while men were slaughtering each other in thousands on this hill the civilized world watched the tape, wondering who would win, what the end would be. how many protested or were even indignant at this legalized butchery? it is said, of course, that war is necessary and inevitable, that it freshens and invigorates national organism. this may be so, but it also brings a step closer the realization of the socialistic dream. of this i am certain.

december 3 arrived and passed under similar conditions, except that the fight on the hill was, if possible, more exasperated. in the fortress the feeling of alarm was intensified, and all unemployed men had been got under arms (at the time of the surrender the number of armed men had been increased by 9,000), and the other points denuded, in order to feed the maw of 203 metre hill. even the hospitals gave their contribution. december 4—bright and frosty—ushered in a fresh hell. it was now hardly a fight between men that was taking place on this accursed spot: it was a struggle of human flesh against iron and steel, against blazing petroleum, lyddite, pyroxyline, and mélinite, and the stench of rotting corpses. it was the last day but one of the long-drawn agony.

a shell to-day fell into one of the hospitals full of wounded men, but perhaps the scene of horror inside was hardly[pg 253] increased. were the enemy getting ferocious in their exasperation, and beginning to ignore humanity? it looked like it. by night our feelings had become deadened by the continued strain; we were almost apathetic.

on the hill our men still held on under the gallant leadership of colonel irman, but in spite of his bravery he did not really replace tretiakoff, and butusoff, by now well known to the reader, had just before this fight been given a week's leave to rest—a rest which he sadly needed. captain veselovsky, of the 26th regiment, was actually commanding on the hill. the officers with him were lieutenants obolensky and rafalovitch, of the same regiment. while the first-named was calmly doing his duty a splinter tore away his face right down to the lower jaw. on his body there was left a chin fringed with beard and some teeth. rafalovitch, who was standing alongside, was untouched, being merely covered with earth and blood; but he was quite upset, and asked semenoff to relieve him for a few hours. the latter telephoned permission, but 'not for more than two or three hours,' as the waste in officers was very great. rafalovitch appeared at the staff head-quarters. he was dirty; his clothes were torn and covered with blood and spotted with whity-red bits of something. this handsome, healthy young fellow was quite unstrung by what he had been through. he was trembling as if in a fever; his eyes were bloodshot and wandering, and he could scarcely speak.

'what's happened? your face is covered with blood. are you wounded?'

'no, sir, i am—i am not wounded. it's not my blood; it's captain veselovsky's brains,' was the stammering reply jerked out.

'what! veselovsky killed?'

'yes, sir. his head was carried away—only not quite:[pg 254] the lower jaw and beard were left—and i was covered with his brains, right in my face. it almost blinded me. i thought i was wounded. can i go and rest a little?'

'yes, go, and god be with you. go and rest, but remember we are short of officers.'

after a few hours a message was received that obolensky had been killed with a bullet in the head. there was now not a single officer left in the 5th company of the 26th regiment; there was only the sergeant-major. he was promoted by telephone to be acting ensign, and rafalovitch was sent for.

the telephone rang.

'sir, general kondratenko wants to speak to you.'

semenoff took the receiver and listened.

'i think the position so serious that colonel butusoff should be sent there.'

'sir, butusoff is exhausted, and asked a few days ago for leave to go and rest. i gave it him on the condition that he would at once come if wanted.'

'tell him that i do not order him to go to 203 metre hill, but i would ask him to. we want him there; he is irreplaceable. say it is my particular request.'

he was at once summoned, and went up to the hill. we knew we should not see him again, and sure enough next day butusoff, the pride of the frontier guards, was mortally wounded in the stomach, and suffered frightful agony till he became unconscious before death.

as the sun rose on december 5 it lit up the two-humped summit of 203 metre hill for the last time in the possession of russian soldiers—a handful of gunners, sappers, and infantry hiding among shapeless mounds of rubbish. this was the last day. on it occurred an incident which might be for ever quoted as an illustration of the 'fog of war.'

