december 29, 1904, to continue a protracted defence of the fortress.
provided for under, etc.
the end