october 1 was an epoch in the history of the defence of port arthur, for it was on that day that the first of the 11-inch shells fell into the fortress, and so changed the aspect of affairs.
it was during a conference held on the positions that a message was received that an 11-inch shell had fallen in chi-kuan-shan fort, destroyed the masonry, and killed and wounded several men. those who were present suggested that a bombardment had again begun from seaward.
'no, no. these are newly mounted land guns—big guns. i am afraid they will do for the forts and the fleet.'
the majority of those present doubted it.
'you doubt it? it is no use. you will soon see.'
i walked with general smirnoff back from this conference along the hills. as the bullets were whistling over the deep trench along which we were walking, i could not help thinking that there was nothing worse than this whistling—one got used to shells, but not to this ceaseless squeaking of invisible birds. we had scarcely got on to mitrofanieff hill when a pillar of smoke, sand, and stones rose up out of chi-kuan-shan fort, as if a gigantic tree had sprouted up and been thrown down. then, with clockwork regularity, fantastic[pg 207] trees grew up every few minutes in different directions along the north-east front, and we heard the roars of dreadful explosions. eight of them occurred in erh-lung-shan and chi-kuan-shan forts this day and did great damage to the casemates. they were different to anything i had yet seen.
about two o'clock in the afternoon a bombardment of the town began; the fire was concentrated near the tifonty mill and grew heavier every minute. as the area of the falling shells gradually contracted, it became clear that the target was this mill which supplied us all with flour. this was the first day of a special bombardment of the town: there were no 'shorts'; it was a deliberate cannonade. the fire continued steadily, and the mill was struck by several shells.
the result of the foreigners' visit to us was apparent!
the conditions in the besieged fortress—the wearing, trying uncertainty, the want of confidence, and the constant, unavoidable danger began to tell. the younger men lost their nerve, and suicides commenced.
on october 2, nine 11-inch shells fell in fort no. 4, and it was reported that a large howitzer was mounted to the right of, and in rear of, sugar head.
on october 5 a fire was caused on tiger's tail by the enemy's shells. in the morning we attacked signal hill, which we had abandoned the day before. after a fierce and bloody fight we recaptured it, and it remained ours till the end of the siege. on this day raschevsky's diary says:
'the parallels and approaches of the gradual attack against chi-kuan-shan fort, open caponier no. 3 and no. 2 battery, have got much closer. the japanese are working with great perseverance, notwithstanding our fire and occasional sorties. it has been decided to make these oftener and of greater strength.'
[pg 208]
and on the 7th he continued:
'... the approaches also are being pushed forward with greater perseverance than ever toward our works; we can, in the daytime, even see the men digging, while we are not strong enough to concentrate our gun-fire on them. the situation of the approaches is particularly dangerous in front of no. 3 open caponier, where the distance between the enemy and ourselves is only 50 yards.'
in the afternoon the enemy suddenly began to shell the quarters of st?ssel and smirnoff by rafales from their small guns. their sudden and extraordinarily accurate shooting is proof that they had learned from the 'correspondents' where st?ssel and the commandant were living, for up to this they had always fired on the viceroy's house. as soon as the first shells began bursting near st?ssel's quarters he at once gave orders that general volkoff's house, which was at the foot of quail hill, should be got ready for him, and he began to move. however, an 11-inch shell happening to strike this house, compelled him to abandon the idea.
on the 8th raschevsky wrote:
'since 9 a.m. their big howitzers had been busy firing at our howitzer batteries nos. 20 and 21. by 1 o'clock they had fired about fifty-five shells at them. the left half of the masonry battery, no. 21, afterwards presented a picture of complete destruction: the concrete is in many places destroyed, and has fallen down in great masses.'
for six days now the town had been bombarded with 11-inch shells—great masses of metal of awful destructive power. nowhere could we find real safety from them except, perhaps, in the bomb-proofs of madame subotin, dug out of the rock. the concrete of the forts, the armour on the battleships, were penetrated clean through. from october 1 life in arthur was any[pg 209] thing but pleasant. on the evening of the 9th the enemy seemed to be concentrating near rocky redoubt, water-supply redoubt, and the village close by.[26] we had made an attack, but as they were in great force, we had to withdraw. they were also active on the west front. the following is the entry in the diary for the 9th:
pic
bombardment: japanese shells bursting on hill.
