the 18th was a lovely day—bright, sunny, and calm. silence reigned all along the front, save for the usual intermittent rifle fire, and on the forts the sentries alone were to be seen.

fort chi-kuan-shan was still in a very critical state. the japanese held the counter-scarp, and the explosion of their mines was momentarily expected. the garrison had been greatly decreased, and were tired out. it was impossible to find reliefs for the ordinary duties even; much less could this exhausted, weakened body of men be asked to make any special effort that might be done by fresh troops. the feeling among them at the appointment of fock, who had for long been nicknamed 'the general of retreats,' was apathetic. he didn't consider it necessary to go to the fort himself to encourage his sorely-tried men; they only knew him by his prophesies of their death and the awful pictures he had painted of the destruction of the forts by the enemy's shells.

pic

north fort, chi-kuan-shan, showing green hills in the distance.

it was the day upon which the japanese had decided to make an end of the fort, and for which they had made all preparations. at 11 a.m.—a time when the trench-guards were usually relieved and there was always noise and movement—their troops told off for the storm[pg 285]ing were quietly moved up and collected in the last approaches, where they awaited the explosion of the mines. the men told off for this 'forlorn hope' were divided into two parties. one party, who had red bands on their arms, was moved towards the caponiers; on the explosion it was to storm the interior of the fort. on their shoulders the second party from the last approach were to climb. if these did not manage to drive out our men, they were to be reinforced by all their available troops, who were to overcome the garrison by sheer weight of numbers.

just about a quarter-past one a volcano seemed to burst from the parapet, and with a roar and the shock of an earthquake a huge black cloud of dust and smoke shot up to the sky. this was followed by a second eruption. for a moment there was comparative calm; then the sky commenced to rain beams, boulders, stones, masses of concrete, sacks, bodies, while on the rear of the fort (to catch our reinforcements) fell a hail of shells. our men, shaken for a moment by the suddenness of all this, and expecting a third explosion, dashed for safety; but they quickly rallied behind the parapet of the prepared retrenchment, from whence they opened a heavy fire on those madly gallant stormers with red bands, who showed themselves on the fort. so impatient were they, and so quick was their advance, that our men could see them being buried under the falling stones and masses of masonry hurled into the air by the explosions.

the nearest batteries—tumulus, laperoff's, zaredoubt, and b—opened a murderous fire on all the approaches, thus paralysing further assaults and preventing the enemy from crowning the craters of their mines. consequently, this face of the fort, with its destroyed revetment, became neutral ground. our gunners, shooting splendidly, glued the enemy to the spot, and did not allow them to advance[pg 286] a yard; but their skill was wasted, for general fock took no advantage of it. he did not reinforce the garrison, as he should have done, and thus enable them to crown the craters, and so again establish themselves on the outer parapet. meanwhile the enemy were holding on, preparing themselves for another assault, and our men behind the thin parapet of the retrenchment were suffering heavily.

it was the psychological moment, the crisis. had reinforcements been sent up, they would have turned the scale, and chi-kuan-shan would have been saved, but general fock seems to have made up his mind at the first explosion that the fort must be abandoned. to be exact, a reinforcement of a company of sailors from the pobieda and peresvet was sent up by smirnoff; but coming under a heavy fire on their way, few reached the fort, and they were not sufficiently numerous to render much assistance.

so it continued till night. when darkness came on the enemy again dashed to the attack, at the same time turning all their guns on to the ground in our rear to prevent the approach of supports. a hand-to-hand fight ensued. both sides fought like lions, or rather devils; but the more of the enemy that we killed the more seemed to appear. they even dragged two mountain guns up on to the parapet, and got to work with them at close range, and then the scene, lit up by the cold beams of the searchlights and the dazzling glare of star-shell and rockets, indeed seemed like hell let loose. the fort's hours were numbered, for without reinforcements it could not last for ever—and no reinforcements came.

while it was in its death agony, the higher authorities were engaged in correspondence.

[pg 287]

telephone message from general fock to general gorbatovsky. 7.40 p.m., december 18, 1904.

'general st?ssel has given orders that the casemates of chi-kuan-shan fort are to be at once mined, and then, if the japanese do not withdraw from the fort—i.e., from the parapet—the garrison is to retire and the casemates are to be blown up. the enemy are not to be allowed to establish themselves on the parapet, which must be fired on by the guns and the torpedo tube. in view of captain stepanoff's report, to the effect that before sunset he and colonel mekhmandaroff could see from big eagle's nest only one jap officer and three men on the parapet laying sand-bags, i leave it to you to hold on to the fort so long as you think necessary. in giving this order, based on my report, general st?ssel came to this decision only because he thought that under present circumstances no other course was possible. at sunset a sailor came to me and reported that by the explosion of a bomb thrown by the enemy we had had 15 casualties.'

telephone message from general gorbatovsky to the staff of the general officer commanding land front (fock). 9.35 p.m., december 18, 1904.

'from chi-kuan-shan it is reported that heavy casualties are occurring from grenades thrown by the enemy. we have not been able to reoccupy the parapet. i therefore propose to avail myself of your permission to blow up the casemates, and i have ordered the garrison to hold on till our sappers have got the mines ready. as a precautionary measure and to cover the garrison during the retirement, please move one company temporarily from the main reserve to the ice-house. i am just going to colonel glagoleff to give the necessary instructions on the spot.'

telephone message from colonel dmitrevsky (chief staff officer to general fock) to general gorbatovsky. 9.40 p.m., december 18, 1904.

