the fall of erh-lung-shan and the last council

it is not easy to arrive at the truth about the fall of erh-lung-shan fort. there are many different accounts, and the loss of this fort is still the subject of keen discussion between various officers. therefore, to enable the reader to form his own judgment, the evidence of two of the senior men in the fortress who did not agree is quoted. one is general smirnoff and the other gun-captain direnkoff. their evidence is amplified by extracts from the raschevsky-schwartz diary. i begin with direnkoff.

'at 7 p.m. on december 27 the japs stopped their mining work under the glacis of the salient. this cessation of work did not attract much attention, as it was thought to be temporary. as a matter of fact, the enemy, having reached the desired spot, had stopped excavating in order to load and fire their mines. on this occasion they gave no indication of their intention, and kept on firing 11-inch shells and throwing grenades into the fort as usual. the night passed quietly, with no suspicion of what was to come, on our part. at 7.30 the next morning the first explosion took place, but it was a failure. at eight o'clock a single japanese dashed out on to our parapet, then rushed back again. five minutes later i was walking from the inner parapet, and had not quite reached the caponier when a second explosion took place, which shook the whole fort and the hill it was on. the japs at once[pg 300] opened fire and began hurling a quantity of hand-grenades and bombs, while they set to work to raise a wall of sand-bags on this side of the ditch. our losses from the explosion were about 100 killed and wounded, several being suffocated by gases in the caponier. the officer commanding sent word to major-general gorbatovsky:

'"the japanese have blown up our advanced parapet. our losses are very heavy. please send reinforcements."

'reinforcements arrived, amounting, i should think, to about 500 men. when darkness came on the enemy's artillery ceased firing, and only the occasional crack of rifles disturbed the silence. the officer commanding ordered the wounded, who were lying about everywhere, to be brought in, and this was finished by about 10 p.m. he then sent word to gorbatovsky:

'"erh-lung-shan is surrounded by japs. what are your orders?"

'the general replied:

'"do what you can. there are no more reserves to send you."

'the officer commanding then sent fifty men of the retvisan to drive the japs from the inner parapet, but the attempt failed and nearly all were killed. the japs, in addition to occupying this, had crawled into the caponier. three times our men attempted to turn them out, but were three times driven back. by nine o'clock the japs had contrived to make a sand-bag parapet in it and to drag a machine-gun and torpedo-tube on to the fort. by ten the garrison was ordered to evacuate the fort. the officer commanding ordered us to take away the breech-blocks from the 37-millimetre guns, and on leaving the forts to give them to general gorbatovsky, which we did. when we left the fort about 100 men were still in the caponier. i imagine our casualties must have been about 600 killed and wounded. the guns left to the[pg 301] enemy were: three 6-inch (all disabled), one baranovsky, two field-guns (4-pounders), seven 37-millimetre.

'we also left 300 rifles, a lot of entrenching tools, and 2 unloaded spherical mines; of ammunition: 37-millimetre, 2,000 rounds; baranovsky, 200 rounds. i don't know what 6-inch ammunition was left. the gunners, by some careless mistake, did not remove the breech-blocks of these guns. of food supplies we left 30 sacks of biscuits, 400 pounds of bread, 1? boxes of tinned meat, and a quantity of groats.'

general smirnoff's evidence about this fort was as follows:

'at last, at 9 a.m. on the 28th, a big explosion took place on the parapet. the enemy opened a heavy fire on the retrenchment; this our men could not stand, and they took cover in the casemates underneath. about 5 p.m. some of the enemy reached the retrenchment, while another portion of them moved along the flank ditches. though the garrison of the fort consisted of some 7 to 9 officers and 300 men, their moral was so affected by the example of fort chi-kuan-shan that the men would not obey their officers, who ordered them out of the casemates back on to the retrenchment; nor did the officers give an example to the men. i sent one company after another from the reserve to reinforce the garrison, and ordered gorbatovsky to drive out the enemy; but the fresh troops became infected by the others: they were demoralized, and would not put their hearts into a counter-attack.

'when gorbatovsky told me of this on the telephone, he, not wishing to make it public, sent captain stepanoff to report personally to me, and begged permission to abandon the fort, or else all the garrison would be killed. i forwarded this news to reuss for information, and did not give gorbatovsky the permission asked[pg 302] for, as i was waiting to see stepanoff first; but before he had reached me gorbatovsky received orders direct from general st?ssel that the fort was to be abandoned. on withdrawing, our men rallied on the half-prepared position some 300 to 500 paces in rear, from rocky ridge to fortification no. 3.'

from the raschevsky-schwartz diary, december 28.

