the siege of port arthur was the event of the late war in the far east which most attracted the attention and interest of the rest of the world. there were other military operations, it is true, of equal if not of greater importance to the ultimate issue of the struggle; but, owing to their complexity, their slowness, and the absence of definite advance information, their progress and purport were not easily grasped by any save military students. the case of port arthur was different. the long drawn-out agony of the siege was continued before the eyes of the world for many months,[1] and, while the imagination was touched by its romantic side, the point at issue was at once apparent.

even so, there was much mystery about the conduct of the defence and the eventual fall of the fortress; for, owing to its remote position and almost complete isolation by the enemy, the available information almost entirely consisted of that supplied by correspondents with the japanese, and was, therefore, information from the outside, and more or less a history of results alone. in 1907, or between two and three years after the culmination of the siege, the inevitable disclosures—the aftermath of defeat—which sometimes help to an appreciation of causes began to be made in russia.

more than one book has recently been written by russians who saw the defence from inside the fortress, and who therefore claim to be in a position to give the inner history of the tragedy.

'the truth about port arthur' was published in russia last year. m. nojine, the author, by whose permission this abridged translation has been made, was the accredited russian war-correspondent in port arthur, and as such went through the greater part of the siege. he had exceptional facilities for collecting material for his work, for he was all through in close contact with the 'fighting' leaders of port arthur, and had access to official documents and diaries, and, having been an eye-witness of much, and possessing the trained observation of a journalist, his testimony should carry weight. his book is one long indictment of the then régime in russia, and of some of the officials connected with the defence of port arthur.

by the time that the english translation was completed, in the autumn of 1907, it was announced that some of the senior officers who conducted the defence were to be tried by court-martial. in fact, from the copy of the official indictment then published,[2] it seemed as if it might almost have been framed upon material furnished by m. nojine's book. it was therefore decided to delay publication whilst matters were sub judice. the trial is now over, the result is known to the world, and there seems no reason why the english version of the account by an eye-witness of what went on in the ill-fated fortress should not be given to the public.

the translator and editor disclaim all responsibility for the statements made and the opinions expressed, which are the author's own.

if he has sometimes been carried beyond the limits of a strictly judicial impartiality, it is, perhaps, in the circumstances, comprehensible. his patriotism must have been again and again outraged by the existing maladministration, while his personal feelings were probably embittered by the treatment which he and those who bore the burden of the defence received.

though the author, as will be seen by a perusal of his book, is not sparing of censure and is distinctly outspoken in his conclusions, yet he is capable of giving praise when he considers it to be due. indeed, it is a relief, amongst so much that is depressing, to read his opinion of generals smirnoff and kondratenko amongst others, and his whole-hearted championship of the stolid, dogged russian soldier who, weighed down by the incompetence of many above him, struggled through those weary months of defeat, privation, and suspense.

amongst much in this book which gives food for thought there are two or three matters described by the author which are truly extraordinary. for instance, it is difficult to believe that when, after so much threatening, the storm eventually burst and war broke out, port arthur—that outpost of the russian empire—was so far from being ready that on january 14, 1904, only eight guns of the allotted armament were mounted on the land defences. and yet there is official authority for this statement (see appendix ii.). it is also remarkable that even before the place was finally cut off by complete investment in july, 1904, the troops had to be put on short rations; this seems to have been caused by the subordination, even in war, of the military to other requirements. general fock's theory also upon fortress warfare (p. 227) is strangely at variance with the practice of his great countryman todleben, who defended sevastopol for 349 days, and his reasoning is difficult to follow. finally, the action of the senior officer of a beleaguered fortress, in disobeying and concealing the official messages which ordered his recall and appointed his successor, seems inconceivable.

undoubtedly, if a proper organization had existed upon the outbreak of hostilities instead of the inadequate product of a nation's false economy, port arthur might have held out for a considerably longer time than it did; but speculation upon the possible results of this is beyond the scope of this preface. without labouring the morals pointed by this siege, it is clear that policy should wait on military preparedness, that now as of old the internal jealousies within an army are as dangerous to it as the enemy, and that it is still the moral factor that counts most.

