the following order (no. 439) was published on the 29th by general st?ssel:

'to-day the enemy attacked the position held by the 13th east siberian rifle regiment and 4th reserve battalion in force, and crept up on to wolf's hills, but were hurled back by our guns. nevertheless, it was impossible for us to hold the position longer, owing to the lack of frontal communications and the number of ravines, which made the enemy's advance easier, and another position has been taken up from pan-lun-shan, through temple and water-supply redoubts.'

from this order it might be imagined that the enemy had been defeated, and that we had evacuated wolf's hills of our own accord, merely to occupy a new and more advantageous line. that we had retired, badly pressed by the enemy and in complete disorder, does not admit of the slightest doubt.

had st?ssel only conceived what was really in store for port arthur, instead of being so firmly convinced that speedy relief was coming from the north, he would by now have been with the 3rd siberian corps awaiting him up there. he had received a telegram from kuropatkin, dated june 18, in which he was ordered immediately to hand over the command to smirnoff, and to leave port arthur in a cruiser. had he obeyed this order, it would have meant disgrace; on the other hand, if he stayed[pg 134] even in defiance of orders, there was reason to suspect that one victory over the enemy would have reinstated him. he stayed. it was certain that some of the assaults before the relief would be repulsed, and for this he wished to obtain the credit; by that time kuropatkin would arrive—a month earlier or later would not matter—and would relieve the besieged town. once that happened, st?ssel would be the saviour of port arthur. he would have succeeded in defending the fortress, and no blame of his actions would get a hearing. nothing succeeds like success.

on the 31st st?ssel issued two interesting orders:

'the enemy is landing considerable numbers of troops from ten ships hidden in louisa bay, whence they are marching through the water to pigeon bay. apparently they mean to attack the western front. from a letter found on a dead japanese officer, it is evident that they intend, if possible, to take port arthur by august 10. i presume they will attempt an assault. i am convinced that the gallantry of the brave men under my command will repulse the enemy.'

in this order it will be noticed that a more humble tone was adopted. st?ssel was convinced that the assault would be on the western front of angle hills and liao-tieh-shan, and he set to work to build fort no. 6, at enormous cost.

the second order (no. 441) read:

'commanding officers and officers! we are now standing in front of the fortress, on the last of the previously fortified advanced positions....'

he and general fock always thought that angle hill was not an advanced position of the fortress, but was quite outside of it. with the original impracticable polygon of the fortress—not in the least corresponding to the condi[pg 135]tions of the ground—the fortification of angle hill, as a position of the enceinte, was a necessity. a glance at the map will at once show that 203 metre hill, and then angle hill, literally cry aloud to be fortified carefully and with permanent works. on the latter should have been a permanent fort, on the former fortifications of strong profile.

as a matter of fact, on angle hill we only succeeded in tracing out fortifications for a weak armament, while on to 203 metre hill a road was made, and materials and guns were taken up. it should be remembered that it was velichko himself, one of the most noted military engineers in russia, who drew out plans for the original polygon. to return to the order:

'... remember what this means. it means that you must at all costs check the enemy, and not let him reach the forts of the fortress. i have reason to believe that they will attack over the open in order to gain time, which for them, is all-important. the assault must be repulsed. it will fall on the advanced positions, and you, gentlemen, on these positions must not for a moment dream of letting them break through, though the assault be, as is probable, at night. you must remain at your posts alive or dead. you must hold the enemy till dawn; if they do not retire then the fortress will finish them. remember that you are glorious russian soldiers.'

general st?ssel was of opinion that his troops had not yet come within the confines of the fortress, and were holding the last positions outside it. this order was, therefore, a district order. as a matter of fact, with the loss of wolf's hills the investment of the fortress proper had begun, and by the regulations for the guidance of commanders of fortresses the commandant of the fortress was now in supreme command. accordingly, st?ssel, having given up his district, and retired with his force within the enceinte of port arthur, should have been[pg 136] subordinate to the commandant. the commandant of the fortress, smirnoff, imagining that, from the moment the troops entered into the fortress he was in sole command, issued an order on july 31, which, in conjunction with what general st?ssel had written, gave the impression that we had two commanders in the one fortress. it was a bad omen. st?ssel considered that he was still operating in the district; smirnoff, considering that angle hill, ta-ku-shan, and sia-gu-shan were the advanced positions of the fortress proper, assumed that the blockade had begun, and therefore that all the troops were subordinate to him. on reading the order issued by st?ssel, smirnoff protested, but not very forcibly. why? because he had not the smallest idea that a telegram (that of june 18) from the commander-in-chief had been hidden from him, or that st?ssel had been ordered to leave arthur and hand over the command to him.