'it was quite quiet up to 12 o'clock. exactly at noon a salvo was fired at the town. after a short time it was repeated, and then, at 2 o'clock, the enemy turned all his nearest batteries on to the trench in front of erh-lung-shan fort, which we had recently recaptured, and we were obliged to abandon it again. to-day a sortie was ordered on the redoubts with the object of seizing them and some of the japanese trenches in front. in the event of success the enemy would, of course, have had to evacuate his parallels and approaches to chi-kuan-shan fort, from which they were now only 150 yards distant. the attack failed.'
on the 10th the 11-inch shells did much damage on the north-east front. general st?ssel published the following order this day:
'on the 7th instant i received the following telegram from the commander-in-chief, dated mukden, september 20:
'"i have received your despatch of september 16, and i congratulate you warmly on your fresh success. we are making energetic preparations for an advance. the 1st army corps has already arrived. god be with you! trust to me to succour you."'
when kuropatkin received general st?ssel's piteous despatch asking that he might be allowed to remain on in arthur, he had forwarded it to petersburg, asking what he was to do (st?ssel had by this time been made aide-de-camp to the tsar, and had been promoted to the third-class order of st. george), adding that he had already twice recalled him from the fortress. petersburg replied that it left the matter entirely to him. kuropatkin naturally did[pg 210] not think that st?ssel had changed his spots by having had the above distinctions conferred on him, but being a clever and experienced diplomat, he did not wish definitely to recall a newly-appointed imperial aide-de-camp, and so kept silence.
on the 11th and 12th there was fighting round chi-kuan-shan and erh-lung-shan forts on the east, as well as fortification no. 3 and tumulus redoubt, where the enemy gained ground. on the west they were entrenching on the slopes of 203 metre and long hill. the following is an extract from the diary for october 12:
'the enemy's approaches are getting closer up. with wonderful energy and perseverance they are digging them towards chi-kuan-shan fort, open caponier no. 2, and b battery. early this morning two additional approaches were made towards kuropatkin lunette, and parallels were begun. our artillery fire is not continuous enough to stop them. sorties are not often made, and when made few scouts go with them, so that they are carelessly carried out, and have little result; consequently the siege-works are progressing rapidly. in the last parallel in front of b battery the japanese have built a thick bomb-proof with a covering of chinese wood, apparently with the object of protecting the gun crews from hand-thrown grenades.
'we are all alarmed for the condition of the caponier of the main faces of chi-kuan-shan. they have mined behind the counter-scarp, and evidently mean to blow it up. in anticipation of this we are making two counter-mine galleries from the corners of the caponier, which, running for twelve yards, ought to hit their main gallery, but as the soil here is almost rocky, progress is slow, and we may be late in intersecting the enemy's gallery. in order to ascertain the position of their shaft, and the direction of their gallery, orders have been given for a sortie to-morrow, in which the sappers will take part.'
pic
results of a bombardment.
[pg 211]
this sortie failed through the clumsiness and noise of the men who were not specially trained scouts.
from chi-kuan-shan we made another sortie on the night of the 15th. this also failed, owing to the majority of the men turning tail. st?ssel's order about sorties undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the poor spirit shown on this occasion. an attempt was also made to stop the work on the sap-head by firing the war-head of a torpedo charged with 70 pounds of pyroxiline out of a torpedo-tube on the parapet. on the 17th general gorbatovsky took the place of general nadein as commander of the right flank of the defences.
in some places now the enemy were face to face with our men, with only a distance of twenty to thirty yards between them. taking cover behind sand-bags, the japanese were doggedly continuing step after step, yard after yard, and fresh earth was constantly being thrown up out of the deep saps which hid the men working. occasionally one would see the glint of a spade, or a black forage cap, and along the communicating trenches here and there would run a japanese dressed in black.
on the 20th raschevsky wrote:
'at 3 a.m. a sortie was made from chi-kuan-shan. its arrangement was entrusted to me, as its main object was to reconnoitre the enemy's works nearest to the fort: 40 infantry and 5 sappers took part in it. owing to the failure of the two preceding sorties, this one was most carefully prepared. the men were ordered to go round the foot of the glacis and its slopes, and to dash on to the head of the enemy's three approaches. if possible they were to destroy the works, and not attempt to pursue, but immediately to return. a party of 25 infantry and 3 sappers, under the command of ensign marchenko, were to go round the fort from the left, and to lie concealed on the glacis. the other portion, under the command of a non-[pg 212]commissioned officer, was to break through the wire entanglement placed along the glacis of the right face, and to lie down there silently and wait for the signal for the general attack by both parties. the signal was to be a ray of searchlight thrown on to the nearest peak of ta-ku-shan. the first flash, at 2.45 a.m., was to be a warning for the men to be ready: the second, at 3 a.m., was to be the signal for the general attack. both parties were then to dash simultaneously down the glacis right on to the appointed place. by doing this we hoped partly to escape the fire of the enemy's machine-guns, which in the previous sorties had fired along the direction of the salient angle of the glacis, and along the slopes under the flanks of the fort. our men were not to fire till discovered, but directly the japanese opened fire, the guns and infantry from the neighbouring works were at once to concentrate their fire on their near trenches—not, however, closer than a certain given direction towards the foot of the glacis—in order to divert their attention. at the same time a demonstration was to be made from the covered way of the salient angle by raising dummies up above the glacis, and throwing stones tied with string on to the wire entanglement to make it appear as if we were trying to advance from the centre and not from the sides.
