on the morning of july 24 it was rumoured in the town that our best destroyer, the lieutenant burakoff, and another, the boevoy, had been torpedoed during the night. the destruction of the former was particularly disheartening, as she had made several dashes to yinchow and back, and been of the greatest service, and might have done much more for us still in the hands of her commander, lieutenant borodatoff, a most brilliant officer and the pride of the fleet, for she was the best and fastest of her type. the employment of destroyers for night duty was quite useless, and resulted in nothing except the fatigue of the men and the loss of the boats, for on foggy nights the enemy lay in wait for them.

our patrols on the land-front used now to find proclamations lying about on the ground. these proclamations, written in bad russian, were left by the japanese outposts for our consumption, and were deliberate attempts to work on the moral of the men, by enumerating our defeats in manchuria and reverting to political events in russia.

on july 25 we on the staff of colonel semenoff, who was in command of the right section of the advanced defences, were visited by general kondratenko. after tea conversation turned on the prospects for the following day. the general, with his elbows on the table, and[pg 111] stirring his tea with a spoon, smiled, and his small expressive eyes lit up. he looked at the speakers and said in his quiet way:

'the 26th is always a fatal date for us in arthur. on may 26 we abandoned kinchou; on june 26 we lost kuen-san; and apparently to-morrow will not be uninteresting. we mustn't forget that it is a great japanese holiday—the "chrysanthemum." they are sure to want to do something to please the mikado.'

'well, sir, what can be worse than having to remain on the defensive? we ought to attack; with the attacker lies the initiative. and you sit and wait, trying to guess when they will attack. it is an awful state of affairs,' said the keen, impulsive semenoff.

'yes; the r?le of the defender is none of the easiest or most advantageous—especially in conditions like ours. many great errors have been committed, and there is heavy work ahead. to-morrow there will be a decisive and desperate battle, and we must hold our ground. by the way, semenoff, have you given orders for the outposts to be strengthened, and warned all officers to expect an attack to-morrow?'

'yes, sir.'

'the reserve will arrive to-night. the commandant has consented to give us some companies from the reserve battalion, and they must bivouac here in the valley. to-morrow the general reserve will be under your orders. we have very few men, and so you must be particularly careful and economical with it. we must shell kuen-san well to-day: we don't yet know if the enemy's guns have got into position or not; but in any case it has a telephone and will be their chief observing station, and the battle will be directed from there. perhaps they'll reply to our shells, and so unmask the position of their guns.'

[pg 112]

when he left i accompanied him, while semenoff, after conducting us to the lunwantun valley, went on to the outpost line. we finally arrived at the foot of rocky ridge, on which was the howitzer section. kondratenko was evidently anxious, and was astounded on reaching this place to find that the howitzers had been run down below. 'why is this? i sent orders that i would shell kuen-san to-day. who has altered them?' he asked angrily.

it seemed that fock had had the howitzers run down. kondratenko gave instructions for them to be brought back immediately; but while they were being dragged up the very steep ascent it began to get dark, and a cloud settled on the top of kuen-san. by the time they had been got into position again half of the hill was in cloud, which concealed the enemy's works. it was now useless to attempt to fire. kondratenko was furious, but did not show it in the presence of the various officers, and as it was now rapidly getting dark, we started to return. on the way back i for the first time saw him angry, and he used no measured language with regard to general fock's interference. after giving his final instructions to semenoff, he went back to port arthur. semenoff then expressed his opinion that the idea of not holding on as long as possible to the advanced positions was absurd, though it was common.

he was quite right. for some time before the battle of july 26 i often heard the opinion expressed by officers that a dogged defence of the advanced positions would be detrimental to the ultimate defence of the fortress. it seemed more and more as if the general inclination was to sit tight in the permanent works as being the easiest course. having little knowledge as to the state of our bomb-proofs or of their durability, people drew a most rosy picture of the defence of the actual fortress under[pg 113] a strict blockade. they thought that the bomb-proofs would save them. they compared the defence with that of sevastopol, but unfortunately forgot that guns and shells are now somewhat different. they forgot that sevastopol was in direct and unbroken communication with russia, where the sick could be sent and whence reinforcements could come, and they forgot that, even under these favourable conditions, sevastopol eventually fell into the enemy's hands. port arthur, completely isolated from the world, with a minimum reserve of provisions, ammunition, and men, and with incompleted works, was a trap for the army and fleet. people did not realize that the longer we held the enemy on the advanced positions, the longer time we should have to do in arthur itself what we had left undone.