in the translation there has of necessity been some abridgement; but an endeavour has been made all through to convey the writer's meaning and, wherever possible, to use his exact words. the chief interest of the work for british readers seems to be in the picture presented of the general conduct of the defence and of the state of affairs in the fortress rather than in the more technical accounts of the actual fighting, which are very like each other. to those not engaged, the description of an attack on one point bears much resemblance to the descriptions of attacks on other points. it is with this feeling that the necessary curtailment has been made. some, also, of the author's picturesque writing, which would probably appeal less to the briton than it would to the slav, has been eliminated.

all military history must to a certain extent lose in interest for the non-professional reader from the continual occurrence of the names of small places which are only of importance to the military student, and which, even without necessitating a reference to the map, rather break the continuity of the narrative. this is especially so in the case of the recent war, where the majority of the localities referred to are obscure spots, possessing names of chinese origin which not only are very long and uncouth, but also have a confusing resemblance to each other. added to this, they have been as a rule spelled differently in every account or on every map. it has, therefore, been decided in this translation to give, wherever possible, the english equivalents of the russian instead of the chinese or japanese names of places, forts, or positions. they are shorter, convey more meaning to the british reader, and therefore so far tend to simplification. this has been thought to outweigh the disadvantages of the fact that they are comparatively unknown, for the chinese or japanese names have so far been almost exclusively used in england.

to this rule there are three exceptions. three localities at port arthur possess non-russian names, which are now almost historic in the english tongue, and for which it would be confusing and almost pedantic to use the russian equivalents. these are 203 metre hill, north fort chi-kuan-shan, and fort erh-lung-shan, which would not be recognized under their russian names of high hill,[3] fort no. 2, fort no. 3. for these three places the names already so well known have been used, except in appendix i. and the table of appendix iii.

as regards the accounts of the fighting and the numbers engaged, it must be borne in mind that the organization of both the russian and japanese infantry is different to that existing in the british army, and that where a regiment is mentioned in the text it means three battalions. thus a division of the east siberian rifles (as well as a japanese active division) consisted of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions each, or twelve battalions.

finally, a short description of the defences of port arthur will, perhaps, elucidate the author's narrative. at the outbreak of war the land defences of the fortress consisted of the following:

the chinese wall, which was a continuous earth rampart extending for some distance round the north of the place.

five principal permanent works of large size and great strength, arranged in a rough semicircle from sea to sea. of these, one, no. 5, was not finished at the outbreak of hostilities. another, no. 6, which was to have completed the girdle on the west, was not commenced. these works are called in the text 'forts.'

five subsidiary works in the intervals between the principal 'forts.' these were not of such strength as the latter, and were for the most part completed but not armed at the commencement of hostilities. they are called in the text 'fortifications.'

certain of the batteries on the land side, and a few auxiliary works—such as redoubts, etc.

after the outbreak of war the existing permanent and semi-permanent works were supplemented by a large number of batteries and closed infantry works, in some of which guns were emplaced. these were sited between the other works, or, in some cases, upon special points, and are called 'redoubts' and 'lunettes.' there were also a few open infantry works constructed for the special purpose of 'flanking' others, or for firing over ground in front of them not covered by their own fire. these are here called 'open caponiers,' and should not be confused with the masonry structures called 'caponiers,' placed at the bottom of the deep ditches of the larger works for the defence of those ditches.

round, between, and behind the forts, fortifications, redoubts, lunettes, etc., a maze of trenches grew up for fire, shelter, and communication, and numerous bomb-proofs, magazines, dressing stations, were also built. in front were wire entanglements, live electric wires, land mines—every obstacle that ingenuity could suggest.

to assist in identification a table has been prepared in which the russian and the other names (where available) of the localities mentioned are given. a chronological table of the principal events of the siege has been also added.

london, march, 1908.