'at 7 a.m. the enemy began to shell intermittently fortification no. 3 and erh-lung-shan fort, and their miners continued working. at 9 a.m. the noise of work in the mining galleries suddenly ceased, and two charges were exploded in the salient angles of the fort. at the moment of the explosion there was only the gun crew on duty in the casemate; the rest of the men were in their quarters in the gorge. great blocks of the inner skin of armoured concrete were torn off by the force of the explosion and piled up in the exit, crushing several men. on the parapet, to left and right of the shelter, were two huge craters. to relieve the position to some extent, and to check the enemy's assaulting columns, our batteries were ordered to fire on the approaches in front of the fort; but what good could our fire do when in the zaredoubt battery there was only one serviceable 6-inch gun, on laperoff hill also only one 6-inch and a 40-millimetre battery, on mitrofanieff's hill one 40-millimetre battery, and on tumulus hill four quick-firing field-guns? all these batteries, though under a heavy shell-fire, did what they could.

'about 11 a.m. the first message from captain bulgakoff, commanding the fort, was received by the staff of the section, reporting that the enemy had destroyed the parapet by the great explosion, and had seized it, that our men were panic-struck and were holding the retrenchment with great difficulty. gorbatovsky then sent up a company at once from the reserves to relieve bulgakoff,[pg 303] and to drive the japanese out of the fort. however, despite this reinforcement, the garrison not only failed to hurl back the enemy, but lost the retrenchment. the officers tried to lead a counter-attack, but when, on going out from the retrenchment, the first men were killed, the remainder refused to go on, and bolted from the retrenchment into the quarters in the gorge. taking advantage of the darkness, small parties of the enemy got round the flanks, threatening to surround the fort from the rear, to seize the gorge ditch, and cut off communication with the fortress. the enemy's artillery continued firing all day. the communicating roads to the fort were destroyed, but were being repaired all the time by our sappers, especially at night. the abandonment of the fort was begun in the afternoon and finished about two in the morning. on leaving the fort captain bulgakoff gave orders to pour kerosene over the bed-boards and set light to the men's quarters and light the long fuses of the mines. at 2 a.m. gorbatovsky ordered me to go to fock in the morning and give him my opinion as to the necessity of holding fortification no. 3 to the end.'

the general opinion of the officers in arthur was that the loss of erh-lung-shan fort was due principally to the bad moral of the garrison, caused by the general's demoralizing influence and the example he had set by fort chi-kuan-shan.

at 6 p.m. on december 29 a meeting—the last meeting—of the council of war took place in the district staff offices. all the senior commanders in the fortress were present:

1. captain golovan, chief staff officer 7th east siberian rifle brigade.

2. lieutenant-colonel dmitrevsky, chief staff officer 4th east siberian rifle division.

[pg 304]

3. colonel khvostoff, chief of the fortress staff.

4. colonel reuss, chief staff officer of the kwantun district.

5. lieutenant-colonel nekrashevitch-poklad, commanding 25th regiment.

6. colonel petrusha, commanding 28th regiment.

7. lieutenant-colonel handurin, commanding 15th regiment.

8. colonel semenoff, a.d.c., commanding 26th regiment.

9. colonel savitsky, commanding 14th regiment.

10. colonel griaznoff, commanding ——[40] regiment.

11. colonel mekhmandaroff, commanding 7th east siberian rifle artillery division.

12. colonel irman, commanding 4th east siberian rifle artillery brigade.

13. colonel grigorenko, commanding the fortress engineers.

14. rear-admiral wiren.

15. rear-admiral loschinsky.

16. major-general gorbatovsky, commanding the eastern front.

17. major-general biely, commanding the fortress artillery.

18. major-general nadein, temporarily commanding 4th east siberian rifle division.

19. major-general nickitin (no special appointment).

20. lieutenant-general fock, lately commanding 4th east siberian rifle division, now in command of the land defences.

21. lieutenant-general smirnoff, commandant of the fortress.

22. general st?ssel, a.d.c.

[pg 305]

it was evening, and the town and front were quiet. the collected members conversed and exchanged opinions in a low tone while waiting for the meeting to commence. every one was naturally much interested in what was coming, and most guessed why general st?ssel had summoned all the senior commanding officers. at last it began. the meeting is recorded for clearness in the following form:

st?ssel. 'gentlemen, i have called you all here to give me your opinion frankly with regard to the actual state of the fortress and the steps which should be taken in future. when the meeting is over i will read you this paper' (in his hand was a letter).[41] 'let us commence with the juniors. captain golovan, what is your opinion on this question?'

golovan. 'we must certainly hold out to the very last.'

dmitrevsky. 'the food is very bad. we have little ammunition now left. i do not see that we can expect anything by continuing the defence.'

nekrashevitch-poklad. 'we have no ammunition. scurvy is on the increase, and the hospitals are full. we have few men to garrison the fortress works. under such circumstances, there is little use in carrying on with the defence.'

petrusha. 'we have held out till now, and we can hold out longer; and then—god's will be done.'