next morning, just as a few men were moving about amongst the horse lines and the camp was beginning to wake up, a distant boom was heard in the direction of oytse-laza hill. i looked at my watch: it was past half-past six. after a few moments we heard a second report, somewhat nearer, then a third and a fourth, each louder and nearer, and shells hurtled through the air and burst quite close to our tents. in a very short time the bivouacs had disappeared, for the majority of us had lain down without undressing, and the cannonade started all along the line. the day and the fight of the 26th had begun. the fire of the enemy's bigger guns, the shells of which were loaded with mélinite, was chiefly concentrated on the batteries under prince chkheydsey and skridloff, and covered the tops of our hills with smoke, while the field and mountain guns kept up a hot shrapnel fire on the infantry trenches, preparing the way for an attack. our own batteries, which were well concealed, replied steadily. at eight o'clock dense columns of japanese were seen opposite the right wing of green hills, and, supported by[pg 114] the fire of their ships, they advanced in the direction of big ridge, just as speedily and in as orderly a manner as if at man?uvres. in front, all along the line of green hills, crackled incessant and rapidly increasing musketry fire. the infantry attack began. thinking that our reserves were massed in lunwantun valley the enemy endeavoured to shell it and the approaches to it with shrapnel. by nine o'clock the fight grew hotter, and it rained hard. the fire of rifles and guns was at times so mingled that nothing except the rhythmic rat-tat-tat of the machine-guns could be picked out. from all directions down into the valley came orderlies to colonel semenoff, who was now at the mouth of the litangon valley.

'ah! they have begun; they all want support at the same time. look! there are men coming from the right as well as from the left.'

an orderly galloped up with a note; a second, a third, and then a fourth.

'they all ask for reinforcements. surely, things are not as bad as all this. here, zagorovsky, you go off to the left; and senkevitch, you go to the right. go off as quickly as you can and find out what has happened.'

kondratenko now arrived on the scene, and riding up to semenoff, was, after a short consultation, soon acquainted with the position. having given general instructions, he went on to the hill in front, into the zone of fire, in order to see for himself the state of affairs. it was now 10 a.m. suddenly, in the distance, we noticed men in disorder running down from the right peak of green hills.

'what are they up to? surely they are not retiring? naumenko, do you see them?'

the latter looked through his glasses.

'yes, sir; they are bolting down the slope of the hill as hard as they can.'

[pg 115]

kondratenko, without answering, put spurs to his horse, and we galloped along the valley; the general was in front, and in his white uniform on his black horse was very conspicuous. we could now clearly see a number of infantry-men against the background of the hill; they were running below in all directions. kondratenko held up his hand.

'halt, halt! where are you going to? where's your officer? what's happened?'

and then up ran an officer, quite blown and scarcely able to speak. on his face were depicted terror and fatigue; he was red from running. his cap was all awry and his hand was shaking.

'sir, it is awful there—awful. it is impossible to hold on. we have done everything—everything that it is possible, but it is a perfect hell.'

'where were you?'

'there, sir, there,' he said, pointing.

meanwhile the men were still bolting down, some helping the wounded, others going by themselves and the bullets were whistling thick over our heads. big ridge had been abandoned; high hill, the extreme point on our right, was, owing to this premature retreat, cut off, but was held by butusoff with two companies. a portion had been taken by the japs; they might force their way through the line. the position was critical; in fact, the issue of the fight was in the balance, and the retirement must be stopped immediately. it was only the presence of mind of the general and his personal bravery which saved everything.

'what are you doing? are you mad? why, reinforcements are already on their way to help you. company, follow me!' the men stopped and collected in a group. 'follow me!'

the men quickly turned back, and those in rear called[pg 116] out to those still further off to return, and they began to double back.

having collected another company which had just come up, we led them, all puffing and blowing, up the hill. the enemy began firing on us. the general, standing at his full height, and half turning to the enemy, said:

'men, it is better to die than disgrace yourselves by retreating. remember that the tsar and russia rely upon us. there must be no retirement; we must all die if must be. and now god be with you—advance!'

the men extended, threw themselves down behind the rocks, and opened fire. just then twenty or so men came dragging along our big clumsy machine-guns, and began to throw up cover for them. the companies who were extended advanced slowly and with great difficulty.

by midday the fight had somewhat abated, and the rattle of musketry was less frequent. the japanese having seized big ridge and a point just opposite us, kept up a broken fire; high hill was still almost cut off, but butusoff was obstinately holding his ground with his two frontier guard companies. the presence under fire of the general of the division, his striking coolness and pluck, inspired all with confidence, and improved the spirit of the troops, fatigued by long and constant outpost service. sitting on one of the spurs behind the hill, sheltered from the bullets, the general was now quietly giving his orders, while naumenko, on one knee, was writing them down.