st?ssel was now in rather a quandary. he still hoped, of course, that kuropatkin would listen to and grant his petition,[14] or at least give consent by silence; but at the same time he knew that, in the event of kuropatkin's original order being confirmed, there was an end to his dream of glory, for he would have to leave port arthur in disgrace. if a grand attack, however, should occur while he retained command, and be repulsed, he would be saved. so, characteristically, he now after this protest began to 'hedge' and make friends with smirnoff. he visited the latter, and said openly: 'well, my duty is over now. it is for you to act, and i won't interfere with you in any way. the whole defence is absolutely in your hands.'

smirnoff, in ignorance of the hidden telegram, had every reason to believe in st?ssel's sincerity. it never,[pg 137] of course, entered his head that the other was playing a waiting game. every one was convinced that when the news of the rapid loss of the district which had been entrusted to st?ssel reached the commander-in-chief and st. petersburg, he would be shorn of all authority, and everything would be given into general smirnoff's hands. every one was also certain that, once the 'district' ceased to exist and its troops came into the fortress, they came under the direct orders of the commandant, and therefore st?ssel, having neither district nor troops, had no power. besides the simple logical issue, there was another and more material reason for supposing that smirnoff, with the cessation of operations in the district, would assume complete control: this was based on an article in the military regulations, in which it is laid down that the commandant of a besieged fortress must not subordinate himself to the commander-in-chief of the field army, but must act as he thinks best—as the person most conversant with the defence of the fortress. unluckily in our particular case, thanks to the complicated circumstances, to this paragraph was added a rider—an imperial order, which clearly defined that the commandant of port arthur was subordinate to the officer commanding the district; but, of course, when this was written it was only intended to mean before the commencement of military operations. st?ssel and his chief of the staff were unable to justify any part for themselves to play in the fortress once the district had ceased to exist: they appeared in it as stars, and, as there was already a commandant and a staff existing, they did not know what to do. they well knew that they were not competent to conduct its defence. while waiting for the commander-in-chief's answer, they busied themselves with writing the most voluminous orders, which, if things went right for them, would be conclusive evidence[pg 138] of the minute care with which they had gone into every detail of the defence.

at last, with the close investment, the time had come when general smirnoff could speak with the authority of the commandant of a besieged fortress; the moment had come when he should free himself for ever from st?ssel's encroachment and attempts to usurp his authority. though he knew nothing of the concealed telegram, yet, as the absolute master of the fortress, being well aware of the work done by the 'band of heroes,' and therefore of the demoralizing and harmful influence exercised by the generals in the defence, he ought to have stated categorically in orders that, in accordance with the regulations, he had assumed sole command, and that any harmful interference in the sphere of his duties or authority, or any encroachment on them, would be tried according to military law in the field, and reported to the commander-in-chief. general smirnoff did not do this. notwithstanding his great strength of will and firmness, he was a true slav. with all his brilliant qualities as a strategist, tactician, and administrator, he had not sufficient decision to run counter to an imperial order—the order which had placed him subordinate to st?ssel. though he never lost his head in the most difficult crisis, and impressed every one by his coolness and presence of mind, yet he could not decide to take this all-important step—a step which would have spared russia the shame of the premature capitulation. he let the present opportunity slip, and subsequent events, which unexpectedly developed, tied his hands. later he was powerless to control st?ssel; then the only thing left was to arrest him and fock just before the surrender. he failed at the critical moment to play his cards properly, and for his lack of decision paid bitterly.

and so wolf's hills had passed into the possession of[pg 139] the enemy. with glasses numbers of them could be seen constructing batteries. ta-ku-shan and sia-gu-shan could not long hold out, being liable to be shelled from front and flank from wolf's hills. the operations on the advanced positions were over, and the enemy had reached the forts.