from raschevsky's diary, november 18:
'we have to wait and wait, which makes things very difficult. it is far easier to fight a fierce action which would be decisive than to waste away by slow degrees. sickness has already begun to break out. the troops seem to be losing their energy, and there is a shortage of supplies; in fact, the state of affairs is daily becoming unendurable, and we are not in a condition to endure any ill-fortune.'
in reality the position of the fortress, owing to the decrease in energy, was getting alarming. writing these lines, i can plainly see before me raschevsky's well-built figure, as he used to report to the commandant about the progress of work at the front. if the energetic, indefatigable raschevsky began to feel tired, what must the faint-hearted have felt? raschevsky did not live, he seemed to boil over with energy, and his eventual loss to the army was irreparable. arthur was indeed being burned in a slow fire, but no one had been heard to talk of a surrender except chez st?ssel. we all longed for a fierce, decisive battle and a quick end—better death than a shameful surrender. meanwhile the enemy were on the whole silent, occasionally firing at us, gathering together their strength for the future. this lull, this weary uncertainty, was hard to bear. to continue quoting from the diary:
[pg 234]
'news has been received from chinese spies that the seven guns which were lying on the shore of louisa bay have been mounted at nangalin. they also say that the japanese, annoyed at their want of success in the north, have decided to seize arthur between november 21 and 26, whatever it may cost, and that if this assault, for which they have about 40,000 men and will use their fleet, is not successful they will not attempt another.'
at this time there occurred one or two episodes which seemed to be indicative that the idea of surrender was already held in certain quarters.
general smirnoff was now paying special attention to the third line of defence, already armed with naval guns, and having excellently laid out redoubts and deep trenches. on this it was intended to oppose the enemy should we have to withdraw from the second line, and admiral wiren was to be appointed to command it. in the middle of november the commandant unexpectedly received a definite order to cease work, not only on the third but also on the second line (the fortress works), and at the same time to send men from the main reserve direct to the first line of defences—the forts, and intermediate works—of the north-east front. though general smirnoff thoroughly appreciated the important r?le which the second and third lines must play in the future defence, he obeyed the order and also sent the chinese coolies to the first line, but at the same time continued to carry on the works on the second and third lines energetically, so that by the middle of december they were almost finished. st?ssel's definite order to cease work on the second defence line, which was most important, could only mean that he either did not understand the importance of this line, or that, under the influence of general fock, he had an ulterior motive. the course of later events forced me to suppose[pg 235] that the order was founded on a previously formed conclusion that the fortress could no longer be held, once the enemy should have established themselves on the part of the first line between tumulus and b batteries, from the highest point of which—eagles' nest—they could observe and direct the fire of their guns on to any point up to the sea. another incident, which took place directly after the interruption of communications in april or may, possessed in conjunction with the one just described a curious significance. from the moment when the railway was cut, the majority of the inhabitants had wisely withdrawn their deposits from the russo-chinese bank, and consequently scarcely any ready money remained in hand. the defence fund deposit could not be drawn upon, but in the treasure chest of the 3rd corps there was ￡120,000. as the chinese labourers had to be paid almost daily, cash was a necessity, and general smirnoff asked the officer commanding the district, through colonel grigorovitch, to advance him ￡5,000 in order to pay them; but st?ssel declined. then the commandant himself went to st?ssel and tactfully and politely explained to him the absolute necessity of paying the labourers, and he said that if this was not done all the work on the defensive lines would be stopped. the reply he received was: 'the money belongs to the 3rd corps, and should stay at its credit.'
'but, sir! i have absolutely no money with which to pay the chinese, and shall have to stop work altogether in two or three days. and, if they find they can't get work here, they'll all leave the place. at present great progress is being made with the defences; the labour is absolutely essential, and i must have money.'
he argued, and tried for a long time to convince the officer commanding the district, but when he had done speaking st?ssel bluntly refused his request with the words:
[pg 236]
'it is nothing to do with me.'
realizing what menaced the fortress if money for these labourers was not forthcoming, the commandant sent general kondratenko to st?ssel to endeavour to get something out of him, if only a small sum. roman isidorovitch[32] went and, after great difficulty, eventually got st?ssel to lend ￡1,500 to the defence fund. later it was found necessary to borrow several more thousands of pounds from the corps treasure chest, but to each request st?ssel at first gave a refusal, doing everything in his power to hinder and prevent the money being lent, though the corps did not require it, the men having nothing to spend their savings on. it was due to this difficulty of getting money, that right up to the strict investment, the works were not made on the liberal scale on which they should have been, but were constructed from hand to mouth according to the money available. it was due to this action of st?ssel's that much in the fortress was found unfinished and unready at the beginning of the blockade. everything which was incomplete had to be finished anyhow—by the superhuman efforts of men who, since may, had begun to feel the effects of being on short rations.