'tell colonel semenoff again that he must at once reinforce butusoff.'

'very good, sir,' and he wrote it down.

'sir, colonel semenoff sends me to say that he has twice reinforced colonel butusoff: the reserves are almost expended,' said zagorovsky, who had just come up.

'thank you.'

[pg 117]

'zagorovsky, tell semenoff to send a section of petrenko's battery here immediately, at a quick trot. it will be an unpleasant surprise for the enemy on the ridge, and will relieve butusoff.'

before the general had finished his orders a mounted scout rode up from the right.

'sir, colonel butusoff orders me to report that he is only holding his own with immense difficulty; the japanese are climbing up in great strength and firing point-blank.'

'these frontier guardsmen are splendid fellows. i know that butusoff would die rather than retire without orders. ah, there's the officer commanding the section.'

semenoff, slightly limping, came up.

'my reserves, sir, are practically finished; we must do a little shuffling, and take the troops from the points where the attack is not being pressed home.'

'good; i think so too. how well those frontier guards are doing!'

'yes, sir. butusoff will never retire without orders.'

the guns now galloped along the valley and over the bridge.

'at last. splendid! now everything will be all right. we will put the fear of god into them on that hill and relieve butusoff.'

the guns were soon hauled up, and before a quarter of an hour had passed one shot rang out after another. 'sir,' said the chief of the staff, 'you must get behind the hill; the enemy will be opening fire on this at once.' he was right, for in a minute or two shells began to whistle through the air, bursting high up and covering the hill with bullets.

'things are all right here now; let's go and see what's being done on the left. i want to see general fock.'

we went down into the valley, mounted our horses and[pg 118] moved off. the road turned sharply to the right, and we came on to naumoff's battery, which was covering the defile. the enemy's shells were falling all round it. naumoff had beaten the enemy off during the whole morning, and they were determined, apparently, to destroy his battery; but they found it none too easy, as he had hidden the guns in a fold in the hill. their shrapnel did not make the slightest impression, and their high explosive shells sang over into the lunwantun valley. at last we reached the village of kodamin, where we found the general in a small chinese house. the pomp surrounding him—for he had a staff of about fifteen officers and a whole section of orderlies—was a great contrast to the simplicity of the other.

after a frigid greeting and a few formal words fock went away. we had some food, then rode on to the village of khodziatun, where kondratenko had been summoned to attend a council of war under st?ssel. the generals sat down; kondratenko stood, a smile on his lips. a quarter of an hour passed, and they were still sitting, and without sign of any conclusion having been reached; apparently st?ssel and fock were determined to get through what they had already decided to do. i looked on the picture with the greatest interest. at last there was a movement; they were going to disperse, and some of them seemed anything but pleased. coldly saying good-bye, st?ssel, with his numerous suite, moved off to the right towards seven-mile station, and by four o'clock we were back at the temporary head-quarters of colonel semenoff. we found his staff very indignant.

'our fleet is behaving disgracefully. we have very few guns, and if only our ships had opened a well-directed fire from the sea on the attacking columns, it would have helped us enormously; the japanese would never take green hills.' and so the conversation went on.

[pg 119]

as a matter of fact the gunboat division did make an effort to co-operate with the army. it steamed out towards lunwantun, but was driven back by a superior force; our error lay in our not supporting the gunboats with the guns of our coast batteries. one japanese cruiser struck a mine and had to be towed away, and one of their gunboats caught fire.

at five o'clock the japanese gun-fire on chkheydsey's and skridloff's batteries became heavier, as did their rifle-fire, and as twilight came on endless columns advanced to the attack. their gallant infantry came nearer and nearer, but were driven back with appalling losses. they got to within 600 to 800 yards, but were unable to get closer for a decisive assault. besides our rifle and machine-gun fire from the ridge of green hills, the storming columns were under close-range gun-fire from the above-mentioned batteries, the fire of whose guns tore great lines through them, and strewed the valleys and slopes with dead bodies. at 7 p.m. a report came in that high hill was once more in our possession, but that part of the position was still in the enemy's hands.

'we owe this to butusoff. if he had retired in the morning we should not have been able to retake the hill. how well his men have behaved! we must relieve them. send two companies from the reserve at once,' was kondratenko's comment.

i was sure that the enemy would not repeat the attack that day. having got to within 600 paces, they spent the night in entrenching and bringing up reserves, so as to be ready for a fresh effort in the morning.