[pg 306]

savitsky and griaznoff. 'it is very difficult to hold out longer. everything is going badly.'

semenoff. 'we must hold out at all costs. my troops are in excellent fettle and the best of spirits.'

mekhmandaroff. 'we must continue the defence.'

st?ssel. 'you must surely know, colonel, that, having got possession of erh-lung-shan fort, the enemy command the neighbouring batteries and works, and can from there shell us. can you guarantee that the enemy won't mount guns there?'

mekhmandaroff. 'i cannot guarantee that, but i will swear that i will put any of their guns out of action as soon as they are mounted. as long as we hold on to rocky ridge the loss of erh-lung-shan does not make our general position in any way critical. we can hold out easily for some time. we still have a number of splendid rear-guard positions. we can, and i consider we ought to, hold out—in fact, to defend ourselves to the last moment.'

irman. 'in any case, we must hold out in the same way as we have already held out. why, up till now one might say that we have really only been holding field positions, not permanent ones. we can easily hold out longer.'

grigorenko. 'we must hold out. let us look at the question on a broader basis. to do the best, i consider we ought to reduce the garrison of all points not being attacked—i.e., liao-tieh-shan and signal hill—and send the troops thus released to the threatened points.'

fock. 'no, no. liao-tieh-shan is the keep—it mustn't be touched.'

reuss. 'as the fleet has ceased to exist, arthur's r?le of affording a sanctuary to it is over. it is quite unnecessary to the army operating in the north, as that army has concentrated now in great strength. a further[pg 307] defence can only end in a street massacre, which is to be deprecated.'

wiren and loschinsky. 'the place must be defended to the bitter end.'

gorbatovsky. 'if the fortress is to fall or to capitulate, we must postpone the day as long as possible. we must fight to the last.'

biely. 'i fail to understand what dmitrevsky means by saying there is no ammunition. we have plenty to repulse two more big attacks—102,000 shells of our own and 100,000 still available from the fleet, with 8,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition. from an artillery point of view, i do not consider we are at all in a critical position. the defence ought to be continued.'

nadein. 'i also agree. we must continue to hold out.'

nickitin. 'we must certainly hold out to the last. if our position is bad, that of the enemy is not particularly happy. a further defence is possible, and should be successful, as we have a series of excellent positions, and in the new chinese town a number of excellent buildings for the troops.'

fock. 'a short time ago i was in the trenches. my god! what did i not see? the suffering, the wounds, the sickness—never shall i forget the sights. who is better or more noble than the private soldier? who can equal him in gallantry, unselfishness, and endurance? we should not let him die for nothing. we should not let him die unless something is gained thereby. the losses will be greater now if the japanese mount guns in erh-lung-shan——'

mekhmandaroff. 'i have already guaranteed that i will not allow them to bring a single gun into action there.'

fock. 'think of the wretched men—hungry, worn out——'

smirnoff. 'i have heard everything that has been said[pg 308] on the subject, and i consider it my duty to state that, according to regulations, there should be in every fortress secret instructions in which the raison d'être of the fortress in the theatre of war is defined. according to these instructions, the commandant is to be the judge as to the extent to which the fortress has done its duty—fulfilled its mission. unfortunately, such instructions do not exist in this fortress. one of the objects of this fortress—to afford a refuge and protection to the fleet—ceased to exist when the fleet was destroyed. the other object—to co-operate in the strategical plans of the main army by keeping employed the japanese army now laying siege to us—is not finished. no matter what the opinion on the question may be, the regulations for the guidance of commanders of fortresses definitely require them to hold out till all strength and means are exhausted, which with us is far from the case. thus we must continue the defence. the scheme of defence conforming to actual circumstances should be as follows: so long as possible we should hold the chinese wall, as from behind it we can throw hand-grenades and fire mines. to strengthen our fighting line we must weaken liao-tieh-shan and signal hill.' (fock shook his head and tried to interrupt.) 'i am sure that we can hold on to the chinese wall for a fortnight. then we will fall back on the second line—i.e., tumulus battery, vladimir, mitrofanieff, and nameless hills. this line has one defect—that it won't be possible to keep the supports and reserves near it, owing to the scarcity of cover. we must therefore regard it as a rear-guard position; but, all the same, we shall be able to hold the enemy on it for a week. finally, there is the third line on stonebroken ridge, running from the left to the northern portion of the town wall, and from the right to big hill. it is at present well fortified, and has directly in rear of it a number of buildings, in which[pg 309] the supports and reserves can get cover. thanks to the strength of this position, we should be able to hold on in it for at least three weeks. by that time our supplies will be running out, and then—not till then' (raising his voice)—'can the question of the fortress's life be discussed.'

he finished.

every one remained silent; no one liked to speak. the commandant had spoken what all knew to be the truth.

st?ssel continued: 'in my opinion the second line is extremely weak, and it is in no way important. well, gentlemen, i see that all of you almost are in favour of a further defence, and we will accordingly carry on. russian soldiers could not act otherwise. i am extremely grateful to all of you for coming to such a resolution.'

the meeting broke up, and the news of the conclusion reached and of the opinions of individual members was soon spread abroad.