on the 8th was held a meeting of the council of defence, a meeting which is historic in the annals of this unique body. up to now at previous meetings many things had been discussed. the plan of the forts and the fortifications had been criticized generally and in detail. the uselessness of our engineers had been pointed out ad nauseam; the disgraceful nature of the concrete work, which, though designed to resist 6-inch shells, was easily destroyed by them, and the insufficiency of the munitions of war, had been discussed. it had been reiterated in no measured terms that arthur was in no sense a fortress, but only an entrenched camp. general fock generally spoke more than the others; his speeches were verbose and not convincing. each successive meeting was a repetition of the preceding one and the minutes were of no value, as the resolutions entered in on them by st?ssel, some of them dictated by others, were at variance with the opinion of the members, and were made with 'one eye on the gallery,' for future use. they were, later on, characterized by lieutenant-general froloff, chief of the head-quarter staff, as being 'an apologetic document submitted betimes with a view to later on justifying the surrender.'

the commandant, knowing from experience that nothing would result from these meetings except endless discussion[pg 266] and waste of time, was unwilling to summon them. he used to do so once a month simply to satisfy general st?ssel. instead of this council, smirnoff used to hold daily conferences with the general officers commanding the land defences, the fortress artillery, and the fortress engineers, at which all urgent questions were quickly decided.

on the morning of the 8th, st?ssel and reuss went to kondratenko's quarters. general biely, commanding the artillery, saw this from the veranda of his hut, and could not understand why they should visit kondratenko. after a couple of hours they came out, conversing eagerly. st?ssel went home, but reuss went up to biely. he talked to him eloquently of the critical state of the fortress, drawing a dark picture of the future. he asserted that, with the destruction of the squadron, arthur's importance as a fortress had ceased, and that therefore, on account of the suffering wounded and of the exhausted and scurvy-stricken garrison, matters should be put a stop to. biely was dumb; the object of st?ssel's visit to kondratenko was now clear. reuss then spoke openly about surrender, and did his best to persuade biely to agree to it. at last, declaring he was going on to the commandant, he said good-bye, but he went off in the opposite direction, and shortly afterwards smirnoff received a note from him to the following effect:

'owing to the great change in the conditions since the loss of 203 metre hill, the officer commanding the district requests that you will summon a meeting of the council to discuss future action for the defence of the fortress.'

on receiving this, the commandant presumed that the council was to meet in order that generals fock and nickitin, who had no duty, might be acquainted with the scheme for the future defence. at 5 p.m. the members met in smirnoff's room, all except kondratenko, who was[pg 267] telephoned for. he was unable to come at once, so the discussion went on without him. smirnoff opened the proceedings:

'as roman isidorovitch [kondratenko] thoroughly knows the scheme for the future defence, i will begin without waiting for him. well, gentlemen, 203 metre hill has fallen. with its fall began the bombardment of our warships, which have been destroyed. nevertheless, the loss of the hill has not altered the position of the defence. so long as we held angle hill, 203 metre hill was, with regard to that, a réduit.[33] as soon as we abandoned angle hill, 203 metre hill became a salient on the western front, which the japanese had to attack. this salient no longer exists. our lines over this hill were large, but the enemy's were incomparably greater. for us 203 metre hill was only an advanced point, the defence of which was mainly important in order to ensure the safety of our fleet. this defence, on which we had to concentrate all our available strength, gradually weakened us all along the line. i held on to it till the denudation of the other fronts, especially of the north-east, in order to provide reinforcements, became dangerous. from the moment i felt that a further expenditure of men on 203 metre hill was more dangerous than useful, i decided to give it up. from what i have said it is clear that, with the fall of the hill, we are forced back on to positions on the main line of defence. the western front, in addition to the permanent and intermediate works, which have hardly been touched, has a lot of ground behind it. to reach this front from 203 metre hill by systematic approach (the enemy could not do it by assault) will take at least a month and a half. i have no fear for it.'