'as all the members of the sortie parties knew beforehand where to go and what to do, everything turned out almost as we had hoped. the sortie was a complete surprise to the enemy, and, when our men dashed on to the heads of their approaches, they were seized with panic. from the glacis i could hear their shouts of fear distinctly, and their fire was comparatively weak, no machine-guns being used. after these shouts we heard a few cheers, and then, after five or ten minutes, our men appeared at the caponier, where they rushed, fearing that the japanese would recover themselves and get to work with their[pg 213] machine-guns. however, they successfully went down the ladders into the ditch and got round the caponier. they had ascertained that the japanese were making galleries under the caponier of the fort. the direction of one was along under the axis of the caponier; the direction of the other we did not discover. the heads of their galleries were found covered by bomb-proofs, into one of which a sapper managed to throw a six-pound bomb. we lost 3 killed and 7 wounded, amongst whom, to our great regret, was marchenko, very dangerously wounded. the result of the sortie was so far very successful, and our countermining will now no longer consist of groping blindly.'
colonel raschevsky was inclined to judge our men severely, because they dug slower than the japanese; he called them absolute children. i cannot agree. the russian soldier, when he came to port arthur, was physically strong, though intellectually starved. by this time he had become physically starved as well. no soldiers of western europe would have done what he did.
extracts from colonel raschevsky's diary.
october 22.—'the japanese approaches are being particularly developed these days in front of kuropatkin lunette. there are scarcely any new ones in front of chi-kuan-shan, but the men saw from caponier no. 2 that stones were being carried out from under the glacis; they were evidently from mine-galleries.
'to-day, for the first time, was heard a suspicious knocking in our counter-mines. i myself listened for a long time from both galleries, but could hear nothing. i think it must have been a mistake, and the noise was probably made by some one in the caponier. however, i have told the miners to listen oftener and more carefully.'
[pg 214]
'october 23.—the enemy have not yet done anything to seize open caponier no. 3, and the position there is most curious. we have dug a trench and are holding two branch ends. at these ends are our sentries; the japs are behind the sand-bag traverse. occasionally our men throw hand-grenades at them, but they haven't as yet replied. at this close range it is impossible to prevent constant firing, each trying to spot the other and shoot first.
'our men resort to the following ruse: one fastens a pole on his back, on this is put a fur cap and round it a great-coat. he then crawls on all fours along the trench. the japs at once open fire on what they think is a man, and, exposing themselves, give us a target. generally speaking, the men are in excellent spirits, though things are daily getting worse. it is becoming colder—almost freezing at night, and in the thin bomb-proofs it is uncomfortable, and in the trenches horrible. the danger from the enemy's fire is daily increasing and the food is wretched. but our men don't seem to notice it; on the contrary, they seem to be more light-hearted and full of life.
'a chicken costs 12 roubles, a goose 20, an egg 1, a pound of flour 1, a pound of horse-flesh ? rouble.'[27]
the colonel was to-day kinder to the men. his engineer heart had grieved at the slow progress made with the works, and it was quite comprehensible. his one desire was at all costs to interfere with, to delay, the enemy's works, not to give him a chance of seizing the trenches of the fort. in chi-kuan-shan the men felt uneasy, expecting an explosion, but the countermining was in raschevsky's capable hands.
on the 24th he wrote:
'yesterday morning the noise of the enemy working was heard in our left gallery in front of chi-kuan-shan; this time it was more easy to be certain of than yesterday.[pg 215] judging from the loudness of it, the enemy cannot be further than 20 to 25 yards away, and are advancing. however, the sounds are very indistinct,' etc.
on the 25th he wrote:
'since 4 a.m. the enemy has ceased work in front of chi-kuan-shan, and has not recommenced up to the present. this is very suspicious. we must in any case not stop our work, but must shove on our two galleries and sink two new ones.'
on the 26th:
'at 4 a.m. we suddenly heard the japs working from the left gallery in front of chi-kuan-shan, and the thud of their tools seemed much nearer and more distinct. when i listened to it about 9 a.m. it seemed as if they were at work almost 5 feet to the left and a little above. the calculations for a camouflet[28] to destroy their gallery worked to a charge of about 320 pounds of powder, and i at once gave orders for a chamber to be dug out and all the necessary material for tamping it to be got ready.