[pg 255]

that morning semenoff was watching through a telescope from obelisk hill. at ten o'clock he saw that the fighting was at the very top of the hill. at noon he saw our men retiring; the japanese had gained the top, and our men were dashing down the hill. the enemy did not follow; they did not even open fire, but more and more of them were collecting on top and working as hard as they could, throwing sand-bags together and entrenching themselves. their flag fluttered in the breeze. a parapet grew up; our men were getting further and further away. it was all quite clear and distinct. every minute was precious. it was essential to concentrate a heavy fire on the hill and prevent the enemy establishing themselves, or all would be lost. he dashed to the telephone.

'put me on to the officer commanding the artillery.'

an answer came from the exchange that the line was engaged.

'in general st?ssel's name put me on to general biely.'

he got through.

'sir, the japanese are entrenching on the top of 203 metre hill. we are retiring; the artillery must shell the hill. every minute is precious.'

biely calmly answered that, according to the reports from irman, the hill was still ours.

'i assure you, sir, the japanese have got the hill, and are throwing up a parapet. i can see it through my telescope.'

biely answered as before, and suggested that semenoff should communicate with the fortress staff. meanwhile the japanese were feverishly, rapidly continuing to work, and time was going—precious time that never would return.

semenoff rang up the fortress staff. they replied[pg 256] that, according to a report just received from kondratenko, the hill was still in our hands. semenoff assured them that our men had abandoned it and the japanese had seized the summit.

the artillery remained silent: without an order through 'the proper channel' they could not open fire. no one else either saw or knew what was happening. it was only from semenoff's observation point, and by aid of an excellent telescope, that it could be seen that the japanese had taken the hill. semenoff again rang up biely:

'sir, open fire on 203 metre hill, or it will be too late. there are many japanese there now. they are entrenching themselves on the top, and we shall not be able to get it back.'

'perhaps you are mistaken. why doesn't irman, who is commanding the western front, send us any word? i——'

but semenoff rang off. it was already 2 p.m. he rang up irman's staff and spoke to kondratenko:

'sir, the japanese have occupied the top of 203 metre hill, and are building a parapet. we have retreated. i can see it all in my telescope. fire must be opened on the hill.'

'how is it that i can still see our men in a bomb-proof? and irman tells me that the hill is ours. i will ask him now,' said kondratenko.

'i assure you, sir, that the japanese are on the top.'

'well, i'll ask irman at once. if it is so, we must open fire immediately, although i myself clearly see our men, and have asked the commandant not to fire.'

pic

general biely.

this muddle can be very easily explained. it was all caused by the 'point of view.' the commandant had received information that the japanese were on the hill,[pg 257] and that our men were retiring; he had been told so often before. however, being convinced that 203 metre hill was in possession of the enemy, he ordered biely to open fire on the top. the order was given, but it took at least an hour before it reached the battery commanders by telephone. meanwhile kondratenko telephoned to him and implored him not to open fire, as some of our men were still concentrated on the hill! the commandant, upon receipt of this message from the officer commanding the defences, at once ordered biely not to fire. kondratenko was correct in reporting as he did; he saw what was happening on the hill from his own point of view, and there certainly were some men in the bomb-proof. semenoff from his position could see well that the japanese had occupied the top, and were entrenching. so it went on.

later kondratenko telephoned to semenoff and asked him to go to him to arrange a withdrawal of the troops. this was irman's duty, not semenoff's. but the former was now useless: after all the strain and confusion, he had quite lost his head. there was again some misunderstanding about the withdrawal. in the evening an unsuccessful attempt was made to regain 203 metre hill, and after its failure, smirnoff decided to abandon it altogether, but to cling on to flat and divisional hills. however, by an error of kondratenko's, all three were abandoned at the same time. it did not much matter, as with the fall of 203 metre hill the two others had no real value. the withdrawal began at dusk, and was carried on without a hitch till 6 a.m. notwithstanding the fact that every one in arthur well knew that it must fall sooner or later, that it was not strong enough to resist siege-guns, or to repulse for ever assaults which were constantly being reinforced by fresh columns, the[pg 258] actual end created a deep impression. the lull which now ensued, though, as usual, made the garrison believe in its own strength, in spite of the fact that the last days of the pacific ocean fleet had come.

203 metre hill was lost, and with it more than 5,000 russians.