'it is essential to strengthen the defence of liao-tieh-[pg 268]shan, which is the keep of arthur. the enemy will now turn all his attention to it. it is necessary to strengthen it and defend it,' interrupted fock.

kondratenko then entered.

after telling the new-comer what had been said, smirnoff continued:

'and so, i repeat, i have no fear for the western front, as i am almost certain that nogi, being for the present satisfied with the capture of 203 metre hill and the destruction of the fleet, will not force his way any more in that direction. what he does there will be in the nature of a demonstration; he will turn all his real attention to the north-east front, which has cost him so dear, to the half-destroyed forts and works whose parapets are now almost occupied by him. this is obvious, because, having conducted with the greatest pains a gradual attack against this front for more than three months, and having at last reached the parapets of our works after immense loss, he will never abandon them in order to commence a fresh attack on the almost untouched side. besides, the enemy know well that behind this front are all the vital parts of the fortress—the dockyard, workshops, mills, supply dep?ts, arsenal, magazines, etc. on the western side, however, there is no such attraction for them; on the contrary, there is everything to put them off, so i repeat that i do not fear for it. our north-east front, from tumulus battery to b battery, however, causes grave anxiety. chi-kuan-shan fort and fortification no. 3 are the most critical, and that is where we must pay all our attention. owing to this, it is essential to take some of the troops from the west and send them to the east, after drawing on the garrison of liao-tieh-shan and the forts which have not been attacked. at present on the north-east front a second line has been got ready, running from tumulus battery across vladimir and mitrofanieff hills to name[pg 269]less redoubt. the third line on stonebroken ridge will soon be finished. i have paid special attention to this, and it will shortly be extremely strong. at present, with the forts and chinese wall still with us, the naval guns mounted on the third line and the shore front will enable us successfully to carry on an artillery duel, notwithstanding the fact that the enemy is within the fortress area. but, in any case, it is necessary to concentrate as many men as possible on the north-east front. the main reserve is now a little more than a thousand men. general gorbatovsky also has a fairly strong reserve, but, owing to the great losses one way and another, we must take troops from liao-tieh-shan and the forts on the western front. that is the position. i am ready to hear any suggestions that may be put forward.'

fock replied:

'i urge the importance of strengthening the defence of liao-tieh-shan. i have already pointed out its strategical importance to the fortress. it is the keep, you understand, gentlemen—it is the keep of arthur.'

smirnoff replied:

'i say that liao-tieh-shan at present is of no importance to the fortress. even if the japanese occupy it, it will only be of use to them as an observation point, as it is so far away. it will take a very long time to mount guns there, and they will never attempt it, for the simple reason that to shell the old town and the north-east front from there is impossible. the old town is seven and the north-east front is nine miles away as the crow flies. but let us now get on to those points which are closely connected with the strength of the garrison.'

fock returned to the charge:

'i urge the necessity not only of holding, but strengthening, the defence of liao-tieh-shan. it is the keep of arthur'—but smirnoff continued:

'at present dysentery is on the decline; typhus, though[pg 270] it exists, is stationary; what is worst of all is the increase of scurvy—that is the scourge that we must fight. the most rational, and the only thing to do is to increase the allowance of meat. this may not stop the epidemic, but it will weaken it. scurvy is a slow disease, and by increasing the rations we may yet be able to make use of the men who have only got it in the initial stage. we have about 3,500 horses. according to my calculations, not more than 500 are required for the works. the munitions of war and food-supplies are now concentrated all along the defences, and so long-distance transport of them will not be necessary; besides, the décauville light line,[34] connecting the old town with cossack square, will to a considerable extent relieve the transport of supplies to the front. i think that, with luck, we may take for food, without harm to the transport of supplies, more than 3,000 horses. i therefore propose to issue to the garrison ? pound of horse-flesh per man. i have not worked it out exactly, but, roughly, for a garrison of 40,000 men that means fresh meat for forty-eight days at ? pound per man per day.'

after some discussion it was decided to issue a ?-pound meat ration to those in hospital and ? pound to the combatants.

biely, who knew what was coming, could not for the life of him make out why smirnoff was beating about the bush so long instead of coming to the main subject of the meeting. gorbatovsky, in complete ignorance, was quietly awaiting the end of the meeting. khvostoff was hurriedly writing down notes from which to draw up the minutes. reuss, who looked as if he were sitting on tin-tacks, suddenly jumped up.