early in november, field-marshal oyama joined the besieging army, with orders to ascertain on the spot the reasons for the siege being so long protracted. the enemy were alarmed at the vision of the approaching baltic fleet, for, so long as arthur held out and afforded protection to what remained of the pacific ocean fleet, this, after uniting with rojdestvensky's squadrons, would shake their position at sea. they were accordingly most anxious to take the place, and at a council of war it was decided that nogi must seize it at any cost. fresh troops were pushed up to the front and the tired ones relieved;[pg 237] more guns were mounted, and ammunition was replenished.
all along our front men lived just like every one else—they ate, slept, hoped, and died. to the noise of bursting shells and firing they had long got accustomed. a shell burst; a man—perhaps two or three—were killed. up came others to separate the wounded from the dead; but there was no bustling, no excitement; it was nothing unusual—merely routine! habit is indeed wonderful! when a fairly long lull took place we at first enjoyed it, but after a bit began to feel the want of something. it was thus all along, except on the extreme flanks and on the shore-line, where there was almost absolute safety, especially on tiger's tail and on liao-tieh-shan. of course, in some parts of the front, where the enemy were within 15 to 20 yards of our parapets, life was a little difficile. neither side dared show up to the other; each was always waiting for a shot. it was particularly so with erh-lung-shan, chi-kuan-shan, and fortification no. 3. here the merciless, dogged struggle never relaxed for a moment. it was our most vulnerable point, to which the enemy stuck like leeches, daily establishing themselves more firmly. they dug, dug, dug, and burrowed like moles, laid fougasses, exploded mines, pounded us with shells, and showered bullets.
we now started the november 'assault season,' which began on the 20th. it was begun by a bombardment, followed by an assault of several companies, which dashed into the ditch of fort erh-lung-shan. after a desperate struggle they were repulsed by 4 p.m., and by dusk all was quiet. the men were so used by now to death and fighting that, except for the conversation in the casemates being afterwards perhaps a little more animated, no change was noticeable. among the staff-officers alone one saw unusual activity, and telephones were busy. an[pg 238] alarming message was received, also, to the effect that the enemy had fired a mine in the caponier of fort chi-kuan-shan, and we had been obliged to withdraw some 8 yards behind the traverse. we had actually given them 8 yards! this was at once reported to the commandant, who, as usual, when not riding round the defences, was studying the chart on his table or at the telephone: he never had a spare moment, for he was the slave of the telephone. when in his house he could never leave the instrument day or night. he used to doze beside it, always ready to make decisions and give orders, for he was the nerve-centre, the brain of the fortress.
on november 21 they built a new battery on the north side of ta-ku-shan. the importance of the hill and its command over the north-east front was always being brought home to us. had we only fortified it well, and been able to retain it, what a difference it would have made to the fortress! on the 22nd the enemy hurled themselves at dark against kuropatkin's lunette and b battery, but, being seen in time, were repulsed by reserves taken from the flanks. at midnight they again attacked, and again were hurled back.
the following is an extract from raschevsky's diary of november 23:
'as usual, we found it very hard to drive the japs out of the trenches; it took nearly half an hour. it is clear proof of the faulty way in which our trenches are built. they are narrow and deep with revetted banquettes, on which the men firing are like hens on a perch, and it is impossible either to shoot well from them or to give support to any place broken through. men who want to move along have to squeeze past those manning the trench; it is agony to a wounded man to pull him out along behind the firing-line, and it is very difficult for an officer to get past to control the fire. generally speaking, our trenches are[pg 239] beneath contempt, and yet new ones are being dug, on the same pattern, and we are forbidden to let the men build them in any other way!'
on november 24 our guns were busy all day destroying the crowning of the glacis of fort erh-lung-shan and fortification no. 3. the enemy continued to advance, and mounted a gun in the ditch of fortification no 3, with which they battered the caponier, and built a bridge across the deep ditch of the fort, which was only destroyed with great difficulty. there was heavy firing all night on the 25th, and at dawn on the 26th every gun on the north-east front was in action. the whole line from tumulus hill to b battery was enveloped in thick black smoke from the shells of hundreds of guns concentrated on to a comparatively small space.