'after listening most carefully, we all came to the conclusion that the enemy was sinking a shaft from the surface of the glacis with the object of destroying our left gallery. at 8 p.m. the commandant arrived, and, having listened attentively, said that he wished to fire the first camouflet himself.'
the besiegers had driven a long gallery under this fort so as to blow it up, and the defenders dreaded an explosion any moment. the dangers were much exaggerated, for some one spread a rumour that the japs were laying a charge of thousands of pounds of dynamite, and the whole fort would be blown into the air. though this[pg 216] was of course absurd, in their hearts the men believed it and it acted on their spirit.
it was a calm moonlight night when the commandant went to inspect the fort and the progress in mining. having received the report of the officer commanding, general smirnoff went to look at the destruction to the masonry work, which had just been badly breached by 11-inch shells. then he descended into a subterranean casemate, where he was met by colonel grigorenko, the fortress chief engineer, colonel raschevsky, colonel tretiakoff (an expert in mining), and some junior officers. having gone down into the low subterranean gallery and crawled to the end, he listened attentively to the work being done by the enemy. from this gallery he crawled through to the next, where he again listened. not more than 3 to 4 feet of granite can have been between him and the enemy. every one looked at each other in astonishment; this daring act of smirnoffs surprised us. amongst the men the word was passed in an instant: 'the commandant himself has crawled into the gallery.' some believed it, some did not; but it made a great impression.
at a conference in the officers' casemate (where general kondratenko was killed later on) it was decided to load the camouflet without loss of time. the condition of the fort was indeed serious; any hour, any minute, an explosion might take place. it was a question of who could explode their mine first—a game, and a dangerous game! all were nervous; but general smirnoff calmed every one by a few words.
pic
general smirnoff firing the camouflet.
heavy and continual bombardment of the position was carried on on the 26th and 27th. at 11 a.m. on the 27th the commandant, accompanied by lieutenant hammer, arrived in the fort, where everything was ready for firing the camouflet. all the fortress guns were ordered, in case of a successful explosion, at once to open fire on the[pg 217] enemy's batteries if they should concentrate their fire on the fort. at this time the enemy were methodically shelling this fort, kuropatkin lunette, and b battery with 11-inch shells, which were detonating every two or three minutes. after an inspection of the tamping,[29] the electric leads were extended from the station in the casemate to the outer parapet, when, taking advantage of the interval between the shells, the general went on to the parapet and pressed the firing-key.
above the caponier rose a cloud of dust and smoke, out of which projected planks, stones, and bodies. we had succeeded,[30] and the garrison breathed again. the awful, weary hours of waiting had passed. congratulating every one, the general went down into the inner courtyard. his presence as head of the fortress at the most dangerous place in the defences soon became known, and inspired every one to further efforts.
on the 28th the japanese blew a breach through the wall of caponier no. 3. they followed this up with an assault, but were repulsed. the same afternoon batteries were shelling the road from little to big eagle's nest, from the saddle of ta-ku-shan. this only emphasized what the loss of that hill meant to us. one cannot help asking why, when velichko drew out the plans of the fortress, he did not insist on ta-ku-shan being fortified? it was a natural fort! could he not realize the difficulty of defending a fortress when its roads are under shell-fire from the very commencement, and he our leading professor of military engineering? on the western front there was considerable activity towards wolf's hills, the trenches of siu-shuing village.
[pg 218]
so far, smirnoff had endeavoured to imbue the men with the idea of no surrender, but general fock now wrote a memorandum in which he persuaded general st?ssel to lay mines under our forts in order that they might be blown up when it was decided to abandon them! smirnoff protested most vehemently, trying to show that mining our own forts (to say nothing of the danger to the men in them) would sap at its very roots the principle that a fort might perish but must never surrender, and would consequently demoralize the troops.
st?ssel believed fock, and insisted. the commandant then sent grigorenko to him, who submitted a detailed report, in which he pointed out most clearly that the results of the explosions of such mines would, generally speaking, be inconsiderable, whilst the mines, if laid, would constitute a great danger to the garrison, as a chance 11-inch shell might cause a premature explosion. but st?ssel had made up his mind, and ordered chambers to be made in the forts for the laying of charges. in chi-kuan-shan, however, the commander, lieutenant floroff, said point-blank that so long as he was in the fort it should not be mined.