'the officer commanding the district has instructed me to ascertain the opinion of the council as to how long they consider the fortress should be defended.'

[pg 271]

'excuse me, sir; that question does not permit of discussion. although we have not an overabundance of ammunition, we have sufficient to repel at least two more heavy assaults, and if the big-gun ammunition runs out we shall have more than 10,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition left. when all the ammunition is finished we shall still have our bayonets. such a question is quite inopportune, premature, and does not permit of discussion. as to the question of how long we can hold out, that is easily decided for us by the supply returns.' and, getting up, smirnoff moved towards the table on which the books were lying. 'let us see what the fortress intendant has to say as to the amount of supplies in the dep?ts to-day. i see that flour, groats, green food, tea and sugar, will last for more than a month. the question of horse-flesh we have just settled. in addition to this we have sufficient biscuits for more than a month and a half.[35] the question of surrender cannot at present be considered. i cannot allow any discussion with regard to a capitulation before the middle of january at the earliest.'

there was a general movement of assent amongst the members. they all loudly declared the raising of the question to be quite premature. reuss remained sitting, looking extremely disconcerted.

'yes, yes; the raising of this question is premature,' said fock.

reuss looked at him with unconcealed astonishment.

smirnoff continued sarcastically:

'at home they are just preparing to celebrate the jubilee of sevastopol. our fathers held out for eleven months! we shall not have completed eleven months till january 8, and only then will the son be worthy of his father.'

[pg 272]

when they went out into the street kondratenko turned to biely.

'what has happened to general st?ssel? has his wound really made such an impression upon him?'

khvostoff alone was left in the room, scribbling hard at the minutes. next day these were sent round to all the members for signature. they all signed, but reuss attached his dissent, in which he protested that the commandant had decided the question of surrendering the fortress purely on the basis that arthur had not held out so long as sevastopol. with regard to the actual facts he said nothing.

when the minutes were sent to st?ssel for his confirmation he first wrote repudiating the instructions which reuss said he had given about raising the question of surrender; then, agreeing with fock's opinion as to the immense importance to the fortress of liao-tieh-shan, he gave definite orders that its garrison should not be weakened, and that it should be defended to the last. he also expressed great astonishment at the commandant's ignorance in thinking that guns, rifles, and bayonets were used in succession one after another and not together!

'every soldier knows that guns, rifles, and bayonets are used together. as to surrendering the fortress, i shall know when the time comes, and i will not permit a street massacre.'

the most important resolution of the meeting—namely, the question of increasing the horse-flesh ration on account of the spread of scurvy—he did not confirm. the garrison continued to be fed on fish for five days per week, receiving ? pound of horse-flesh per man only on the other two days.

how can one account for such a decision concerning men suffering from scurvy? not only was the deprivation cruelty to the sick men, but it tended to reduce the garrison to a state of impotence through disease.

[pg 273]

with general st?ssel must unquestionably lie the responsibility for the fact that the whole fortress was slowly converted into a living cemetery (scurvy increased with great strides), and that the way for surrender was thus prepared. finally, he, to every one's amazement, issued an order that day by which he endeavoured to prevent the commandant getting in touch in any way with the outside world. this order was as follows (no. 904, dated december 9, 1904):

'should any chinese junks approach the shore, the nearest picquet or gendarme post will take steps to guide it into a safe place, and will put a guard on it to see that no one goes near it. its arrival must be immediately reported to the district staff, whence further instructions will be awaited. all correspondence found will be at once despatched to the district staff office. no junk will be permitted to leave without permission of the district staff, and permission for anyone to go on board the junks must also be obtained from that office. the despatch of any correspondence whatever in junks is strictly forbidden. before their departure junks will be carefully inspected, and any correspondence found on them will be confiscated, and the authors will be held responsible.'

the gendarmes were placed in the most impossible position by this order, but their chief, prince mickeladsey, knowing what the officer commanding the district was worth, and being, properly speaking, subordinate only to the commandant of the fortress, continued to obey the orders of the latter.

admiral grigorovitch, as before, continued to communicate with chifu.