'general fock fully concurs in your opinion about chi-kuan-shan. he trusts that you will see that the repairs to kuropatkin lunette are energetically carried out.'

[pg 288]

at 11.30 p.m., in accordance with orders received direct from general fock, commanding the land defences, the garrison, after destroying the entrance bridge, abandoned the fort, which for four months had been held, despite much desperate and bloody fighting. although general gorbatovsky in his message at 9.35 p.m. on december 18 proposed to avail himself of the permission given in the previous messages and to abandon the fort, he never, in fact, gave the order.

at 11 p.m. he visited the fort to ascertain personally the state of affairs, and met the men already retiring. when he told them to go back, they said general fock had ordered them to withdraw.

only after four months' awful fighting, tens of thousands of deaths, countless numbers of wounded, a sea of spilt blood, a hell of human sufferings, tears, and sorrows, and owing to the difficulties in which we were, did the enemy succeed in capturing the first of our permanent forts. and even then it would not have been theirs if fock (this is the deliberate opinion of all the most experienced officers) had reinforced it in time, and had not, on his own responsibility, determined to abandon it when he did. he carried out his theories in practice, and made this unnecessary surrender.

smirnoff—the commandant of port arthur—only learnt of this deplorable surrender after it had been carried out; for fock, in direct contravention of the first principles of discipline, did not even inform him of his intention. he knew better than to let smirnoff have any suspicion of it, and, ignoring him, communicated direct with st?ssel.

this is not fiction, but the plain, unvarnished truth.

early next day general fock went to the commandant to report the loss of the fort.

[pg 289]

'who, may i ask, gave you permission to abandon it?' asked smirnoff.

'i received a direct order to that effect, sir, from general st?ssel. it was he who gave the order. how could i have dared to do such a thing on my own responsibility?'

'perhaps you are unaware, general, that i have been appointed by his imperial majesty the tsar to command this fortress. you, as commanding the land defences, are immediately subordinate to me, and without my permission you have not a shadow of right to abandon anything in my fortress. i am its commandant, and i alone am responsible.'

'i hunted for you last night, sir; i went to your hut to look for you, but couldn't find you anywhere.' this was incorrect; he had not done so.

'you must have known it was useless to look for me there—i do not follow the example set by some amongst you, and change my quarters every time a chance shell comes near them.[38] every one knows that i live here, and i only leave this to go out on to the defences. i repeat,' continued smirnoff, 'you have not the slightest right to give up a fort without my approval. i can reinforce it as much as seems advisable to me. there are more than 30,000 men at this minute bearing arms in the fortress. under no circumstances should the fort have been abandoned; it might very easily have been held. moreover, its surrender has had the worst effect on the whole garrison. you have undermined the principles i have always instilled into the men—that a fort may perish, but never surrender; you have done untold harm. i cannot tell now but what the men will take it into their heads to retire from forts of their own[pg 290] accord. the garrison is worn out and underfed, and to men in this condition an example of this sort is paralysing, and may fatally injure the further defence.[39] men are but human; they wish to live, and the instinct of self-preservation is always strong in them.'

from smirnoff fock went off at once to st?ssel. on the 18th a secret meeting of the district staff was held. the result was the publication in a district order of an entirely inaccurate version of the circumstances relating to the loss of the fort.

after the sudden abandonment of this strong fort, which was made without permission of, or even reference to, the council of defence, the commandant despatched the following cypher telegram to kuropatkin, no. 1,282, dated december 20, 1904:

'to the commander-in-chief of the armies and the fleet.

'on december 15 major-general kondratenko, commanding the land defences, was killed. to succeed him general st?ssel has appointed lieutenant-general fock, though i requested that only the western portion of the front should be entrusted to him, and that i should take, in addition to my other duties, the direct command of the eastern front. my reasons were that on the west the enemy are still some 1,200 yards distant, while in the east they are practically sitting on our parapets. fock's first action on assuming command was to blow up the casemates in chi-kuan-shan fort and abandon it, taking advantage of instructions given to him directly by st?ssel. this was done without reference to me, without my knowledge, and without asking either my opinion or that of the council, and despite my previously expressed views on the subject. general st?ssel's systematic ignoring of my rights as commandant of the fortress, in particular with regard to administrative matters and the hospitals, has been constant since september; but though my authority is being continually undermined by various orders issued in the fortress without reference to me, the actual defence has till now suffered little, thanks to the complete agree[pg 291]ment of the late officer commanding the land defences, the officer commanding the artillery, and the officer commanding the engineers with my views. now, however, that so serious a matter as the surrender of a fort has been decided on without reference to me, and, as it was in my opinion most injurious to the defence, i have the honour to ask that either general st?ssel may be ordered to recognize my rights as commandant at once, in accordance with fortress regulations, and may be forbidden to interfere, or else that i may be relieved of all responsibility for the further defence of the fortress and of my duties as commandant.'

having sent this telegram, general smirnoff hoped that port arthur would live till an answer could be received, which would be at longest in about three weeks; if it should be favourable to him, and the defence should pass entirely into his hands, he felt sure that, in spite of the harm already done by fock, he would be able to hold out till the end of february.

alas! the end came just twelve days after the despatch of the above message.