general st?ssel was in the habit of issuing frequent orders direct to general biely, commanding the fortress artillery, and gave the strictest instructions that not a gun was to be mounted without his special sanction. as he never visited the fronts attacked, and, therefore, could not judge of the state of affairs himself, the result of this order could have been merely to make unpleasantness for general smirnoff and to interfere with his work. though things were usually done in the end as smirnoff wished, all this hindered progress and made matters very difficult. when systematic attacks began before the general assault of october 30, st?ssel, ignoring the commandant, told general biely to open fire from the north-east front on to the ground near to the fortifications at[pg 219] sunset—at first at intervals, more often between 7 and 8 p.m., and again intermittently from then till 10 p.m. his ostensible reason was that the enemy would attack at that time. of course, they did not do so, but despite the protests of smirnoff, biely, and kondratenko, he insisted upon this cannonade—an utter waste of ammunition, when every shell was valuable.
to fire away our ammunition pointlessly in this manner was unjustifiable, nay suicidal, and the motive for doing so is difficult to comprehend.
the following were some reports received on the 29th:
'there has been gun and rifle-fire all night. a fight is now being waged for the trenches. in chi-kuan-shan the enemy have blown in the roof and outer wall of the caponier, and are making use of iron shields in the attack. from the opening they have dug a trench to their trenches. the fire is increasing on erh-lung-shan, fortification no. 3, and tumulus.'
on the night of the 29th a heavy bombardment of the position took place, and on the 30th there was a general assault. the following telephone messages will show the progress of the fighting:
from colonel naumenko.
11.50 a.m.—'the artillery-fire is increasing. shrapnel has begun. we are awaiting the attack.'
from sub-lieutenant vonliarliarsky.
12 noon.—'the japs are storming b battery.'
12.30 p.m.—'a bayonet fight is going on in b battery.'
12.50 p.m.—'a japanese flag has been planted on the parapet of b battery. it has been torn down, but the japs are near the guns.'
[pg 220]
from captain golovan.
1.55 p.m.—'fortification no. 3 is on fire. our men are holding the gorge.'
2.10 p.m.—'fortification no. 3 is burning and the face has been occupied by the japs. our men are in the gorge. chi-kuan-shan, fortification no. 2 and kuropatkin lunette were captured, but have been retaken.'
2.23 p.m.—'fortification no. 3 has been recaptured.'
from colonel semenoff:
11.30 a.m.—'the japs are in force under erh-lung-shan.'
12.25 p.m.—'water supply redoubt and trenches are strongly occupied by the japs.'
1 p.m.—'the japs are moving in force on erh-lung-shan.'
2.5 p.m.—'the japs were driven out of b battery at 1 p.m. they are on wolfs hills in force.'
2.25 p.m.—'from wolf's hills the japs are moving in front of water supply redoubt.'
5.15 p.m.—'the japs are entrenching themselves in front of the obstacles of fortification no. 3. they are laying sand-bags along the trench that was ours. they have got storming ladders.'
the third general assault on october 30 was preceded for four days by a cruel bombardment, which began at midday on the 26th, and gradually increased till the night of the 29th. for forty-eight hours the works on the north-east front were incessantly pounded, the enemy deciding to break down and annihilate everything with their fire, and then to dash on the defenders with the bayonet. the night of the 30th was black, and the sky cloudy. morning came, and the fire increased, and by 10 a.m. the whole front was enveloped in dense smoke: the hills were literally reeking. the whole destructive energy of hundreds of guns was thrown on the portion[pg 221] from b battery to fortification no. 3. it seemed as if everything there must be destroyed—every living thing killed, that no one could be left to defend, and that any moment the enemy would dash in to fight in the very streets. further opposition seemed useless, inhuman. the fire slackened, and then again broke out; shrapnel was poured on to those points that were to be stormed; the other works were paralysed by high explosive shells. the assault began, and the commandant quickly moved the reserve companies along the ravines to the attacked points. the enemy dashed in with the bayonet, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. the commandant followed the progress of the assault and defence on the telephone, and the reserves were massed in time at all the most dangerous points successively.
pic
kuropatkin lunette after the assault in october.
at last the front was again clear. we had survived the third assault, and the crisis was over.
the october attacks were short, but most determined and bloody. as regards their success, it was but slight. the enemy had gained some dozens of yards—no more. our total loss was open caponier no. 2, already quite destroyed by the bombardment. the japanese had fired over 150,000 shells.