the assault began. living waves of infantry rolled forward against the ruined front, and the moments of the fortress seemed numbered. bayonet fighting was the order everywhere, as attack was met by counter-attack. time after time the enemy threw themselves with extraordinary gallantry and persistence on forts erh-lung-shan, chi-kuan-shan, and b battery. thousands were mown down, but the living surged onwards. but it could not go on for ever, and at 3.30 the infantry attack slackened and ceased. we had lost nothing save caponier no. 2, but the enemy kept pounding us with their guns, and we awaited a fresh attack. at 8 p.m. our searchlights showed up dense columns behind the railway near tumulus hill. on they came, and hell was again let loose. their effort was to break through cossack square towards the central wall. they got the hill and reached our guns—on, on they crept. it was the moment for a counter-attack. bayantseff's company, commanded by lieutenant misnikoff, doubled to the rescue and reached the foot of the hill.
[pg 240]
'company—halt!' shouted misnikoff. 'men—in front is glory or death. pray.' the men crossed themselves.
'forward!'
it was the work of seconds. the men climbed upwards. 'hurrah!' 'hurrah!' was heard, and the japanese were hurled backwards, bayoneted, and swept from the battery; but again they crept up. a section of quick-firers came to the rescue and saved the day, leaving the hills in our hands. the fortress had survived a critical moment, for the firing-line had not only sucked up into it the whole of the naval detachment, but the latter's reserve also. all next day and night an incessant stream of wounded poured into arthur, our losses being more than 1,500 men. in many companies but sixteen men remained. a strange sight could be seen that day, for the slopes below and beyond tumulus hill were thickly spread with dead japanese. a thick, unbroken mass of corpses covered the cold earth like a coverlet.
on the day of the assault the following order had been issued by major-general nakamura, who commanded the japanese force told off for that forlorn hope—a force composed of the bravest men of the whole of the enemy's left flank.
'our objective is to sever the fortress in two parts. not a man must hope to return alive. if i fall, colonel watanabe will take over the command; if he also falls, colonel okuno will take his place. every officer, whatever his rank, must consider himself his senior's successor. the attack will be delivered mainly with the bayonet. no matter how fierce the russian fire, our men will not reply by a single shot until we have established ourselves. officers will shoot any men who fall out or retire without orders.'
this order shows excellently how relentless our enemy could be in his determination to gain his end. it was issued to a force of brave men—all volunteers. it was read on the[pg 241] threshold of death, and each of those who read it knew well that it was not a joke, but the end. each well understood that there, on the steep slopes of tumulus hill, was his grave. they knew there was no return; that the only issue was death—the death of a hero or the shameful fate of a coward. that is the kind of foe we had to fight.
on the 26th the enemy unexpectedly began to force their way forward on the western front, in front of 203 metre hill. on the morning of the 27th they attacked in superior force the hill at little pigeon bay, north of the village of shan-yan-tau, capturing a small hill in front of the big one. this led to the idea that an attack on the highest point of the western front was intended, and smirnoff accordingly began to strengthen that flank by bringing up the reserves. on the 27th an attack was delivered between flat hill and 203 metre hill. during the day a magazine in fort erh-lung-shan was exploded. the noise was awful, but the casualties were few.
about 4 p.m. on the 27th a group of japanese carrying a white flag were seen near tumulus battery. the 'cease fire' sounded, and the parapets of our works were dotted with those who had for long been hiding in the trenches and other holes. men seemed once again to become men and the past was forgotten. captain spredoff went out from fortification no. 3 to meet the flag party, whose leader handed over a letter written in french asking permission to carry away their wounded. the staff was telephoned to, and while waiting, those who had been deadly enemies looked at each other with unconcealed curiosity and admiration. around on all sides the dead were lying—endless rows of them. the sight was horrible. they lay, as if alive, with open but glazed, fixed eyes. on their faces were expressed horror, entreaty, agony, anger, and even laughter. they lay face downwards, doubled[pg 242] up, with nails dug into the ground in a last convulsion. they lay with thoughtful, earnest expressions on their faces, upturned to the heavens. they lay on their sides naturally, as if asleep. they lay with clenched fists and wide-open mouths, showing all their teeth. they lay in heaps together, one on the top of another, some looking at others as if in amazement. they lay side by side in several rows. arms and legs were torn off, heads split in half; some were headless, some were cut in half.... the japanese looked and looked again, but could find no wounded among the dead, and they slowly and sorrowfully retraced their steps....